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Abstract
This thesis has two main themes: (1) values shift versus cultural particularity and (2) values and 
democracy.  The Postmaterialist  thesis  and related theories of  values  shift  presented by Ronald 
Inglehart and others assume that, as a consequence of industrialisation and post-industrialisation, 
people's values transform in such a way as to increase an emphasis on self-esteem, self-expression 
and other qualities. Individuals become increasingly capable,  autonomous and inclined to public 
demands, which can be conducive to liberal democratic outcomes. In relation to these, the present 
study suggests that cultural particularity should be taken into consideration as a factor competing 
with that of values shift in terms of influence on people's attitudinal conditions. For individualism 
is  often quoted as a core element of  Western civilisation, which is not  necessarily so in other 
cultural scenarios. 
With this enquiry, the study mainly concentrates on the analysis of the World Values Survey. 
Postmaterialist indexes are closely investigated by comparing the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. 
The examination further incorporates broader regions: Western, Postcommunist  and East Asian 
regions. The results indicate a certain validity in the cultural effect. This is especially the case with 
a Postmaterialist values item on 'freedom of speech', which contrasts with other Postmaterialist 
item:  'giving  people  more  say  in  important  government  decisions'.  Their  implications  for 
democracy are  subsequently  considered.  These non-Western societies  appear  to  exhibit  certain 
weaknesses  in  the  Postmaterialist  transformation  and  its  attitudinal  efficacy  for  polyarchy-like 
democracy. 
The attention turns to gaps in perceptions of freedom between the USA, Russia and Japan, 
which could be applied to the trilateral regions. This national difference also seems to be present in 
the area of protest, notwithstanding the fact that there are some indications of values shift. Culture 
seems to matter on popular outlooks vis-à-vis the Postmaterialist effects. Multivariate analysis on 
this aspect endorses the same conclusion. The outcomes imply variation between the citizens of 
these societies in ways that they relate to government. The nations are compared with respect to the 
influences of liberal democratic attitudes on moderate protest and views of governance. After all, 
American (and probably British) individuals seem to be more compatible with public demands and 
participatory  democracy  than  those  in  Russia  and  Japan.  Western  cultural  emphasis  on  the 
particular quality of freedom could be favourable to Postmaterialist values as well as individual 
attitudes that call for responsive and accountable democracy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – Postmaterialist Values, Culture and Democracy
1.1 Introduction
The Postmaterialist thesis has endured for some decades and received a broad recognition. 
When it  is  placed  in  the context  of  non-Western  societies  as  well  as  implications  for 
democracy, nonetheless, there still  seems to be a further possibility of exploration. The 
Postmaterialist thesis was originally created to explain the changing orientation of popular 
values in economically advanced industrial societies and their attitudes and behaviours in 
relation to  democratic  governments.  The  concept  of  Postmaterialist  values  is  therefore 
initially  utilised  to  study  popular  orientations  in  established  democracies  that  are 
maintained for relatively long periods. Most of such democracies are located within the 
category of Western societies that share the West European tradition. For that reason, it 
seems that the extent of attention to non-Western regions has been considerably less for its 
analysis in comparison to Western democratic societies. 
The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories assume that industrialisation and post-
industrialisation are likely to have the effects of values transformations. Nonetheless, there 
is the possibility that the attitudinal patterns in relation to Postmaterialist and Materialist 
values are influenced by culturally particular factors especially in non-Western societies. 
Despite this, there do not seem to be sufficient approaches to consider such effects.  It is 
plausible  to  employ  the  view of  two  competing  factors:  the  values  shift  and  cultural 
particularity. On the other hand, when the issue of democracy is considered in the context 
of the Postmaterialist perspective, it seems that its implications have not been explored 
substantially. Do the distributional patterns of Postmaterialist and Materialist values affect 
democracy and democratisation, and how? When this is clarified, the binary effects of the 
values shift and cultural particularity will come to have significant meaning with respect to 
democracy. If the Postmaterialist values are conducive to some dimensions of democracy, 
and if there is the presence of the values shift, economic development could be understood 
as being conducive to democracy in that context. If,  however, the cultural particularity 
considerably influences the state of Postmaterialist-Materialist  values,  the conditions of 
democracy and democratisation could be interpreted to be rather specific to the locality of 
individual societies regardless of (or in addition to) economic conditions.
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As such, these are summarised into three issues: (1) how do Postmaterialist values 
shift  and  cultural  particularity  respectively  affect  the  condition  of  the  Postmaterialist-
Materialist  values  dimension,  (2)  what  implication  do  Postmaterialist  values  have  for 
democracy, and further (3) how do the values shift and cultural particularity matter to the 
state of democracy?  A major purpose of this thesis is to explore the three issues. And, 
particular attention is paid to the comparative analysis of four societies, Russia, Japan, the 
USA and Britain, and regional implications are further examined. The values of freedom 
and individual autonomy are often regarded as apt underpinnings for the function of liberal 
democracy. Postmaterialist values share considerable commonality with these values. Are 
they able to be attained through a universal process? Are they rather not – due to different 
cultural elements? These are the questions to be kept in mind throughout the thesis.
1.2 Review: Postmaterialist thesis and democracy
In view of the fact that the present research mainly refers to Inglehart's thesis, this section 
explicates his contribution to the study of democracy. It, first of all, reviews Inglehart's 
Postmaterialist  and other related theses. The second part  focuses on the Postmaterialist 
effect on political dimensions. The next part examines his studies particularly related to 
democracy while screening out what specific dimensions of democracy his perspective is 
concerned with. The point is further clarified with some critique and speculation on this 
perspective, which will be a basis for questions presented in following sections.
Briefly speaking, what is Inglehart's crucial contribution to the study of democracy 
and democratisation? After all, Inglehart's Postmaterialist thesis and the further evolved 
concepts of Inglehart's work are about the increasing awareness and concern of individuals 
(such  as  self-actualisation  and  self-esteem)  as  a  result  of  industrialisation  and  post-
industrialisation processes, which entail society's attainment of economic prosperity and its 
long-standing  maintenance  with  stability.  The  process  is  to  be  accompanied  by  an 
increasingly liberal outlook and distrust of authority among the people. It also increases 
individuals'  acquisition of social  and political  skills  and knowledge,  as well  as  critical 
capability,  due to the spread of economic and intellectual resources such as education. 
These  could  amount  to  popular  inclination  to  public  self-expression.  In  the  political 
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context,  in  my  view,  this  could  correspond  with  rising  awareness  of  governmental 
responsiveness among the populace. With this summary, let us start with the overview of 
Inglehart's thesis.
1.2.1 Thesis of values shift
In the Postmaterialist thesis, it is hypothesised that a process of intergenerational change is 
gradually  transforming  popular  values  in  advanced  industrial  societies.  According  to 
Inglehart, it is assumed that, as a consequence of economic development and its security in 
most industrialised nations, the experiences of younger generations in their formative years 
were  distinct  from those  of  older  generations,  which  resulted  in  the  rise  of  different 
outlooks.1 The economic growth and affluence satisfied people's basic needs for safety and 
sustenance and facilitated changes in popular values. Inglehart states: 
[T]he historically unprecedented degree of economic security experienced by 
the postwar generation in most industrial societies was leading to a gradual 
shift from "Materialist" values (emphasizing economic and physical security 
above all) toward "Postmaterialist" priorities (emphasizing self-expression and 
the quality of life).2
The concept of Postmaterialist values was initially presented as early as the 1970's. 
This  was  expounded  in  Inglehart's  early  book,  The  Silent  Revolution (1977),  being 
followed by series of studies on values shift. Although the Postmaterialist thesis attracted 
numerous debates and critiques, its essence has been maintained as central to Inglehart's 
work  for  decades  with  some  revisions  and  refinements.  The  thesis  has  survived  with 
accumulation of survey data, which has enabled the testing of the hypothesis and provided 
supportive evidence.  In  his  second book,  Culture  Shift  in  Advanced Industrial  Society 
(1990), there was a great deal of evolution. Whereas Inglehart suggests his intention to 
continuously study the Postmaterialist  transformation,  he points  out  that  this  is  only a 
1 Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in  
43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. Also, for the Postmaterialist thesis, see Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing 
Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 
1977).
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single dimension within a much larger trend of cultural transformation.3 He also notes the 
growth in the empirical scope and capability to explore the trends thanks to the substantial 
availability of time series data.4
An investigation has been presented in a more articulate manner by his third book, 
Modernization and Postmodernization (1997). He termed the broad trend of values shift 
'Postmodernization'. The idea is linked with the central claim of modernisation theory. It is 
argued, based on empirical evidence especially from the World Values Survey, that there 
are coherent cultural patterns that have close links with economic development. Inglehart 
argues that, in the course of economic development, cultural and political changes tend to 
occur, and their patterns are likely to be coherent and, to a certain degree, foreseeable.5 He 
points out that industrialisation has a certain tendency of giving rise to a sociocultural 
syndrome  in  a  society.  In  Inglehart's  terms,  'Modernization'  involves  industrialisation, 
bureaucratisation,  centralisation,  economic  development,  occupational  specialisation, 
rising educational level, urbanisation, belief and values that support high rates of economic 
growth and so forth. 'Postmodernization', on the other hand, involves rising emphasis on 
the  quality  of  life,  self-expression,  individual  freedom  and  autonomy.  It  also  is 
accompanied  by  growing suspicion  of  authority  and  declining  support  for  hierarchical 
social and political institutions.6 With this wider perspective, a Postmaterialist shift, though 
not necessarily regarded as the most important, is still seen as one component of the broad 
trend and remains a key indicator for its analysis.7 In fact, by recognising 'Modernization' 
and 'Postmodernization'  processes separately as a two-step trend in his terms, Inglehart 
seems  to  acknowledge  a  Postmaterialist  shift  within  the  latter  phase  of  the  trend, 
'Postmodernization'.
On the basis of these works,  Inglehart's  thesis of values shift  has been evolving. 
Conceptually,  the thesis has been extending the scope for more direct connection with 
democracy.8 Methodologically,  renewed  quantitative  techniques  have  been  constantly 
3 See Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), pp. 5-7.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
5 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 5.
6 For the detailed account of values change, 'Modernization' and 'Postmodernization', see ibid., pp. 5-107. 
7 Ibid. pp. 4-5, 78, 108.
8 For instance, see Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2005).
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added. Geographical areas covered by the World Values Survey, on which his analysis is 
based, have been widened, covering representative samples from most countries across the 
globe.9 This seems to have provided supportive outcomes for his thesis to propose a more 
generalised argument on values shift at a world-wide level. The details are discussed in 
later sections. 
1.2.2 Inglehart and democracy
What is his contribution to the study of democracy? When we look at Inglehart's academic 
contribution in terms of democracy, there are several key points to consider. One of the 
most relevant cases is a chapter in his book, Modernization and Postmodernization (1997). 
In this chapter, he explores correlations between several variables and three dimensions on 
the conditions of democracy: stability of democracy, level of democracy, and change of 
level of democracy. The main variables to be analysed were (1) well-being and trust, (2) 
social  structure  (i.e.  education,  occupation)  and  (3)  social  capital  (i.e.  organisational 
network and membership). Although there are numerous variations of the results due to the 
many combinations of the variables, he emphasises, and in fact the results indicate, that 
well-being  and  trust  as  variables  have  a  strong  correlation  with  those  conditions  of 
democracy.10 Furthermore, well-being and trust are the components of Postmodern values. 
Similarly, in following his works, Inglehart consistently argues that trust and subjective 
well-being are crucial factors that have a strong relationship with democracy.11
As  for  Postmaterialist  values,  Inglehart  claims  that  Postmaterialist  values  are 
conducive to democracy for three reasons:
(1) Postmaterialist values 'entail an emphasis on self-expression and participation that is 
inherently conducive to political participation... Postmaterialists are relatively likely to 
9 Inglehart and Welzel state that the survey data utilised is 'from eighty-one societies containing 85 percent 
of the world's population, collected from 1981 to 2001'. See ibid., p. 1.
10 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 160-215. As for the three measures, for stability of 
democracy, see ibid., note 1, p. 165. See ibid., 'appendix 3', p. 357.
11 For example, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Trust, well-being and democracy,' in Mark Warren ed., Democracy and 
Trust (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-120; Inglehart, Ronald and 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness', in Ed Diener and E. M. Suh eds., 
Subjective Well-being Across Cultures (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 165-183; Inglehart, 
'Globalization and Postmodern Values', pp. 215-228.
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act to attain democracy.'12
(2) 'Postmaterialists view democracy as something that is intrinsically desirable'.13
(3) 'Postmaterialists tend to hold a wide range of basic democratic norms'.14
In the course of the argument, he presents positive results in respect to the connection 
between Postmaterialist values and democracy. He argues that '[n]ations with relatively 
high  proportions  of  Postmaterialists  are  much  more  likely  to  have  had  continuously 
functioning  democratic  institutions  than  other  institutions'.15 Inglehart  assumes that  the 
values shift has an effect of increasing popular demands for more democratic institutions.16 
Although he admits that mass attitude is not a singular determinant for democratisation, he 
shows 'remarkably strong correlation between the ratio of Postmaterialists to Materialists 
and the existence of stable democracy (r = .71)'.17 
Inglehart further explains why nations with a relatively high ratio of the population 
in endorsing Postmaterialist values tend to be stable democracies, as follows:
(1) '[T]heir publics give relatively high priority to individual freedom and to democratic 
values'.18
(2) '[T]heir publics are relatively likely to engage in direct political action that can help 
bring a shift from authoritarian to democratic regimes.'19
In connection with these, Inglehart indicates that Postmaterialists have stronger inclination 
to undertake protest actions, such as joining boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations and 
12 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 210.
13 Ibid., p. 210.
14 Ibid., p. 210.
15 Ibid., p. 213. Inglehart points out that nations with strongly Materialist publics are likely to be either non-
democracies or recent democracies (with perhaps instability). 
16 Ibid., p. 213.
17 Ibid., p. 213. In this analysis, he admits that, when Postmaterialist values are entered into regression 
analyses that incorporate multiple variables such as interpersonal trust, subjective well-being, social 
structure and economy, there were 'positive but not significant linkages with stable democracy and high 
levels of democracy.' See ibid., p. 214. Nonetheless, Postmaterialist values are part of the syndrome 
involving these other values and therefore share qualitatively similar elements (and thus possibly the 
elements of statistical variance) with them. Postmaterialist values could have more influence than 
nominal output indicated in the regression analyses. See ibid., pp. 214-215.
18 Ibid., p. 214.
19 Ibid., p. 214.
6
so forth, than Materialists do. This relationship is present not only in Western societies but 
also in others such as Eastern Europe and East Asia, as observed in the World Values 
Survey.  According  to  Inglehart,  this  implies  that  the  emergence  and  spread  of 
Postmaterialist  values  increases  mass  inclination  to  elite-challenging  actions  such  as 
protest, which has been often regarded as unconventional political action. While stating 
that these unconventional political actions played an important role in the transitions to 
democracy across Eastern Europe as well as democratisation moves in East Asia and Latin 
America,  Inglehart  suggests  the  possibility  of  their  more  vital  role  in  non-democratic 
regimes than in the West. 
Aside  from  the  plausibility  of  factors  such  as  the  economy  and  other  elements 
motivating people to protest, and aside from economic and other effects on the collapse of 
the  regimes,  Inglehart  claims  the  possible  influence  of  Postmaterialist  values  in 
encouraging  the  people  to  esteem  free  speech  and  self-autonomy,  and  its  impact  on 
democratisation. Likewise, Inglehart argues that, with some findings, the younger, better-
educated and more Postmaterialist cohorts have been replacing the older, less-educated 
ones in the populations covered by the World Values Surveys (of 1981 and 1990).  In 
correspondence with this change, Inglehart points out the relative increase of inclination to 
elite-challenging behaviours (such as protest) and the comparative stagnation or decrease 
in likelihood of elite-controlled forms of participation (such as voting) among the mass 
publics throughout industrial societies.20
In similar terms, Inglehart's assumptions and findings that are related to democracy 
are things such as 'cognitive mobilisation' and individuals' increasing tendency to dislike 
authority in the Postmodern process. Overall points underlying these assumptions as well 
as his Postmodern/Postmaterialist thesis are that, as a result of industrialisation and post-
industrialisation  processes,  individuals  become  increasingly  capable,  autonomous  and 
critical of authority. In this process, individuals are assumed to shift and strengthen their 
concerns toward themselves individually while acquiring more capacity of social/political 
communication  and  protest  through  the  increasing  level  of  economic  and  intellectual 
resources among the masses. This image of strengthened individuals is possibly related to 
20 Ibid., pp. 211-213. As quoted by Inglehart, the connection of Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy with 
the inclination to protest actions is also demonstrated in Barnes, Samuel, and Max Kaase, Political  
Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).
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some essential factors for democracy such as 'public contestation', 'rights consciousness' 
and  so  forth.21 By  suggesting  the  presence  of  such  a  development,  nonetheless,  the 
emergence of Postmaterialist values is not necessarily the direct  determinant of regime 
changes toward democracy. Rather, Inglehart seems to argue that it is  conducive to such 
transformations in non-democratic nations, whereas in established democracies it gradually 
gives substance to  democracy.  Probably,  the democracy that  Inglehart  emphasises  is  a 
democracy that attaches strong importance to popular inclination to individuals 'speaking 
out'  their  wills  and  claims  with  awareness  of  freedom that  includes  self-esteem,  self-
expression, individual autonomy and so forth. Accordingly, on the side of institutions, the 
attention would be directed toward governmental responsiveness to their claims.
In relation to such issues, Inglehart's recent work attempts further development on 
studies of democracy using the World Values Survey, whereas the Postmaterialist index 
and its elaborated versions have become components of these analyses. For example, as 
noted before, in some of his works, the former Postmaterialist index is dealt with as one 
component  of  'survival  vs.  self-expression  values'.22 In  another  study,  the  measure  of 
Postmaterialist  values  is  examined  (along with  'survival  vs.  self-expression  values')  in 
terms of correlation with Freedom House ratings as a measure for the level of democracy. 
According to Inglehart, these variables have a somewhat higher correlation with the level 
of  democracy  than  indicators  of  regime  support  (such  as  an  'autocracy/democracy' 
measure) do.23 By this, he seems to suggest economic development and the subsequent rise 
of self-expression (and Postmaterialist)  values are  viable factors conducive to a higher 
level of democracy.
 In his article co-authored with Welzel and Klingemann, the four-item Postmaterialist 
index is developed into another slightly elaborated version called the 'liberty aspirations' 
variable.24 This version is integrated into the measure of 'emancipative values,' which is, in 
21 For public contestation, see Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971), pp. 1-16. For rights consciousness, see Gibson, James L., Raymond M. Duch, 
and Kent L. Tedin, 'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', The Journal of  
Politics 54: 2, (May 1992), pp. 329-371; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism and 
the Emerging Soviet Democracy', Political Research Quarterly, 47: 1 (1994), pp. 5-39.
22 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization; Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 'Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', American Sociological Review, 65 (February 
2000), pp. 19-51.
23 Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', PS 
(January 2003), pp. 51-57.
24 In this elaboration, from the first and second choices of four-item question, four-point index is created 
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a way, a reorganised version with some changes of components from the measure of the 
'survival vs. self-expression values' (and partly 'traditional vs. secular-rational values') in 
Inglehart's former studies.25 In this article, they attempt to integrate the linkage between 
socioeconomic development, emancipative values and levels of democracy. Their claim is 
that socioeconomic development provides individuals with objective resources that enable 
them to have autonomous choice, whereas the rise of 'emancipative values' enhances their 
subjective willingness for choice, and democratisation institutionally entitles them to their 
freedom for choice.26 In the process, there is also an 'impact on elite integrity', enhancing 
effective  democracy.27 By  employing  the  concept  of  'human  development',  while 
integrating  perspectives  of  modernisation  theories,  they  try  to  present  more  precise 
articulation  of  modernisation  processes  conducive  to  democratisation  with  universal 
implication.  Overall,  the  work  attempts  to  demonstrate  the  impact  of  economic 
development on democratisation.
 In another work by Inglehart and Welzel, the argument is maintained in consistency 
with the former studies while revising the measure of 'emancipative values' into that of 
'self-expression values' with slight modification of its components and their terminology.28 
As  one  of  its  components,  the  'liberty  aspirations'  measure  is  renamed as  'liberty  and 
participation' with the identical format (which is therefore the elaborated version of the 
Postmaterialist four-item index). The other components are: 'tolerance of diversity,' 'public 
assigning from 0 to 3 point. In comparison, the former Postmaterialist four-item index is made from the 
same settings of the question items into a three-point scale consisting of the categories of Postmaterialist, 
Mixed and Materialist types. For details, see Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,' European Journal of  
Political Research, 42 (2003), p. 341-379, esp. 354. This way of four-point (0-3) index is employed in 
other article as well with different name called 'liberty-participation' variable. See Inglehart, Ronald and 
Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' Comparative 
Politics, 36: 1 (October 2003), p. 65.
25 For comparison, see descriptions of the variables in ibid., p 354; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 24.
26 Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', p. 
341-379.
27 Ibid. As for measurements, in addition to the scale of 'emancipative values,' they employ Freedom House 
rating for 'formal democracy (the aspect of freedom rights),' and Transparency International scores for 
'elite integrity.' By simple mathematical manipulation of these two kinds of scores, they created the 
measure of 'effective democracy.' For the scale of 'individual resources,' they utilise Vanhanen's 'index of 
power resources'. For details, see ibid., pp. 353-358, 373-375.
28 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level 
Linkages,' Comparative Politics, 36: 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-79. For comparison, see Ibid., p. 65; 
Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis', p. 
354.
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self-expression  (using  variable  of  signing  petitions),'  'interpersonal  trust'  and  'life 
satisfaction.' These include the same elements as ones that Inglehart has respectively paid 
attention  to:  Postmaterialist-Materialist  dimension,  interpersonal  trust,  subjective  well-
being and (peaceful) protest. Moreover, in his former studies, he constantly regards them 
as crucial constituents of the values syndrome in the course of economic development (and 
'Postmodernisation' in his term) while claiming them to be conducive to democracy and 
democratisation. Another point to be noticed in this article is the naming of the 'liberty and 
participation'  variable  (as an elaborated version of the four-item Postmaterialist  index). 
Here,  Inglehart  seems to  be aware that  'free speech'  and 'more say'  items in  the  scale 
correspond with 'liberty' and 'participation' accordingly.
In a  similar  direction,  Inglehart's  recent  academic interest  has been paying direct 
attention to the matter of democracy, often in collaboration with Welzel. For instance, in 
one of their works, they emphasise the impact of economic development on the emergence 
of pro-democratic political culture, which in turn facilitates the emergence and stability of 
democracy  as  an  institution.  With  multivariate  analyses,  they  suggest  that  the  pro-
democratic  culture  (that  is,  self-expression  values)  matters  in  shaping  democratic 
institutions  far  more  than  being  shaped  by  it.29 As  a  consequence  of  their  research, 
Modernization,  Cultural  Change,  and  Democracy (2005)  presents  a  comprehensive 
treatment  of  issues  on  values  and  democracy.  Thus,  Inglehart's  works  have  provided 
significant  contributions  to  the  studies  of  democracy.  Accordingly,  the  four-item 
Postmaterialist index has played a crucial part for these studies.
1.2.3 Individualism?
Nonetheless, these works seem to be based on an underlying view that has a very strong 
stress  on,  and  esteem  for,  freedom  and  the  individual  as  exclusively  essential  in  his 
definition of democracy. In that sense, 'democracy' in these works might have a specific 
connotation that places a high regard on the values of individual liberty. In fact, in the 
course  of  his  argument  on  self-expression  values  as  a  central  pro-democratic  attitude, 
Inglehart relates the values to individualism.30 For the matter of democracy, one of the 
29 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Howard J. Wiarda eds., 
New Directions in Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164.
30 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 6, pp. 135-145.
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main measurements employed in his works is the Freedom House rating, which evaluates 
two dimensions of societies:  civil  liberty and political  rights.  Whereas these are major 
facets of democracy in a general sense, the evaluation of the rating is mainly concerned 
with the extent of freedom. In that sense, the 'democracy' that is presupposed in his works 
(and probably the  Freedom House rating)  is  something close to  'liberal  democracy'  or 
'democracy with strong emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom.'31
Incidentally, 'liberal democracy' or 'democracy that puts strong emphasis on liberty' 
coincides  with  the  general  idea  or  critically  conceived  model  of  so-called  'Western 
democracy'. Although this concept is vague and neither clearly defined nor accepted with 
academic precision, it may well be said that democratic societies in the Western tradition 
tend  to  hold  prevailing  values  that  attach  importance  to  a  sense  of  liberty  and 
individualism. At least, their emphasis seems to be generally stronger than in societies of 
other regions.  As pointed out by some scholars  especially from non-Western contexts, 
individual freedom is not necessarily as highly appreciated in some non-Western traditions 
as in  Western culture.  For  example,  Bell  and Jayasuriya argue that,  although the high 
esteem of freedom such as individual autonomy is the core element of values in Western 
civilisation, it is not necessarily a universal phenomenon. In relation to this, they question 
the immediate application of the universality of liberal democracy that is predominant and 
possibly unique in the Western region.32 In similar terms, as for liberal democracy, Parekh 
argues  for  the  'cultural  particularity  of  liberal  democracy'  in  the  West.33 Thus,  strong 
emphasis on and sensitivity to freedom constitute one of the central features of Western 
societies.34
31 For the details on the Freedom House measurement, see http://freedomhouse.org.
32 Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel 
A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in 
Pacific Asia (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.
33 Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in David Held ed., Prospect for 
Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-175. In addition, on 
liberal democracy and individual, Parekh argues that liberalism is the premise and foundation of liberal 
democracy, and that 'liberalism takes the individual as the ultimate and irreducible unit of society' while 
stating that individualism 'lies at the heart of liberal thought'.
34 For example, see Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 71-72. For quantitative comparison in relation to 
individualism, see Hofstede, Geert, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions,  
and Organizations across Nations, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001), esp. pp. 
209-278. Lipset argues the American people's salient inclination to individualism, while those in other 
Western societies (to a less extent) hold similar penchant being compared with those in some non-
Western zones. See Lipset, S. M., American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (London/New 
11
To be fair,  the excessive invalidation of  liberal  democracy  per se does not  have 
plausibility.  In  fact,  the  institutional  arrangement  of  liberal  democracy  has  provided  a 
strongly viable and perhaps the sole  model that systematically  secures civil  rights  and 
freedom against  the  coercion of  authoritarian rules.  Hague and Harrop  mention  that  a 
major character of liberal democracy is the protection of individual liberty and rights by 
the  law,  such  as  constitutional  arrangements,  that  limits  the  exercise  of  the  power  by 
government over individuals.35 Nonetheless, when it comes to the realm of 'values', it is 
still possible to acknowledge societies where cultural or traditional particularity exists in a 
manner that is somewhat obstructive to liberal views. 
In the case of Japan, for instance, although there seems to have been an increase of 
liberal  outlooks,  still  the  cultural  penchant  strongly  appears  to  deter  the  fully-fledged 
spread of liberal and individual values in comparison with the West. According to the 
World Values Survey in 1995, the proportion of respondents who chose 'freedom' rather 
than  'order'  is  higher  in  younger  age  cohorts,  implying  its  potential  rise  through 
generational shift. However, the overall level per se is unequivocally lower than that of the 
USA and Russia. Institutionally, Japan holds highly liberal democratic arrangements and 
receives high scores on the Freedom House ratings comparable to Western democratic 
societies. Nonetheless, the formal arrangement does not necessarily indicate the people's 
actual  orientation  to  freedom and  their  informal  capacity  that  underpins  liberal  social 
practice. Maruyama's critical account of Japanese political  culture includes the people's 
weakness of individuality,  which has a persistent  penchant to be submerged under the 
authority of holistic as well as hierarchical social contexts.36 Lipset argues for a Japanese 
proclivity in clear contrast with the American one. He argues that the Japanese tradition is 
prone  to  collective  norms  such  as  deference,  obligation,  consensus  and  hierarchy  in 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996). Pye argues, for instance, paternalistic authority in the context of 
Asian values, which has contrast with the emphasis of individual autonomy prevalent in Western culture. 
See Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority 
(Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985).
35 Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 6th ed., 
(Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 35-50. For comprehensive account of 
liberal democracy and democracy in general, see Held, David, Models of Democracy, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Polity), 1996.
36 Maruyama, Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour of Modern 
Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964). For the English translations of his selected 
monographs, see Maruyama, Masao (Morris, Ivan ed.), Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese 
Politics (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
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interpersonal  relations,  whereas  American  culture  tends  to  emphasise  freedom,  self-
autonomy, egalitarian values based on free-standing and right-asserting individuals, and 
competitiveness  on  fair  ground.37 Japanese  heritage  seems  to  be  less  compatible  with 
elements  conducive  to  liberal  democratic  practice.  In  particular,  the  trait  would  be 
disadvantageous  to  individual  participation,  free  speech  and  public  discussion.  That 
virtually constitutes the peculiarity of the Japanese situation on values, which suggests the 
considerable influence of historically inherited characteristics.
Even so,  it  may well  be  noted that  Inglehart's  approach still  possesses  a  certain 
validity and strength as a criterion. Above all, the clarity of its theory and empirical tools 
are  considerably  useful  for  cross-national  comparison.  The  relevant  employment  of 
conceptual standards and measurements produces workable and meaningful comparative 
analyses.38 In this sense, Inglehart's arrangement possesses qualities that reasonably meet 
such conditions. The central claim of his thesis is relatively straightforward. Its theoretical 
background is systematically articulated. These features allow researchers to make focused 
and lucid reference to hypotheses and theories in relation to empirical studies. Moreover, 
the Postmaterialist index and related scales hold clearly defined items of values, which 
enables actual tests to be performed on relatively common ground. As long as a view of 
subjective bias is avoided, his model would secure a legitimate position as an analytical 
device. For this, it is crucial to be aware of what normative potential may be involved in 
the notional model. 
37 Lipset, American Exceptionalism, ch. 7, pp. 211-263. Also, see 'Appendix: Individualism and Group 
Obligation', pp. 293-296.
38 For comparative method, see for instance, Mackie, Tom and David Marsh, 'The Comparative Method', in 
Marsh, David and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1995), ch. 9, pp. 173-188; Hague and Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, ch. 5, pp. 69-
85; Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 58-79; Kohno, Masaru, 'Hikaku-seiji-gaku no Hoho-
ron [Methods of Comparative Politics]', in Masaru Kohno and Masahiro Iwasaki, eds., Akusesu Hikaku-
seiji-gaku [Access to Comparative Politics] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha, 2002), pp. 1-16. For the 
issue of measurement, see King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry:  
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 150-
168; Peters, B. Guy, Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 
1998), pp. 80-108; de Vaus, David, Research Design in Social Science Research (London/Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 29-32.
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1.3 Values shift versus cultural particularity
This section, first  of all,  raises a question of culture  vis-à-vis the view of values shift. 
Subsequently, the discussion is focused on the cultural effect on the Postmaterialist index. 
Also,  a  primary  perspective  for  analyses  on  the  competing  efficacies  of  economic 
development and cultural particularity is mentioned.
1.3.1 Question of culture 
As  reviewed  so  far,  the  central  claim  of  the  values  shift  thesis  is  that  economic 
development  or  industrialisation  and post-industrialisation  processes  nurture  conditions 
favourable to democracy. Especially, according to Inglehart's perspective, the conditions 
would emerge in the realm of values as a pro-democratic political culture. Nonetheless, 
there is one question. Is the state of the values not due to inherited cultures or historical 
contexts that have already been present specifically in a given society? Even if there is the 
evidence of values shift, is it not possible that the directions of the transformations are 
affected by cultural and historical divergence?
The USA, Britain and the West
The USA and Great Britain hold democratic institutions and are often cited as having 
democratic norms and practices as their cultures.39 In Almond and Verba's classic work, 
Civic Culture (1963), American and British citizens' orientations were depicted as closer to 
an ideal of participatory democracy.40 It  was published more than a decade before  The 
Silent  Revolution (1977)  explicated  the  emerging  Postmaterialist  shift.  Tocqueville's 
observations on democratic culture in America were presented as early as in nineteenth 
century.41 Democratic systems in both of the countries were established and nurtured long 
before the burgeoning of Postmaterialist values.42 Thus, their democratic arrangements and 
39 For comprehensive empirical studies on British political culture, see Miller, William L., ed., Alternatives 
to Freedom: Arguments and Opinions (London/New York: Longman Group, 1995); Miller, William L., 
Annis May Timpson, and Michael Lessnoff, Political Culture in Contemporary Britain: People and 
Politicians, Principles and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1996).
40 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). Also, for an attempt of its re-examination, see 
Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
41 Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America (London: Fontana Press, 1994 [1837]).
42 Inglehart describes that Postmaterialist shift occurred after the World War II. See Inglehart, 
Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 4.
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customs preceded the values  shift.  This implies  that  the presence  of  their  traditions  is 
independent, not the consequence of the Postmaterialist transformation.
Democratic practices could be their embedded heritages. The populace, for example, 
attaches an exceptional importance to democratic accountability. In Britain, there are very 
frequent occasions where the Prime Minister and ministers answer questions as regards 
governmental policies such as a regular arrangement of 'Question Time'.43 For Western 
Europe as a whole, the European Union seems to have a considerable concern for the state 
of public opinion.44 The Eurobarometer survey has been routinely conducted to observe the 
postures of popular outlooks on behalf of the European Commission.45 In February 2006, 
the Commission adopted a 'White Paper on a European Communication Policy'.46 There 
are comprehensive attempts to encourage the people to directly express their views by such 
methods  as  consultations,  discussions  and  other  communicative  means  through  the 
internet.47 These would be concerned with promoting public legitimacy of the European 
Union. The attempts correspond with a tendency that West European people (and elites) 
have critical awareness of governmental responsiveness as a prime source of legitimacy. 
For the World Values Survey, there is an indication that in Western Europe 'democracy' is 
understood in the sense of public accountability, whereas in others such as Postcommunist 
societies it is not necessarily so.48 
As for liberal or individual oriented outlooks, the USA, Britain and most Western 
societies  have  a  stronger  inherited  attachment  than  societies  in  non-Western  contexts. 
43 Jones, Bill, Dennis Kavanagh, Michael Moran, and Philip Norton, Politics UK, 4th ed. (London/New 
York: Pearson Education, 2001), pp. 358-359.
44 The current policy initiatives of the European Union mainly stem from West European nations. 
Therefore, it would be plausible that a normative basis for its direction is likely to reflect values prevalent 
in Western Europe. Due to this, the policies of the European Union are presented as examples to 
demonstrate West European cultural orientation.
45 For Eurobarmeter survey series, see ESDS International, Economic and Social Data Service 
[http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/access/eurobarometer.asp]; GESIS (German Social Science 
Infrastructure Service) [http://www.gesis.org/en/data%5Fservice/eurobarometer/].
46 For the White Paper, see [http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/doc/white_paper_en.pdf]. 
Other related documents are: 'The Commission's contribution to the period of reflection and beyond: 
Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate'; 'Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the 
Commission'. See [http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_paper/index_en.htm].
47 For instance, see 'Your Voice in Europe' [http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index.htm]; 'Debate Europe' 
[http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm].
48 West European societies tend to have negative significant correlation between two question items asking 
whether respondents have positive or negative attitudes towards (1) 'having a democratic political system' 
and (2) 'having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the 
country'. For these, Postcommunist opinions tend to have not significant (and in some cases positive) 
correlation on this.
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There has been a liberal tradition in Great Britain.49 American political culture possesses an 
even stronger orientation to freedom and individualism.50 As mentioned above, the esteem 
for  liberty  and  individual  autonomy is  a  core  element  of  Western  heritage.  Likewise, 
Inglehart's values map indicates that Western societies share close locations, constituting a 
cluster  almost  distinct  from  other  cultural  zones;  especially,  for  one  of  its  axes:  the 
'survival vs. self-expression' scale, the Western cases concentrate noticeably higher scores 
among societies across the world.51 Moreover, similar groupings are found in Inglehart's 
variables such as trust, well-being and so forth.52 Considering the fact that these scales 
have a clear correlation with the Freedom House rating, liberal democratic attitudes would 
distinctively characterise the populace in the contemporary West.53
Thus, there seems to be cultural coherence among Western societies, which is highly 
compatible with liberal democratic attitudes. The features of this cultural zone overlap with 
the  Postmaterialist  and  self-expression  values.  This  raises  one  problem.  In  Inglehart's 
thesis, these attitudes are supposed to be the outcomes of the values shift. Nonetheless, 
there may be a potential that the attributes are due to cultural heritage rather than results of 
the values change.
Japan and East Asia
Japan  is  a  case  that  has  attained  an  economically  comparable  level  to  many  Western 
societies while holding the experience of a long-standing democratic system for more than 
fifty  years.  On the  other  hand,  Japan is  often  regarded  as  having  culturally  particular 
values, and there are studies on its cultural aspect.54 This provides a rationale to incorporate 
49 Jones, Kavanagh, Moran and Norton, Politics UK, pp. 79-87.
50 Lipset, American Exceptionalism.
51 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 92-100; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization,  
Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 48-76, esp. 63.
52 For example, see Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', pp. 89-91; Inglehart, 'Globalization and Postmodern 
Values'; Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'; Inglehart and Welzel, 
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 70-72, 139-144.
53 For the correlations, see for instance, Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', p. 149; 
Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', p. 54.
54 For Japanese political culture, see for instance, Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo [Thought and 
Behaviour of Modern Politics]; Pye with Pye, Asian Power and Politics, ch. 6, pp. 158-181. For in-depth 
analyses of Japanese culture, Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese 
Culture (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947).
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Japan for comparison with the Western societies.55 In particular, such a comparison allows 
one to detect the extent of cultural influence over the conditions of values. For instance, the 
length  of  maintaining  the  economic  security  in  Japan  should  enable  one  to  expect  a 
widespread  Postmaterialist  values  shift  equivalent  to  Western  democratic  societies. 
Nonetheless,  the  Postmaterialist  tendency among the  Japanese  public  seems to  have  a 
certain  weakness.  As  depicted  in  later  chapters,  there  is  a  lower  degree  of  individual 
inclination  to  public  discussion,  free  speech  and contestation.  This  runs  counter  to  an 
account  that  industrialisation  and  post-industrialisation  universally  cause  the  values 
transformation. There seem to be cultural factors that have been affecting the status quo.
Also, Japan is a part of East Asia and shares traditions with societies in this region. 
Pye sees Japanese political culture in the context of (East) Asian values.56 As presented 
later in this research, there seem to be comparatively homogeneous perceptions of freedom 
and  order  among  East  Asian  public  opinions.  Likewise,  Inglehart's  values  map 
demonstrates  that  these  societies  hold  analogous  positions  constituting  a  group.57 East 
Asian societies are often claimed to have provided examples of democratisation models.58 
For instance, while leaving aside political changes towards democracy, the countries give 
first priority to the pursuit of guided industrialisation and economic development under the 
auspices of authoritarian regimes. Democratic changes are expected (albeit not necessarily 
certain) to take place gradually after the attainment of economic security and affluence.59 
Moreover,  the viability  of  the  'economic  first'  model  in  East  Asia  implies the popular 
orientation towards Materialist rather than Postmaterialist values. One of major conditions 
55 Ike made a remark similar to this rationale. See Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational 
Change in Japan', American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), p. 1195.
56 Pye with Pye, Asian Power and Politics, pp. 1-89, 158-181, 283-346.
57 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 92-98; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization,  
Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 48-76, esp. 63.
58 For studies on democracy in East Asia, see Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner ed., Democracy in East  
Asia (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Huntington also mentions an East Asian 
model. See Huntington, Samuel, 'Democracy's Third Wave', in L. Diamond et al., eds., The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 3-25; 
Huntington, Samuel P., 'Democracy For The Long Haul', Journal of Democracy, 7: 2 (1996), pp. 3-13. 
Inoguchi presents an overview of comparative studies of East Asian politics. See Inoguchi, Takashi, 
Seiji-gaku no Mechie [The Métier of A Political Scientist] (Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo, 1996), ch. 6, pp. 93-
120.
59 Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then (Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East 
Asian Model', in Democracy and Democratization: Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective 
(London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 255-268.
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that  enable  East  Asian  countries  to  take  such  a  model  is  probably  that  their  cultural 
orientations would not persistently motivate the expansion of liberal and political rights as 
in  the  West.  Liberal  democratic  causes  may  have  much  less  appeal  than  economic 
growth.60 Such  a  pragmatic  orientation  is  comparable  to  Materialist  values,  since 
Materialist orientation is to give priority to economic and social security over public self-
expression and political participation. In contrast, the degree of importance that Westerners 
attach to democratic priorities seems much higher. The distribution of values in East Asia 
could be due to cultural difference rather than the state of values shift, which potentially 
affects the output of Postmaterialist-Materialist index.61 
Russia and Postcommunist societies
Russia is another example for cultural variation, which is generally considered to have a 
distinct  outlook  from  the  standard  of  the  contemporary  West.  There  is  a  prevalent 
perspective  that  historically  Russia  has  held  to  a  tradition  in  which  the  people  are 
supportive of a strong leader or authority that ensures the order of society.62 The people 
have  peculiar  or  complex  attitudes  on  the  matter  of  order  and  freedom,  at  least  in 
comparison to Westerners' perceptions.63 Before its transition from the communist regime, 
there had been a Soviet legacy that 'the authorities were above the law'.64 For some of 
Inglehart's  variables,  Russian  public  opinion  has  a  strong  skew  towards  an  opposite 
direction to one that Western opinions normally take. The Russian average is located in the 
realm of the survival values, whereas the great majority of Western societies are around the 
self-expression  values.65 The  rating  of  subjective  well-being  is  exceptionally  low  for 
60 Heywood, Andrew, Politics (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), pp. 34-35.
61 Nonetheless, it is not to negate the validity of economic modernisation effect on democratic changes, but 
to raise the point that cultural particularity also matters. The East Asian 'economic first' model in fact 
suggests both its cultural particularity and the emergence of conditions favourable to democracy due to 
economic development.
62 White, Stephen, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).
63 For the issue of order and freedom, see Gibson, James L., 'The Struggle between Order and Liberty in 
Contemporary Russian Political Culture,' Australian Journal of Political Science, 32: 2 (1997), pp. 271-
290; Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions between Democracy and Order among 
Russian Citizens,' Studies in Public Policy, 352 (2001).
64 Bacon, Edwin with Matthew Wyman, Contemporary Russia (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 112.
65 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 92; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural 
Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural  
Change, and Democracy, p. 63.
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Russia, whereby the score drastically decreased from 1981 to 1995.66 In political terms, the 
country has been 'consolidating' the extraordinary concentration of power to the presidency 
with popular support.67 This in fact corresponds with the above mentioned view of Russian 
political  culture,  which  in  turn  presents  a  deviant  scenario  from  Western  democratic 
contexts.
Aside from the salient Russian character,  Postcommunist  societies tend to cluster 
together  in  attitudinal  orientations  around  Russia.  Inglehart's  values  map  shows  a 
distinctively  Postcommunist  area.68 Multiple  types  of  his  variables  are  apt  to  exhibit 
emphatically  Postcommunist  proclivities  for  these  societies'  outputs,  which  are  often 
opposite  to  Western  responses.69 There  seem to  be  culturally  or  historically  particular 
elements,  which  have  driven  them  to  have  such  distinctly  'Postcommunist'  or  East 
European  attributes.  In  one  way,  in  the  last  century  these  societies  had  achieved  and 
maintained a certain economic level. Under former communist regimes, social welfare was 
relatively equally provided to the people, so that at least physical and social security was 
secured to some degree for a relatively long period. In Inglehart's terms, 'physiological 
needs' were met to the extent that can diminish scarcity. Moreover, educational standards 
of these societies are at high levels for the world average.70 With this, if the Postmaterialist 
hypothesis is applied, an indication of the values shift should be expected. Even if the 
impact of regime transition is considered as an intervening factor, there should be a sign 
for  it,  since  the  majority  of  the  population  had spent  their  formative  years  before  the 
transitions.71 In reality, nonetheless, the Postcommunist societies hold much less support 
66 Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'.
67 White, Stephen, Russia's New Politics: the Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3, pp. 70-106; Willerton, John P., 'Putin and the Hegemonic 
Presidency', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., Developments in Russian Politics 6  
(Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 2, pp. 18-39; Waller, Michael, Russian Politics 
Today: The Return of A Tradition (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 23-
47. 
68 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, p. 92; Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural 
Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural  
Change, and Democracy, p. 63.
69 Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', pp. 89-91; Inglehart, 'Globalization and Postmodern Values'; 
Inglehart and Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness'; Inglehart and Welzel, 
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 70-72, 139-144.
70 It should be noted that education is an important element in relation to the values transformation and 
Postmaterialist outlooks, since widespread rising level of education in a society is one of the crucial 
characters in post-industrial society. For a related diagram, see Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 5; 
Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, p. 6.
71 According to the Postmaterialist theory, experiences during a juvenile period affect the formation of basic 
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for Postmaterialist values than the West. They are rather oriented to Materialist values. 
This denotes the importance of paying attention to cultural and historical factors, which 
could not be explained simply by the Postmaterialist hypothesis.
In fact, the people in ex-communist societies have historically gone through different 
circumstances.  Before  their  transitions,  many of  them had not  experienced a  capitalist 
system.72 The people's freedom (especially of speech) was restricted. Many of them did not 
have formalised systems of representative democracy comparable to Western counterparts, 
though  the  authorities  regarded  the  regimes  as  democratic  centralism.  There  was 
communist  ideology  that  was  dominantly  shared  as  an  official  view.  There  were 
governmental controls that permeated politics, economy and the people's daily lives.73 The 
people  developed  views  and  behaviours  to  adapt  to  the  circumstances.  As  for  East 
European  attributes,  they  have  not  directly  gone  through  much  of  the  significant 
experience in West European history (with the exception of societies contiguous to the 
borders).74 The  collapse  of  the  former  regimes  also  has  had  serious  impacts  on  the 
particular state of their outlooks.75 There are numerous reasons to assume the presence of 
cultural and historical factors that affect the popular values, which could be observed even 
within Postmaterialist-Materialist categories. 
Consequently,  the  cases  of  Japan  and  Russia  present  qualitatively  different 
characteristics from the USA and Britain, which could not be explicated simply by the 
values  shift.  Accordingly,  these  societies  respectively  hold  cultural  traits  of  their  own 
regional commonalities:  the USA and Britain for the Western tradition, Japan for East 
Asian values, and Russia for Postcommunist and East European attributes. Cultural and 
historical heritage matters for the conditions of values and their rationales. This raises the 
necessity of an additional perspective in relation to the distribution of Inglehart's values 
dimensions, including the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. 
outlooks, which maintain a certain durability thereafter.
72 In relation to this, for example, Nodia argues that communist modernisation is different in that 
communism abolished the institution of private property and seriously influenced individual attitudes. See 
Nodia, Ghia, 'How different are Postcommunist Transitions?,' in Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, 
eds., Democracy after Communism (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 3-17.
73 In relation to this, for the concepts of 'totalitarian' and 'post-totalitarian' regimes, see Linz, J. and A. 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996).
74 For the historical account of East European societies, for instance, see Kido, Shigeru, and Takayuki Ito, 
eds., To-o Gendai-shi [Modern History of Eastern Europe] (Tokyo: Yuhi-kaku, 1987).
75 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 38.
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1.3.2 Values shift and cultural particularity
It would be reasonable to employ the view of two competing elements: the values shift and 
cultural particularity. The Postmaterialist thesis and related theories of values shift support 
the  perspective  that  values  orientations  are  likely  to  change  through  the  process  of 
industrialisation  and  post-industrialisation.  Nonetheless,  inherited  cultures  probably 
influence the directions. In fact, Inglehart and Welzel notice that both of the effects affect 
the state of people's outlooks, so that the conditions of values are 'path-dependent' over 
time.76 Likewise, Inglehart and Baker  present cultural divergence as a crucial factor on 
attitudinal postures while recognising the effect of economic development.77 Girvin notes 
that, in the face of trends conducive to changes, inherited political cultures still persist. 
They  might  assimilate  the  changes,  but  the  core  values  of  the  heritages  have  steady 
continuity.78 Similarly, Dalton points out that Inglehart's relatively recent work has become 
more sensitive to cultural and local variation.79 Thus, the Postmaterialist index seems to 
need  an  amended  interpretation.  The figure  1.1  presents  its  basic  perspective.  It 
incorporates both views of values change and cultural variance for the translation of the 
Postmaterialist scale.
76 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 1, pp. 15-
47.
77 For instance, see Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional 
Values'; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington 
eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.
78 Girvin, Brian, 'Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture', in J. R. Gibbins ed., 
Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age (London: Sage Publications, 1989), pp. 
31-51.
79 Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the 
United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 
1988), p. 109.
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Figure 1.1 Values shift and cultural particularity
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1.3.3 The selection of cases
This part deals with the related issue of case selection. Especially, reasons for choosing the 
USA, Britain, Russia and Japan, in conjunction with three regional groups, are considered. 
Why  are  the  cases  restricted  to  only  four  nations?  In  methodological  terms,  this 
arrangement  would  be  categorised  as  a  focused  comparison  or  'small-N'  analysis.80 
Although limiting the number of cases may have some restrictions, there is an advantage in 
that the fewer cases we investigate, the more details we can examine.81 In fact, including 
more than these nations could result in a superficial description of each case. Although it 
might be possible to conduct the detailed examination of a larger number of cases, it could 
make the analysis and its presentation unduly complex. In addition, the disadvantage of the 
'small-N' analysis is compensated by incorporating the analysis of national figures from the 
three  wider  regions  (that  is,  Western,  Postcommunist  and  East  Asian  regions),  which 
includes elements of a 'large-N' analysis.82
But why do the cases specifically have to be these four countries? With respect to the 
USA and Britain, first of all, they are typically applicable to the overall assumptions of the 
Postmaterialist  thesis,  and  therefore  can  be  regarded  as  exemplars,  based  on  which 
comparison could be conducted with other types of countries. This could be the case with a 
wider group of Western societies, since the Postmaterialist hypothesis has been mainly 
examined  on  this  range  of  societies  with  relatively  supportive  outcomes.  Although 
comparative examination is able to illuminate the attributes of respective cases in relative 
terms, employing cases that tend to conform to a hypothesis (thus, basic examples) would 
enhance the efficacy of comparison. In the context of democracy, similarly, the USA and 
Britain could be taken as  representatives of Western liberal  democratic  nations,  which 
would be able to play the roles of standard models in comparison with non-Western cases. 
Moreover, in Verba and Alomond's  Civic Culture, the USA and  Britain were chosen as 
examples  of  stable  democracy.83 Since  our  research  would  be  categorised  within  the 
80 See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, pp. 74-77; Hague and 
Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, ch. 5, pp. 80-83.
81 For the issue on the number of cases, see Peters, Comparative Politics, pp. 58-79.
82 Also, statistical analyses of survey data conducted in this research has the quality of  'large-N' analysis. 
For the problems of 'small-N' analysis, see King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 119-
122, 126, 144-146, 196-197, 204-206, 208-230; Peters, Comparative Politics, pp. 61-74.
83 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Also see, Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research 
Methods in Politics, p. 66.
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political  culture approach, it  would be of use to employ similar settings to this classic 
work. With such standard examples which have consistency with the theories, it is a viable 
method  to  present  contrasting  cases  that  possibly  raise  questions  about  the  theories. 
Presenting atypical cases as evidence is one of the effective methods of questioning the 
validity of a given theory. The Japanese and Russian cases could be employed with this 
reasoning,  since  they  may  directly  counter  the  main  rationale  of  values  shift  and 
Postmaterialist thesis. On the other hand, this setting could present the element of a 'most 
different' design in comparative methods.84 If there is a common tendency that corresponds 
to  the  Postmaterialist  hypothesis  among  these  cases  despite  their  obvious  cultural 
difference,  it  could  suggest  possible  validity  in  a  certain  aspect  of  the  Postmaterialist 
thesis.
Our study assumes that, for some attributes, the four societies have continuities with 
wider groups of societies: the USA and Britain with the Western societies, Russia with 
Postcommunist societies, and Japan with East Asian societies. As mentioned above, there 
are indications that there is cultural coherency within each of the groups. In this context, 
the cast studies of the four nations would be able, within a certain limitation, to illuminate 
analogous differentiations of characters between these larger groups. With this framework 
of case selection, let us expand the central rationale of the comparison. 
The trilateral difference in the analytical settings of the four societies and the three 
regions  can have  direct  relevance  to  the  evaluation  of  Postmaterialist  and  values  shift 
discourses. One major issue is a gap in the perception of freedom.  The Postmaterialist 
discourse  presumes  that,  after  economic  development  fulfils  the  material  needs  of  the 
people,  their  values  orientation  is  likely  to  transform in  a  manner  to  emphasise self-
actualisation needs.85 Along with further-elaborated values shift  theories,  it  is generally 
hypothesised that the individual increasingly acquires self-oriented values, an inclination to 
public expression, a critical stance towards authority, proactive participatory attitudes, and 
intellectual and political skills and resources.86 In one aspect, this may be interpreted as the 
growth  of  individualism.  Nonetheless,  societies  where  such a  values  orientation  is 
84 For the 'most different' design (and a 'most similar' design), see ibid., pp. 62-66; Hague and Harrop, 
Comparative Government and Politics, pp. 82-83; Peters, Comparative Politics, pp. 37-41.
85 See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution.
86 Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society; Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization; 
Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
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flourishing  are  mainly  ones  with  Western  traditions.  As mentioned earlier,  there  is  an 
inherited cultural emphasis on the freedom of individuals in these societies. This could be 
advantageous to the spread of Postmaterialist and related values. Thus, traditional culture 
could  be  functioning  as  an  intervening  factor  (as  an  enhancer  for  this  case).  On  the 
contrary, there could be other cultural scenarios that have opposite effects, especially if the 
normative  worth  of  individual  liberty  is  de-emphasised  by  historical  or  cultural 
backgrounds. The cohorts of Postcommunist nations and East Asian nations respectively 
present such cases with particular coherency. Some of their  elements can systematically 
run counter to Postmaterialist shift at least in the realm of freedom. 
In  East  Asia,  there  is  the  cultural  presence  of  a  conformist  orientation,  which 
virtually  discourages  the  presence  of  autonomous  free-standing  individuals.87 Higher 
priority is likely to be placed on the holistic interests of community, society or state rather 
than personal  ones.  Culturally,  a  border  between self  and others  is  more  ambiguously 
perceived  than  in  Western  perspective.  There  is  a  strong sense  of  social  ties  between 
individuals. The people are likely to find a sense of security and well-being by being a part 
of larger social contexts. Paternalism and familism can often be accepted as viable societal 
norms that provide benevolent elements and legitimate rationales to collective behaviour.88 
Thus,  their  embedded  culture  possesses  an  intrinsic  resistance  to  Western-style 
individualism.
On the other hand, those in ex-communist societies can have a lower inclination to 
liberal  motives  as  well  as  a  different  perception  of  freedom  from  the  one  typically 
conceived in the West. Historically, they have gone through the imposition of a communist 
ideology whereby individual freedom was restrained in numerous aspects of society. Free 
market and  private ownership were suppressed in the name of state planning that was 
supposed to provide collective prosperity to the people. The long-term experience of such a 
system could nurture popular attitudes to rely on the state rather than free competition, 
which could encourage their support for a collective goal prior to individual autonomy. 
87 For East Asian political cultures, see for example, Pye with Pye, Asian Power and Politics; Bell, Brown, 
Jayasuriya, and Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia; Diamond and Plattner ed., 
Democracy in East Asia. For Japanese case, see Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou [Thought 
and Behaviour of Modern Politics].
88 Pye discusses paternalistic authority in Asian values whereas Maruyama mentions familism in Japanese 
case. See Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics]; Pye 
with Pye, Asian Power and Politics.
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Politically,  many  communist  states  took  the  form  of  totalitarian  or  post-totalitarian 
regimes.89 The regime facilitated what is called social atomisation while eliminating many 
elements of civil society, thereby countless individuals lost social  channels to actualise 
their free wills. Mass mobilisation for the state and the ideology seems to have eventually 
fostered  widespread  political  passivity  (and  apathy).90 These  presumably  deterred  the 
politically proactive and spontaneous attitudes of individuals. It is possible that communist 
experience prevented the rise of participatory values based on free wills. Moreover, the 
lack of a free environment and the prevention of liberal values transformation may have 
preserved  traditional  outlooks,  which  include  cultural  attitudes  submissive  to  political 
authority in such as Russia and post-Soviet republics.91 Thus, although communist nations 
had achieved a certain level of economic development, the process seems to have been a 
different  version  of  modernisation  from  the  one  typically  found  in  the  West.  These 
Postcommunist particularities possibly have given rise to irregularity to and deviation from 
the standard effects of values shift. As a consequence, there could be an attitudinal and 
perceptional gap in relation to freedom between Postcommunist and Western societies.
Consequently, popular mind-sets in Postcommunist and East Asian societies could 
incorporate  a  systematic  hindrance  towards  Postmaterialist  transformation  especially 
concerned with the matter of liberty. At least, their  particularities function as intervening 
factors in relation to the Postmaterialist effect. Thus, the two regional groups respectively 
present  the  coherent  examples  that  hold  particular  elements  competing  with  the 
Postmaterialist effect. Such coherency may be perhaps salient in comparison with other 
non-Western groups. In this sense, Postcommunist and East Asian groups are ideal cases to 
examine the present theme: Postmaterialist shift versus cultural particularity. 
But why do Japan and Russia have to be representatives of these two groups?  As 
mentioned earlier, Japan has maintained a level of economic development comparable to 
Western democratic societies for a long period. Given this, if Japan hold a certain attribute 
89 For the concepts and their application to former communist nations, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of  
Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
90 For political mobilisation during the communist era, see Friedgut, Theodore H., Political Participation in  
the USSR (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). For the political disengagement in Russia and 
former Soviet republics, see Hutcheson, Derek S., 'Protest and Disengagement in the Russian Federal 
Elections of 2003-04', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5: 2 (2004); Hutcheson, Derek S. 
and Elena A. Korosteleva, 'Patterns of Participation in Post-Soviet Politics', Contemporary European 
Politics, 3: 4 (December 2005).
91 For Russian case, see for example, White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics.
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in consistency with other East Asian societies, and especially if such an attribute is not 
observed in Western societies,  it  would suggest the presence of an East  Asian cultural 
element  as  against  that  of  values  shift.  For  it  exists  among  the  East  Asian  nations 
regardless  of the  effect  of  economic  development  (as  the  source  of  the  values 
transformation). Russia is a typical major case of a country with communist experience. Its 
cultural traditions are relatively independent of Western influence in comparison with some 
other Postcommunist  countries close to Western Europe.  Although other  former Soviet 
republics may have such traits, Russia is the largest in size and therefore would be the most 
comparable to the USA among them. Some may question that Japan does not have an 
equivalent size in this context. Nevertheless, although the size of the land may not be so, 
that of the population can be at a comparable level. Moreover, Britain is incorporated as 
another case of Western society, which could be comparatively close to Japan in the extent 
of the national territory.92 In this way, the risk of Japanese gap  vis-à-vis Russia and the 
USA could be reduced. 
1.4 Values and democracy
This section considers the matter  of values and democracy.  First  of  all,  general  issues 
surrounding  'Western'  liberal  democracy  are  mentioned.  For  this,  the  importance  of 
differentiating values and institutions is suggested. Subsequently, the influence of values 
on  institutions  is  explicated.  In  view  of  this,  the  final  part  presents  variables  to  be 
examined for this research.
1.4.1 Liberal democracy?
When liberal democracy and culture are considered, there may be some responses from 
non-Western regions with potentially negative connotations. As mentioned above, many 
such questions are directed to the 'liberal' aspect of liberal democracy on the basis of an 
account  that  the  high  esteem of  freedom is  not  necessarily  the  core  attribute  of  non-
92 The sizes of the countries are as follows: The USA (population: 285318000, surface area: 9632030 [sq. 
km]); Britain [United Kingdom] (population: 59500252, surface area: 243610 [sq. km]); Russia 
(population: 145949580; surface area: 17098240 [sq. km]); Japan (population: 127149000, surface area: 
377880 [sq. km]). The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators, 2001 
[http://www.worldbank.org/].
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Western cultures.93 
Nonetheless, even though there might be people who regard liberal democracy as 
something particular to Western nations, is there any actual alternative that is not liberal 
but democracy in the current world? Although the definition of 'liberal' would vary and 
therefore need to be treated with caution, for 'liberal democracy' at least we could consider 
the case of democracy that institutionally ensures freedom of the people including civil 
liberty  and  political  rights.  Given  this,  could  a  system be  a  democracy  without  such 
attributes? In reality, it is difficult to imagine democracy that lacks the quality of freedom. 
In a similar vein, the concept of 'polyarchy' presented by Dahl involves the element of 
freedom.94 Moreover,  the  notion  of  polyarchy has  been  a  viable  model  explicating  an 
important dimension of democracy.95 There are arguments on freedom as a crucial element 
in relation to democracy.96 The two indicators of the Freedom House rating are political 
rights  and  civil  liberties.  The  rating  has  been  widely  regarded  as  a  measurement  of 
democracy.  Plattner  argues  with  respect  to  a  connection  between  liberalism  and 
democracy.97 The institutional guarantee of liberty seems to be an essential asset for being 
a democracy that one can conceive in the present age. 
Meanwhile, there are governments that restrict certain types of liberty while holding 
some  formalities  of  democracy.  For  instance,  there  are  newly  introduced  democratic 
systems where the governmental offices consider the restriction of free speech or other 
freedoms as a policy option. Some of them rationalise the regulation due to the fact that the 
systems suffer social instability, which could seriously affect the security of order. This at 
times tends to be supported by the populace,  owing to drastic changes and confusions 
93 For Asia, for example, see Fareed Zakaria, 'A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew', Foreign Affairs, 73: 2 
(March-April, 1994), pp. 109-127. For Russia, for instance, in March 2000 then acting-President 
Vladimir Putin made statements which included that 'democracy is the dictatorship of the law' while 
rebuking those who 'privatise' the law to serve own interests. Quoted in Bacon with Wyman, 
Contemporary Russia, ch. 6, pp. 111-130.
94 Dahl, Polyarchy, esp. pp. 1-16.
95 See Masahiro, Iwasaki, and Kogure Kentaro, 'Seiji-hatten-ron [Political Development Theories]', in 
Kohno and Iwasaki eds., Akusesu Hikaku-Seijigaku, ch. 4, pp. 71-91, esp. 74-77; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, 
'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good 
Governance', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20:1 (March 2004), pp. 28-55.
96 Beetham, David, 'Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit', in David Beetham ed., Defining 
Measuring Democracy (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 28-30; Beetham, David, 
'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., Assessing the Quality of  
Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
97 Plattner, Marc F., 'Liberalism and Democracy: Can't Have One Without the Other', Foreign Affairs 
(March/April 1998).
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produced through such  things  as  a  regime transition  processes  or  economic  difficulty. 
There  is  an  argument  that  economic  development  is  likely to  be  successful  under  the 
guiding  force  of  a  political  authority.98 Apparently,  these  systems  might  have  traits 
compatible with variants of elitist  models for democracy.99 Nonetheless, these types of 
rationales have a potential to be taken advantage of to excuse authoritarian rules. This is 
the point that has been a centre of criticisms by intellectuals and public opinion especially 
from Western or liberal democratic societies, as seen for some cases of the former USSR 
republics  and Asian nations.100 Some scholars  regard them  as 'managed'  or 'delegative' 
democracy.101 There  could  be  weakness  in  quasi-democratic  systems  in  terms  of 
democratic practices such as civil and political liberties. Hague and Harrop categorise such 
regimes as 'semi-democracy'.102
The institutional guarantee of freedom is crucial for democracy. However, why are 
there some non-Western voices  that  question 'liberal'  democracy while  criticising it  as 
'Western' democracy? To be fair, one reason might be that their democratic customs and 
outlooks are still too premature to employ and adjust to a democratic system. On the other 
hand, it would be true that there is something very 'Western' in it, which is heterogeneous 
and therefore could not be fully accommodated by the non-Westerners. It is not reasonable 
to simply regard non-Western outlooks as 'traditional' or 'pre-modern' in a deterministic 
98 For a brief introduction of debates for and against this view, see Hague and Harrop, Comparative 
Government and Politics, p. 57.
99 For the description of elitist models, see Held, Models of Democracy, pp. 157-198. For Schumpeter's 
original account in relation to an elitist perspective on democracy, see Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976).
100 For related discussions on 'Asian values', see Thompson, Mark R., 'Whatever Happened to "Asian 
Values"?', Journal of Democracy, 12: 4 (October 2001), pp. 154-165; Hague and Harrop, Comparative 
Government and Politics, p. 48. For Russia, see Bova, Russell, 'Democracy and Russian Political 
Culture', in Russel Bova ed., Russia and Western Civilization: Cultural and Historical Encounters, 
(Armonk NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-276; White, Gitelman and Sakwa ed., Developments  
in Russian Politics 6; Waller, Russian Politics Today, pp. 23-47. 
101 O'Donnell, Guillermo, 'Delegative Democracy', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter eds., The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 94-108; 
Sakwa, Richard, 'Politics in Russia', in White, Gitelman and Sakwa eds., in Developments in Russian 
Politics 6, ch. 1, pp. 1-17.
102 Hague and Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, ch. 3, pp. 35-50. For related arguments, see 
Collier, David and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research', World Politics, 49:3 (1997), pp. 430-451; Collier, David, and Robert Adcock, 'Democracy and 
Dichotomies', Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), pp. 537-565; Brown, Archie, 'From 
Democratization to 'Guided Democracy'', Journal of Democracy, 12: 4 (2001), pp. 35-41; Ottaway, 
Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
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perspective of a modernisation process. For such a view holds a risk of being biased. With 
this,  what  is  it  that  non-Western  people  could  not  help  claiming  as  different?  It  is 
'individualism' to which one of their major critiques is directed. The criticisms are often 
accompanied  by  caution  and  scepticism  towards  a  strong  reliance  on  the  esteem  of 
freedom, by referring to its incompatibility with their own cultural contexts.103 This tends 
to be mixed and confused with arguments on the institution of liberal democracy (along 
with modernisation and Westernisation).104 The crucial  point  is  that  the object  of their 
attention  is  mainly  the  'values'  of  liberty.  The  core  critique  is  not  necessarily  of  the 
'institution'  per  se that  secures  liberty.  Thus,  values  and  institutions  need  to  be 
differentiated.
1.4.2 Values and institutions
It  is  important  to  perceive values and institutions  separately.  Inglehart  and Welzel  are 
particularly aware of this. They explicitly identify variables that represent each of these 
while placing them in theoretical contexts.105 This also enables analyses to be functional. It 
would be useful to present a sketch of disaggregation on at least one dimension of liberal 
democracy. The following items are not exhaustive. However, they give a primary picture 
for matters treated in later chapters. 
Institution:
                                                        [Freedom House]106  [Polyarchy]
Democratic political system            Political rights          Inclusiveness (participation)107
                                                                                          Public contestation
103 For the case of Asian values, see Parekh, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy'; Bell and 
Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'. 
104 It should be noted that 'individualism' in many cases tends to be misunderstood by non-Westerners, which 
is different from the way Westerners conceive. Individualism is likely to be understood with connotations 
of 'selfishness' in non-Western criticism, whereas Westerners normally understand it in the sense of 
individual 'autonomy'.
105 For example, see Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political 
Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages'; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 'The 
Theory of Human Development'; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy.
106 Inglehart and Welzel identify the Freedom House rating with a measurement for 'liberal democracy'. See 
Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 149-157.
107 For the concepts, see Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. 1-16.
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Guarantee of civil liberties108           Civil liberties            (Civil liberties)109  
                                                                                 
Values:                                                                                  
Self-expression / Postmaterialist values [Inglehart]
Liberal democratic values110           
(1) Liberty / individualism111   (2) Trust / social capital112   (3) Tolerance   (4) Equality113 
(5) Anti-authoritarianism114   (6) Participation   (7) Contestation   (8) Public discussion
(9) Political consciousness   (10) Right consciousness115   (11) Subjective well-being116
108 This might be comparable to the notion of 'constitutional liberalism'. For this notion, see Zakaria, Fareed, 
'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', Foreign Affairs (November 1997).
109 Berg-Schlosser points to 'civil liberties' as a normative dimension included in the account of polyarchy in 
addition to public contestation and inclusiveness. See Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in 
Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance', pp. 30-32. For a 
similar point, see Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore/London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 8. 
110 As mentioned earlier, Inglehart (and Welzel) notice that the elements of values such as trust, tolerance, 
liberty, participation and subjective well-being have linkages with liberal democracy measured by scales 
based on the Freedom House ratings. These elements are largely the components of the self-expression 
values. 
111 It should be noted that values of liberty in this sense is a comprehensive description of orientation to a 
sense of freedom. Therefore, it does not precisely represent exhaustive accounts of variants on liberalism 
in philosophical or ideological terms. This is rather an approximate direction of attitudes when people in 
the West generally conceive of the sense of individual and liberty or when non-Western people (vaguely) 
point out individualism in the West.
112 An element of trust could have qualitative equivalence to that of 'social capital', which has been widely 
argued as being conducive to democracy. For social capital, see Putnam, Robert D., Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Fukuyama, 
Francis, 'Social Capital', in Harrison and Huntington eds., Culture Matters, pp. 99-111; Putnam, Robert 
D, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York/London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000); Putnam, Robert D., 'Civic Disengagement in Contemporary America', Government and 
Opposition, 36: 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 135-156; Norris, Pippa, 'Social Capital and Civil Society', in 
Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 137-167.
113 Bell and Jayasuriya notice equality as one of the crucial values in Western culture (in relation to liberal 
democracy). See Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'.
114 An anti-authoritarian attitude is also treated as part of a values transformational trend by Inglehart while 
being suggested as contributive to democratic orientation. See Inglehart, Ronald, 'Postmodernization 
Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy', in Pippa Norris ed., Critical  
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 236-
256. For his values scales, nonetheless, the attitude to authority is incorporated in the 'traditional/secular-
rational scale', which is applicable to the first half phase of the values shift. See for instance, Inglehart and 
Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 48-56.
115 For right consciousness, see for instance, Gibson, James L. and Duch, Raymond M., ‘Postmaterialism and 
the Emerging Soviet Democracy,’ Political Research Quarterly, 47 (1994), pp. 5-39.
116 Subjective well-being is crucial for the positive condition of liberal democracy, which is pointed out by 
Inglehart's works as mentioned above.
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Among the above-mentioned liberal democratic values,  the present research will  pay a 
special attention to a liberal dimension, since the major focus is surrounding Inglehart's 
thesis. Inglehart and Welzel write, '[h]uman development is not linked with all forms of 
democracy to the same degree; it  is most specifically linked with the liberal  aspect of 
democracy that institutionalizes human choice.'117 They also state, '[o]ur analysis focuses 
on "liberal" democracy because our theory implies that human development is inherently 
linked with the liberating aspects of democracy.'118
As  for  values and  institutions,  Fukuzawa,  an  intellectual  in  the  early  period  of 
modernising Japan, envisaged that the introduction  of the external aspect of civilisation 
would have less difficulty, whereas the incorporation of its 'inner spirit' would encounter 
far  more resistance.119 According to him, 'the externals  of civilization are all  empirical 
details, from food, clothing, shelter, implements, and so forth, to government decrees and 
laws'.120 This external category therefore includes institutions. On the other hand, the 'inner 
spirit'  would  be  largely  analogous  to  values.  In  fact,  later  years,  whereas  Japan 
substantially  accommodated  the  external  sphere  of  Western  civilisation,  a  traditional 
heritage strongly remained in the internal sphere. For instance, as late as mid-twentieth 
century, Maruyama pointed out cultural traditions that essentially underlay some political 
phenomena in Japan.121 Huntington's discourse largely supports this point in that inherited 
cultures  are  likely  to  persist.  He  points  out  'the  strength,  resilience,  and  viscosity  of 
indigenous cultures and their ability to renew themselves, and to resist, contain, and adapt 
Western  import'.122 He  further  states  that  although  political  leaders  'can  introduce  the 
elements of Western culture, they are unable to permanently suppress or to eliminate the 
core elements of their indigenous culture'.123 
117 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 149. 'Human development' is 
another description of values transformation especially in its latter phase.
118 Ibid., p. 173. This statement is made for the analysis of a causal direction between democratic values and 
democratic institutions. Also, see ibid., 174-176.
119 Fukuzawa, Yukichi, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, translated by David A. Dilworth and G. 
Cameron Hurst (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), pp. 16-19. [The original work was published in 1875, 
Japan, with a title, 'Bummeiron no Gairyaku'.] In normative terms, because of the difficulty, he 
encouraged to incorporate the inner aspect first, then the external one later.
120 Ibid., p. 16.
121 Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].
122 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 154.
123 Ibid., p. 154. But also he notes that, once introduced, some Western elements remain and are difficult to 
remove.
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Considering  this,  though  at  the  risk  of  over-simplification,  let  us  clarify  the 
hypothetical characters of the two dimensions:
Institution:
1.  Institutions  would  be  the  'external'  aspects  of  civilisation  (which  can  be utilised as 
practical devices).124
2. There would be less difficulty to be introduced in comparison with values. 
3. There would be relative generalisability in their efficacy (if applied). 
Values: 
1. Values could involve 'internal' belief systems.
2. There would be more hindrance to its transformation or the accommodation of other 
values.
3. It would be more difficult to apply universal connotation (even if it is possible). 
If these are the case, liberal democracy in an institutional sense would have less difficulty 
in its  acceptance in non-Western societies than that  of values.  On the contrary,  liberal 
values and individualism might not be fully understood and accommodated in non-Western 
societies. It implies the potential difficulty of incorporating liberal aspects of democratic 
values due to the persistence of cultural heritage in some societies. Also, such a hindrance 
could  run  counter  to  values  shift  favourable  to  liberal  democratic  attitudes.  This 
demonstrates the importance of examining the conditions of dichotomous effects: cultural 
particularity and values transformation.  Since this is still an assumption, examinations are 
left to later chapters.
1.4.3 Influence of values
There are, however, questions. Do values or political culture matter to institutions and their 
operations? Are values not merely products of institutional arrangements? It would be of 
course biased if one holds that only one side of either values or institutions has exclusively 
unilateral influence over the other. In practice, it  is reasonable to assume that there are 
124 For the meaning of 'external', see the Fukuzawa's statement as quoted above.
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certain bilateral interactions. The point is which element has predominant efficacy over the 
other. As Inglehart and Welzel note, 'there could be reciprocal effects in the relationship 
between  democratic  institutions  and  democratic  mass  values,  in  which  case  the  key 
question is whether the causal arrow is stronger in one direction than the other'.125
Values over institutions
There have been debates on the influence between values and institutions. Inglehart and 
Welzel's  emphasis  is  on  the  effect  of  values  on  institutions.  They  hold  that  the  core 
argument of political culture discourses resides in the congruence of political institutions 
and people's  values that lead to stability and effectiveness of a governing system. The 
outlook of people for human freedom, and societal pressures for its institutionalisation, 
function  against  an  authoritarian  rule.  In  the  meantime,  opposite  attitudes  that  are 
compliant to state authority could run counter to the consolidation and efficacy of liberal 
democracy.126 As Inglehart and Welzel argue, Great Britain presents an important case for 
the independent effect of values.127 Britain does not have a written constitution, but is a 
country maintaining democracy for a long period. Moreover, the British model is often 
conceived as one of ideal examples for a democratic system. They mention the former 
USSR  in  comparison  with  Britain.  They  point  out  that,  despite  the  democratic 
characteristic of the Soviet Union's constitution on paper, its guarantees did not have any 
real  effect,  which  is  opposite  to  Britain  where  democratic  practices  are  commonly 
observed with 'unwritten norms'.128 Inglehart and Welzel state that '[f]ormal institutions and 
the underlying political culture have a symbiotic relationship, with institutions becoming a 
behavioral reality only in so far as they become a part of the political culture'.129 By this, 
they argue for a strong influence of political culture on the survival of democracy rather 
than that of democratic institutions on political culture. 
Empirically, Inglehart and Welzel examined the direction of influence between pro-
democratic values and democratic institutions at a world level. Their results show that self-
expression values as pro-democratic culture have powerful influence over the emergence 
125 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 173.
126 Ibid. 158.
127 Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', pp. 154-155.
128 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
129 Ibid., p. 155.
34
and  survival  of  democracy.  Although  democratic  institutions  could  be  conducive  to 
shaping self-expression values, it is a minor factor compared with economic development 
and  cultural  inheritances.  They  emphasise  that  culture  far  more  affects  democratic 
institutions  than  the  other  way around.130 In  another  work,  they  demonstrate  a  similar 
proposition with theoretical articulations as well as empirical results based on four types of 
analyses.131 They  point  to  the  strong  causal  effects  of  self-expression  values  on  the 
emergence  of  both  formal  and  effective  democracies,  while  mentioning  that  causal 
influences  of  democratic  institutions  on  self-expression  values  are  discovered  to  be 
trivial.132 These findings provide strong support for an explanation that emphasises values' 
effect on democratic institutions.
Institutions over values: critique
On the other hand, there are schools of thought that emphasise the predominant efficacy of 
institutions over political  culture.133 Such a  view includes  an emphasis  that  democratic 
culture is produced under democratic institutions.134 People's values are shaped through 
learning and  internalising norms and practices that  are  presented by the  institutions.135 
Inglehart and Welzel do not concur with such habituation theories. They point out that the 
theories contradict the fact that historically pro-democratic conditions and outlooks had 
existed beforehand and led to the emergence of democratic regimes. According to them, 
emancipative values that emphasise self-expression and human autonomy can emerge even 
under an authoritarian regime and in fact it did.136 They also quote Postcommunist cases. 
Despite  the  instalment  of  formal  democratic  or  electoral  systems,  the  levels  of  pro-
democratic values in most of the former Soviet societies have not increased from their 
originally  lower  levels.  Meanwhile,  western  Postcommunist  societies  such  as  East 
130 Ibid., pp. 153-161.
131 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 7 and 8, pp. 149-209.
132 Ibid., p. 208.
133 For instance, see Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller, 'Social Capital and Politics', Annual Review of  
Political Science, 1 (1998), pp. 47-73.
134 Muller and Seligson demonstrate that 'interpersonal trust' (as an element of civic culture) is not a cause 
but a result of democracy, although they admit that another element: 'support for gradual reform' would 
facilitate democracy. See Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Civic Culture and Democracy: 
The Question of Causal Relationships', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), pp. 635-652.
135 Rustow presents a model of democratisation that entails habituation phase. Rustow, Dankwart A., 
'Transitions to Democracy Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics, 2 (1970), pp. 337-363.
136 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 166.
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Germany,  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Croatia,  and  Slovenia  hold  rather  more 
commitment to such values.137 The conditions of values seem to stem from their continuous 
presence in respective societies rather than institutional arrangements.
In fact, the habituation hypothesis leaves a serious question. How can only external 
arrangements  foster  'proactive  motives'  and  societal  forces  that  underpin  the  liberal 
democratic arrangement? In order to effectively operate a formal system, there needs to be 
momentum to propel the function. Nonetheless, the momentum would not be fully fostered 
through passively formulated patterns of behaviours. Habituation may shape the formality 
of deeds, at best, to the extent that people take it for granted. However, it would not go 
beyond it. If people are willing to support and accordingly  utilise a given system, there 
need to be internally motivated rationales or attitudes that spontaneously commit them to 
the  behaviours. The democratic arrangement could help such practices by allowing and 
entitling human free choices.138 But, this would not be more than that. Institutions per se  
could not provide substantive reasoning and sources to bring about embedded motives in 
one's heart that voluntarily generate liberal democratic perception and practice. In Western 
societies, many democracies have been achieved and developed from within nations, and 
there  had been popular motivations that exceeded what was expected by then existing 
systems.  For  Japan,  the  achievement  of  the  democratic  system  was  not  due  to  a 
spontaneous process, but mainly to the introduction of the system as a consequence of its 
defeat in the World War II.  For the former USSR, the initiatives of perestroika and a 
following transition virtually started from above (although there were reactive responses 
from the side of the masses). The people may have been habituated to take part in elections 
and behaviours that accompany the practice of a democratic system. Nonetheless, this does 
not  necessarily  mean that the people have attained internal  willingness or  desire  for a 
liberal democratic ideal in concrete manners. To be sure, they would be discomforted and 
may protest if they were treated in unjust manners by political authorities. However, these 
could be passive or reactive concerns. This could not necessarily mean proactive outlooks, 
principles and demands towards the actual function and creation of democratic practices. 
137 Ibid, p. 159.
138 Inglehart and Welzel point out that the instalment of democratic institutions is a part of pro-democratic 
process (termed as 'human development'), but not a sole condition for it. See for instance, ibid., pp. 2-3, 
152.
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Moreover,  generally  speaking,  spheres in  which a  formal  democratic  system can 
promote norms are limited—indeed, a very little portion of people's lives. For the great 
majority of the population, a political life occupies only a slice of daily concerns. Consider 
that, in our normal lives, people need to engage in professions, manage social lives, rear 
children, or receive education especially during youth. They have to conduct other various 
human  and  social  activities.  But,  in  what  proportions  do  ordinary  people  commit 
themselves to political matters? The opportunities would be elections or times when people 
browse  news  on  paper,  television  or  the  internet  while  occasionally  pondering  these 
matters.  These  are  restricted  parts  of  daily  lives,  and are  not  necessarily  perceived  as 
important  issues  unless a  given person is  committed to  a  specific  political  problem.139 
Then, from scratch, how could ordinary people and in fact a society as a whole foster 
internalised  motivations  that  go  along  with  liberal  democratic  norms?  Meanwhile, 
intellectuals may create rationales or import democratic ideas from the Western democratic 
societies, and may contribute to the rationales of democratic principles. But there would be 
little chance that these substantially permeate people's minds to the degree that they are 
motivated  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Such  knowledge  is  at  any  rate  external.  It  might  be 
effective for those who are willing to assimilate intellectual discourses. However, for most 
people in society, such exhortations may be nothing particularly important for real lives 
that contain other numerous daily matters. It would be unlikely that only either democratic 
institutions  or  intellectual  instilment create  democrats  with  liberal  perceptions  in  a 
substantial portion of population.
How do values matter?
With this, practically, how do values affect institutional operations?  Let us consider an 
example that there are two types of societies, such as the USA and Japan, where political 
participation and public contestation are 'institutionally' guaranteed, and their institutional 
arrangements are qualitatively analogous. Given this, what if there is difference in 'values'? 
One  society  holds  outlooks  that  emphasise freedom,  individuals,  self-expression,  self-
assertion  and  public  discussion.  The  other  society  attaches  more  importance  to 
139 To be fair, the accumulation of experiences could be conducive to the learning and internalisation of the 
democratic norms. Nonetheless, it would take a number of generations until it forms a substantial set of 
values if such values should take root.
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interpersonal relationships, harmony, conformity, collectivism, self-regulation, consensus 
and attitudes to avoid explicit discussion at an individual level.140 
How would these attributes be reflected in their political  behaviours? In the former 
society where individuals and freedom are respected, and public discussion is perceived to 
be important, the people are likely to be active in expressing their opinions and claims. The 
systems  of  public  contestation  and  political  participation,  which  are  institutionally 
guaranteed, are likely to be utilised as viable means for their actions. On the other hand, in 
the latter society such as Japan there would be a much lower likelihood that the people take 
advantage of the equivalent institutions. At the level of masses, their consequences would 
make a clear difference. There would be a considerable gap in the degrees to which the 
people discuss politics personally with others, express publicly what they need,  criticise 
incumbent  officials  on  public  accountability,  and  participate  in  civic  protest  towards 
political authority.
Whether  such  critical  citizens  are  present  can  greatly  matter  to  the  degree  of 
governmental responsiveness.141 Where there is a moderate but constant invisible pressure 
by  the  public  for  democratic  causes,  political  elites  tend to  be  regularly  compelled  to 
accommodate people's demands. They need to develop capacities to respond and channel 
the  voices  of  the  public.142 In  this  manner,  such  practice  becomes  more  likely  to  be 
perceived  as  a  source  of  legitimacy  for  governance.  In  other  words,  democratic 
accountability becomes a core principle in both norms and behaviours in a society. On the 
contrary, without such a civic orientation, a society lacks an element that underpins and 
facilitates governmental responsiveness. Thus, in actual practice, values can matter in the 
ways of democracy.143
140 For contrasting cultural difference between the USA and Japan, see Lipset, American Exceptionalism, ch. 
7, pp. 211-263.
141 Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel note responsive governance due to an effect of self-expression values. 
See Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.  
142 For an equivalent account, see Furusawa, Katsuto, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and 
the 'Outsider' States', Contemporary Politics, 12: 2 (June 2006).
143 In an analogous perspective, Maruyama presents an insightful account on how states of individuals affect 
political conditions. On the basis of his categorisation of individuals, he depicts the political 
consequences of their combinations. See Maruyama, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A 
Conceptual Scheme'.
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Liberal motives
In  fact,  liberal  outlooks are  not  necessarily confined within a  political  dimension.  The 
outlooks  per  se might  even  stem from other  spheres  before  they  acquired  a  political 
connotation.  In  the  West,  liberal  democratic  demands  could  be  rather  a  political 
consequence of  people's core values on freedom. Individual rights, fair  treatment,  their 
concrete institutionalisation, pluralism, a representative political body—these originated in 
the West. They qualitatively conform to the direction of liberal outlooks, which have been 
predominant in this cultural zone. It would be possible that these political elements have 
been  substantially  influenced  by  such  popular  values.  In  non-Western  societies,  if 
comparable values were to be fostered, it would require systematic conditions or a driving 
force that would motivate individuals' outlooks to burgeon from within rather than from 
outside themselves. Could there be such an internal driving force in a society in which 
such liberal democratic values have not been present? Or, is there no such potential that the 
people's outlook could be transformed from the inherited patterns of values? Inglehart and 
Welzel argue that there is such potential.144 This research examines whether or not such 
elements could exist in non-Western societies through comparison. If there is, it attempts 
to explore to what extent and how these elements affect society.
1.4.4 Variables
Postmaterialist index and liberal democratic values
Given the  primary  frameworks,  instruments  are  needed  for  empirical  analyses.  Which 
variables are examined for this research? Whereas the Postmaterialist index is specifically 
studied,  attention  is  also  directed  to  several  items  of  the  liberal  democratic  values 
mentioned above. By this, it is intended to examine the Postmaterialist index in relation to 
liberal democratic contexts. Since the emphasis of Inglehart's thesis is on liberal aspects of 
democracy, special attention is paid to the matter of freedom. Nonetheless, since these are 
in the realm of attitudes, they do not necessarily indicate anything concrete on political 
dimensions. Therefore, there need to be variables that have direct political and democratic 
relevance.  For  actual  analyses,  two  types  of  variables  are  examined:  (1)  views  of 
governance and (2) protest.
144 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
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Governance
Two variables on views of governance are employed as empirical measures that represent 
political  and  democratic  contexts.145 They  are  considered  as  primary  attitudinal 
measurements concerned with democracy. As mentioned above, one of the main themes 
for this research is 'values and democracy'. In view of this, the two variables are examined 
in the context of association with liberal democratic attitudes (and Postmaterialist related 
values). As for the character of the variables, one of them measures the degree of support 
for non-democratic rule. This, from the reverse direction, can be a measurement that would 
evaluate the extent of agreement with democracy as against non-democratic regimes. The 
other variable is a scale on the evaluation of the efficacy of democracy. It measures the 
respondents' levels of support for the performance of a democratic system. In essence, they 
are  scales  that  reflect  respondents'  attitudinal  stances  towards  a  democratic  regime. 
Nonetheless, one might contend that these variables are not exhaustive as the indicators of 
attitudes in relation to democracy. In fact, Inglehart compared several attitudinal scales in 
terms of correlations with the level of democracy (based on the Freedom House ratings). 
Some of these scales (which are concerned with views of governance) overlap with the 
components of the two variables in this research. According to the comparison, such scales 
are less correlated than the 'self-expression values' scale does.146 Thus, aside from views of 
governance, there could be other attitudinal dimensions and their measurements that are 
connected  with  democracy.  Nevertheless,  this  does  not  negate  the  fact  that  views  of 
governance  as  well  as  the  variables  in  this  research  have  relevance  to  the  matter  of 
democracy,  which  therefore  should  not  be  neglected.  Moreover,  regime  support  and 
popular views on democracy's performance (as the properties of these variables) directly 
deal with the issue of 'values and democracy' which is in fact one of our main themes. In 
this  context,  analyses  are  conducted  by  incorporating  the  perspective  of  views  of 
governance.
145 For the details of these variables, see Chapter 8.
146 Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for 
Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?'.
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Protest
The following are the central reasons for using the variables of protest. The first rationale 
is that protest inclination is related to Postmaterialist orientation. Some observers suggest 
that behavioural motives of protest  in post-industrial  societies reflect  values shift.147 In 
Inglehart's thesis, some unconventional political actions such as citizens' protest are often 
explained  as  'elite-challenging'  forms  of  participation,  instead  of  conventional  'elite-
directed'  political  behaviours  such  as  voting.  They  are  regarded  as  a  consequence  of 
empowered individuals and their transformed outlooks through industrialisation and post-
industrialisation  processes.148 Thus,  in  view of  the  connection  with  the  Postmaterialist 
attitudes,  protest  inclination is  one of  the crucial  variables to be examined in  political 
terms.
The  second  rationale  is  protest  variables'  potential  implication  for  democracy. 
People's protest, especially in the sense of 'civic protest', could be related to governmental 
responsiveness.  In  contemporary  Western  societies,  the  people  hold  an  inclination  to 
moderate protest activities.149 Many of the actions are often on the basis of civic ideals or 
liberal democratic rationale. In Britain, a recent case would be the 'make poverty history' 
demonstrations surrounding the  G8 Summit in 2005. In Europe, there were widespread 
anti-war  demonstrations  in  2003.  Citizens'  environmental  concerns  often  emerge  as 
grassroots  movements,  at  times  accompanied  by  peaceful  protests.  These  moderate 
patterns of protest might be described as 'civic protest'.150 Such protest could have qualities 
that  underpin  and  facilitate  governmental  responsiveness.  Civic  protest  can  stand  for 
people's  strength  to  go  beyond political  passivity  and  demand  towards  government  in 
peaceful manners. It can be the reflection of an underlying societal capacity to check the 
political authorities on regular basis, which informally ensures their sensitivity and norms 
to accommodate popular voices.151 Nonetheless, there could be gaps in the natures and 
147 Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, pp. 314-318; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics:  
Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham 
House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74.Inglehart and Welzel, 
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp.43-44, 115-134.
148 Inglehart has consistently mentioned 'elite-challenging' (or 'elite-directing') participation in relation to 
values shift. See for instance Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, Culture Shift  
in Advanced Industrial Society, pp. 5, 335-370; Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 43-
44, 307-315; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 94-134.
149 Dalton, Citizen Politics, pp. 58-74.
150 Furusawa, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States'.
151 Ibid., p. 208.
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patterns of protest between different societies. Especially, in some non-Western societies, 
protest could be simply protest that has traditional and radical connotations. Moreover, 
such a radical character could go against democracy, potentially threatening the stability 
and  security  of  society.  In  other  societies,  protest  may  not  be  related  to  a  sense  of 
participation at all while being merely perceived as behaviour to be avoided. This study 
attempts to explore such an attitudinal variability of societies in relation to governmental 
responsiveness.
The third rationale is associated with the variation of protest patterns for different 
societies.  A major interest  is  whether the variance is due to cultural  divergence or the 
extent of progress in values shift. In fact, besides the reasoning of values shift, there could 
be a perspective that a penchant to protestation is a part of Western heritage. Dalton notes 
that protest is 'not new to Western democracies'.152 Marsh also mentioned protest activities 
as associated with British traits.153 In fact, historically, there has been a persistent protest 
orientation  in  Western  societies.  Challenge  from  below  followed  by  restructuring  of 
systems that took over old authorities and norms has been, in a way, a typical scenario in 
Western history. The examples range from the Magna Carta,  bourgeois revolutions, the 
French  Revolution  through  to  labour  movements,  American  civil  rights  movements, 
student  protests  during  the  sixties  and  seventies,  and  so  forth.  As  a  recent  case, 
environmental movements might share, in more moderate tones, similar qualities of such 
an  orientation.  The  establishment  of  democratic  systems  per  se has  been  in  fact  the 
consequence of  protestations,  which have been historically  prevalent  in  the West.  The 
protest  tendency  also  seems  to  have  played  crucial  roles  for  the  gradual  institutional 
extension of rights and welfare towards broader ranges of populations. On the other hand, 
the  increase  of  people's  general orientation  to  (civic)  protest  has  been  a  rather  recent 
phenomenon in post-industrial societies. Is protest orientation the consequence of Western 
cultural heritage or that of values shift? The nature of the question actually parallels to this 
dissertation's main inquiry: values shift versus cultural particularity. For this reason, the 
sphere of protest is treated as one of areas to be examined.
In sum, the Postmaterialist index, liberal democratic values, view of governance and 
protest are examined by comparing the four societies: the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. 
152 Dalton, Citizen Politics, pp. 58-59.
153 Marsh, Alan, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).
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The investigation is concerned with their  implications for democracy as argued so far, 
while incorporating another strand of a question: values shift versus cultural particularity. 
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an introductory picture of the overall research. Having reviewed 
Inglehart's thesis as a centre of attention, the present study consists of two main strands. 
The first strand is an issue: values shift versus cultural particularity. The second one is on 
values and its implications for democracy. 
Inglehart's  discourses  and  empirical  works  have  contributed  to  the  studies  of 
democracy,  especially  in its  liberal  aspects.  Meanwhile,  this  liberal  emphasis  seems to 
come across divergence of cultures, which potentially runs counter to a simple explanation 
of the values shift. The inherited orientations of the USA and Britain seem to be highly 
compatible with liberal democratic outlooks. On the other hand, cultural heritages in Japan 
and Russia  respectively differ  from those in the former two nations,  and do not share 
analogous qualities and histories with their liberal traditions. It is the case with tripartite 
regional distinction: the West, East Asia and Postcommunist area. This could affect the 
distributions in the outcome of the Postmaterialist index and other measures for the values 
shift assumption. Consequently, one chief aim of the research is to employ a dichotomous 
view of these competing effects and examine the degrees of predominance by either of the 
two sides. Another concern is to probe the values' impact on democracy. In addition to the 
Postmaterialist index and its variants, several items of liberal democratic values will be 
investigated.  Also,  political  attitudes  related  to  this  dimension  are  examined  as 
intermediate  spheres  that  reside  between  the  values  and  institutions.  The  views  of 
governance and protest (especially in the sense of 'civic protest') are examined for this 
purpose. For the series of analyses, comparisons between these societies are conducted. 
All  the  way through  this  study,  values  in  relation  to  the  issues  of  freedom and 
individuals are the centre of inquiry. Indeed, this element could be a core issue for the 
values shift, cultural difference, the Postmaterialist thesis, and liberal democracy in both 
values and institutions. Does an emphasis on individual freedom emerge as a result of 
industrialisation and post-industrialisation? Is it rather a unique attribute of the Western 
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societies? How are the political consequences of these conditions in relation to democracy? 
The following chapters will attempt to answer these questions.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with methodological issues for this research and consists of four 
sections. The first section attempts to provide an approximate picture of where the present 
research is located within the map of disciplines for political science. A brief review of 
studies on democratisation,  popular attitudes and public opinion data  is  presented as a 
background with particular reference to the World Values Survey and the work of Ronald 
Inglehart. The second section explores the issues of the Postmaterialist index. It starts with 
the reasons for utilising the index in this study, being followed by an introduction to the 
basic idea and components of the Postmaterialist scale. The subsequent part attempts to 
exemplify  the  validity  of  the  scale  with  several  questions.  The  third  section  mentions 
approaches  that  are  employed  to  examine  the  dichotomy:  values  shift  and  cultural 
particularity. The fourth section explores the relevance and utilities of quantitative methods 
and survey data, which are major methodologies in this study.
2.2 Background: studies on values and democracy
The aim of this section is to clarify the position of the present study in the map of political 
science.  It  overviews  the  recent  trends  in  the  discipline,  particularly  looking  at 
democratisation and studies on values, and subsequently centring on the World Values 
Survey and the values study thesis of Ronald Inglehart. 
2.2.1 Democratisation and studies on values
When the third wave of democratisation from non-democratic regimes culminated in 1989, 
many scholars' interests were attracted to the study of democratisation especially during a 
transition phase.1 As time went by, the major concerns gradually shifted from the transition 
1 For example, O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Philippe. C. and Laurence Whitehead eds., Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986). For East European cases, for example, Bermeo, Nancy ed., Liberalization and Democratization:  
Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); 
Beyme, Klaus von, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press 
in association with International Political Science Association, 1996); Mason, David S., Revolution and 
Transition in East-Central Europe, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); McSweeney, Dean and 
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per se to the consolidation of democracy. Although institutional arrangements are of prime 
importance for the establishment of democracy, unless there are social conditions capable 
of maintaining and nurturing democracy such as popular values to support it, there is the 
potential that a newly adopted democracy will be constantly threatened by authoritarian 
elements and instability. Consolidation, therefore, is a crucial phase to establish durable 
democracy.2
 The growing scholarly interest in the consolidation phase has led to a re-emphasis 
on exploring a political culture approach.3 Public opinion studies and their analytical skills, 
especially,  have  been  enhanced  by  the  spread  of  quantitative  methods  among  social 
scientists  thanks  to  recent  technological  advances.  This  development  has  opened  the 
possibility of examining how conducive given popular attitudes are to the maintenance and 
development of (or, in some regions, transition to) democracy through a social scientific 
perspective.  For  Postcommunist  societies,  there  have  been  in-depth  examinations  on 
popular attitudes in relation to the conditions of relatively new democracies.4
2.2.2 Cross-national data and World Values Survey
Along  with  this  trend,  cross-national  studies  of  public  attitudes  have  been  developed 
markedly with their growing analytical capacity. Quantitative methods have become more 
widespread  among  scholars  than  ever  before,  owing  to  the  increasing  availability  of 
computerised  statistical  resources.5 Meanwhile,  due  to  worldwide  co-operations  of 
Clive Tempest, 'The Political Science of Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe', Political Studies, 41: 
3 (September 1993), p. 408-419; Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, 'Thinking About Post-communist Transitions: 
How Different Are They?', Slavic Review, 52: 2 (Summer 1993), p.333-7; White, Stephen, Graeme Gill 
and Darrell Slider, The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
2 For democratic consolidation, see for instance, Linz, J. and Stepan, A., Problems of Democratic  
Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Diamond, Larry, 
Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999); Sorensen, Georg, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing 
World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Plasser, Fritz, Ulram, Peter A. and Waldrauch, Harald, 
Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998).
3 For a review of several contemporary approaches on political culture, see Wilson, Richard W., 'Review 
Article: the Many Voices of Political Culture - Assessing Different Approaches', World Politics, 52 
(January 2000), pp. 246-273.
4 For example, see Miller, William L., Stephen White and Paul Heywood, Values and Political Change in 
Postcommunist Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998); Rose, Richard, William Mishler and 
Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka, eds., 
Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe (New York: Routledge, 2006).
5 For an attempt to depict such a new environment, see Tanenbaum, Eric, and Elinor Scarbrough, 'Research 
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academics, bountiful bodies of survey data have been accumulated across the world. There 
are,  for  instance,  public  opinion  surveys  such  as  the  World  Values  Survey,  the 
International  Social  Survey  Programme  (ISSP),  the  New  Democracies  Barometer,  the 
Eurobarometer and so forth. Numerous surveys and quantitative data have been deposited 
to data archives across the world.6 This allows us to have a great deal of accessibility to 
well-established cross-national data that are carefully coordinated with academic precision.
 The World Values Survey is a significant work in this connection. It encompasses 
representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of people on all six inhabited 
continents  that  cover  the  representatives  of  more  than  seventy  percent  of  the  world's 
population.  This  constitutes  a  worldwide  investigation  of  sociocultural  and  political 
change. It builds on the European Values Surveys that first took place in 1981. A second 
wave of surveys was designed for global use and completed in 1990-1991. A third wave 
took place around the period 1995-1998, and a fourth wave was carried out around 1999-
2002.7 The World Values Survey, due to its broadness, enables us to compare popular 
attitudes across countries, which could go beyond the borders of different civilisations. It 
also allows us to inquire into values shifts in multiple nations over one or two decades. 
There are numerous publications based on the World Values Survey, including works in 
relation to democracy.8
2.2.3 Inglehart and values studies
Strategies in the New Environment', in Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum eds., Research Strategies  
in the Social Sciences: A Guide to New Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
6 Main data archives that provide comprehensive services are such as the UK Data Archive in the Great 
Britain, the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research) in the USA, and the 
GESIS (German Social Science Infrastructure Services) in Germany.
7 For descriptions of the World Values Survey, see for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Globalization and 
Postmodern Values', The Washington Quarterly, 23:1 (Winter 2000), p. 215; Dalton, Russell J., 
'Appendix: The Major Cross-National Opinion Surveys', in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam eds., 
Disaffected Democracies: What's troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ/Cheicester: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 315-318; Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and 
Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p.3.
8 For instance, see Pharr and Putnam eds., Disaffected Democracies; Arts, Wil, Jacques Hagenaars and 
Loek Halman eds., The Cultural Diversity of European Unity: Findings, Explanations and Reflections 
from the European Values Study (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2003); Arts, Wil and Loek Halman 
eds., European Values at the Turn of the Millennium (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2004). See also 
Inglehart, Ronald, 'Publications Using World Values Survey Data', World Values Survey (1999) 
[http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/pub.shtml]; 'Publications' in WVS 
[http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/library/index.html].
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Among the most influential examples of values studies are those written by Inglehart. He is 
also  a  leading  figure  in  the  development  of  the  World  Values  Survey.  His  academic 
interests  include  the  studies  of  values  and  public  opinion  survey  for  analysing  their 
influence  on politics  and society,  to  which he has  contributed numerous  publications.9 
Throughout  these  works,  Inglehart's  primary  concerns  are  consistently  based  on  a 
hypothesis  that  people's  values  change  in  response  to  industrialisation  and  post-
industrialisation, which coincide with society's economic prosperity and its long-standing 
stability.10 It  has a crucial  effect  on political  and social  attributes of nations. With this 
hypothesis, Inglehart has produced contributions to the area of democratic studies, which 
has been mentioned in the previous chapter.
2.2.4 Research position
There has been an area of studies on public attitudes involving quantitative methodology.11 
The discipline also constitutes one of trends in contemporary democratic studies.12 The 
present study utilises the Postmaterialist scale as well as the World Values Survey for the 
comparative analysis of Russia, Japan, the United States and Britain.  Further, a regional 
perspective is incorporated by referring to distinctions between Western, East Asian, and 
Postcommunist  societies.  It  takes  a  position  related  to  Inglehart's  thesis  especially  on 
Postmaterialist  values. Nonetheless,  this is not to replicate it  but to explore the further 
9 Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics 
(Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, Modernization 
and Postmodernization; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005).
10 For the terminology of popular attitude and values, Inglehart at times uses the expression 'culture'. 
However, it should be noted that 'culture' in that specific sense is different from the definition of 'culture' 
generally used to describe traditionally inherited set of norms, customs and values in respective societies. 
The former includes popular attitudes and values before and after their transformation due to economic or 
modernising development of societies while assuming such attitudes and values are (at least some parts) 
transformable. The latter obviously is more concerned with 'difference' between societies with a certain 
degree of consistency or durability. In this research, the latter sense of 'culture' is employed.
11 For instance, see Hofstede, Geert, Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behhaviors, Institutions,  
and Organizations across Nations, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001); Arts, 
Hagenaars and Halman eds., The Cultural Diversity of European Unity; Arts and Halman eds., European 
Values at the Turn of the Millennium.
12 For example, see Pippa Norris ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Pharr and Putnam eds., Disaffected Democracies; Norris, 
Pippa, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism: Reinventing Political Activism 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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potential  or  reinterpretation  of  the  Postmaterialist  scale  in  relation  to  democracy. 
Moreover, in addition to the time span perspective of the values shift, this research adds 
another dimension for consideration: the perspective of  space as represented by cultural 
divergence. One of the prime foci is on people's attitude to civic protest, which is assumed 
to have a certain relevance to the development of responsive democracy. Protest attitudes 
are  supposed  to  have  connections  with  Postmaterialist  values  as  well  as  a  sense  of 
individuality  and  freedom.  Meanwhile,  other  political  values  such  as  the  views  of 
governance are examined.
2.3 Postmaterialist index
2.3.1 Using the four-item Postmaterialist index
As shown in the previous chapter, Inglehart's work employs comprehensive indicators such 
as  a  scale  on  self-expression  values,  for  which  the  Postmaterialist  four-item index  is 
utilised as a part. In this study, rather than looking at the comprehensive variables, the 
investigation is centred on the measure of the Postmaterialist four-item index (and variants 
that are developed on the basis of the four-item index).
The reason is, first of all, despite Inglehart's recent work on broader trends of value 
transformation, the Postmaterialist thesis has had an independent importance in political 
and other social sciences. It is still relevant to pay particular attention to the Postmaterialist 
index per se. Secondly, from the outset, the Postmaterialist four-item index has constantly 
been utilised by Inglehart and his associates and has played a crucial role in his thesis. In 
relation to this, the four-item index has been employed consistently in series of surveys 
such  as  the  World  Values  Survey,  the  Eurobarometer  Survey and others.  Thirdly,  the 
Postmaterialist four-item index has a special significance to democratic studies. Inglehart's 
recent articles on democratic studies involve the frequent use of this index.13 Especially, 
two of its items, 'free speech' and 'more say', have a strong relevance to some dimensions 
of democracy. After all, the items imply liberty and participation. With this, the following 
parts review the theoretical basis of the Postmaterialist index.
13 This has been done sometimes with modification in the form of variable as well as changes of its name 
such as 'liberty aspirations' and 'liberty and participation'.
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2.3.2 Explaining the Postmaterialist index
How are Postmaterialist values evaluated? What are actual question and values items to be 
employed? This part briefly presents the constitution of the Postmaterialist index along 
with Maslow's values hierarchy quoted by Inglehart.
Maslow's values hierarchy
For the Postmaterialist-Materialist scale, Inglehart primarily took advantage of Maslow's 
values hierarchy, as presented in figure 2.1. According to this perspective, human goals are 
divided into several factors in hierarchical order. Overall, there are two categories, that is, 
(1)  physiological  needs  and  (2)  social  self-actualisation  needs.  It  is  supposed  that 
individuals tend to first seek to satisfy their physiological needs. After their fulfilment, 
they  are  then  inclined  to  step  further  and  fulfil  their  social  self-actualisation  needs. 
Moreover,  physiological  needs  are  separated  into  (a)  sustenance  needs  and  (b)  safety 
needs. Sustenance needs are such as food, water and shelter, which are basic to maintain 
human life and therefore sought as a first priority. When these needs are met, individuals 
continue to search for material concerns until the attainment of a comfortable margin of 
material security. These needs and concerns are interpreted as safety needs. After their 
attainment, individuals are assumed to have desires to satisfy feelings such as a sense of 
belonging and esteem, and further intellectual and aesthetic fulfilment. These amount to 
social  and  self-actualisation  needs,  which  are  located  as  higher-order  in  Maslow's 
hierarchy.14 Hence,  the  search  of  human  needs  is  presumed  to  shift  according  to  the 
hierarchy.
Inglehart interprets Maslow's values hierarchy in a Materialist and Postmaterialist 
context through the application of political issues. Physiological needs are described as 
Materialist values that include economic growth, security, order and so forth. They are 
believed to be conducive to the sustenance and safety of human requirements. Inglehart 
further goes on to apply another set of political issues to social and self-actualisation needs. 
Through the development of  industrialisation, which ensures a high level of continuous 
economic security and affluence, a society would make significant advancement to  fulfil 
its physiological needs. Then, a shift of values priority would occur towards an emphasis 
14 For Maslow's thesis, see Maslow, Abraham, Motivations and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 
1954).
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on individual freedom, self-expression and participation, which are  categorised as social 
and self-actualisation needs. This type of orientation is labelled Postmaterialist values.15 
Postmaterialist index
What is a Postmaterialist index? There are two types of Postmaterialist-Materialist scale. 
One  is  a  four-item index,  and  the  other  is  a  twelve-item index.16 They  are  based  on 
question items of surveys such as the World Values Survey. As exhibited in figure 2.2, the 
four-item index is based on the question subset in the middle: scale B. The twelve-item 
index is based on all of the three scales.17 The four-item index is the most relevant to this 
study due  to  its  connection with  major  aspects  of  democracy,  as  diagnosed in  a  later 
chapter. 
15 Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 39-43; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and 
Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of 
Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), pp. 80-81.
16 The disadvantage of the four-item index is, as Dalton suggested, that 'it is based on only four items, and 
this provides a narrow basis for tapping a broad dimension of human values'. See Dalton, Citizen Politics, 
3rd ed., p. 95 (note 2). Nonetheless, the disadvantage could be moderated through the employment of 
twelve items. Moreover, empirical works so far have provided plausible supports for the validity of the 
scale. Another disadvantage would be the four-item index is particularly sensitive to temporary economic 
conditions, as argued later.
17 It should be noted that, as shown in figure 2.2, the Postmaterialist twelve-item index is based on five 
Postmaterialist items despite the fact that there are six items in the Postmaterialist category. This is due to 
the fact that one of the six Postmaterialist items: 'trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful' 
is not included (or treated as neutral) for the construction of the twelve-item index. According to 
Inglehart, the factor analysis of the twelve items had a result that all the six Materialist items cluster 
towards one pole whereas five of the Postmaterialist items cluster towards the opposite pole. The above-
mentioned 'more beautiful cities' item was an exception, since it tended to be located in the middle 
between the two groups. Also, there might be a slight technical difference in the procedures of 
constructing the twelve-item scale between the original version and a version in the World Values 
Survey. See Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, pp. 39-53.
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Figure 2.1 Maslow's values hierarchy and Postmaterialist and Materialist items
Source:  Inglehart,  Ronald,  The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among 
Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42.
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Figure 2.2 Postmaterialist index
Question statement:
'People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this 
card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please 
say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?' 
'And which would be the next most important?'
Scale A   (first and second choices)
1. A high level of economic growth M
2. Making sure this country has strong defence forces M
3. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done 
    at their jobs and in their communities PM
4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful PM
Scale B  (first and second choices)
1. Maintaining order in the nation M
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions PM
3. Fighting rising prices M
4. Protecting freedom of speech PM
Scale C  (first and second choices)
1. A stable economy M
2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society PM
3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money PM
4. The fight against crime  M
Note: PM = Postmaterialist; M = Materialist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (4-item index)
This index is based on Scale B. 
If both Materialist items are chosen =>  Materialist (= 1)
If one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are chosen =>  Mixed (= 2)
If both Postmaterialist items are chosen =>  Postmaterialist (= 3)
2. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (12-item index)
This  index  is  based  on  all  12  items  (Scale  A,  B  and  C).  It  sums  up  the  total  number  of 
Postmaterialist  items  that  were  given  high  priority  (i.e.,  ranked as  either  first  or  second most 
important in its group of four items). Scores range from zero (none of the five Postmaterialist items 
was given high priority) to five (all five of the Postmaterialist items were given high priority).
Source: '1995-1997 World Values Survey: English-Language Version of Questionnaire, Institute for Social 
Research, The University of Michigan' and 'SPSS coding instructions for Materialist/Postmaterialist Values 
Indices',  in Inglehart,  Ronald et  al.,  ICPSR 2790, World Values  Surveys  and European Values Surveys,  
1981–1984,  1990–1993,  and  1995–1997, ICPSR  (Inter-university  Consortium  for  Political  and  Social 
Research) [a PDF file attached to the dataset], pp. 33-34, 171-172.
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2.3.3 Validity of the Postmaterialist index
For the utilisation of the Postmaterialist index, it is worthwhile exploring its validity. In 
this section, several discussions are presented on this matter.
2.3.3.1 Conceptualisation of values dimensions
Conceptualisation  of  values  dimensions  is  one  of  key  debates.  Flanagan  challenged 
Inglehart's thesis regarding the concept of values change. He contended that in advanced 
industrialised societies there are at least two dimensions in values shift rather than a single 
dimension of Postmaterialist-Materialist values change. Whereas the first dimension is a 
values transformation from material towards non-economic values, the second one is from 
authoritarian towards libertarian values.18 
 On this argument, Dalton states, 'Flanagan's theoretical distinction is useful, but the 
empirical evidence suggests that these two value dimensions overlap and that both value 
shifts  are  occurring  simultaneously  in  most  advanced  industrial  democracies.  Thus, 
Flanagan's two dimensions can be seen as subelements of Inglehart's broader framework. 
Regardless of how we conceptualize this process, however, there is general agreement that 
the value priorities of modern publics have been changing.'19 Indeed, Flanagan's concept of 
two values dimensions is not incompatible with Inglehart's thesis that explicates a single 
Postmaterialist-Materialist  values  dimension.  The  former  examines  the  relevant  values 
transformation  from  two  separated  perspectives  whereas  the  latter  presents  values 
transformation in highly modernised societies by elucidating the interconnection of the two 
dimensions that are in effect taking place concurrently. Thus, Flanagan's conceptualisation 
of the two-values dimensions does not invalidate the concept of Postmaterialist-Materialist 
values and could even be considered a supplement to it.
2.3.3.2 Validity of measurement
There have been discussions over the validity of the Postmaterialist  index.  One of the 
issues  is,  for  example,  'whether  we  should  measure  values  in  terms  of  personal  life 
18 Flanagan, Scott, 'Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Society', Comparative Political Studies, 14 
(1982), pp. 403-44; Flanagan, Scott, 'Value Change in Industrial Society', American Political Science 
Review, 81 (1987), pp. 1303-19.
19 Dalton, Russell, J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinions and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial  
Democracies, 2nd ed. (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), p. 94.
54
conditions or phrased as political goals that are linked to political behaviors'.20 Inglehart 
arranged  Postmaterialist  and  Materialist  values  items  on  the  basis  of  Maslow's  values 
hierarchy. Relevant political goals are allocated to each of the items.21 It is pointed out that 
problematic nature of this would be 'the unsubstantiated nature of the relationship between 
values, as represented by public policy goals and psychological needs.'22 The main concern 
is  whether  the  Postmaterialist  scale  in  fact  is  able  to  tap  the  basic  values  dimension 
hypothesised in Inglehart's thesis.
There have been studies that have been concerned with this issue. Marsh probed a 
British sample with individual-level analysis. In his initial research as presented in 1975, 
Marsh cast doubt on the capacity of the Postmaterialist scale in measuring fundamental 
personal  values.23 Marsh  developed  a  scale  that  measures  the  'personal'  dimension  of 
Postmaterialist values in contrast with the Inglehart's Postmaterialist index. Marsh regarded 
the  latter  conventional  index  as  representing  the  'public'  dimension,  since  it  primarily 
employed political goals as survey question items that constituted the index.24 Due to the 
political characteristics of the components, the 'public' Postmaterialist index was assumed 
to  have  weakness  in  tapping  basic  values  orientations  in  relation  to  Maslow's  values 
hierarchy.25 Marsh suggested relatively  low correspondence  between the  'personal'  and 
'public'  Postmaterialist  scales  by  presenting  their  modest  correlation  and  other  results, 
which  implied  limitation  in  the  'public'  scale.26 Nonetheless,  this  does  not  necessarily 
invalidate  the  conventional  Postmaterialist  index.  The  two  types  of  indexes  could  be 
different simply because they may mainly measure distinct areas of Postmaterialist and 
Materialist  dimensions.27 Furthermore,  the  validity  of  the  'public'  Postmaterialist  scale 
20 Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2nd ed., p.94.
21 For the details of the allocation of the items, see a section on Postmaterialist scale and Maslow's values 
hierarchy in this chapter.
22 Trump, Thomas M., 'Value Formation and Postmaterialism: Inglehart's Theory of Value Change 
Reconsidered', Comparative Political Studies, 24: 3 (October 1991), p. 368.
23 Marsh, Alan, 'The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain', American 
Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 21-30.
24 Marsh, Alan, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977).
25 Marsh, 'The "Silent Revolution," Value Priorities, and the Quality of Life in Britain'; Marsh, Protest and 
Political Consciousness, pp. 165-197.
26 Ibid., pp. 165-184. Inglehart contends that the fact that the correlation figures (.22 and .21) are positive, 
albeit modest, is in favour of the Postmaterialist thesis. Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced 
Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 160.
27 In this sense, the presence of the positive correlation between the two scales indicates that they overlap 
while sharing the same ground of a values dimension.
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cannot be rejected only by the lack of conformity to the 'personal' scale, since the latter 
scale can also have weakness.28 Meanwhile, in Marsh's findings, there is an indication that 
both scales represent the Postmaterialist and Materialist values.29 Moreover, Marsh himself 
employed  the  two  indexes  in  relation  to  protest  potential.30 He agreed  that  elements 
represented  by  the  two  types  of  Postmaterialist  scales  affect  protest  potential.31 This 
virtually indicates his acceptance of the 'public' Postmaterialist scale as a valid measure. 
Lafferty and Knutson  conducted individual-level research using sample data from 
Norway in the context of Postmaterialist values.32 They examined their own version of a 
'personal'  Postmaterialist  index,  having  reviewed  Marsh's  study.  They  found  that  the 
'personal' Postmaterialist values were systematically associated with the 'public' sphere of 
Postmaterialism, which would support Inglehart's thesis.33 For it indicated the consistent 
presence of the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension across personal and political 
values. Moreover, their principal component factor analysis showed such presence in both 
measures.34 Consequently, the findings of Lafferty and Knutson endorse the validity of the 
'public' Postmaterialist index that utilises political items. In short, although scepticism on 
the validity of the Postmaterialist index may have certain plausibility in logic, this could be 
only sustained by empirical analyses. There have been examinations based on survey data 
to that effect, and they seem to have obtained results in favour of Inglehart's thesis and its 
scale.
28 For example, in a principal axis analysis, the item of 'respect' as one of supposed Postmaterialist items 
was located in the Materialist cluster. See Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness, pp. 176-177. Also, 
practically, an empirical scale based on survey data cannot be a pure measure that perfectly taps a 
theoretically presumed values dimension. Therefore, it is implausible to employ the 'personal' 
Postmaterialist index as a definite standard to be able to judge the validity of other Postmaterialist scales.
29 For instance, the principal axis analysis indicated polarisation between Postmaterialist and Materialist 
groups in both indexes. See ibid., 177.
30 Ibid., pp. 184-192.
31 Ibid., p. 191-192.
32 Lafferty, William M., and Oddbjorn Knutson, 'Postmaterialism in a Social Democratic State: An Analysis 
of the Distinctness and Congruity of the Inglehart Value Syndrome in Norway', Comparative Political  
Studies, 17 (1985), pp. 411-430. For Laferty's earlier work, which critically analysed Inglehart's thesis, 
see Lafferty, William M., 'Basic Needs and Political Values: Some Perspectives from Norway's Silent 
Revolution', Acta Sociologia, 19 (1976), pp. 117-36.
33 Lafferty and Knutson, 'Postmaterialism in a Social Democratic State', pp. 418-421, 426-427. This was 
further illuminated by the fact that the 'personal' values items did not show particular relationship with 
other two values dimensions: 'left-right placement' and 'leftist materialism'.
34 Ibid., pp. 424-427. It should be noted that, in similar analyses of ('public') Postmaterialist and Materialist 
items for several Western societies, Inglehart obtained results that largely indicated the presence of the 
Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension cross-nationally. For the analyses, see Inglehart, The Silent  
Revolution, pp. 43-53; Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, pp. 131-141.
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2.3.3.3 Susceptibility to temporary economic conditions
There  have  been  questions  if  the  Postmaterialist  index  is  suspiciously  susceptible  to 
fluctuations  in  economic  conditions.35 For  example,  the four-item index is  sensitive  to 
conditions of inflation since one of the items is 'fighting against rising prices'. It could be 
affected by relatively high inflation, so that the choice of the item could be interpreted as 
an immediate reflection of current (therefore temporary) economic needs rather than an 
underlying basic values dimension.36 Nonetheless, although the item of 'fighting against 
rising prices' might be relatively susceptible to economic conditions, this is a rather minor 
weakness of the index. In view of the fact that the whole index comprises twelve items, 
and six are chosen out of them, it is unlikely that only the fluctuation of the single item 
seriously affects the indication of actual values dimension. 
Also,  economic  circumstances  often  have  transitory  elements  and  are  easily 
distinguished  when  the  types  of  conditions,  such  as  inflation  and  unemployment,  are 
present. This means that as long as analysts are careful about the choice of the cases and 
periods for observation, they can avoid such problems. Even if one chooses data under 
irregular economic conditions, analysts can simply take these into consideration. It is not 
difficult to recognise these factors. Furthermore, since an attitude to economic matters is 
essential  for  Postmaterialist-Materialist  values  dimensions,  it  is  impossible  to  remove 
economic items. In effect,  such criticism is only a minor technicality, so that it  cannot 
rebut the usefulness of the Postmaterialist index. In brief, minor weaknesses on economic 
items do not significantly reduce the validity of the Postmaterialist index.
2.3.3.4 Index of choice
 There are researchers who criticise the style of the Postmaterialist scale in that it measures 
35 For example, Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg, Chris McIntyre, Petra Bauer-Kaase and Max Kaase, 
'The Effect of Economic Value Priorities on the Measurement of Value Change: New Experiment 
Evidence', American Political Science Review, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 637-647; Clarke, Harold D. 
and Nitish Dutt, 'Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of 
Unemployment', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), pp. 905-20; Duch, Raymond M., and 
Michaell A. Taylor, 'Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition', American Journal of Political  
Science, 37 (August 1993), pp. 747-79; As for counter arguments to such critique, for instance, Inglehart, 
Ronald, and Abramson, Paul R., 'Measuring Postmaterialism', American Political Science Review, 93: 3 
(September 1999).
36 Dalton, Citizen Politics, 3rd ed., p. 95 (note 2).
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the priority of values items in the context of a Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. They 
argue  that  although  Postmaterialist  and  Materialist  values  are  different,  they  are  not 
conceptually opposite to each other. This means that 'rather than representing mutually 
exclusive (and hence contradictory) concerns, postmaterialism and materialism represent 
values which are in practice often compatible' as Brooks and Manza put it.37 Davis and 
Davenport wrote that '[f]rom a measurement perspective, asking individuals to rank values 
that  may be equally  desirable  and not mutually  contradictory may be an inappropriate 
measure of value orientation.'38 
In appearance, these points may sound plausible. Nonetheless, they miss a point: the 
central aim of the Postmaterialist scale. Their claims may be true only if one's 'degree' of 
attachment is  to be measured on a single  item. However,  this is not the case with the 
Postmaterialist  index.  The  Postmaterialist  scale  is  basically  to  measure  an  orientation 
towards either of two values: whether one is oriented to such concerns as self-expression 
(which constitute Postmaterialist values), or to materialistic and economically beneficial 
concerns (which amount to Materialist values). The two values do not need to be opposite. 
What matters is which set of values is more emphasised.
The critics support a type of a measurement that evaluates whether an individual is 
inclined strongly or weakly (in other cases, for or against) to one values item. They may 
allow another style of measurement that does not overtly ask a degree of support, by using 
two mutually exclusive and contradictory values items. In that case also, it measures one 
values issue. The point is that two items are located respectively at the two opposite ends 
of one measure line in terms of one issue. In this sense, when two mutually exclusive and 
contradictory items are used for measurement,  it  still  qualitatively measures a person's 
'degree' of attachment towards one side relative to the other side on one issue.39 
The Postmaterialist  index  is,  however,  fundamentally  different  in  its  nature.  The 
index is about 'choice' on either of  two different values: Postmaterialist and Materialist 
values, as shown in figure 2.3. It is about expressing priority or ranking which type of 
37 Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza, 'Do Changing Values Explain the New Politics? A Critical Assessment of 
the Postmaterialist Thesis', Sociological Quarterly, 35: 4 (1994), pp. 547.
38 Davis, Darren W. and Christian Davenport, 'Assessing the Validity of the Postmaterialism Index', 
American Political Science Review, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 651.
39 Suppose that a person prefers one of the two opposite items in such a measurement. If the degree of the 
person's attachment to the preferred item is high, the attachment to the other item become automatically 
low. And, if the person prefers the other item, vice versa.
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values are closer than the other type to a given individual's preference. This is clearly a 
scale to inquire the individual's values orientation. The natures of two values items do not 
need to be mutually exclusive and contradictory. Moreover, the arrangement of the index 
has relevance to political issues. Priority implies choosing options over others. That could 
indicate which options people would choose, if necessary, at the cost of the alternatives. 
Real  political  matters  often  constitute  such  questions  of  choice,  often  given  limited 
resources and circumstances. The items provide the distribution of values priority directly 
related to policy choices. Thus, the validity of the Postmaterialist indicator is justifiable to 
this effect.
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Figure 2.3 Types of measurements
1. Measurement of 'degree'
[A] Items of extent
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Very Good Good Poor Very Poor
[B] Mutually exclusive and contradictory items
Modern Traditional
Democratic Authoritarian
2. Measurement of 'choice' (emphasis and priority)
Postmaterialist Materialist
Respondent
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2.3.3.5 Question of culture: revisited
There  is  one  crucial  question.  The  Postmaterialist  index  was  basically  developed  to 
measure  the  consequences  of  the  values  shift.  There  is  possibility,  however,  that  the 
variable  is  affected  by  the  presence  of  cultural  characteristics.  As  Dalton  points  out, 
although Inglehart's earlier work had a close linkage with the Maslovian values hierarchy, 
his more recent work gives less prominence in the linkage, since he has become more 
sensitive to cultural and local variation that could affect what values are seen as scarce and 
therefore need to be  emphasised.40 In a study on Japanese attitudes, Ike suggested that 
although there was an indication of change, the indication was more complicated than the 
way Inglehart's perspective depicted in the case of Western societies. By this, he connoted 
the effect of traditional  cultural  presence in conjunction with economic development.41 
Inglehart and Welzel's argument on the 'path-dependent' nature of values shift corresponds 
with this, which allows cultural variance to be taken into consideration.42 Hence, values 
priorities could  be  affected  by  cultural  differences even  within  the  range  of  the 
Postmaterialist scale.
 As  seen  in  the  values  hierarchy,  people  with  values  of  (2)  social  and  self-
actualisation needs (Postmaterialist) would attach importance to self-expression and self-
esteem being oriented towards individuals as well as to non-material and abstract beauty in 
the  realm  of  ideas.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  emphasise  (1)  physiological  needs 
(Materialist) give weight to actual benefit such as economic gain as well as security and 
social  order,  which  are  much  related  to  immediate  needs  and  daily  concerns.  These 
dispositions, however, could be due to a cultural penchant. If so, is it legitimate to interpret 
the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy simply in the context of 'values shift' with the 
scarcity  hypothesis  based  on  Maslow's  values  hierarchy?  On  the  one  hand,  it  sounds 
feasible (and has been tested with positive results in Western democratic societies) that as 
industrialisation advances and generates a certain degree of affluence and security for a 
long period, a certain values transformation occurs. On the other hand, in non-Western 
societies, where it has not been examined thoroughly in terms of values shift, it is also 
40 Dalton, Citizen Politics, 3rd ed., p. 95 (note 1).
41 Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', American Political Science 
Review, 67 (1973), pp. 1194-1203.
42 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 1, pp. 15-
47.
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plausible  that  cultural  particularity  can  have  an  influence  over  the  variety  of  values 
priorities.  In  Inglehart's  values  map,  there  is  a  noticeable  variation  observed  among 
different cultural zones regarding values priorities.43 
Considering  this,  it  seems  that  the  values  distribution  in  Postmaterialist  and 
Materialist values items should be understood through the perspective of a horizontal view 
that  see  the  values  items  equally,  rather  than  a  hierarchical  view  that  connotes  a 
unidirectional  shift.  This would be especially suitable to comparing culturally different 
societies. Moreover, it is more precise to see the Postmaterialist-Materialist values items 
respectively,  rather  than  categorically  binding  them  together  in  terms  of  the  two 
dichotomous values sets.
Consequently, having reviewed several discussions of the Postmaterialist index, it 
seems that there is relatively firm support for the validity of the index. The scale appears to 
have scientific foundations that have endured numerous examinations. In view of these, it 
is plausible to conclude that the utilisation of the Postmaterialist index can be justified. 
However, the index seems to have sensitivity to cultural variation, which is one of the core 
enquiries in the present study.
2.4 Exploring dichotomy: values shift versus cultural particularity
The exploration of dichotomy in terms of values shift and cultural particularity is one of 
the central themes for this study. In reality, however, it is difficult to distinguish whether 
the  difference  derives  from  values  shift  or  cultural  variation  especially  due  to  the 
availability  of  data,  which  covers  only  two  decades  at  best.  Given  such  restriction, 
nonetheless, several attempts are made in the present study to explore the dichotomy. One 
of  the focuses  is  on 'durability'.  If  there  is  a  consistent  systematic  change,  this  would 
connote a values shift. If there is coherent durability in the distribution of a given values, 
this  suggests its  persistent tendency and hence strength  in the  values'  presence.  It also 
43 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 92-100; Inglehart, Ronald and Baker E., 
'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', American Sociological  
Review, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy, p. 48-76, esp. 63.
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implies a certain 'immunity' to the variability of conditions that are the supposed causes of 
a  values  shift.  And,  if  such  a  character  is  different  from other  societies,  this  could be 
translated as cultural particularity. For instance, we could take advantage of the availability 
of data from several time points (albeit limited), which may allow us to detect the signs of 
values change or durability. The durability could be measured even in data at a single time 
point.  By  using  sociological  variables  (for  example,  age,  income,  occupation,  gender, 
education and so forth) as independent variables, if a certain level persists regardless of 
such variables, it may be accepted that the indicated level of values have a durability that 
transcends  different  attributes  in  a  given  society.  If  such  a  tendency  is  unique  in 
comparison with other societies, it suggests cultural particularity. Another method is to use 
multiple  regression by  employing  dummy variables that  represent  regional  groups.  By 
comparing  the  relative  impact  of  the  dummy  variables  with  other  variables  such  as 
economic level, we could grasp the persistent presence of cultural effects.44 This discussion 
will be considered in more detail in the relevant sections of later chapters.
2.5 Quantitative methods and survey data
This part examines the validity of the survey data and quantitative methods that are utilised 
in this study.
2.5.1 On parsimony and variance
It  is  possible  to  question  whether the  use  of  a  quantitative  approach  with  specified 
variables could be oversimplified when examining the realm of values. This is due to the 
complexity of the social and human issues involved. Nonetheless, in order to recognise the 
object of study in a tangible manner, one needs to employ abstraction or simplification at a 
certain  level.  Without  abstraction,  it  is  difficult  to  logically  establish  the  presence  of 
causality or contexts.  Unless one simplifies a given phenomenon,  a  person could neither 
achieve a workable arrangement of analysis nor findings that could be communicated with 
others. Simplification provides clarity, and clarity enables a given idea to be shared with a 
number of others.  Rightly abstracted conceptual models help indicating what is a crucial 
44 In fact, this method is employed by Inglehart's recent works (i.e. regression using dummy variables for 
measuring cultural/local/regional particularity).
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context  in  order  to  adequately  understand  reality.  Every  detail  is  not  required.  Thus, 
simplification is a viable and essential tool for social sciences. As Huntington remarks, 'we 
need a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our 
purposes'.45
Such simplification is often cited in relation to 'parsimony'.46 Quantitative methods 
are  in  a  way  skills  that  purposefully  employ  adequate  simplification  and  formalise 
analytical processes in accordance with it. For instance, econometric models as empirical 
tools for economics are based on this underlying idea.47 To be fair, there are limitations for 
such  methods.  It  is  almost  impossible  that  a  single  social  theory  can  stand  for  every 
complex  reality.  Despite  this,  it  is  still  possible  to  find  out  central  patterns  that  are 
functioning with relative coherency. The aim of using theories and quantitative methods 
rest  on  this  utility.  Therefore,  good  theory,  measurement  and  quantitative  models  are 
concerned with how correctly they identify the central trends and how effectively they 
express them in the best possible manner. 
Technically,  a  theory  (to  which  a  researcher  pays  a  focused  attention)  could  be 
equivalent  to  a  'systematic  part'  of  a  quantitative  expression,  while  residuals,  namely, 
elements unfocused or unexplained by the systematic part could be equated to 'error terms 
(or disturbance)'. Let us consider a simple example where a given theory states that an 
element 'x' affects the state of 'y'. (Say, as 'x' increases, 'y' increases.)
A quantitative model: y = ax + b + e
(1) y = ax + b : (a systematic part: explained)
45 Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 31.
46 For parsimony, see for instance, King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social  
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 
20, 29-30, 104-105; Gujarati, Damodar N., Basic Econometrics, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 
pp. 46-47; Burnham, Peter, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, Research Methods in 
Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 4-5.
47 For a basic notion of econometric models, see Maddala, G. S., Introduction to Econometrics, 3rd ed. 
(Chichester/New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001), pp. 3-10; Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, pp. 1-14; 
Kennedy, Peter, A Guide to Econometrics, 5th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 1-10; Stock, 
James H. and Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometrics (Boston/London: Addison Wesley/Pearson 
Education, 2003), pp. 3-15; Wooldridge, Jefferey M., Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 
2nd ed. (Mason, Ohio: South-Western, Thompson Learning, 2003), pp. 1-19.
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(2) e : (an error term/residual: unexplained)
The 'x' is an independent variable or element that is to explain the condition of a dependent 
variable 'y'. The 'b' is a constant. The quantitative model takes into account both explained 
and unexplained elements on the state of 'y'. Moreover, the size of the 'e' (an error term) 
indicates the extent of the limitation of explanatory power by 'x', namely, a theory.48
This is a primary awareness of quantitative methods. The methods not only accept 
but also consider the existence of errors that could not be explained by theories. Indeed, 
one of the crucial attributes of the methods is to intentionally cope with the variance. A 
good theory or model therefore is the one that is able to minimise the degree of variance, 
which in turn is to maximise its explanatory power in relation to a given phenomenon. In 
one way, quantitative methods are one of means to systematically show to what extent a 
given  theory  or  model  is  valid  for  explicating  reality.  In  this  sense,  a  critique  that 
quantitative methods are too simplistic is irrelevant, since the methods  are aware of the 
limitation of a simplified theory, and are capable of explicitly presenting the degree of the 
limitation, that is, how well the theory explains a given phenomenon. 
Moreover,  with  this  basic  principle,  quantitative  models  can  be  developed  to 
construct complex, robust and potent structures for empirical explanation. A primary step 
is to add extra independent variables, which enables competing theories to be compared for 
their  levels  of  validity.  For  this,  the  selection  of  variables  is  crucial,  since  omitting 
essential variables could lead to a partial view of reality. Therefore, caution is needed in 
choosing what  contexts  are  important  while avoiding their  undue exclusion.  The more 
relevant decision we make for the selection, the more powerful the explanation becomes. 
Thus,  quantitative analysis  is  a  viable  and powerful  tool  that  makes possible  both the 
focused examination and the systematic evaluation of hypotheses.
2.5.2 Quantitative methods versus qualitative methods
It is also possible to make criticisms of the methodological limits of analysing survey data. 
The critique may be that quantitative data based on questionnaires would be restricted and 
rigid in relation to the in-depth contexts of social and human attitudes. To be fair, on the 
48 For analogous arguments, see for example, Maddala, Introduction to Econometrics, pp. 4-6; Gujarati, 
Basic Econometrics, pp. 3-9, 37-52; Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, pp. 2-5, 22-61.
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one hand, there may be a certain inflexibility in this type of research materials. Many of 
the data are based on ordinal and nominal measurement, which may fix responses within 
limited  categories.49 Even if  interval  measurement  is  considered,  the  data  may  simply 
represent a unidirectional variability in each item. Nonetheless, on the other hand, the use 
of  quantitative  data  and  techniques  holds  efficacies  that  more  than  balance  the 
disadvantages.  The advantages of quantitative methods and survey data could be well-
illuminated by comparison with qualitative interview methods. 
First  of  all,  a  general  concern  of  simplicity  is  not  necessarily  the  case  with 
quantitative analysis. A researcher could attempt a great deal of complex examinations in a 
systematic manner. A number of combinations of variables are possible. There is a wide 
range of availability for numerous types of techniques. Analytical processes are relatively 
standardised. These make possible the fusion of complexity and systematic analysis, which 
is one of the key strengths in this method. In contrast, a qualitative approach may have 
disadvantages in this context. The format of data and analysis process is not as solidly 
standardised as a quantitative approach.50 Due to the complicated, unique and probably 
reactive  characters  of  conversational  data  extracted  from  individual  interviews, 
inexperienced researchers may draw various interpretations, which would not necessarily 
be compatible with each other. Depending on analysts, there could be a potential risk that 
an  analytical  result  would  constitute  a  sum  of  divergent  descriptions  rather  than  a 
consistent conclusion. Meanwhile, although a quantitative approach could be complex, the 
complexity tends to be structured. This is due to the fact that the analyses are based on 
clearly defined variables and the formality of statistical methods.
Another  shortcoming  of  qualitative  approaches  might  be  that  the  contents  of 
interview could be susceptible to situations.51 During observations, the contents, flows and 
dynamisms of conversations can change, depending on multiple factors. The factors could 
49 For types of questionnaire items and variables, see de Vaus, D. A., Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed. 
(London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 80-105, 129-132; Bryman, Alan and Duncan Cramer, Quantitative Data 
Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), 
pp. 55-70; de Vaus, David, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 94-121, 
203-206.
50 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry point out that the feature of a survey method is 
standardisation. They admit that '[t]here is no standard set of techniques that can be applied' for elite 
interviewing in qualitative contexts, while arguing that standardisation would not be adequate for that 
purpose. See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, pp. 205-6.
51 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry depict the processes and techniques of qualitative interviews, 
which entail strong sensitivity to situations. See ibid., pp. 211-217.
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be personalities and other attributes of both interviewers and interviewees, their temporary 
conditions, environments where these take place, researchers' communicative skills and 
experiences, and so forth.52 Although flexibility is an advantage of a qualitative interview, 
this flexibility can also allow inconsistent contents of interviews. On the other hand, survey 
methods would be less prone to these factors.  Although responses may be affected by 
circumstantial  effects  to  some  extent,  formalised  sets  of  questions  can  minimise  the 
fluctuations.  Since the items in  a  questionnaire are  clearly pre-arranged, it  is  easier  to 
consistently draw answers for specific issues as planned.
Nonetheless, this is not to negate a qualitative approach  per se. There are several 
arguments  in  its  favour.53 The  method  allows  for in-depth  probes  and  a  more  subtle 
approach to  research  objects,  including  issues  that  are  unquantifiable.54 This  can  be  a 
source to generate important insights. It also has the capacity to be flexible.55 The method 
is advantageous to focus on a sub-category of a population for a specific subject matter.56 
Moreover, quantitative and qualitative analyses are not necessarily exclusive to each other. 
It  could be that  'the qualitative/quantitative divide is  rather  less clear-cut  than is  often 
assumed'.57 It  is  possible  to  combine  the  strengths  of  the  dichotomous  methods.  A 
qualitative study could often generate assumptions to be tested by a quantitative study, and 
albeit  less  frequent,  vice  versa.58 There  is  an  approach  of  triangulation,  which  is  '[a] 
process by which two or more kinds of data from different sources are used to see if the 
information is corroborated'.59 This logic could be applied to the two types of methods.60 
Similarly,  Tarrow  presents  several  possibilities  to  bridge  quantitative  and  qualitative 
52 Devine depicts how interviewers' stances, behaviours and skills affect responses from interviewees. See 
Devine, Fiona, 'Qualitative Methods', Theory and Methods in Political Science, Marsh, David, and Gerry 
Stoker eds. (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), pp. 143-144.
53 For a comprehensive introduction to qualitative research, see for example, Harrison, Political Research, 
pp. 73-138.
54 For instance, see Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', pp. 137-138, 146-152; Harrison, Political Research, pp. 
74, 78-79; Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, p. 211-236.
55 Harrison, Political Research, p. 75.
56 For political studies on decision-makers, for instance, elite interview is an efficient method to effectively 
draw useful information by spotting people who are particularly knowledgeable on a matter to be 
investigated. See Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, pp. 205, 
219.
57 Ibid., p. 277.
58 Ibid., pp. 277-278.
59 Harrison, Political Research, p. 168. For triangulation, see also Peters, B. Guy, Comparative Politics:  
Theory and Methods (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp. 97-102.
60 Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, pp. 277-278.
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studies.61 Thus, both of  the  methods have respective advantages  that could complement 
each other.
For practical reasons, however, researchers have to be selective for the employment 
of methodology. Which method is to be utilised depends on types of themes, theories and 
other characteristics of the research. For the present study, the theme is on the national 
comparison of popular attitudes. Due to this, a quantitative approach would be adequate in 
view of  its  function.  To put  it  precisely,  major  reasons  for  using  the approach  are  as 
follows. Its main rationale rests on generalisability. Thanks to the techniques of inferential 
statistics,  it  is  theoretically  possible  to  estimate  population  parameters  (namely,  actual 
figures of populations) by using sampled data. Moreover, for the World Values Survey, the 
numbers of cases in most national samples range approximately between 900 and 2600 
(with  a  small  number  of exceptions).62 The  large  sizes  of  the  samples  support  the 
generalisability of the analytical results.63 On the other hand, qualitative methods may have 
a  certain  weakness  for  this  purpose.64 Methods  such  as  qualitative  interviews  and 
participant observation are likely to allow only a limited number of cases to be observed.65 
This  would  make  it  difficult  to  generalise the  results  as  representative  of  national 
populations. There is methodological difficulty in applying an inferential procedure to such 
a small size of respondents, who are often selected without particular sampling designs.66 
In  addition,  the  nature  of  qualitative  data  might  present  a  certain  hindrance  to 
generalisability  because  of  its  complexity  and,  for  some  cases,  idiosyncrasy.  In  the 
61 Tarrow, Sydney, 'Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide', in Henry E. Brady and David Collier 
eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004), pp. 171-179.
62 This includes the four waves of World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-8, 1999-2002.
63 For statistical analysis, it is normally the case that the larger a sample size is, the better it represents a 
wider population. For the issues of a sample size, see de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed., pp. 
70-73; Bryman and Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows, pp. 103-104; 
de Vaus, David, Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis (London/Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 150, 175-186; de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed., pp. 80-
83.
64 Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', p. 145.
65 Devine suggests that '[a] small sample of approximately 30-40 interviewees is the norm' for a qualitative 
research. See ibid., pp. 142. Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry state that '20-30 interviews 
might be a reasonable target for a project in which elite interviewing was the principal method'. See 
Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, p. 208.
66 Devine writes, '[r]ather than generate a tightly defined sample according to according to a range of 
criteria, qualitative samples are more loosely defined'. She states, '[t]here is often no sampling frame', 
while mentioning 'snowball sampling' as a usual way, which is dependent on a network of interviewees. 
See Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', p. 142. For a similar remark, see Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-
Henry, Research Methods in Politics, p. 207.
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meantime,  the present  research is  concerned with issues surrounding Inglehart's  thesis, 
which emphatically utilises survey data. For this specific purpose, it would be appropriate 
to focus the examination as an extension of his arguments and methods. Consequently, 
quantitative methods and the World Values Survey would be most suitable to the aim and 
character of the present research.
2.6 Conclusion
This  chapter  has  explored  the  methodological  dimensions  of  the  dissertation.  Within 
political  science,  the  present  study  occupies  a  position  in  the  areas  of  studies  on 
democratisation and popular attitudes while involving major academic interests concerned 
with political culture. Inglehart's thesis and the World Values Survey are the prime sources 
of examination. The Postmaterialist index, especially the four-item scale, is  utilised as a 
main device.67 Despite challenging critiques, the postmaterialist  index holds considerable 
validity and utility. One major concern, however, is its possible susceptibility to cultural 
difference, although the index is supposed to measure outlooks in relation to post-industrial 
values transformation. This point is further investigated in the following chapters as one of 
the research themes. There are several options that could analyse the competing effects of 
values shift and cultural variation. As for quantitative methods and survey data, they are of 
great importance to the aims and nature of this research. With these, the following chapters 
move  on  to  actual  data  analyses  to  examine  the  dichotomy:  values  shift  vs.  cultural 
particularity  through comparison  of  the  USA,  Britain,  Russia  and  Japan.  Some of  the 
outcomes  are  further  explored  in  the  context  of  tripartite  categories:  Western, 
Postcommunist and East Asian regions. Also, the political consequences of their attitudinal 
patterns are considered in relation to democracy.  
67 Some variants are also developed from the index, as shown in a later chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Postmaterialist Index
3.1 Introduction
Inglehart's  Postmaterialist  thesis  puts  its  emphasis  on  values  shift.  This  chapter 
incorporates another emphasis:  the values  variation of different societies.  By this, it  is 
envisaged to suggest a supplement to the Inglehart's thesis. The discussion takes advantage 
of the Postmaterialist scale and concepts of the thesis. The values shift depicted in the 
Postmaterialist thesis may be a plausible symptom of modernised societies. In the process 
of such a symptom occurring, nonetheless, there could be various cultural and historical 
conditions that either hinder or accelerate its development. A major purpose of this chapter 
is to compare values configurations of four societies: the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan. 
The focus is to establish how different and similar their values distributions are within the 
Postmaterialist and Materialist categories. In a concluding section, the implications of the 
analytical outcomes to democracy and Russia are mentioned.
3.2 Hypothesis
According to Inglehart's thesis, the acquisition and continuation of wealth and security in a 
society satisfy material needs of the people. It amounts to a shift in their values toward 
non-material  needs such  as  self-actualisation.  This  hypothesis  underpins  a  values  shift 
assumption,  under  which  Postmaterialist  outlooks  are  nurtured  by  a  relatively  long-
standing affluence of society due to its economic growth.1
However, societies with noticeable development of such values mostly belong to the 
Western democratic world. In these societies the freedom of individuals has been highly 
valued  in  comparison  with  other  societies.2 It  seems  that  this  social  esteem  of  the 
1 See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among 
Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart, Ronald, Culture 
Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Inglehart, Ronald, 
Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, 
(Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997).
2 Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel 
A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in 
Pacific Asia (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16; Huntington, Samuel P., The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 
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individual is deeply related (at least advantageous) to the historically earlier emergence and 
spread of Postmaterialist values in their societies. Since main elements in Postmaterialist 
values include self-actualisation and self-esteem, they in effect overlap with the emphasis 
on freedom in Western tradition. 
Conversely, even if high economic growth and relatively long-standing wealth are 
maintained, in a society where individual liberty has not been strongly appreciated or even 
intentionally weakened, it is possible that the spread of Postmaterialist values will have 
been deterred or distorted. There are at least two types of societies in which this may be the 
case. One is the cohort of former communist societies, and the other is that of East Asian 
societies. What is common between the two types of societies seems to be such as social 
norms that under-emphasise individuals in comparison with a holistic goal of a society, 
state or governance, and tendencies that put more importance to material benefits rather 
than intellectual or abstract fulfilment. Under the former communist regimes, their official 
ideologies upheld state-planning economies, which were supposed to provide the equal 
supplies  of  economic  benefits  to  the  people  while  suppressing  free  competitions  and 
private  ownerships.3 The  well-being  of  the  populace  was,  at  least  officially,  apt  to  be 
understood in  material  terms.  For  Russia,  there  has  been historical  popular  orientation 
prone to a strong leader that ensures order of the nation.4 This in turn indicates a certain de-
emphasis of freedom in exchange for order. In East Asia, cultural orientation is likely to 
encourage conformism and the overall  benefit  of  society or  societal  contexts  to which 
71-2; Hofstede, Geert, 'Individualism and Collectivism', in Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values,  
Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage 
Publications, 2001), ch. 5, pp. 209-278, esp. 215.
3 For descriptions of communist rule, its effects and post-communist changes, see for instance, White, 
Stephen, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, Developments in Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics, 2nd ed. 
(Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1992); Sakwa, Richard, Russian Politics and Society 
(London/New York: Routledge, 1993); White, Stephen, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman ed., 
Developments in Russian & Post-Soviet Politics, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1994); 
Sakwa, Richard, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2nd ed. (London/New York: Routledge, 1998); 
Remington, Thomas F., Politics in Russia (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999); 
Diamond, L. and M. Plattner, ed., Democracy after Communism (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002); Roskin, Michael G., The Rebirth of East Europe, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice Hall/Pearson Education, 2002); White, Stephen, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, 
Developments in Russian Politics 6 (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
4 White, Stephen, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).
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individuals  belong.5 This  is  also  applicable  to  Japanese  cultural  contexts.6 East  Asian 
outlooks hold a pragmatic tendency in conjunction with a strong sense of achievement. 
With this, their societies and governances have been likely to put an emphasis on economic 
growth  prior  to  the  enlargement  of  civil  and  political  rights.7 Consequently,  these 
characteristics have closer attributes to Materialist values than Postmaterialist ones. These 
inherited factors can weaken the formation of the Postmaterialist orientation.
The inquiries could be reduced to the following hypothesis. Whereas the explanation 
of  Postmaterialist  shift  due  to  economic  growth  and  continuous  affluence  would  be 
relatively appropriate to Western societies, this is not necessarily the case with societies in 
Postcommunist and East Asian regions. Their cultural or historical factors can discourage 
or distort the values shift and thus affect the state of Postmaterialist and Materialist values. 
The  configurations  of  values  could  be  affected  by  competing  effects:  economic 
development and cultural factors. But how? To answer this, the Postmaterialist index is 
examined in detail. By doing this, one can detect to what extent cultural variation matters 
within  the  Postmaterialist-Materialist  categories.  With  this,  the  following  sections  pay 
particular attention to comparisons between Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan. 
3.3 Postmaterialist index
In this part, the configurations of Postmaterialist and Materialist values are presented by 
comparing  four  societies:  Russia,  the  USA,  Britain  and  Japan.  It  separates  into  two 
sections for the four-item index and the twelve-item index. Each of the two sections further 
separates into two parts. The first half considers four societies comparatively, whereas the 
second half investigates each of the societies individually by comparing values conditions 
between different time points. The former part investigates whether there are differences or 
5 For (East) Asian political cultures, see for example, Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and 
Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority, (Cambridge, MA/London: Belknap Press, 1985); Bell, 
Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia; Diamond, Larry and Marc F. 
Plattner ed., Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
6 Maruyama, Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou, Zoho-ban, [Thought and Behaviour of Modern 
Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964).
7 See, for instance, Heywood, Andrew, Politics (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), pp. 34-35; 
Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then (Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East 
Asian Model', in Democracy and Democratization: Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective, 
(London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 255-268; Saich, Tony, Governance and Politics 
of China, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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common tendencies between the four different societies. The latter part looks at whether 
there are signs of shift or fluctuation in values conditions over a period of five or fifteen 
years, and whether there is any durability of values conditions in each of these societies 
over the periods. The four societies are compared by taking advantage of the four waves of 
the World Values Survey: 1981, 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002.8
3.3.1 The Postmaterialist four-item index
Comparison of societies
As presented in figures below, comparisons between the four societies are conducted. For 
the 1981 survey,  only  British and Japanese  cases  are  available.  Britain  has  a  stronger 
orientation  toward  Postmaterialist  values  than  Japan.  This  difference  continues  to  be 
observed  in  the  two subsequent  surveys.  Over  fifteen  years  from 1981 to  1995-8,  the 
British are consistently almost 10 per cent higher in the rate of Postmaterialism than the 
Japanese,  whereas  Japan  is  higher  than  Britain  by  approximately  10  per  cent  for 
Materialism. The USA shares a very similar tendency to the British case in this respect. 
There is a gap between the USA and Japan, which is consistently observed in available 
data from 1990 to 1999-2002. Thus, there is a gap between the two Western societies and 
Japan.  Russia  has  a  very  strong  orientation  towards  Materialism,  which  far  exceeds 
Japanese case. In 1990, Postmaterialism in Russia is extremely low rate compared with the 
other societies, which is furthered in the following observation (1995-8). This low rate is 
sustained in 1999-2002. Consequently, Russia has a very strong skew to Materialism away 
from Postmaterialism at least over the decade. The Russian Materialist orientation is in a 
very sharp contrast to Britain and the USA, which show a relatively high inclination to 
Postmaterialism. The Japanese case takes a middle position between the two sides.
8 Although the data of the World Values Survey's third wave are labelled as '1995-7' in the dataset, the 
actual year when British case was sampled for the third wave was 1998. Therefore, '1995-8' is used here 
to describe the third wave of the World Values Survey.
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Figure 3.1 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1981
Figure 3.1 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1990
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Figure 3.1 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1995-8
Figure 3.1 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: 1999-2002
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Comparison of waves
This section analyses each of the four societies on changes over two (or one) decades from 
the 1981 to 1999-2002 waves of the World Values Survey. Four graphs in figures 3.2 (I) – 
(IV)  present  the  results.  Postmaterialist-Materialist  conditions  in  Britain  for  the  three 
surveys seem to have relatively consistent forms. On the other hand, there is a gradual 
increase  in  Postmaterialism  and  a  steady  decrease  in  Materialism,  which  connotes  a 
Postmaterialist shift.  For the USA, the available three data show similar forms to each 
other. There is not a great fluctuation in its values distribution over the decade, although a 
slight withdrawal of a Materialist orientation is observed in  favour of the Postmaterialist 
shift. The Japanese case exhibits the Postmaterialist shift in the first ten years, whereas in 
the  second  five  years  the  distributions  are  almost  identical.  The  following  1999-2002 
survey shows a  fall  in  a  Materialist  orientation although the level  of  a  Postmaterialist 
orientation is sustained. As regards Russia, the state from 1990 to 1995-8 waves shows the 
further enhancement of the Materialist tendency, which is the reverse of the Postmaterialist 
shift.9 The distribution remains in similar forms from 1995-8 to 1999-2002 surveys. In the 
three waves, great proportions of the respondents hold a Materialist orientation. 
To  conclude,  despite  some  fluctuations,  there  are  consistent  tendencies  in  the 
distributions  for  each  of  the  four  societies.  This  implies  that  respective  societies  have 
relatively durable particularities in their  positions on the values. On the other hand, in 
British,  American  and  Japanese  societies,  there  are  steady  signs  denoting  the 
Postmaterialist shifts over the period. In the case of Russia, the situation is the reverse. The 
decrease of the Postmaterialist proportion may be due to the deterioration of economic and 
social conditions that can enhance the popular desire for Materialist needs. Nonetheless, 
even if such immediate circumstantial conditions are considered, the tendency in Russia is 
exceptionally inclined to Materialism in comparison with the other three societies. This is 
the case even in 1990, which is before the dramatic increase in Materialism. Therefore, 
Russia may well be regarded as having basically a strong Materialist orientation.
9 It should be noted that the time points when the data of the third wave (1995-8) were collected were 1995 
for the USA, Russia and Japan, and 1998 for Britain. 
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Figure 3.2 (I) Postmaterialist four-item index: Britain
Figure 3.2 (II) Postmaterialist four-item index: the USA
 
77
Materialist Mixed Postmaterialist
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
PM-M 4 item Britain
Britain 81
Britain 90
Britain 98
Materialist Mixed Postmaterialist
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
PM-M 4 item USA
USA 90
USA 95
USA 99-02
Figure 3.2 (III) Postmaterialist four-item index: Japan
Figure 3.2 (IV) Postmaterialist four-item index: Russia
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3.3.2 The Postmaterialist twelve-item index10
Given the initial conclusion of the Postmaterialist  four-item index, does it  apply to the 
twelve-item  version  of  the  index?  The  following  section  probes  the  outcomes  of  the 
twelve-item index with this inquiry.
Comparison of societies
In this part, the societies are compared within each wave for the twelve-item index, which 
is shown in figures 3.3 (I)  – (III).11 For the 1990 survey, there is a similarity between 
Britain, Japan and the USA with majorities scoring as 2 or 3, although the USA has a 
slightly  greater  predisposition  to  Materialism  than  the  other  two.  Russia,  by  contrast, 
shows a partiality to Materialism. The 1995-8 survey has a similar result, while having a 
notable Materialist increase in Russia.12 As for the 1999-2002 survey, for which American 
and Japanese data are available, an analogous outcome to the previous surveys is observed. 
In both 1990 and 1995-8, the great majority of Russian respondents have low scores on the 
Postmaterialism indicator. The Russian increase in the Materialist orientation from 1990 to 
1995-8 is exceptional in view of the other societies. It indicates that, whereas Russia was 
basically oriented to Materialism, its primary orientation to Materialism was strengthened 
during the period. Thus, the twelve-item index has an analogous result to that of the four-
item index in the comparative states of the four societies.
10 The twelve-item index measures the degree of Postmaterialism with a 6 point score. The higher the score, 
the more the inclination toward Postmaterialism, with 5 as the highest score and 0 as the lowest score. For 
details, see Chapter 2.
11 Data for 1981 are not available for the twelve-item index.
12 British data are not available for this.
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Figure 3.3 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1990
Figure 3.3 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1995-8
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Figure 3.3 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: 1999-2002
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Comparison of waves
This part analyses each of the three societies on changes from the 1990 to the 1999-2002 
waves, as shown in figures 3.4 (I) – (II).13 For the USA, the overall distributions are very 
similar over the three waves. This indicates that there is not a great fluctuation across the 
thee time points, denoting consistency in its posture.14 In the case of Japan, there are also 
similarities  across  the  three  waves,  indicating  consistency  in  the  attitudes  on 
Postmaterialist-Materialist  values.  As  for  Russia,  there  is  an  obvious  decrease  in  the 
Postmaterialist orientation from 1990 to 1995-8, becoming more inclined to Materialism. 
However, despite such a change, the Russian distribution of values has a basic tendency 
that is inclined to a Materialist orientation. After all, despite some fluctuations, there seem 
to have been coherent tendencies in each of the societies across different time points in 
terms of Postmaterialist values conditions. This implies that they have durable peculiarities 
in their forms of the values distribution.
13 The data of the twelve-item index for 1981 are not available. Also, British case for the twelve-item index 
is available only in respect of 1990. Since this part compares values conditions between different time 
points, the British case is omitted. 
14 There is, however, a slight change in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.
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Figure 3.4 (I) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: the USA
Figure 3.4 (II) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Japan
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Figure 3.4 (III) Postmaterialist twelve-item index: Russia
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3.3.3 Summary
This section has examined four-item index and twelve-item index of Postmaterialism and 
Materialism in relation to Russia, Britain, the USA and Japan. Each of the two indexes was 
studied through dual comparisons. The first one compared the four societies whereas the 
second  one  compared  different  time  points  in  the  respective  societies.  The  former 
investigated  whether  there  were  differences  or  common  tendencies  between  the  four 
societies. The latter looked at whether there were signs of values shift or coherent national 
patterns.
As for the comparison of the four societies, our results for the twelve-item index are 
similar to those in respect of the four-item index. There are relatively common tendencies 
between Britain,  the USA and Japan. In contrast,  Russia  shows a strong inclination to 
Materialism, while having a further increase in its already strong Materialist orientation 
from  1990  to  1995-8.  Meanwhile,  there  is  a  difference  between  the  two  sets  of 
observations. In the four-item index, whereas Britain and the USA are very close to each 
other, Japan has a greater leaning towards Materialism than the other two societies. On the 
contrary,  in  the  twelve-item  index,  among  the  three  societies  that  shares  a  relative 
similarity, the USA has a slightly greater inclination to Materialism than Britain or Japan.   
As regards the comparison of different time points within each of the societies,  the 
twelve-item  index gives analogous results to the four-item  index. The common features 
between the observations of the two indexes are that, despite some fluctuations, there seem 
to be relatively coherent  patterns in each of  the societies  that  transcend different  time 
points in terms of Postmaterialist and Materialist values. This implies that these societies 
individually have continuous particularities in the values distributions. In both four-item 
and twelve-item indexes, Russia shows an increase in its Materialist orientation from 1990 
to  1995-8  that  gives  rise  to  fluctuations  in  its  Postmaterialist-Materialist  values 
distributions, although a skew towards Materialism remains as the basic Russian values 
distribution. On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  slight  difference  between  the  respective 
observations on the four-item and twelve-item indexes. In the four-item index, in British, 
American and Japanese societies, although they keeps a relatively coherent form, there 
seems to be a steady increase in Postmaterialist values over the period. In the twelve-item 
index, the USA and Japan maintain coherent forms of Postmaterialist-Materialist values 
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across three waves from 1990 to 1999-2002, so that fluctuation between the three time 
points appears to be minimal.
Consequently, in light of our initial hypothesis, there are supportive elements in these 
observations.  Even for the proportional results of the Postmaterialist  indexes,  there  are 
likely to be consistent national patterns, denoting durability. There are also signs of steady 
Postmaterialist shift in the societies, except for Russia which was probably affected by the 
deterioration  of  economic  and  social  conditions.  Over  all,  both  the  values  shift  and 
cultural/national particularity appear to be at work.
3.4 Decomposition of Postmaterialist four-item index
This part examines decomposed versions of the four-item Postmaterialist scale. The four-
item Postmaterialist index categorises respondents into either 'Postmaterialist', 'Materialist' 
or 'Mixed'. The categorisation is based on the selection of four items, which are:
1. Maintaining order in the nation [Materialist]
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions [Postmaterialist]
3. Fighting rising prices [Materialist]
4. Protecting freedom of speech [Postmaterialist]
However, this style has the effect of obscuring which items are chosen by respondents. 
With this in mind, the following section will be slightly more precise by exploring the state 
of  each  item  rather  than  what  Postmaterialist-Materialist  categorisation  indicates.  The 
analyses are set on the two original question items that constitute the Postmaterialist four-
item index. These are (1) a first choice from the above four items, and (2) a second choice 
from the same options.15 The points to be examined are the same as so far: whether there 
15 An examination of second choices in the Postmaterialist index, in comparison with first choices, leaves 
somewhat ambiguous the issue of popular choice among 'priorities.' However, there is no doubt that the 
second choice is also asking about 'priorities' though slightly less strong ones than in the first choice. The 
best way to deal with the second choice index is to conceive of the index as specifically measuring 
'second choices' especially when the index is examined on its own. Another way of using the second 
choice index is to examine it in relation to the first choice index. Although the first choice index has 
considerable validity as a measure of 'priority' on its own and is worth a separate examination, the 
combination of the first choice and second choice index can provide for another strong measure of 
popular values priorities. In this sense, the second choice index is worth using for the purpose of such a 
86
are national variations or the indications of the Postmaterialist values shift. If there are the 
national variances, are they consistent across multiple time points, implying durability in 
national patterns? 
3.4.1 Comparison of societies
Four (or two) societies are compared within each wave of the World Values Surveys that 
were conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002 respectively.
First choice: figures 3.5 (I) – (IV)
As for the results of the first choice, on the whole, there are basic patterns of the difference 
between  the  societies  which  are  relatively  consistent  across  the  multiple  time  points 
(although  there  are  changes  in  'more  say'  and  'prices'  items).  Russia  and  Japan  have 
consistently low scores on the 'free speech' item in comparison with Britain and the USA. 
Russia has a significantly different values shape among the four societies while holding a 
distinctive emphasis on 'order'. Britain and the USA have close forms of values allocations. 
Although Japan is  relatively close to Britain and the USA, Japan is  slightly similar to 
Russia in that 'free speech' has a low score.
measurement, as long its particular character is not forgotten.
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Figure 3.5 (I) PM-M index B: first choice 1981
Figure 3.5 (II) PM-M index B: first choice 1990
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Figure 3.5 (III) PM-M index B: first choice 1995-8
Figure 3.5 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice: 1999-2002
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Second choice: figures 3.5 (IV) – (VII)
For the second choice, there is even stronger consistency in patterns of difference between 
the societies over the period. Each of the societies has an own shape of the distribution. In 
Britain and the USA the four items are at similar levels and balanced around a range of 20 
per cent to 30 per cent.16 In the Japanese case, the item of 'prices' occupies the top position 
among the four items while the 'free speech' item takes the lowest position. Between these 
two items, the 'more say' and 'order' items take positions at levels relatively close to each 
other. The Russian case has an analogous shape to the Japanese one with a much larger gap 
between the highest ('prices') and the lowest ('free speech') scores. In Russia, as in the 
Japanese  case,  'order'  and  'more  say'  stay  at  comparatively  similar  levels  with  a  little 
fluctuation. In relation to 'prices', Russia and Japan have distinctively higher positions than 
Britain and the USA.17 On the other hand, Russia and Japan have significantly lower scores 
than Britain and the USA in relation to 'free speech'.  The deviation from the cases of 
Britain and the USA is greater in Russian than in the Japanese case in relation to both 
'prices'  and  'free  speech'  (though  in  the  opposite  direction).  Thus,  there  is national 
consistency in the patterns. This will be clearer in the following parts on the comparison of 
the waves.
16 The 'prices' item in the 1999-2002 American data is slightly deviant, but still has the score of 18.05 per 
cent.
17 The score of the 'prices' item in the latest Japanese data (1999-2002) may be slightly lower in this context.
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Figure 3.5 (V) PM-M index B: second choice 1981
Figure 3.5 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice 1990
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Figure 3.5 (VII) PM-M index B: second choice 1995-8
Figure 3.5 (VIII) PM-M index B: second choice: 1999-2002
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3.4.2 Comparison of waves in each society (index B)
First choice: figures 3.6 (I) – (IV)
For the comparison of the waves with respect to the first choice, several points emerge 
clearly. On the one hand, the four societies have their own values configurations enduring 
over time in some respects. The cases of the USA and Russia clearly show respective 
forms of the configurations that persist across the waves. In the Japanese case, the degrees 
of support for the 'order' and 'free speech' items are sustained at consistent levels over the 
period of observation. Despite some changes in the British case, the scores of the 'free 
speech'  item remain  almost  the  same  across  the  waves.18 On the  other  hand,  the  four 
societies also have changes. For Japan and Britain, an  overall increase in the 'more say' 
item and a  decrease in  the 'prices'  item are noticeable.  The case of  the USA shows a 
consistent fall in the 'prices' item. Thus, the items of 'more say' and 'prices' seem prone to 
Postmaterialist change in each of these three societies. By contrast, Russia shows a shift 
rather in favour of a still more strongly Materialist orientation. The shift is observed in the 
state of the 'prices' and (with fluctuation) 'more say' items. 
As regards  'free speech',  there  is  a  strong element  of  stability  in  all  of  the  four 
societies over the period of observation, while the level varies in each case. In fact, for 
Britain and Russia respectively, the 'free speech' scores over different waves remain almost 
identical. In Japan and the USA, although there are some fluctuations, the fluctuations are 
small, so that this also supports the impression of stability in relation to 'free speech'. What 
is more, the degree of priority given to 'free speech' varies in different societies. Britain and 
the USA maintain levels of around 20 per cent in 'free speech'.19 Russia and Japan rather 
consistently place much less importance on the 'free speech' item. Japan remains at less 
than 10 per cent and Russia less than 2.5 per cent. This shows that, in Britain and the USA, 
'free speech' is consistently valued regardless of time and probably environment, whereas 
in Russia and Japan 'free speech' is given a clearly low priority with little influence of time 
and  possibly  environmental  changes  such  as  economic  conditions  (at  least  within  the 
period the data cover). 
With respect to the item of 'order', each society maintains a certain stability at its own 
18 Moreover, the overall scores of respective waves are not too deviant from each other in the British data, 
which gives the impression of fluctuation.
19 The score of the USA in 1999-2002 is slightly higher, but still is 25.21 per cent.
93
level, although the item seems also somewhat prone to fluctuation. Between the first and 
the second waves  (1981 and 1990)  Britain  and Japan show drops  in  the  order  item.20 
However, from the second to the third waves (1990 to 1995-8), the 'order' item shows some 
rise in each of the four societies. From the third to the fourth waves (1995-8 to 1999-2002) 
there are slight drops in Japan and Russia whereas the figure remains similar in the USA.
The most general conclusion is that, to a certain degree, basic values positions seem 
to be maintained in each society. However, there are the signs of a Postmaterialist shift in 
Japan, Britain and the USA in relation to 'more say' and 'prices'. Russia, on the other hand, 
shows some movement towards Materialist values.  In contrast,  'free speech' is the most 
durable item, keeping the same levels over time in respective societies. Although 'order' 
items  also  remain  relatively  stable,  the  items  are  a  little  more  prone  to  fluctuation. 
Nonetheless, this fluctuation is not necessarily in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.
 
20 The 1981 data for Russia and the USA on this are not available.
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Figure 3.6 (I) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Britain
Figure 3.6 (II) PM-M index B: first choice: change in the USA
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Figure 3.6 (III) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Japan
Figure 3.6 (IV) PM-M index B: first choice: change in Russia
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Second choice: figures 3.6 (V) – (VIII)
The clearest  single  conclusion from the  second choice index is  that  the four  societies 
maintain  a  high level  stability  over  the  three  or  four  waves  in  their  respective  values 
configurations. Together with this stability, on the other hand, there are changes, though 
they may be comparatively minor.  Britain and the USA maintain a relatively balanced 
values configuration across the four items, but also seem to show shifts in favour of a 
Postmaterialist  orientation especially in the 'more say'  and 'prices'  items. Over the first 
three waves, with trivial fluctuations, Japan maintains a basic values configuration with the 
'prices' item as the strongest priority (and 'free speech' as the lowest) among the four items. 
Although the results of the fourth wave show some changes, its shape is still an extension 
of the basic pattern.21 Russia also maintains a high degree of stability with a slight further 
shift towards the Materialist orientation. The basic Russian configuration is to have 'prices' 
at its peak and 'free speech' as the lowest position, which is very similar to Japan. These 
outcomes  again  show  that  the  four  societies  appear  to  keep  their  own  basic  values 
configurations  despite  some changes among them. Whereas this  tendency is  consistent 
with  the  case  of  first  choice  index,  the  overall  stability  of  the  basic  configurations  is 
greater.
21 In the Japanese data, there is a decrease in the 'prices' item with an increase in the 'order' item. It should 
be also noticed that the score of the 'order' item has gradually risen over the four waves.
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Figure 3.6 (V) PM-M index B: second choice: change in Britain 
Figure 3.6 (VI) PM-M index B: second choice: change in the USA
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Figure 3.6 (VII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Japan
Figure 3.6 (VIII) PM-M Index B: Second Choice: Change in Russia
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Summary: comparison of waves
With  the  respective  observations  of  the  first  and  second  choices,  the  following  is  an 
analytical summary that draws together both outcomes. On the whole, there seems to be 
similarity between Britain and the USA in the state of values configuration. In the second 
choice (figure 3.6 (V) and 3.6 (VI)), Britain and the USA keep comparatively balanced 
four item configurations, which are distinct from those in Russia and Japan. This tendency 
seems to  be  stable  across  the  waves.  As for  the  first  choice  (figure  3.6  (I),  3.6  (II)), 
although the British and American configurations are less balanced than ones in the second 
choice, their patterns are clearly closer to each other than to the Russian pattern. Britain 
and  the  USA have  analogous  levels  of  support  for  the  'free  speech'  item,  which  are 
consistently higher than ones in Japan and Russia. This is observed across the available 
waves in both the first and second choices. In the meantime, the British and American 
results show some changes in favour of a Postmaterialist shift.22 
In  Japan (figure 3.6 (III)  and  3.6  (VII)),  the  first  choice  shows clear  signs  of  a 
Postmaterialist shift in the items of 'more say' and 'prices', whereas the second choice keeps 
its own basic forms with stability (despite a modest shift in the fourth wave).23 The 'free 
speech' item consistently occupies lower positions among the four items in both the first 
and second choice indexes.24 The 'order' item is stable at relatively higher positions in the 
first choice, whereas it shows a steady rise in the second choice.25 
In Russia (figure 3.6 (IV) and 3.6 (VIII)), the basic forms are maintained at a stable 
level in both the first and second choice indexes over the period of observation. Although 
each of the two forms is distinctive, they have in common that in each of them there is an 
item that has a particularly high score among the four items ('order' in the first choice and 
'prices' in the second choice). The point to be noticed is that the two items ('order' and 
'prices') both belong to the range of Materialist values. Moreover, the 'free speech' item 
keeps not just low but very low positions among the four items over the period. The 'more 
say' item remains at around 15 - 25 per cent positions in both the first and second choices 
22 In fact, the later the wave, the clearer the Postmaterialist orientation. For example, in the first choice in 
the third (and fourth) wave, the 'more say' item exceeds 30 per cent and the 'prices' item becomes lower 
than 20 per cent in both countries.
23 It also should be noted that, for the second choice, the decrease in the 'prices' item in the fourth wave 
coincides with a increase in the 'order' item. The two items are both within a Materialist category.
24 In comparative terms, 'free speech' occupies higher positions in the second choice than in the first choice.
25 This is somewhat opposite to a Postmaterialist shift. 
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over the same period. Simply put, in Russia, there is clear tendency that the very great 
majority of people tend to choose 'order' item as their first priority and 'prices' as their 
second priority among the four items.  'Free speech'  is  likely to have the least  priority 
whereas 'more say' keeps a relatively low priority. On the whole, Russia retains a strong 
inclination  to  the  Materialist  orientation with  a  high degree  of  durability  in  its  values 
configuration over the period.
3.5 Conclusion
Overall
In this chapter, the analyses have been conducted in inductive manners. Britain, the USA, 
Japan  and  Russia  are  compared  in  terms  of  observations  made  by  the  Postmaterialist 
indexes  as  well  as  the  decomposed  scales  of  the  four-item Postmaterialist  index.  The 
overall result  of observation is as follows: Britain and the USA have relatively similar 
forms  of  values  configuration  to  each  other  in  Postmaterialist  and  Materialist  values 
allocations. Although Japan has configuration that is close to Britain and the USA, it also 
has deviation from the two societies in some respects, which makes Japan slightly similar 
to Russia. Russia as a whole has very different shapes of values configurations from the 
other three societies, having strong orientation to Materialist.
On the whole, the results support our initial hypothesis. Although there are signs of 
the Postmaterialist values shift, the values distributions are affected by national elements. 
Each of the four societies seems to have a basic shape of values configuration and tends to 
have certain consistency in the shape over the period of the observation. This implies that 
respective societies have durable and therefore basic peculiarities in their forms of values 
distribution.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  shifts  and  fluctuations  among  these 
societies. Whereas Britain, Japan and the USA show changes that imply Postmaterialist 
shifts  over  the  waves,  Russia  shows the  opposite  direction of  change towards  a  more 
Materialist orientation in addition to its basic Materialist orientation.
The significant point on the Postmaterialist values shift is that among the four items 
'more  say'  and  'prices'  items  are  prone  to  changes  in  relatively  coherent  directions. 
Therefore, these two items seem to have particular connection with the values shifts. The 
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item of 'free speech', on the contrary, shows very strong durability since 'free speech' tends 
to keep the same levels over different time points in most cases of the four societies. It is 
possible that 'free speech' is likely to be highly influenced by  nationally  peculiar factors 
(such  as  inherited culture  and history).  Another  point  about  'free  speech'  items is  that 
Britain and the USA largely put a certain priority comparable to the other three items. On 
the other hand, in Russia and Japan, 'free speech' item receives consistently low priority 
among the four items. This suggests that, in Russia and Japan, cultural or historical factors 
hinder the  Postmaterialist  effect  on  the  popular  evaluation  of  'free  speech'.  Special 
attention is paid to this point in later chapters.
Implications for Russia
With the observations of this chapter, there is a question: what are their implications 
for Russia? The consolidation of the democracy is still underway, which just started in the 
very end of the last century. Under such a circumstance, what the people expect of the 
government possibly relates to the way in which democracy operates and the direction in 
which democracy is headed. Russian people, as examined in this chapter, have a strong 
inclination to the Materialist orientation. The Materialist view, that is asked in (particularly 
four-item index of) the Postmaterialist scale, is to expect a government to ensure material 
benefit  and  security  (such  as  economic stability  and  social  order)  prior  to political 
participation and freedom of speech that could be crucial to responsive democracy. In other 
words, the Russian public on the whole seems to share the dominant view that, if necessary 
for  securing  economic  security  and  social  order,  it  may  well  be  accepted  that  a 
governmental role to ensure popular participation and freedom of speech is deterred. Since 
the Postmaterialist view is to expect more participation and free speech to be ensured by a 
government, the dominance of Materialist view and the scarcity of the Postmaterialist view 
among public  as  observed  in  Russia  implies  the  lack  of  popular  values  conditions  to 
underpin and push for the development of governmental responsiveness. This may imply 
the deviation of Russian political system from responsive democracy, which in turn may 
suggest its difference from Western models of democracy.
As  observed  in  this  chapter,  Britain  and  the  USA  have  relatively  high  rates  of 
Postmaterialist  view among  the  public.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  has  a  lower  rate  of 
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Postmaterialist values than these two societies. Also, 'free speech' in Japan is chronically 
fixed  at  a  low rate,  which  is  a  very  similar  tendency  to  Russia.  Despite  such  values 
conditions that are different from the two Western societies, Japan has somehow been able 
to maintain democratic system for more than fifty years. This may be one of clues to figure 
out  the way of Russian democracy under the popular values that are  distinct from the 
typical Western societies and somewhat similar to Japan. What is a democracy that suits 
Russia and Russians? The later chapters explores further this underlying question.
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Chapter 4: 'More say' and 'free speech'
4.1 Introduction
The Postmaterialist  four-item index is  a  vital  index that chiefly  has been employed to 
examine the posture of Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension (and strings of related 
values  explicated  by  Inglehart's  thesis).  In  fact,  results  from the  index  have  provided 
considerable support  for Inglehart's  hypotheses,  including that of Postmaterialist  values 
shift. Nonetheless, there still seems to be analytical leeway. In particular, this relates to two 
items that are categorised as Postmaterialist values. One is 'more say', which represents 
'giving  people  more  say  in  important  government  decisions'.  Another  is  'free  speech', 
standing for an item: 'protecting freedom of speech'.  They are items in multiple-choice 
questions asking about an important aim of a country. In the Postmaterialist thesis, and 
through the process of using the Postmaterialist index, these values items have been simply 
supposed  to  emerge  and  spread  together.  However,  this  may  have  neglected  possible 
details that there could be a  time lag or  difference  in ways of formation (or simply the 
conditions) between the values of 'more say' and 'free speech'. Separate analyses of the two 
variables make it possible to show such a difference. These further enable us to detect 
whether the respective conditions of the two kinds of values are due to a Postmaterialist 
shift or cultural particularity (or both). For this purpose, details of each values item in the 
Postmaterialist  four-item  index  are  closely  scrutinised,  by  employing  new  variables: 
'variables of relative commitment'. 
One of the important sources of influence on these values conditions may be the 
presence or non-presence of a traditional heritage of  individualism and high esteem of 
freedom,  which  might  be  related  to  a  kind  of  distinction  between  Western  and  non-
Western categories.1 The values item of 'free speech' in the Postmaterialist four-item index 
could be strongly affected by this aspect in comparison with that of 'more say'. If this is the 
case, the state of such tradition, that is, cultural  particularity,  may have a considerable 
effect  on  the  condition  of  Postmaterialist  values,  notwithstanding  the  effect  of 
1 For example, see Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72; Bell, Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 
'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka 
Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (Basingstoke/London: 
Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.
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Postmaterialist  values  shift. This  would  further  connote  delay  or  less  efficacy  of  the 
Postmaterialist  shift  in  some  non-Western  societies,  since  such  societies  might  have 
disadvantages or it may simply be that a fully-fledged version of the Postmaterialist shift – 
or at least, an immediate kind of values shift – is irrelevant to some non-Western societies. 
A main purpose of the present chapter is to investigate this issue.
4.2 Variables of relative commitment: 'more say' and 'free speech'
4.2.1 Variables of relative commitment
The  following  parts  discuss  the  variables  of  relative  commitment.  Although  the 
Postmaterialist  four-item  index  is  a  vital  measure  for  examining  the  posture  of 
Postmaterialist-Materialist  values and other related values concerning Inglehart's  thesis, 
there still seems to be analytical leeway. One of the possibilities is that details of values 
items in the index could be more closely scrutinised. The Postmaterialist four-item index 
consists of four values items, that is, 'order', 'more say', 'prices' and 'free speech'. These 
items could be respectively investigated by creating a different version of the variables on 
the basis of the four-item index. New variables are introduced in this chapter with the 
name of 'variables of relative commitment'. The major advantage of the variables is that 
degree  of  emphasis  specifically  on  each values  item could  be  clarified,  which  is  not 
possible in the Postmaterialist index.
4.2.2 Constructing the variables
The variable of relative commitment is different from the Postmaterialist index although 
both types of variables are based on the same original questions.2 In the case of the World 
Values Survey, there are two original questions for a first  choice and a second choice 
respectively. They constitute multiple-choice questions asking respondents to choose the 
first and second most important aims of a country from the four items below:
2 For a basic argument on Postmaterialist four-item index, see Inglehart, Ronald, 'The Nature of Value 
Change', in The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics 
(Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), ch. 2, esp. pp. 27-34. Also, for SPSS coding 
instructions for the Postmaterialist index, see an additional section to 'Codebook' in Inglehart, Ronald et 
al., ICPSR 2790, World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981–1984, 1990–1993, and 
1995–1997 (PDF file), ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research), pp. 171-2.
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1. Maintaining order in the nation (Materialist)
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions (Postmaterialist)
3. Fighting rising prices (Materialist)
4. Protecting freedom of speech (Postmaterialist)
Since the purpose of the variables of relative commitment is to tap the degrees of 
importance that respondents specifically attach to each one of the values items, the original 
questions are combined in a manner to effectively express such a particular emphasis. Four 
variables are created to that effect, that is, the variables of 'order', 'more say', 'prices' and 
'free  speech'.  In  particular,  recoding  has  been  carried  out  in  the  following  way.  If  a 
particular relevant item is chosen as a 'first choice', these variables are to give the value of 
'2'. If the item is chosen as a 'second choice', the value of '1' is given. If the item is not 
chosen at all, the value is '0'. For instance, in the case of the 'free speech' variable, where 
'free speech' was opted for as a first choice, it is given '2'. Where respondents put 'free 
speech' as a second choice, it is '1'. Where 'free speech' is not chosen at all, it is given '0'. 
Accordingly, variables are created for the other items ('order', 'more say' and 'prices') as 
well.
4.2.3 Validity of the variables
4.2.3.1 Separate analyses
The major advantage of the variables of relative commitment is that the specific weight of 
importance that respondents attach to each values item can be clarified. This is not possible 
in  the  Postmaterialist  index,  since  its  output  only  indicates  either  Postmaterialist  or 
Materialist  (or  Mixed)  values  by  simply  integrating  each  values  item  for  a  single 
measurement that classifies them in terms of the Postmaterialist-Materialist  dichotomy. 
This obscures the details of the individual values items. For example, for the two items of 
Postmaterialist values – 'more say' and 'free speech', separate analyses of the two variables 
would show the difference of their conditions – such as how they are distributed  across 
various attributes of the respondents, what elements affect their states to what extent, and 
so  forth.  These  further  enable  us  to  detect  whether  respective  conditions  are  due  to 
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Postmaterialist shift or cultural particularity (or both). 
4.2.3.2 Indicator of commitment 
Why  are  they  called  the  variables  of  'relative  commitment'?  What  do  the  variables 
indicate? To answer these questions, a major point is that the variables indicate the degree 
of  relative  emphasis  that  respondents  put  on  each of  the four  values  items.  Since the 
variables consist of choices from four competing items, the nature of the variable is to tap 
the strength of  emphasis on each specific item  relative to other three items. Obviously, 
because it  is about choice,  the strength is a relative one. Nonetheless, this relativity is 
crucial. Because of the relativity, the variable is capable of expressing  commitment (or 
subjective persistence).
Comparing these variables with an index of rating makes this point clearer.3 The 
index of rating is a scale asking respondents to choose 'very important', 'important', 'not 
very important'  or 'not important at  all'  with regards to the evaluation of an  individual 
values  item.  In  practice,  although  the  latter  index  could  indicate  some  difference  of 
emphases among values items, differences in actual outputs may often be subtle. This is 
because the values asked about are generally ones which people see as important anyway. 
For instance, it would be normal for people to think both 'free speech' and 'more say' are 
important, so that the averages might fall around the level of 'important'  in  both cases, 
showing little difference between their outputs. 
Unlike this  type of index, the index comprising  choice (such as the 'variables of 
relative commitment') indicates often clear-cut differences between values items in their 
levels of emphases. But why is it so important to detect such a difference clearly – the 
difference that could be only subtle in the case of the index of rating? This is because it 
indicates difference in the degrees of  commitment that could persist possibly even at the 
cost  of other values items if necessary. Such a measured persistence could be a viable 
indicator of actual strength of the support for each values item. Furthermore, the extent of 
commitment denotes the strength of durability, which suggests underlying 'values' – rather 
than superficial  evaluation that  is  more  likely  to  fluctuate  being  susceptible  to 
3 For some arguments on question types, see de Vaus, D. A., Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed. (London: 
UCL Press, 1996), pp. 86-92; de Vaus, David, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 99-107.
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circumstantial changes. Thus, the variables of relative commitment are useful measures for 
the examination of values.
As noted, if one of the items still receives high scores in the measure of commitment, 
it denotes the strength and thus durability of support for that specific values item even with 
the loss of other items. If 'free speech', for example, has a certain degree of strength of 
support, that level indicates the extent of persistence that could transcend even a certain 
sacrifice or loss of 'order', 'prices' and 'more say'. In particular, the fact that 'order' and 
'prices'  are  included  as  other  items  is  important,  since  the  index  could  show  some 
durability of support for 'free speech' possibly even if social/political order and economic 
security were threatened to some degree. Likewise, this is the case with the measures of 
'more say' and other items. Additionally, the strength of commitment on 'free speech' as 
well  as  'more  say'  is  especially  important  when  it  comes  to  the  study  in  relation  to 
democracy, as discussed below.
Another point to be noted is that the 'variable of relative commitment' is made up of 
the combination of two-step choices (giving '2' for the first choice and '1' for the second 
choice). By means of this strategy, the degree of relative emphasis can be tapped more 
deeply than an index that comprises only one choice. 
4.2.4 Variables of 'more say' and 'free speech'
4.2.4.1 Rationale of focus: why 'more say' and 'free speech'?
The rationale for paying special attention to the difference between 'more say' and 'free 
speech' variables is as follows. Firstly, despite the fact that both 'more say' and 'free speech' 
are in the same category of Postmaterialist values, obviously what each of them connotes is 
not identical. This could lead to a difference in their distributions. It is therefore possible 
and worthwhile to analyse the distinctions between the two, which could not be done by 
the Postmaterialist  index.  In  similar  terms,  secondly,  sources  of  influence  could differ 
between the two values items. One might be more susceptible to Postmaterialist effects, 
while the other might be more prone to other influences such as cultural particularities (or 
a mixture of influences). In other words, although 'more say' and 'free speech' are within 
the same category of Postmaterialist values, it is possible that the ways the two kinds of 
values take form are different to each other, and so are the types and ways of influences on 
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them. The degrees of the effects of  Postmaterialist shift and cultural particularity could 
differ between  'more say' and 'free speech'. An aim of this chapter is to differentiate the 
ways in which such competing elements affect the states of these values items. Thirdly, the 
variables of 'more say'  and 'free speech'  are especially regarded as crucial  due to their 
significance  for  some  dimensions  of  democracy.  These  two  values  items  respectively 
possess  certain  relevance  to  the  aspect  of  governmental  responsiveness  as  well  as  the 
normative direction of polyarchy, which will be mentioned in the fifth chapter.4 Therefore, 
special attention is paid to these two variables.
4.2.4.2 Difference of connotations and its outcome
The fact that they are both part of Postmaterialist values does not necessarily mean that 
they are the same. Although 'more say' and 'free speech' share some common elements and 
are thus compatible with each other to some extent, what they connote is not identical. 
They  may  share  an  attuned  direction,  but  they  are  two  individual  items.  Then,  how 
different are they? 'More say' implies political participation, whereas 'free speech' denotes 
public expression. Participation has a vertical connotation, since it stands for the input of 
popular claims to political authority. Freedom, on the other hand, represents  horizontal 
expression of popular views. Thus, the difference of the two items lies in their qualitative 
directions.
Obviously, 'free speech' holds strong connotations of freedom, which 'more say' does 
not necessarily share strongly. This subtle and seemingly slight difference could matter 
greatly  in  actual  analysis  and  practice,  as  demonstrated  in  the  following sections.  For 
instance, if some societies have an important heritage of esteem for freedom while others 
do not, the state of the values distributions could be acutely affected by this gap. More 
precisely, it is said that freedom and individual autonomy are highly valued in Western 
societies  as  represented  by  the  tradition  of  individualism.  The cultural  particularity of 
being Western could matter (that is, be advantageous) for having a relatively high degree 
of  an  emphasis  on  'free  speech'  (and  other  values  involving  the  sense  of  freedom). 
Meanwhile,  the  state  of  'more  say'  could  be  less  susceptible  to  such  influence.  This 
Western element of individualism could be a strong source of influence on the state of 'free 
4 For the account of polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
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speech' distributions, whereas societies that lack such a heritage could have considerably 
less appreciation for 'free speech' than Western societies. Likewise, such difference could 
be  present  even  in  the  comparison  of  the  four  societies,  showing  a  major  distinction 
between two sides – the side shared by the USA and Britain, and that of Russia and Japan.
4.3 Methods of analysis
4.3.1 Assumption: what is to be tested?
The major aim of this chapter is comparison of 'more say' and 'free speech' variables in the 
context of dichotomous influences: Postmaterialist shift versus cultural particularity. This 
is  conducted  through  the  analysis  of  Russia,  Japan,  the  USA  and  Britain,  and  of 
Postcommunist, East Asian and Western regions. The centre of concern is whether (and 
how) the two variables are affected by Postmaterialist shift or/and cultural particularity. 
Special attention is paid to an assumption that (due to their tradition of individualism and 
an emphasis on freedom) Western societies are likely to have relatively high appreciation 
of 'free speech' in comparison with other societies while maintaining a certain durability 
for this tendency. This means that cultural particularity especially matters to the values of 
'free speech', despite the fact that 'free speech' belongs to Postmaterialist values. This point 
is disputable,  since the Postmaterialist  hypothesis holds that the spread of 'free speech' 
values  is  chiefly  due to  Postmaterialist  shift.  In  this  sense,  the  cultural  particularity  is 
regarded as a factor that could  compete with Postmaterialist shift. Our task is to explore 
whether they actually compete and how.
In a practical analysis, the state of 'free speech' is compared with that of 'more say' 
which is another item of Postmaterialist values. By doing so, it is expected to demonstrate 
that,  even  in  the  same  category  of  Postmaterialist  values,  the  extent  and  manner  of 
susceptibility  to  cultural  particularity  (and  economic  development) differs. Such  a 
comparison is a functional method to illuminate the cultural susceptibility of 'free speech' 
in a tangible manner.
4.3.2 How to test
The most important point is: how we can figure out whether the states of the variables are 
due to either Postmaterialist shift or cultural particularity, or to both? There are several 
methods to detect such differences, which are employed in subsequent examinations.
4.3.2.1 Durability: particularity versus shift
One  effective  method  to  explore  such  a  distinction  is  to  investigate  'durability'  in 
distributions.
Average (mean) comparison: initial analysis
In an initial analysis, the evaluations of average (mean) scores over four time points across 
the four societies are conducted. These are presented through their comparisons  within 
values items  and  within nations  respectively. The point is to examine whether there are 
noticeably consistent differences over four time points (1981, 1990, 1995-8, 1999-2002) in 
degrees of support  for the values items  between nations as well as between the values 
items. 
For instance, in an analysis to compare nations in terms of the state of each values 
item, if  there are evident  gaps between nations in a particular values item with strong 
persistence  over the period, it will denote the existence of  durability in their distinctions 
and thus imply national characteristics (viz. particularities) as regards that values item. On 
the contrary, if there are steady increases or decreases in a values item, it will suggest the 
possibility  of  a  Postmaterialist  shift.  Likewise,  in  an  examination  within  nations  to 
compare between the values items, there may be coherent contrasts in the levels of esteem 
between  the  items transcending  the  period.  This durability  would  imply  national 
particularities of relative commitment to the respective four values items. In the mean time, 
constant  rise  or  fall  in  their  levels  of  support  would  indicate  the  possible  effect  of  a 
Postmaterialist shift on the items.
Age cohort analysis: durability versus shift
In a subsequent part, the analysis is focused specifically on 'more say' and 'free speech', 
both of which belong to the Postmaterialist category. The study goes further to examine 
more details  of  them in relation to  durability.  Age cohort  analysis  is  utilized,  since  it 
enables us to detect an indication of generational shift, where the predominant view of 
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younger age cohorts eventually take over that of older ones. If there is such a sign in 
favour  of  an increase,  which consists  of  higher  esteem in younger  age cohorts  plus a 
consistent rise over the multiple time points (with long-standing affluence or a comparable 
degree of economic security), this will plausibly suggest susceptibility of that values item 
to Postmaterialist shift. On the other hand, if there is no such evidence (especially with 
relatively equal distributions across the different age cohorts), it will rather point to the 
existence of durability in this values item. Moreover, if the overall degree in a given nation 
is particularly high or low in comparison with other nations while the degree is relatively 
constant  across  the  multiple  time  points,  it  will  be  possible  to  infer  that  there  is 
particularity of that nation with respect to the values item.
Scatterplot: comparison of durability against economic effect
This analysis goes beyond the four-society comparison. It incorporates worldwide cross-
national  data  available  from  the  World  Values  Survey  with  a  nation  (national 
aggregate/average) as a unit of cases, which also adds some flavour of generalisation. The 
scrutiny is centred on a contrast between 'more say' and 'free speech' with respect to the 
effect of economic development on them. An overlapped version of a scatterplot is used 
for the convenience of a visual comparison. To this, linear regression lines are attached for 
each of the two items. 
According  to  the  hypothesis  of  Postmaterialist  shift,  economic  development  is  a 
crucial  factor that enhances the values shift.  With this  rationale,  the level  of economy 
(GNP per capita) is employed as a key indicator of that aspect. While allocating economic 
level as an independent variable (X), 'more say' and 'free speech' are respectively assigned 
as dependent variables (Y). This provides a contrast of relative economic effects between 
'more say' and 'free speech'. On the whole, if one of the two Y variables tends to hold a 
higher  position  than  the  other  at  given  levels  of  economic  development,  it  could  be 
surmised that the former has higher (or more immediate) susceptibility to economic effect. 
At the same time, this would mean that the latter have stronger durability against economic 
impact. The higher susceptibility would represent more of a tendency to Postmaterialist 
shift whereas the greater stability would signify less influence of the values shift and thus 
suggest  greater  influence  from  cultural  or  local  particularity.  In  this  manner,  relative 
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durability  against  economic  development  is  investigated  between  'more  say'  and  'free 
speech'.
4.3.2.2 Regional particularity
The question of cultural/local particularity vis-à-vis Postmaterialist shift is further explored 
in a regional context by taking advantage of the data available at the aggregate cross-
national  level.  Regions,  when  adequately  differentiated,  could  be  representations  of 
cultural zones, where identical or similar traditions are relatively shared.5 Of course, the 
meaning of cultural zone varies depending on what kinds and levels of human traditions 
are meant to be the objects of observation. In this analysis, the distinction of the West, 
Postcommunist and East Asia is regarded as useful and relevant, considering the earlier 
investigation on the four societies (Russia, Japan, the USA and Britain). Also, due to some 
particular heritages shared in each of the three regions, it  would be quite legitimate to 
consider  that,  at  some points,  these regions  possess  categorical  characteristics  that  are 
different  from each  other.  In  particular,  in  practice,  as  noticed  later  in  the  process  of 
examination, it is observed that there are some regional characteristics, and some of them 
are meaningfully represented by the four societies. With this, the following analyses are 
employed to identify some valid clues to the issue of culture versus Postmaterialist shift. 
Average (mean) comparison: initial analysis
As an initial analysis, mean scores of the three regions on 'more say' and 'free speech' 
variables are compared. Although they are simple averages, the figures give a primary and 
succinct view of the regional characteristics in relation to the two variables. As shown 
later,  distinctions  between  'more  say'  and  'free  speech'  as  well  as  between  regions 
monitored in the figure will consistently be a basis of what is discovered in subsequent 
5 For example, Huntington differentiated, though controversially, several regional clusters that are regarded 
as sharing similar cultural and traditional heritages, calling the unit 'civilization'. See Huntington, Samuel 
P., The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). In a 
more empirical manner, Inglehart tested and acquired positive results on an assumption that such regional 
distinctions exist and have influence on popular values. Nonetheless, the popular values, according to 
him, are also susceptible to economic development. See Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 
'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', American Sociological  
Review, 65 (2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and democracy', ch. 7, in Harrison, Lawrence E. 
and Samuel P. Huntington eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic 
Books, 2000), pp. 80-97; Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic,  
and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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analyses.
Scatterplot: presence of regional particularity
This analysis is accompanied by another version of scatterplots. Although they could not 
provide precise numerical indicators, using this kind of visual figure is useful and effective 
in expressing the hidden trend of data in a tangible manner, which otherwise might not be 
easy  in  some cases.  Being  expressed  by  the  axes  of  X and Y,  a  scatterplot  could  be 
perceived as a 'map' in which locations of dots (cases) sometimes form meaningful shapes.
The aim here is to probe the figures in terms of regional particularities. If cases of an 
identical region cluster around a similar position in the map, it would connote the possible 
existence of a regional character. This would be more likely when respective regions have 
such  unique  tendencies.  If  the  locations  of  cases  simply  overlap  or  are  compounded 
between  different  regions  without  any  particular  distinctions,  the  presence  of  regional 
particularities  would  be  much  less.  The  scatterplot  employed  in  this  analysis  has  an 
economic  variable  as  X-axis  (independent  variable).  This  means  that,  if  there  is  a 
distribution that signifies the presence of regional particularities, the regional particularities 
should be viewed as a factor that  competes with economic effect (especially when some 
linear correlation is observed between X and Y). If there is no regional particularity while 
showing a linear correlation between X and Y, economic effect would be a  predominant 
factor in that figure. The details of the visually perceived result will be further inspected by 
the following method of multiple regression analysis.
Multiple regression: regional particularity versus economic development
The multiple regression analyses employed here are to scrutinise the relative extents of 
dichotomous influences –  regional cultural  particularities  and economic development  – 
over people's commitment to 'more say' and 'free speech' respectively. Dummy variables 
are utilised for the purpose of tapping the regional particularities. Since the aim of analysis 
is mainly concerned with three regions, the created variables are 'West', 'Postcommunist' 
and 'East Asia'. As for coding in each of these variables, '1' is given to cases of a relevant 
region, and '0' to the rest. Coefficients presented by the multiple regressions will be lucid 
indicators in identifying how the binary influences compete. For reference, in a similar 
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context with different organisation of variables, the same method was used by Inglehart 
and Baker in order to search for the persistence of cultural/traditional values vis-à-vis the 
modernisation effect.6 The respective inspections of 'more say'  and 'free speech'  enable 
comparison between the two values items for the states of the competing influences on 
their  formations.  It  is  assumed  that  the  influence  of  regional  cultural  particularity  is 
noticeably high in 'free speech' in comparison with 'more say'. This is to be demonstrated 
in later analyses.
4.4 Durability of local particularity
This part presents the first half of output in actual analysis, which has been described so 
far.  A major  point  is  to  scrutinise the extents  of  durability (vis-à-vis shift)  in  people's 
relative commitment to respective values items that derived from original questions of the 
Postmaterialist four-item index.
4.4.1 Initial analysis: average (mean) comparison
This section presents the result of an initial analysis on outputs from the Postmaterialist 
four-item index as well as the variables of relative commitment with the comparison of 
four societies across four waves.
4.4.1.1 Postmaterialist four-item index (figure 4.1)
In a previous chapter, Postmaterialist indexes were examined with comparisons of Russia, 
6 See Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'. In 
their research, a dependent variable was a scale of 'traditional/secular-rational values' and 'survival/self-
expression values', which constituted two multiple regression analyses. Their independent variables were 
'variables measuring modernization and cultural heritage', which consisted of modernisation measures 
(such as real GDP per capita of 1980, percentage employed in industrial sector of 1980, percentage 
employed in service sector of 1980, percentage enrolled in education) as well as cultural heritage 
measures. In our research, dependent variables are 'more say' and 'free speech' that derive from the 
original questions of the Postmaterialist four-item index. In the mean time, the variable of 'survival/self-
expression values' in Inglehart and Baker's research was composed of several variables that include the 
Postmaterialist four-item index. In that sense, their variables were for the search of comprehensive trends 
of popular values, whereas in a way our variables are to scrutinise very specific parts of what they 
studied. Nonetheless, it is still important and is valid to inspect 'more say' and 'free speech' independently, 
since our task is an in-depth analysis of respective/specific states and formations of the two values items, 
which possibly has a crucial implication in the issue of cultural particularity versus values 
shift/modernisation.
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Japan,  the  USA  and  Britain.  In  this  section,  first  of  all,  a  summary  analysis  of  the 
Postmaterialist four-item index is presented. This is presented as a primary observation to 
compare with the variables of relative commitment (which are reorganised versions on the 
basis of the four-item index) in a following part. In terms of the level of Postmaterialist 
values, Japan is somewhat lower, and Russia is obviously lower, than the USA and Britain. 
The USA and Britain are quite close. Also, this difference is consistent over four time 
points. This denotes that there is some durability in this values dimension.7
4.4.1.2 Variable of relative commitment (figures 4.2 and 4.3)
Considered here are the separated sum variables of the four items ('more say', 'free speech', 
'order', and 'prices'). These variables represent relative commitment to the respective items. 
What is  observed in figure 4.2 is that,  especially for 'free speech',  while the USA and 
Britain maintain comparable levels,  Japan is obviously lower than them, and Russia is 
further lower. This also persists over different time points. As for 'more say', Britain and 
Japan are similar with some steady increase. The USA maintains a level comparable to the 
two nations over three time points, while showing a slight initial rise from the second to 
third waves. In the case of Russia, there is a decrease, being followed by a small increase. 
The steady rise of 'more say' in Britain and Japan (and partly the USA) possibly represents 
the Postmaterialist  effect,  due to long-standing economic security.  The Russian change 
(especially the initial decrease) and lower emphasis on 'more say' may reflect economic 
deterioration, with priority on other values items in the Materialist category. As regards the 
item of support for 'order', the Russian case is distinctly high in comparison with the other 
three cases (that share similar levels). With respect to comparison between 'free speech' 
and 'more say',  they are different. In 'free speech', the national difference persists, thus 
connoting durability. For 'more say', there is some similarity across nations, showing that 
they are possibly prone to economic changes.
Figure 4.3 presents a comparison of relative commitment to the respective four items 
within each nation. In the cases of Britain and the USA, people have more balanced levels 
7 Though not presented as a figure in this chapter, analysis is made in Postmaterialist twelve-item index. It 
shows that in Japanese case the level of Postmaterialist values seems to be similar to the USA and Britain 
in relatively consistent way. This also illustrates that Japanese case is lower than the USA and Britain 
particularly in the Postmaterialist four-item index.
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of commitment to the values items than in the other two societies. Postmaterialist items 
are, to a certain extent, at comparable levels to Materialist items (although the 'prices' item 
in the USA shows a gradual decrease and thus a deviation from the other items). In Japan 
and Russia 'free speech' receives distinctly lower support among the items. Moreover, in 
the Russian case, the support for order is very strong. These conditions, especially the state 
of 'free speech' support, persist in the respective nations across time points, implying the 
presence of durability.
4.4.2 Durability versus shift: age cohort analysis (figures 4.4 and 4.5)
We can further examine the stability as well as change in 'free speech' and 'more say' by 
investigating age cohort differences. If we look at figure 4.4, overall, there is not much 
difference  in  the  support  for  'free  speech'  over  the  age  groups.  Apart  from  slight 
fluctuations, the degrees of support tend to be steady in the four societies, whereas each of 
the societies maintains its own degree across the age differences. In the USA and Britain, 
the relatively high appreciations for 'free speech' are at similar levels over the separate age 
cohorts. Likewise, all the age cohorts in the Russian case are consistently at low levels. In 
Japan, in spite of some fluctuations, its particular level persists and is clearly distinct from 
that of the other societies.
On the contrary, in figure 4.5, there are observable changes in the case of 'more say'. 
In  the  cases  of  Japan,  Russia  and  Britain,  younger  cohorts  tend  to  have  a  higher 
commitment to 'more say'.  In the USA, support for 'more say' is steady across the age 
cohorts at quite high levels, implying the stability of a comparatively strong commitment 
to 'more say'. In the cases of Britain and Japan, there is a steady increase over the available 
time  points.  This  suggests  a  values  shift  that  is  consistent  with  the  Postmaterialist 
hypothesis. In the case of Russia, there is a change in the overall level over the multiple 
time points, but this still keeps the age difference. The change may be due to the condition 
of the economy. Especially, economic deterioration may have facilitated its initial decrease 
as mentioned above.8 (The persistence of age difference might become conducive to values 
shift, if the economy were to attain good conditions.) At any rate, these indications of the 
changes in the 'more say' item still suggest some tendency to change – probably mainly 
8 This perhaps encouraged a connection between economic concerns and the support of the 'more say' item
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due to economic circumstances. In other words, the relative commitment to 'more say' has 
much less durability than that of 'free speech' (whether low or high).
4.4.3 Comparison of durability against economic effect: scatterplot (figure 4.6)
If we look at figure 4.6, this gives a comparison of scatterplots of the 'free speech' and 
'more say' variables on the effect of economic development. Aggregate national means are 
used from the result of the World Values Survey 1995-98. According to the output, on the 
one hand, both the commitment to 'free speech' and 'more say'  could be susceptible to 
economic change. Nonetheless, as seen in the graph, 'free speech' is consistently lower than 
'more say'. The effect of economic development seems to be stronger on 'more say' than on 
'free  speech'.  If  the  effectiveness  of  economic  development  is  taken  into  account,  the 
relative commitment to 'free speech' would be 'delayed' in comparison with that of 'more 
say'. Also, it should be noted that the R Squares in both cases are at moderate levels, so 
that it would only  partly explain the linear effect of economic development on the two 
variables. Also, since this graph is assuming the linearity of the relationship, there may 
need  to  be  some  caution  that  there  might  be  non-linear  relationship.  In  fact,  when 
curvilinear analysis is attempted, R Squares increase. At any rate, having looked at the 
overall scatterplot, a rise in economic development could have an impact on the increase of 
these  variables.  However,  'more  say'  consistently  tends  to  take  a  position  above  'free 
speech'. 'Free speech' seems to be more likely to maintain persistent levels.
4.5 Analysis of regional context:  Does being Western, Postcommunist or East Asian 
matter? 
This part presents the latter half of the output from the analysis. It is assumed that the 
difference between the four societies corresponds with that between three regions. The 
dichotomy of West versus non-West seems to be quite plausible, particularly in terms of 
the appreciation of 'free speech'. These points are demonstrated in the following sections.
 
4.5.1 Initial analysis: average (mean) comparison (table 4.1)
These are mean scores of the three regions (West, Postcommunist and East Asia). On the 
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whole,  the  averages  of  the  Western  region  are  higher  than  the  other  two.  While  the 
difference in the levels of 'more say' is relatively small, the gap in the score of 'free speech' 
is very obvious. This may be, on the one hand, surmised as regional cultural difference, in 
that the Western societies generally have a cultural tradition of a higher commitment to 
such values – especially to 'free speech'. But, is it really? Probably, we need to consider the 
economic factor. Since the Western region is obviously more economically developed and 
wealthier,  this  could be  due  to  the  economic effect  as  depicted by  the  Postmaterialist 
hypothesis (or, more broadly, modernisation theories). 
4.5.2 Presence of regional particularity: scatterplot (figure 4.7)
Figure 4.7 is a demonstration of this question: the effect of economic development versus 
regional particularity. On the whole, there seems to be an economic effect – the higher the 
level of economic development, the greater the commitment to both. However, from the 
perspective  of  regionality,  in  'free  speech'  especially,  there  is  an  observable  regional 
difference. Each of the regional groups holds to a particular pattern. As for 'more say', 
regional distinction is rather ambiguous. This suggests that the state of 'more say' is mainly 
affected  by  economic  difference,  whereas  'free  speech'  is  susceptible  to  regional 
particularity with durability (although also being affected by economic development). This 
difference is in clear accord with the earlier analysis.
4.5.3 Regional particularity versus economic development: multiple regression (table 
4.2)
For the further  exploration,  multiple  regression analysis  is  undertaken on the effect  of 
economic development versus regional particularity. The result is as follows.  As seen in 
table  4.2,  as  for  'free  speech',  there  is  a  strong impact  of  regional  particularity,  while 
economic development also has an impact on the variable. With respect to 'more say', there 
seems to be little impact of regional particularity when entered with the economic variable. 
The economic variable constitutes a major predictor. (It should also be noted that the R 
Square on this is rather moderate unlike the case of 'free speech', so that there may also be 
other factors that have an impact or there may be a non-linear relationship.)
This  suggests  that  the  condition  of  'more  say'  is  susceptible  to  the  effect  that  is 
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expected in the Postmaterialist hypothesis as well as the overall argument of modernisation 
theories (rather than stuck to regional particularity). Meanwhile, 'free speech' is more apt to 
be  bounded  by  regional  local  factors  with  some  durability,  while  sensitive  to  some 
economic  or  modernisation  effect.  In  other  words,  'more  say'  is  changeable  due  to 
economic situations. Meanwhile, relatively high and stable commitment to 'free speech' is 
a  particular  asset  in  Western  societies,  as  is  the  relatively  weak  commitment  to  'free 
speech' in Postcommunist and East Asian societies.
4.6 Conclusion
4.6.1 Four societies: durability versus shift
From the comparison, for Russia and Japan the item of 'free speech' receives quite low 
support among the four items whereas in the USA and Britain 'free speech' is appreciated 
at comparable levels to the other items. As for 'more say', as seen in the case of Japan, 
there is a noticeable, consistent increase over the period of observation. In Russia, while 
the item of 'more say'  is still  low, there seems to be some fluctuation,  unlike for 'free 
speech'. In the cases of the USA and Britain, the respondents have reasonably high regard 
for 'more say'. Considering these results, it is surmised that in Russia and Japan there are 
durable tendencies for weak commitment to 'free speech' whereas the appreciation of 'more 
say'  is  more subject  to  change.  This implies that  'more say'  is  probably susceptible  to 
changes in the environment such as the economic situation (whether long term or short 
term). On the other hand, 'free speech' seems to be much less affected by such factors 
keeping its state very steady. 
The consistent increase of 'more say' in the Japanese and British cases may reflect a 
steady  values  shift  due  to  long-standing  economic  security  (as  depicted  by  the 
Postmaterialist thesis). The relative stability with an initial rise in the level of American 
support for the 'more say' item would suggest that, after the process of values shift, the 
American values orientation may have reached 'a saturation point' of what is expected by 
the Postmaterialist  theory.  On the whole,  the  item of  'more  say'  seems to  be  more in 
agreement with the major issue of the Postmaterialist thesis, which hypothesises the impact 
of economic development on the increase of Postmaterialist values. Meanwhile, as for the 
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Russian  change in  'more  say'  (and  rise  in  'prices'),  it  is  inferred  that  the  item is  also 
somewhat sensitive to a short-term economic change (as some critics have argued).9 On the 
contrary,  'free  speech'  seems  to  be  relatively  free  of  such  influence  or  at  least 
comparatively high 'immunity' to the economic effect or the Postmaterialist effect, whilst 
receiving low appreciation in Russia and Japan and higher support in Britain and the USA. 
Consequently, even if there emerge favourable conditions for Postmaterialist shift 
such as the attainment of economic prosperity and hopefully long-standing maintenance of 
affluence and security, what could be expected in Russia (and, as observed, in Japan) is 
quite likely to be a deficient version of the Postmaterialist effect. At least, if at all, the 
emergence of a high degree of support for 'free speech' would be considerably  delayed 
(being compared with that of 'more say'). Besides such inference of the future, the current 
situation in Russia has, in economic terms, far from ideal conditions for the Postmaterialist 
hypothesis. For the moment at least, in comparison with actual improvement in daily lives, 
the luxury of Postmaterialist effects and values may not have reality in the actual minds of 
the people. 
4.6.2 Regional implication
The characteristics observed at the level of national comparison between Russia, Japan, the 
USA and Britain correspond with the analysis at the level of regional comparison. That is, 
as far as the Postmaterialist-Materialist, 'more say' and 'free speech' variables scrutinised 
above are concerned, the cases of the USA and Britain quite clearly represent the regional 
group of the West. Likewise, the Russian case seems to neatly stand for the characteristics 
of the Postcommunist region, and the Japanese case for that of East Asia.
In Postcommunist and East Asian regions, as in the West, the inclination to 'more 
say' may be strengthened by economic development. Also, since the 'more say' dimension 
is  associated  with  'equality',  the  sense  of  equality  may  tend  to  be  enhanced  through 
9 For example, Clarke, Harold D., Kornberg, Allan, McIntyre, Chris, Bauer-Kaase, Petra, and Kaase, Max, 
'The Effect of Economic Priorities on the Measurement of Value Change: New Experiment Evidence', 
American Political Science Review, 93: 3 (September 1999), pp. 637-647; Clarke, Harold D. and Dutt, 
Nitish, 'Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment', 
American Political Science Review (1991), pp. 905-20; Duch, Raymond M., and Taylor, Michaell A., 
'Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (August 1993), 
pp. 747-79; For counter arguments to such a critique, see, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, and Abramson, 
Paul R., 'Measuring Postmaterialism', American Political Science Review, 93: 3 (September 1999).
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economic development from a relatively early phase of the process. Moreover, according 
to  the  multiple  regression,  when incorporated  as  independent  variables  along with the 
economic effect, there is no significant indication that regional difference affects the state 
of the 'more say' variable. This suggests that, as far as the extent of appreciation for 'more 
say'  is  concerned,  economic  development  has an impact  whereas  regional  particularity 
hardly has. 
In the meantime, in these non-Western regions, the obviously lower emphasis on 
'free speech'  than in the Western region is somewhat  enduring.  Although having some 
tendency to the influence of economic growth, the multivariate analyses show the strong 
susceptibility of 'free speech' to regional difference (which is not observed in the case of 
'more say'). Being Western does matter in producing a higher commitment to 'free speech', 
and being non-Western (Postcommunist/East Asian) vice versa. Hence, while related to the 
values  of 'freedom',  this  sphere  seems to  be  strongly  connected  with  regional  cultural 
particularity. As mentioned earlier, Western societies are said to have a traditional esteem 
for freedom, which means that non-Western societies could have less strength of support in 
this  area.  Despite  this  seemingly  simplistic  assumption,  the  result  indicates  quite 
unequivocal and plausible support for it.
Consequently,  in  the  Postcommunist  and  East  Asian  regions,  although economic 
development  would enhance the Postmaterialist  effect,  the result  is  not necessarily  the 
fully-fledged version expected by the hypothesis. The support for 'free speech' could be a 
distinctly local characteristic of Western societies. 
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Figure 4.1 Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index: comparison of four societies 
across four time points
Postmaterialist = 3; Mixed = 2; Materialist = 1
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
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Figure 4.2 Variables of relative commitment to respective items: comparison of four 
societies across four time points
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of four variables within each society
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
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Figure 4.4 Free speech: age cohorts
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
126
Br
ita
in
 8
1
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
Br
ita
in
 9
0
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
Br
ita
in
 9
8
(1
8-
24
)
(3
5-
44
)
(5
5-
64
)
0.0
1.0
2.0
Britain: Free Speech 
U
S
A
 9
0
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
U
S
A
 9
5
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
U
SA
 9
9-
02
15
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
-9
8
0.0
1.0
2.0
USA: Free Speech
Ja
pa
n 
81
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
Ja
pa
n 
90
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
Ja
pa
n 
95
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
Ja
pa
n 
99
-0
2
15
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
-9
8
0.0
1.0
2.0
Japan: Free Speech
R
us
si
a 
90
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
R
us
si
a 
95
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 p
lu
s
---
---
---
---
R
us
si
a 
99
-0
2
15
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
-9
8
0.0
1.0
2.0
Russia: Free Speech
Figure 4.5 More say: age cohorts
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Note for Figures 4.4 and 4.5:
(1) The youngest age group has a range between 15 and 24 years old for the 1999-2002 data and 18 and 24 
years old for the other data.
(2) A variable with six age categories is not available in the British data of 1998. Instead, a variable with 
three age categories is available.
(3) The labels of age groups are based on categorisation in the respective datasets.
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of economic effect: Free Speech and More Say 
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Figure 4.7 Economic level versus regional difference
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Table 4.2 Multiple regression models: effect of economic development versus regional 
particularity on relative commitment to Free Speech and More Say
Free Speech 　 　 　 　 　 　
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GNP per capita $, 1997 .147 (ns) .416*** .687*** .374*
West (= 1) .585** .174 (ns) .520*** .512***
Postcommunist (= 1) -.508*** -.509*** -.446*** -.540***
East Asia (= 1) -.346** -.326** -.390***
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square 0.469 0.555 0.434 0.695 0.635 0.694
More Say 　 　 　 　 　 　
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GNP per capita $, 1997 .529* .490** .580*** .715** .541*** .528**
West (= 1) .015 (ns) -.234 (ns)
Postcommunist (= 1) -.147 (ns) -.202 (ns) -.160 (ns)
East Asia (= 1) -.143 (ns) -.241 (ns) -.155 (ns)
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square 0.257 0.277 0.277 0.28 0.275 0.282
Note: Coefficients are standardised.
*p < .05    **p < .01    ***p < .001
N = 54 (Cases with missing values are 
excluded  accordingly  in  respective 
analyses.)
 　 　 　 　 　 　
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98
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Chapter 5: Postmaterialist Variables and Democracy
5.1 Introduction 
In comparison to previous chapters, this chapter is shorter but no less important. For while 
the issue of Postmaterialist-Materialist values has been examined so far, it is the  present 
chapter  that  will  demonstrate its  implication  for  democracy.  There  are  three  major 
enquiries for the research, which were raised at  the beginning of this dissertation.  Our 
examination in the third and fourth chapters has had direct relevance for the first question: 
(1) how do Postmaterialist  values shift and cultural  particularity respectively affect the 
condition of the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension? The outcome has shown that 
the effects of the values shift and cultural particularity differ depending on Postmaterialist 
values items. What implication does it have for democracy? In order to explore this issue, 
the present chapter attempts to answer the other two research enquiries. The first section 
addresses the question: (2) what implication do Postmaterialist values have for democracy? 
It  demonstrates  the dimension of  democracy to  which Postmaterialist  values  items are 
pertinent. Particular attention is paid to the items of 'more say' and 'free speech' in the four-
item Postmaterialist index (and its variants). For democracy, polyarchy is employed as a 
tentative model. The second section is for the question:  (3) how do the values shift and 
cultural particularity matter to the state of democracy? It  connects the logic of the first 
section with results from the previous chapters. In this way, the outcomes for (1) and (2) 
are combined together in order to answer question (3).
5.2 Postmaterialist variables and polyarchy 
In Inglehart's view, Postmaterialist values are more likely to be conducive to democracy 
than Materialist values.1 But, what type or dimension of democracy do the values affect? 
After all, it is the kind of democracy that attaches importance to 'the responsiveness to 
1 For an association between the Postmaterialist values and democracy, see for example, Inglehart, Ronald, 
Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies 
(Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 210, 213-4; Inglehart, Ronald and 
Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Haward J. Wiarda ed., New Directions in 
Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 149-152; Inglehart, Ronald, 'How 
Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', PS (January 2003), p. 54.
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popular claims'. The values items of the Postmaterialist index – especially, 'more say' and 
'free speech' – could represent societal conditions under which individuals have a relatively 
strong  inclination  to  have  a  say  and communicate  their  wishes  to  government.  This 
propensity has certain relevance to the quality of polyarchy. To expand on this point, let us 
start with a rationale for using the framework of polyarchy.
5.2.1 Polyarchy
For the study of democracy (especially in comparative as well as quantitative methods), it 
is crucial to define what is meant by 'democracy'. For this, to examine a framework of 
democracy is particularly useful. In this research, as an institutional sphere of democracy, 
polyarchy is employed as a conceptual model.2 Polyarchy, for the convenience of analysis, 
is utilised as a tentative model that elucidates a single aspect of democracy. Therefore, it is 
not an absolute or general sense of democracy. It is employed as a conceptual measure in 
order to provide a clear scope for this study.
As Dahl states, 'a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness 
of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.'3 To be 
fair,  Dahl  recognises  that  there  are  other  elements in  democracy.  However,  the  main 
concern  is  specifically  'responsiveness'.4 To him,  there  are  two  chief  dimensions  of  a 
democratic  system:  'public  contestation'  and  'right  to  participate  in  election  and office 
(inclusiveness)'.5 These  aspects  have,  as  noted  later,  considerable  relevance  to  the 
Postmaterialist-Materialist perspective.
The model of polyarchy seems to be intrinsically focused on qualities of liberty. It 
involves the guarantee of freedom for the expression of one's own views and the formation 
of  organisations,  which  can  be  mainly  related  to  public  contestation.  The  model  also 
includes political rights for voting and running for elective offices, which can have direct 
relevance to inclusiveness. The political rights entitle people to participate on the basis of 
2 For a brief introduction of polyarchy, see Masahiro, Iwasaki, and Kogure Kentaro, 'Seiji-hatten-ron 
[Political Development Theories]', in Kohno, Masaru and Masahiro Iwasaki, eds., Akusesu Hikaku-seiji-
gaku [Access to Comparative Politics] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 71-91, esp. 
74-77.
3 Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 
1971), p. 1.
4 See ibid., p. 1-2.
5 For the theoretical discussion on public contestation, inclusiveness (right to participate) and polyarchy, 
see ibid., pp. 1-16.
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their free wills. One might criticise the potential that employing the concept of polyarchy 
may encounter  a normative bias  on  liberty in the interpretation of  democracy.6 It is still, 
nonetheless, legitimate to use it  as a  conceptual  measure.  The evaluation is made while 
being aware of the fact that it could be a specific aspect of democracy. Insofar as there is 
such awareness,  its  objectivity can be secured.  Moreover, the adoption of this  standard 
enables the researcher to conduct an effective evaluation. One can  estimate  distances or 
variances of cases from the standard, whereby comparisons and appraisals are conducted 
clearly.7 Thus, the concept of polyarchy is adopted for an objective reason. Another point 
is that, as argued in the first chapter, the 'institutional' guarantee of freedom is in fact a 
crucial asset for a democratic system. There might be a gap in the emphasis and perception 
of liberty in 'values' between diverse cultural and ideological contexts, which could be a 
source  of  normative  conflict.  The  'institution'  represented  by  polyarchy,  however, 
constitutes  an  important  component  of  a  democratic  system with  a  practical  efficacy, 
which can have a certain validity cross-nationally.  Furthermore, the model of polyarchy 
has been broadly utilised as an empirical framework for evaluating democracy.8 
 As for the actual measurement, Freedom House ratings are useful in this research.9 
Diamond wrote that '[t]he "free" rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available 
6 For critiques of liberal democracy especially from non-Western contexts, see Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The 
Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in David Held ed., Prospect for Democracy: North, South,  
East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-75; Lee, Kuan Yew and Fareed Zakaria, 
'Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew', Foreign Affairs, 73 (1994), pp. 109-26; Bell, 
Daniel A. and Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. 
Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in 
Pacific Asia (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), ch. 1, pp. 1-16.
7 For the argument of an ideal type analysis, see Peters, B. Guy, Comparative Politics: Theory and 
Methods (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp. 105-107, 192. For concept stretching, see ibid., p. 
19. Also, for concepts and conceptualisation, see ibid., pp. 81, 83-4, 86, 108, 146-7.
8 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of 
Democratization and Good Governance', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20:1 
(March 2004), p. 30.
9 For the explication of the Freedom House ratings, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/. One might criticise 
the certain weakness of the indicator in terms of scientific rigour. Nonetheless, the Freedom House 
measure is widely employed by a number of political studies, which would virtually legitimise its 
validity. Likewise, Berg-Schlosser acknowledges the Freedom House ratings as a 'proxy' for comparing 
different democracy indicators. See ibid., p. 34. It would be fair to argue that other indicators also suffer 
similar and/or other shortcomings. Moreover, the ratings can be employed for a practical reason to refer 
to other studies that utilise it. For the critique of democracy indexes, see Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay 
Verkuilen, 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices', Comparative 
Political Studies, 35: 1 (February, 2002), pp. 5-34. For discussions on measuring democracy, see 
Beetham, David ed., Defining Measuring Democracy (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994).
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empirical indicator of liberal democracy'.10 Berg-Schlosser  referred to liberal democracy, 
which  shares  a  similar  direction  with  polyarchy.11 He  examined  several  indicators  on 
democracy and pointed out  that  the 'political  rights'  measure (Freedom House)  in  fact 
highly correlates  with major  indexes  such  as  'institutionalized  democracy'  (Polity)  and 
'voice and accountability' (World Bank) indicators.12 According to Coppedge and Reinicke, 
the Freedom House ratings have strong correlations with their Polyarchy Scale.13 Inglehart, 
often with Welzel,  frequently utilises the Freedom House measure as a  basis  for their 
indexes of democracy.14 Since our study is concerned with Inglehart's thesis, it would be 
useful to employ the same measure for a comparative reason. Thus, the use of the Freedom 
House ratings is appropriate for the present study. 
The Freedom House ratings consist of two types of scores: 'political rights' and 'civil 
liberties'. The 'political rights' item would be largely pertinent to the aspect of rights to 
participate  (inclusiveness).  This  item  also  overlaps  with  public  contestation,  since  it 
includes openness to competitive political groupings and the presence of oppositions as 
criteria.  On the other hand, the item of 'civil  liberties'  could represent  the elements of 
foundation  for  public  contestation  and  inclusiveness.  Berg-Schlosser  argues  that,  in 
addition  to  the  dual  qualities,  a  normative  dimension  in  relation  to  civil  liberties  is 
presupposed in Dahl's notion.15 Likewise, Diamond regards civil liberties as crucial for the 
two aspects of polyarchy.16 
10 Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), pp. 12. Also, see the argument of polyarchy and quantitative measure in Rose, 
Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-
communist Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 27-31.
11 Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of 
Democratization and Good Governance', pp. 29-32.
12 Ibid., pp. 34-9.
13 They report their scale's correlation coefficients as .938 and .934 for the political rights and civil liberties 
respectively. Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, 'Measuring Polyarchy', in Inkeles, Alex ed., 
On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), pp. 57, 67.
14 For instance, see Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, ch. 6, pp. 160-215; Inglehart and 
Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And 
How Can We Measure it?'; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: 
Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' Comparative Politics, 36: 1 (October 2003), p. 61-70; Inglehart, 
Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human 
Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
15 Berg-Schlosser, 'The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current Indicators of 
Democratization and Good Governance', p. 30.
16 Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 8. He uses terms: 'opposition' and 'participation' for the two aspects 
of Dahl's polyarchy.
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5.2.2 Values and institution
The institutional  aspects  of  democracy,  as  presented in  the  previous  section,  could be 
understood in the context of public contestation and inclusiveness. This leads to the issue 
of  how  people's  values  can  be  related  to  institutions.  When  public  contestation  and 
inclusiveness  are  considered  in  relation  to  popular  values,  people's  attitudes  towards 
expressing their views in public and towards government are crucial. This orientation is a 
major factor that underpins the two qualities of polyarchy at the individual level. 
For example, if a large proportion of the population share a relative propensity to 
freely discuss and advance their opinions, the function of public contestation will have a 
direct connection with the people. The account of public contestation involves the presence 
of competitive opposition groups  vis-à-vis the government. This will acquire democratic 
substance if they are supported by the people who are willing to express their views and 
demands freely. Similarly, the system of inclusiveness will also be fulfilled by a public 
inclination  to  participation.  Dahl  presupposes  that  'the  greater  the  opportunities  for 
expressing, organizing, and representing political preferences, the greater the number and 
variety of preferences and interests that are likely to be represented in policy making'.17 As 
the requisites of democracy in the context of polyarchy, he points out that elements such as 
'right to vote', 'freedom of expression', 'freedom to form and join organisations' and so forth 
should be institutionally guaranteed.18 Given this, it is a people's inclination towards free 
expression and participation that would actively utilise such arrangements while giving 
functional substance to them. 
On the other hand, if people lack such attitudes, the likely outcome will be quite 
different and such a tendency would mean silence and acquiescence.  If  the people are 
simply apt to comply with the decisions of political authorities and have little inclination to 
contest  them,  the  arrangement  of  polyarchy  should  have  very  different  consequences. 
Public contestation would rarely have any driving force from society. The role of ordinary 
people  would  be  replaced  by  elite  competition.19 Individuals  would  be  kept  at  some 
17 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 26. 
18 Ibid., pp. 2-3; Dahl, Robert A., Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10-11; Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics 
(New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 220-222.
19 Robinson is critical of polyarchy, by arguing that '[p]olyarchy refers to a system in which a small group 
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distance from the political arena, only pursuing private goals and being withdrawn from 
public affairs. The inclusiveness, if exercised, could be taken advantage of by the political 
authorities for mobilisation rather than a means for participation by the people.20 Thus, the 
difference of popular attitudes can have different implications for the practice and function 
of the two aspects of polyarchy.
5.2.3 Postmaterialist items and the dual aspects of polyarchy
In such a context, the Postmaterialist four-item index is important to polyarchy. In the 
question set of the Postmaterialist four-item index, there are two items that have particular 
relevance:  (1)  giving  people  'more  say' in  important  government  decisions,  and  (2) 
protecting  'freedom of  speech'.  In  fact,  as  presented  in  table  5.1,  there  are  significant 
correlations  between  the  Postmaterialist  items  ('more  say'  and  'free  speech')  and  two 
dimensions ('political rights' and 'civil liberties') in the Freedom House ratings.21 As noted 
above, the ratings are employed as measures that have certain relevance to polyarchy in 
this research. Thus, the attitudinal elements represented by the Postmaterialist items seem 
to matter to the polyarchy-like democracy. 
On the whole, there seems to be a Postmaterialist influence on the sphere of 'civil 
liberties'.  The  two  Postmaterialist  items  also  seem  to  have  a  congruent  influence  on 
'political rights', which can be relevant to the two aspects of polyarchy to a certain extent. 
As for the two aspects, further conceptual elucidation might be possible on the paths of the 
influence. As presented in figure 5.1, in relative terms, the values item of 'more say' is 
more pertinent to the right to participate (inclusiveness), whereas the 'free speech' item can 
be  more  relevant  to  public  contestation.22 Public  contestation  and  'free  speech'  has  a 
actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections 
carefully managed by competing elites'. See Robinson, William I., Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization,  
US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 49. 
Although his critique may not entirely grasp the whole account of polyarchy, there could be such 
potential unless a given system of polyarchy is grounded on proactive or participatory popular values and 
behaviour that activate the system.
20 For example, during the period of the USSR, voting virtually had a character of an artificial mobilisation 
by the political authorities. See for instance, White, Stephen, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How 
Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1997), esp. pp. 1-19.
21 In relation to this, Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index has significant and high correlation with 
Freedom House indices as observed by Inglehart. See Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for 
Democracy-And How Can We Measure it?', p. 54.
22 In connection with this, in Inglehart's later work, the Postmaterialist four-item index (which includes 'free 
speech' and 'more say') was developed into a slightly more elaborated version being called a measure of 
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horizontal connotation in society. The right to participate (inclusiveness) and 'more say' are 
more vertical since they imply the input of popular claims on government.23 
In addition, Inglehart argues that the Postmaterialist values orientation can enhance 
people's inclination to protest in a manner that contributes to democracy.24 By democracy, 
he  seems to  mean a  democracy that  attaches  importance to  responsiveness  to  people's 
claims.25 This  view accords with the normative direction of polyarchy that  emphasises 
contestation and participation, being underpinned by civil liberties. As noted earlier, on the 
side of popular outlooks,  an element that supports  such  dimensions of democracy is  a 
popular  propensity  to  free  public  expressions  and  demands  on  government.  These 
attitudinal elements are in fact the components of the Postmaterialist values.
'liberty-participation'. This naming and probably his awareness coincide with the conceptual 
correspondence between the nature of the four-item index and the two dimensions of polyarchy. See, for 
example, Inglehart and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages,' p. 
65. 
23 The figure is slightly modified by swapping the vertical and horizontal axes of the polyarchy in 
accordance with this view.
24 See, for instance, Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, esp. pp. 211-213. Inglehart often 
refers to 'elite-challenging' styles of participation due to the values shift. See Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent  
Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced 
Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 5, 335-370; Inglehart, 
Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 43-44, 307-315; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization,  
Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 94-134.
25 Inglehart and Welzel mention responsive governance in relation to self-expression values. See Inglehart 
and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
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Table 5.1 Correlation: Postmaterialist items and the dual aspects of democracy
Freedom House Ratings
Political Rights Civil Liberties
Free Speech Pearson Correlation   .333*     .470**
Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .001
N 46 46
More Say Pearson Correlation       .525***       .583***
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 47 47
Note:
(1)  The  years  of  the  Freedom House  Ratings  are  in  accordance  with  the  years  of  survey  sampling  in 
respective nations.
(2)  The scores of  'free speech'  and 'more  say'  are  national  averages  measured by the scales  of  relative 
commitment to each of the items, which are developed from question items in the World Values Survey.
(3) *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001.
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Figure 5.1 Values and institution: Postmaterialist values items and the dual aspects of 
polyarchy (with modification)
Items for Postmaterialist four-item index
1. Maintaining order in the nation [Materialist]
2. Giving peopl  e 'more say'    i n important government decisions [Postmaterialist]
3. Fighting rising prices [Materialist]
4. Protecting   'freedom of speech' [Postmaterialist]
Source: For the original diagram of the two aspects of polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 6.
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5.3 Values shift, cultural particularity and democracy
As argued above, the two items of the Postmaterialist-Materialist four-item index: 'more 
say'  and  'free  speech'  have  close  relevance  to  the  quality  of  polyarchy.  With  this 
framework, this section attempts to answer the third question of the research enquiries. The 
question reads as follows:
(3) How do the values shift and cultural particularity matter to the state of democracy?
In order to study this, it is necessary to combine two analytical results. The first result is 
(A) the competing effects of the values shift and cultural particularity on Postmaterialist-
Materialist values, which was examined in previous chapters. The second one is (B) the 
relevance of  Postmaterialist  values  items  to  democratic  institutions,  which  has  been 
clarified in the above section. For an effective explanation, it would be beneficial to review 
the preceding results on point (A).
5.3.1 Review: values shift vs. cultural particularity
Preceding chapters have found  variations in the effects of the values shift  and cultural 
particularity  in  relation  to  Postmaterialist-Materialist  distributions.  The  Postmaterialist 
item: 'giving people more say in important government decisions',  especially, was shown 
to  be  prone  to  values  shift  (as  a  consequence  of  economic  growth  and  its  sustained 
stability). As for Japan, there is an increase in the support for 'more say'. In Russia, 'more 
say' receives still low scores with some fluctuation. For the USA and Britain, respondents 
have  consistently  shown a  relatively  high  regard  for  'more  say'.  In  contrast,  the  other 
Postmaterialist item: 'protecting  freedom of speech'  is less affected by values shift. The 
USA and Britain tend to have a comparatively strong emphasis on 'free speech' whereas its 
appraisal is clearly lower in Japan and Russia. The difference shows persistence, leaving 
each national level holding very steady. The degrees of appreciation for 'free speech' seem 
to  have  durability  at  the  respective  levels  of  the  societies.  This  in  turn  suggests  that 
idiosyncratic cultural or historical experience could be related to their particular levels. 
This  has  been  discovered  to  be  the  case  with  tripartite  regional  contexts:  Western, 
Postcommunist and East Asian regions. The emphasis on 'more say' exhibits susceptibility 
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to the values shift (and therefore, to economic development). 'Free speech' is clearly less 
so, implying cultural durability. On the whole, Western societies tend to cluster around a 
higher support level for 'free speech' and the Postcommunist and East Asian societies are 
likely to have lower appreciation in comparison.
5.3.2 'More say', 'free speech' and polyarchy
With this, what could be inferred for democracy in view of the above-mentioned point (B)? 
Point (B) denotes the relevance of 'more say' and 'free speech' to polyarchy. The following 
is its implication for the four societies. For the USA and Britain, both levels in favour of 
'more  say'  and  'free  speech'  are  reasonably high.  This  indicates  the  presence of  stable 
popular outlooks to give certain attitudinal substance to the functions of civil  liberties, 
public contestation and participation (inclusiveness). In the case of Japan, considering the 
steady  low  commitment  to  the  support  for  'free  speech',  popular  values  condition  as 
underpinning for polyarchy would not be as substantial as that of its Western counterparts. 
Japanese people may have an inclination to 'more say' in government. They have much less 
concern, however, for 'free speech' with some hesitancy in public expression, discussion 
and the articulation of claims at an individual level. Indeed, according to the World Values 
Survey, the Japanese inclination to 'discuss politics with friends' is consistently the lowest 
among the four societies from the first to the third Waves. For Russia, the commitment to 
the two  Postmaterialist  values items (especially 'free speech')  is at  a low level,  so that 
popular attitudes that support polyarchy have far less solid ground at least in this attitudinal 
sphere. Moreover, considering the 'immunity' of low support for 'free speech' to the values 
shift  and  thus  economic  factors,  the  fully-fledged emergence  of  Postmaterialist  values 
could  be  considerably  hindered,  even  if  economic  growth  and  its  maintenance  were 
achieved. For the Postmaterialist effects would tend to be valid on 'more say', but much 
less  so  on  'free  speech'  in  Russia. In  the  political  realm,  economic  development  may 
enhance attitudinal underpinning of polyarchy to a certain extent, especially in the realm of 
participation. Nonetheless, it would not necessarily facilitate a popular inclination towards 
public expression. Thus, in Russia, there can be weakness in the effect of values shift to 
increase an attitudinal element that encourages civil liberties and public contestation with 
democratic substance.
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What  is  their  regional  connotation?  For  all  the  three  regions:  Western, 
Postcommunist and East Asian regions, the inclinations to 'more say' could increase owing 
to economic development. In the political realm, economic development could be effective 
for  reinforcing  this  aspect  of  popular  attitude  in  a  manner  to  support  polyarchy. 
Nonetheless, in the Postcommunist and East Asian regions, the relatively low emphasis on 
'free  speech'  is  somewhat  enduring,  being  influenced  by  regional  particularities.  The 
durable  low  regard  for  free  expression  in  these  regions  can  be  a  sign  of  attitudinal 
weakness  in  relation  to  civil  liberties  as  well  as  democratic public  contestation. 
Consequently, in Postcommunist and East Asia regions, even  if economic  development 
and  its  long-standing  maintenance  are  achieved,  the  Postmaterialist  effect  would  not 
necessarily  the  fully-fledged  version  expected  by  the  hypothesis.  Popular  values  that 
underpin  polyarchy  could  be  less  fostered  in  the  range  of  Postmaterialist-Materialist 
values.  In  the  meantime,  in  Western  societies,  the  values  shift  based  on  economic 
development may have strengthened individuals' orientations to giving 'more say' to the 
government. As for support for 'free speech', a Western cultural penchant to give it priority 
seems to have been already and uniquely present. At least, such a cultural proclivity has 
been  favourable to the Postmaterialist effect as regards the 'free speech' item. Thus, the 
particular  characteristic  of  Western  societies  seems  to  be advantageous  for  the 
Postmaterialist values conditions as well as the democratic substance of polyarchy.
5.4 Conclusion
This  chapter  has  suggested  a  tentative  conclusion  in  relation  to  issues  on  the 
Postmaterialist  four-item index  and  democracy.  Polyarchy  is  employed  as  a  pertinent 
model for this study. It is argued that two Postmaterialist items of the index ('more say' and 
'free speech') are relevant to the model. This framework is applied to an outcome obtained 
in  previous  chapters.  An overall  conclusion is  that,  in  Postcommunist  and  East  Asian 
societies (including Russia and Japan), a values shift could have less effect than what is 
expected by the Postmaterialist hypothesis, so that there could be a certain weakness in its 
efficacy to nurture popular attitudes conducive to polyarchy. On the other hand, Western 
societies  tend  to  receive  full  benefit  in  the values  shift  and,  as  a  consequence,  in  the 
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development of an attitudinal underpinning for such a model of responsive democracy.
Since  polyarchy  has  relevance  to  an  aspect  of  liberal  democracy  as  mentioned 
earlier,  the result is critical for the state of liberal democracy. Culture seems to matter 
especially  on  outlooks  on  liberty  and  perhaps  towards  behavioural consequences  for 
democracy. Economic growth and values shift would not necessarily be perfect medicines 
for liberal  democratic development in the sphere of values in Postcommunist  and East 
Asian contexts. Even if the sign of the attitudinal transformation emerges in a difficult 
domain, it could take a considerable length of time until the effect takes root.
With this, the following chapters further examine popular attitudes, especially those 
concerned with liberal democratic dimensions. First of all, the study will focus on the issue 
of freedom. Subsequently, the focus is extended to political aspects. Finally, associations 
between liberal democratic attitudes and political variables are explored in a comparative 
manner. In this context, the next chapter will explore the issue of freedom. So far, it has 
been discovered that there are enduring cultural differences in the level of esteem for 'free 
speech'.  But,  is  freedom  simply  de-emphasised in  non-Western  societies?  It  is  not 
necessarily so. The chapter will probe variations in the perception of freedom. 
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Chapter 6: Freedom
6.1 Introduction
Freedom has  crucial  implications  for  democracy,  as  it  relates  to  popular  outlooks  on 
individual  rights,  participation  and  freedom of  speech.1 Analytical  results  so  far  have 
shown that there is societal  divergence in the emphasis on free speech.  The difference 
seems to be especially marked between Western and non-Western societies. With this in 
mind,  the  present  chapter  further  explores  the  issue  of  freedom.  A  variable  mainly 
examined  is  the  relative  priority  of  freedom  and  order,  which  connotes  respondents' 
emphasis on either individuals' liberty or the power of political authority. Since the latter 
has the potential to deter individuals' spontaneous political behaviour, popular support for 
freedom as against order by the state could be conducive to the balanced functioning of 
democratic governance.
Nonetheless, even if the people appreciate freedom, the kinds of freedom on which 
various societies place their emphasis could differ. There may be divergent perceptions of 
freedom that are either conducive or non-conducive to the function of democracy. For 
democracy in the sense of polyarchy, Dahl points to the guarantee of freedom in several 
areas as its requirements.2 These denote freedom of political involvement, which in turn 
would be supported by popular attention that is politically proactive rather than passive. 
Nonetheless, there could be a type of freedom that is not necessarily compatible with such 
a  connotation,  as argued later.  Moreover,  this  difference seems to have relevance to  a 
values dimension depicted by the Postmaterialist-Materialist dichotomy. A point that must 
be addressed is whether such a difference should be interpreted in the context of either 
cultural particularities or a values shift in economic modernisation processes. Our basic 
hypothesis is that, although there could be the effect of economic development to push for 
1 For the issue of freedom and democracy, see for instance, Rose, Richard, 'Freedom as a Fundamental 
Value', International Social Science Journal, 145 (1995), pp. 457-471; Zakaria, Fareed, 'The Rise of 
Illiberal Democracy', Foreign Affairs (November 1997); Plattner, Marc F., 'Liberalism and Democracy: 
Can't Have One Without the Other', Foreign Affairs (March/April 1998); Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, 
Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 6th ed. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), pp. 18-20; Beetham, David, 'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and 
Leonardo Morlino eds., Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005).
2 Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 
1-16.
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a certain direction favourable to the Postmaterialist orientation, there is the presence and 
durability of culture that affects the state of the values concerned. Culture could hinder, 
diverge  from  or  in  some  cases  support  the  Postmaterialist  effect.  This  chapter  pays 
attention to these points while particularly referring to the meaning of freedom. A major 
aim is to explore the presence of social difference and how it is affected by social/regional 
particularities.
6.2 Order versus freedom: initial observation
Below are the results of a question that asks respondents  which is  the more important 
responsibility of government as between (1) to maintain order in society and (2) to respect 
the freedom of the individual.3 In the third wave of the World Values Survey, an initial 
observation is that the USA and Russia have a balanced view of order and freedom while 
Japan has a significant inclination towards order  (figure 6.1).4 A later survey (the fourth 
wave) also reveals that Russia has a balanced view in this regard.5
6.2.2 Japan: order orientation
When literally interpreted from the question, in Japan the great majority of respondents 
expect the government to maintain order in society rather than to ensure the freedom of the 
individual, if they have to choose either. Does this mean that the people possess general 
attitudes that could potentially comply with the central authorities to limit political and/or 
civil liberties if it was imperative to maintain order? In reality, a current possibility of such 
an  urgent  case  would  be  low,  since  Japan  has  maintained  a  stable  liberal  democratic 
system,  social  stability  and  positive  economic  performance.  However,  many  Japanese 
seem to  have  a  certain  susceptibility  to  the  collective  interests  of  society  rather  than 
individual liberty.
3 Data on the USA, Russia and Japan are available for this.
4 For issues in relation to order and freedom in Russia, see Gibson, James L., 'The Struggle between Order 
and Liberty in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', Australian Journal of Political Science, 32: 2 
(1997), pp. 271-290; Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions between Democracy 
and Order among Russian Citizens', Studies in Public Policy 352 (2001).
5 For the Russian figures of the fourth wave, 52.1 per cent of the respondents chose 'order' whereas 47.9 
per cent of them selected 'freedom'. American, British and Japanese data are not available for this wave. 
See Appendix 1.
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Moreover, there seems to be attitudinal consistency in this proclivity across various 
segments of society. In relation to the 'order vs. freedom' variables, the analyses of several 
sociological  variables  are  conducted,  including gender,  income,  subjective social  class, 
occupation, employment status and age. The Japanese percentages of those who prefer 
'freedom' are consistently lower than American and Russian counterparts across the sub-
groups of the sociological variables. For most of the categories, gaps are evident between 
Japan and the other two societies.6 This suggests that, on the whole, Japanese respondents' 
low priority  of  'freedom'  vis-à-vis 'order'  are  not  much  affected  by  these  sociological 
variations. This could be interpreted as indicating that there is a certain  durability in its 
tendency. 
Why is  there such a skew towards order? This would be related to a  conformist 
orientation in the Japanese tradition. Culturally, the people seem to have an inclination to 
security by being part of a group or the larger social entity to which they belong.7 There are 
studies  in  which  a  Japanese  orientation  to  collectivism  (and  ambivalence  towards 
individual freedom) is mentioned.8 There is a well-known proverb: 'if you go under a big 
tree, you will be in the shadow [that is, secure]', which depicts a typical Japanese character 
prone to authority and conformism.9 Traditionally, people's cooperation for the good of a 
'whole'  is accompanied by their  expectation for consequential  positive outcomes rather 
than immediate personal interests. An overall prosperity is often perceived as increasing 
individuals'  security  and  welfare.10 The  expectation  would  be  informally  conceived  in 
6 As exceptions, the categories where the gaps are narrow are such as the sub-group of 'lower' in a 
subjective social class variable and the youngest age cohort (18-24 years old) of a six-category age 
variable.
7 Heywood mentions Japanese emphasis on groups as well as community and social cohesion. See 
Heywood, Andrew, Politics (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 1997), p. 34.
8 For instance, see Maruyama, Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour 
of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, 
Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 26, 158-81; Lipset, S. M., American Exceptionalism: A 
Double-Edged Sword (London/New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 211-63, 293-6; Sato, 
Yoshiko, Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho to Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku [A Good Child in 
Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo 
Koron Shin-sha, 2001).
9 The proverb is pronounced as 'yoraba taiju no kage' in Japanese. Another proverb would be: 'be rolled up 
by things that are long (nagai-mono niwa makarero)'. These are often quoted by Japanese themselves (in 
somewhat resigned or satirical manners).
10 Such a logic is compatible with an 'economic first model' in East Asian nations, where the enlargement of 
civil and political rights tend to be put aside while a priority is given to the national achievement of an 
economic growth. For the East Asian model, see Nagle, John D. and Alison Mahr, 'Economic First, Then 
(Maybe) Politics: the Challenge of the East Asian Model', in Democracy and Democratization: Post-
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exchange  for  their  patience  by  suppressing  personal  liberty  (which  would  be  often 
regarded as selfishness).11 In such customary norms, the order of the whole system would 
be taken as prior to individual freedom. Such order is supposed to provide the efficiency of 
the system, which can be conducive to an effective achievement  of overall  goals.  The 
strong sense of order rather than freedom in Japan seems to reside in such outlooks.
Does such a quality affect politics at the national level? Contemporary Japan has 
high diversification and complexity in views and interests, so that collective identification 
and solidarity would be presently unlikely for the nation as a whole.12 Moreover, Japan has 
maintained liberal democratic arrangements that guarantee extensive freedom.13 However, 
at  the individual  level,  they have a  basic  attitudinal  stance to  depend on larger  social 
contexts  for  their  security  rather  than  to  be  independent  individuals.  A  sense  of 
individuality  is  somewhat  weak,  which  has  a  constant  potential  to  submerge  into 
collectivity.14 This quality could enhance their susceptibility to the state authority or main 
streams of public opinions without inherent strength and consistency to uphold individual 
liberty.15 Although  current  Japanese  values  have  been  attaining  a  stronger  sense  of 
freedom, the cultural proclivity of conformism seems to stubbornly remain.16
As for democracy, it seems that in Japan there is an embedded values element that 
could potentially  run counter to  the normative direction of democratic models such as 
polyarchy.  In  the  account  of  polyarchy,  for  instance,  Dahl  argues  that  freedom  of 
expression, freedom to form organisations, the right to votes, the right to run for elective 
Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 
255-268.
11 As East Asian characteristics, Heywood points out their emphasis on practical prosperity prior to 
individual freedom. See Heywood, Politics, p. 34.
12 Japanese society comprises the competitions of divergent groups. Pye mentions a perspective that, 
whereas Japanese have cultural propensity to commit themselves to group identity, the intensity of the 
belonging has a simultaneous consequence of competitions in wider society. See Pye with Pye, Asian 
Power and Politics, p. 168-170.
13 For instance, Japanese scores on civil liberties and political rights in the Freedom House ratings are at a 
comparable level to Western democratic counterparts.
14 This point agrees with what Maruyama persistently argues. See Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to  
Kodo [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].
15 In relation to this propensity, for instance, Maruyama's categorisation of individuals might be useful with 
some reinterpretation. See Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A 
Conceptual Scheme', in Marius B. Jansen  ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 489-531.
16 For example, an age cohort analysis of the 'order vs. freedom' variable suggests higher preference for 
freedom in younger generations, whereas the overall level per se is clearly lower than the levels of the 
USA and Russia. However, a caution on the possibility of a life-cycle effect is needed for its 
interpretation.
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office and so forth should be institutionally guaranteed.17 Freedom is presupposed as an 
inherent norm. In the sphere of popular values, these can be underpinned by respect for 
personal autonomy. For such an emphasis would motivate one to seek for freedom and its 
entitlement  in  a  manner  to  utilise  the  democratic  arrangements.  Thus,  the  values  of 
freedom can constitute a quality that provides substance to democracy at least in the sense 
of polyarchy. In more general terms, this would be the case with liberal democracy. Parekh 
argues  that  liberalism  is  the  premise  and  foundation  of  liberal  democracy,  and  that 
'liberalism takes the individual as the ultimate and irreducible unit of society' while stating 
that individualism 'lies at the heart of liberal thought.'18 As mentioned above, nonetheless, 
most Japanese respondents appear to be prone to prioritising the 'whole' rather than the 
'individual'. The sense of individuality and liberty seem to be much less emphasised than 
the  collective  interest.  This  could  diminish  people's  inclination  to  uphold  individual 
rights.19 The  weak  rights  consciousness  can  lead  to  a  lack  of  attitudinal  strength  in 
participation and contestation.20 If this is the case, popular values in Japan could have a 
considerable influence on the workings of polyarchy and probably liberal democracy.21
6.2.3 The USA and Russia: equilibrium and liberal democracy?
On the other hand, both the cases of the USA and Russia show fairly balanced percentages 
between order and freedom. In the case of the USA, there is an observable tension between 
the  two  elements.  It  could  be  initially  surmised  that  the  USA's  democratic  system is 
functioning with popular  values  that  attach  almost  equivalent  importance  to  order  and 
freedom. Similarly, as presented in table 6.1, the available data from the World Values 
17 Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. 2-3; Dahl, Robert A., Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control 
(New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10-11; Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its  
Critics (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 220-222.
18 Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy,' in Held, David, ed., Prospect for 
Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), Ch. 7, p. 157.
19 Lipset mentions Japanese cultural predisposition in clear contrast with American one, including their 
different emphases on either obligation or rights. See Lipset, Seymour Martin, American Exceptionalism: 
A Double-Edged Sward (New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 211-263, 293-296.
20 For the concept of right consciousness, see Gibson, James L., Raymond M. Duch, and Kent L. Tedin, 
'Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union', The Journal of Politics 54: 2 (May 
1992), pp. 329-371; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet 
Democracy', Political Research Quarterly, 47: 1 (1994), pp. 5-39, esp. appendix.
21 Heywood notices the possibility that 'polyarchical institutions operate differently in an Asian context 
from the way they do in a western one' while pointing out Asian cultural difference from values 'shaped 
by liberal individualism'. See Heywood, Politics, p. 34.
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Survey (1995-98) indicate that Western democracies also largely attach an equal priority to 
order and freedom.22 If it is supposed that Western democratic systems are relatively close 
to the ideal of polyarchy or liberal democracy, the equilibrium may be a values condition 
supportive of such a democratic model. 
As mentioned above, the guarantee of freedom is a crucial asset of polyarchy as well 
as  liberal  democracy.  Accordingly,  one  of  the  citizens'  qualities  that  give  it  substance 
would be their inclination to freedom of speech. It was found that Western societies tended 
to have a comparatively strong commitment to that quality. This connotes that the presence 
of  masses  with  an  emphasis  on  liberty  would  be  advantageous  to  such  a  democratic 
system. Nonetheless, freedom without order could be conducive to an unstable state of 
society. With this primary awareness, it seems that those living in Western democracies 
tend to conceive the importance of order as counter-balancing that of freedom. In other 
words,  Western  respondents'  emphasis  on  liberty  is  not  necessarily  a  sole  esteem  of 
freedom. It is accompanied by a sound consciousness of societal order.23 
Given this, does the Russian balance between order and freedom as in the Western 
democracies mean that Russia also has a set of values that are conducive to polyarchy or 
liberal democracy? Not necessarily. It would be hasty to reach this conclusion in such a 
manner.  To  help  to  answer  this  question,  in  the  subsequent  sections,  perception  gaps 
between societies  in  their  understanding of  freedom are examined.  The gaps could be 
crucial thresholds in terms of whether the respective societies' values (as regards order vs. 
freedom) are compatible with such a model of democracy.
6.3 Meaning of freedom
This section explores further the meaning of freedom relevant to each of the societies.
6.3.1 Freedom of the individual versus freedom of speech
22 An exception is Norway. Also, as for a result in the 1999-2002 World Values Survey, see Appendix 1.
23 In other words, the perception of order in the Western sense seems to hold individuals as autonomous and 
thus separate agents for its premise. On the contrary, the Japanese (or Asian) view of order appears to 
have an emphasis on a holistic perspective, where individuals are ambiguously merged in larger social 
contexts. Distinctions between individuals, and between individuals and society/groups, are not clearly 
defined.
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In addition to the variable of 'order vs. freedom' examined above, a result of observation on 
disaggregated version of the four-item Postmaterialist index needs to be considered, which 
was demonstrated in a preceding chapter. Here, observations based on the 1995 data (third 
wave)  are  presented  (figure  6.2).24 This  is  the  same  wave from which  we derive  our 
observation of 'order vs. freedom'.
The Russian case shows a puzzling output, which is seemingly incompatible with the 
preliminary result of the variable: 'order vs. freedom' (figure 6.1).25 As seen in figure 6.2, 
in the Russian case the degree of support for 'free speech' shows very low percentages, 
indeed, the lowest among four items. This is the case in both first and second choices. On 
the contrary, the appreciation of 'order' shows noticeably higher percentages in the first and 
second choices than 'free speech'.26 Especially in the first  choice index, 'order'  is at  an 
extremely high level while 'free speech' is at an extremely low level. In the second choice, 
although the gap between them is more moderate, 'order' is still higher and 'free speech' is 
lower. This result is strangely opposite to the results of the 'order vs. freedom' index, where 
the two items are  rather  balanced with even some inclination  to  'freedom'  rather  than 
'order'. Thus, the Russian case indicates a very strong inclination to 'order' rather than 'free 
speech' on the one hand, whereas there is a balance between 'order' and 'freedom' on the 
other hand.27 And both results derive from the same 1995 data.
Such  puzzlement  becomes  greater  when  the  cases  of  the  USA  and  Japan  are 
considered. In the case of the USA, the result of the 'order vs. freedom' index shows a 
balance between the two items. The other  index exhibits  a  moderately balanced result 
between 'order' and 'free speech'. In the case of Japan, in 'order vs. freedom', 'order' shows 
a clearly higher percentage than 'freedom'. In the other index, 'order' is placed higher than 
'free speech' in both the first and second choices.28 These are in fact the results that are 
normally expected as a  logical  consequence.  Nonetheless,  the Russian outputs are not. 
Why?
24 For the result of the 1999-2002 data, see Appendix 1 as well as Figures 3.5 (IV) and 3.5 (VII) in Chapter 
3.
25 The output of the 1999-2002 data is presented in Appendix 1.
26 The same results are observed in the fourth wave.
27 The outcome of the 1999-2002 wave conforms to this pattern.
28 For the American and Japanese data of the 1999-2002 wave, the outcomes of the disaggregated version of 
the Postmaterialist index (for the state of 'order' and 'free speech') correspond with this, whereas the data 
of 'order vs. freedom' index are not available.
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The key seems to lie in the difference in the Russian perception between 'freedom' 
and  'free  speech'.  For  Russian  respondents,  freedom of  the  individual  and  freedom of 
speech do not seem to be identical, although, of course, both of them include the meaning 
of freedom. Conceptually, in the sense of common definitions, freedom of speech could be 
included in freedom of the individual, since the latter means a general freedom while the 
former is about freedom specifically to do with speech.29 Thus, in simple terms, freedom of 
the individual is general whereas freedom of speech is specific. In other words, freedom of 
the  individual  can  include  other  kinds  of  freedoms in  addition  to  freedom of  speech. 
Despite  such  a  general  conceptualisation,  nonetheless,  Russian  respondents  appear  to 
perceive a sharper distinction between these two freedoms. Public opinion is about the 
subjective views of respondents, so that its output does not necessarily correspond with a 
rigorous conceptualisation. It seems that, in a subjective sense, Russian respondents are 
likely to see freedom of the individual and freedom of speech as qualitatively different. 
There would be no doubt that freedom of speech is perceived as specific about speech. 
Nonetheless, freedom of the individual appears to be perceived as freedom with a strong 
emphasis on qualities  other than speech. Or, even if freedom of speech occupies a place 
within the freedom of the individual, the emphasis on free speech would be extraordinarily 
small within it. Hence, for Russians, freedom of the individual and free speech appear to 
be perceived in different (at least,  not identical) manners. This difference of perception 
would be a reason that could explain the puzzling results of the two types of indicators 
mentioned above. 
What is inferred from the Russian results on the two indicators is that, as an overall 
tendency, freedom of the individual is valued as much as order, whereas order is much 
more highly valued than free speech. This could be expressed as:
Freedom of the individual = order > freedom of speech30
On the other hand, in the case of the USA, the two indexes indicate that order is relatively 
balanced with both freedom of  the  individual  and freedom of  speech,  which could be 
29 The 'speech' would qualitatively correspond with self-expression.
30 '=' denotes an approximate equivalence. Therefore, obviously it does not indicate numerically precise 
equality.
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expressed as:
Order = freedom of the individual 
Order = freedom of speech
 
The Japanese case would be:
Order > freedom of the individual 
Order > freedom of speech
It seems that, for respondents in the USA (and perhaps Japan), freedom of the individual 
and freedom of speech may be perceived as having comparatively similar  meanings to 
each other. For Russia, the two freedoms seem to have a wider gap to this effect. 
6.3.2 Analysis of two freedoms
To distinguish the possible difference between the perceptions of two freedoms (in the 
sense of priority  vis-à-vis order),  the following analyses are made while comparing the 
societies.
6.3.2.1 Crosstabulation
Two types of crosstabulations are examined. The first one is (A) the percentages of 'order 
vs. freedom' in a disaggregated Postmaterialist four-item index (first choice) (table 6.2 and 
figure 6.3). The second one is (B) the percentages of the disaggregated Postmaterialist 
four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom' (table 6.3 and figure 6.4).31
Russia
In Russia (like the USA and Japan), those who choose free speech tend to select freedom 
of  the individual  with the highest  percentages as  seen in  (A).  Nonetheless,  those who 
choose  freedom of  the  individual  (against  order)  mostly  do  not select  free  speech  as 
31 (B) is a reverse version of (A). For the 1999-2002 wave, Russian outputs are available, whereas British, 
American and Japanese ones are not available. See Appendix 1.
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indicated in (B). Rather, many of them opt for  order (rather than free speech or others) 
among  the  four  items.32 This  means  that,  for  most  Russians,  free  speech  is  neither 
equivalent nor comparable to freedom of the individual. It also indicates that, for them, 
freedom of the individual is conceptually much larger than free speech. In other words, 
free speech can be accommodated in freedom of the individual while occupying only a 
small place within it.33
Meanwhile, in (A), those who opt for order among the four items are more likely to 
select  order  against  individual  freedom than  those  who  do  not.  However,  this  is  in  a 
relative sense. In actual quantity, those who select order among the four items only choose 
half-and-half in the 'order vs. freedom' measure, which obviously cannot be regarded as a 
high appreciation of order against individual freedom.34 This indicates that even those who 
appreciate order as against free speech (and others among the four items) refrain from the 
selection of order when it comes to a choice against freedom of the individual (namely, a 
general sense of freedom). In other words, for Russians, a general sense of freedom has 
clearly more importance in comparison with free speech – to the extent that the weight of 
its importance reduces the priority of order.
In addition, the result shows that the dichotomous choice of 'order vs. freedom' has 
little impact on the choice of the four items (especially between order and free speech) as 
indicated in (B), whereas the latter has some impact on the former as presented in (A). 
When it is considered in the context of free speech and freedom of the individual (in terms 
of  priority  against  order),  it  is  inferred  that  the  result  is  also because  freedom of  the 
individual is much more comprehensive in conceptual perceptions than free speech, and 
tends to accommodate the latter (figure 6.5).35 
Consequently, since free speech is likely to occupy a part of individual freedom, the 
32 The 1999-2002 data also have the same result. See Appendix 1.
33 As for order, those who select order against freedom of the individual in the 'order vs. freedom' index 
give a distinctively high priority to order among the four items (while choosing free speech least 
frequently). On the whole, the choice of either order or freedom of the individual does not make much 
difference in the selection among the four items. Both of them very highly appreciate order while having 
the lowest preference for free speech. This means that the Russian respondents, as a whole, give salient 
priority to order rather than free speech (and the other two) among the four items regardless of their 
preference in terms of either order or individual freedom.
34 In the fourth wave data, although slightly more percentage of the respondents (who select 'order' among 
the four items) chose 'order' as against 'freedom', there still seems to be a relative balance between 'order' 
and 'freedom' in this context.
35 On the whole, the outcome of the 1999-2002 data would agree with this.
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choice of free speech tends to result in the choice of individual freedom. On the contrary, 
since individual freedom is perceived as having a much more comprehensive meaning than 
free speech, even though free speech is its part, it is quite likely that those who appreciate 
individual freedom will choose other than free speech.
The USA
The case of the USA contrasts with that of Russia. It seems that freedom of the individual 
and free speech are perceived to have similar meanings and therefore share considerable 
overlap between each other.36
In (A), those who select free speech among the four items tend to choose freedom 
against order while those who choose order among the four items are highly likely to opt 
for order against individual freedom. Similarly, in (B), among those who prefer order to 
individual  freedom,  order  is  chosen  to  a  notably  high  degree.  For  those  who  opt  for 
individual freedom rather than order, free speech is selected at a reasonably high level 
(which is clearly higher than those who prefer order to individual freedom). This suggests 
that freedom of the individual and free speech are perceived in relatively similar terms to 
one another (in relation to order). Figure 6.5 presents the approximate conceptual locations 
of their perceptions. 
In addition to free speech, in both (A) and (B), the item of 'more say (giving people 
more say in important government decisions)' seems to be quite related to freedom of the 
individual  in  the case  of  the USA. This  suggests  that,  for  Americans,  freedom of  the 
individual (or a general sense of freedom) has the strong connotation of freedom in public 
expression which could be directed towards political authority. At any rate, their freedom 
seems to be closely related to 'speech'.
Japan
The first point to be noticed in the Japanese case is that, in actual quantity, those who 
choose order exceed both those who choose freedom of the individual and free speech with 
clear gaps as observed in (A) and (B).37 It seems that, for the Japanese, freedom in either 
36 American output of the 1999-2002 data for this is not available.
37 Japanese output of the 1999-2002 data for this is not available.
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sense comes after the primacy of order.
In addition to such a major feature, some other points are apparent. In (A), there is a 
slight but discernible tendency that those who select free speech among the four items are 
more likely to choose freedom of the individual than those who do not.38 Nonetheless, the 
difference  in  actual  percentages  is  rather  trivial.  In  (B),  strangely,  those  who  select 
individual freedom against  order are least  likely to choose free speech among the four 
items.39 Instead, they tend to opt for 'more say' while their selection of order is moderate. 
This connotes that the appreciation of freedom of the individual (against order) is related to 
'more say' rather than to 'free speech'. On the other hand, those who select order against 
individual freedom most often appreciate order among the four items and least often prefer 
free speech, as expected. 
What  is  inferred from the results  is  that,  probably,  for  Japanese,  the relationship 
between individual freedom and free speech seems not as close as in the USA. Even if they 
are related, according to (A) and (B), the relationship appears to be diminished by the 
primacy of order in the Japanese case.  Another point to be noticed is the relatively close 
relationship between individual freedom and 'more say' rather than free speech.40 What is, 
then,  their  individual  freedom  without  free  speech,  but  with  'more  say'  (to  the 
government)? There are two points to be considered. 
The first point is the propensity to avoid a type of participation involving public 
expression and discussion. Presumably, the freedom presupposed by Japanese is not a kind 
of  freedom whereby  people  speak  out  in  public  and  compete  for  the  recognition  and 
actualisation of their own views, which seems to be common in the USA. Rather than open 
appeals to policy-making processes, they may be inclined to covert ways of transmitting 
their voices upward such as personal pleas or lobbying to politicians if they should do so. 
More probable presumption would be that their inclination to 'more say' may be simply an 
inward  expectation of being heard or understood by political elites without pronounced 
behaviour of expressing demands. 
38 This is observed in the cases of Russia and the USA more evidently. 'More say' is the second, and 'prices' 
comes third. Those who select order among the four items are least likely to opt for individual freedom 
(against order). On the contrary, those who choose order against individual freedom are ranged in reverse 
order to the above.
39 This is a similar result to Russia.
40 It is slightly observed in the Russian case as well.
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The second point is related to a two-dimensional outlook, which is related to their 
social  conventions. Contemporary  Japanese  attitudes  involve  a  widespread  sentiment 
against authority in a vertical sphere, while holding general hesitancy in self-expression in 
the horizontal sphere. Vertically, Japanese custom includes hierarchical norms, whereby 
people are supposed to show respect and be compliant with those in higher positions at 
least officially.41 Such social conventions have been practised without being questioned 
seriously by the great majority of the population. Despite this, there seems to have been a 
gradual  but  on-going  permeation  of  modern  rational  outlooks  throughout  society. 
Rationality encourages people to seek for reasons for their own behaviour. This could give 
rise to scepticism towards the conduct of following the hierarchical conventions and even 
their  raison  d'être.42 Nonetheless,  many  of  the  conventions  are  engraved  in  societal 
customs and hard to avoid in reality. Much of the time, it is observable that Japanese use 
respectful wordings towards those in senior status regardless of their  actual  thoughts.43 
Their  chronic  inconsistency  between  mind  and  behaviour  (though  they  have  been 
accustomed to it) may have been conducive to intrinsic dissatisfaction with authority. In 
fact,  according to an output of the World Values Survey, Japanese respondents have a 
considerable aversion to authority, which is consistent over multiple points in time. They 
also have a strong inclination to 'have more say' in relation to their government, to which 
the anti-authoritarian sentiment is presumably conducive. Thus, they possibly identify their 
'freedom' with the vertical expression of their views against political authority – or more 
ambiguously, something 'above' in hierarchy.
Horizontally,  on  the  other  hand,  Japanese  seem to  perceive  further  difficulty  in 
41 For example, as a Japanese culture, it is conceived as a common custom that people differentiate 
languages depending on the status of people to whom they talk. This generally involves hierarchical 
consideration. In contrast, in contemporary Britain, rather a frank and equal address to people tends to be 
accepted as the sign of familiarity and fairness in communications. Even in verbal exchanges, there is a 
clear cultural gap between Japan and Britain (and presumably Western societies), which would be related 
to the perceptions of, and behavioural patterns to, authority.
42 In analogous terms, Inglehart notes that people in post-industrial societies are likely to obtain an 
increasing sense of distrust of authority. See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald, 'Postmodernization Erodes 
Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy', in Critical Citizens: Global Support for  
Democratic Government, in Pippa Norris ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 236-256.
43 It is a common notion for Japanese to differentiate 'hon-ne (actual intentions/thoughts)' and 'tate-mae 
(public statements/expressions)' in their social communication. Analogous terms would be 'uchi (inside)' 
and 'soto (outside)', which are often applied to describing typical dual attitudes of individual personality 
as well as a group of people in Japanese culture. Pye mentions 'hon-ne' and 'tate-mae'. See Pye with Pye, 
Asian Power and Politics, p. 175.
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public  self-expression.  They often refrain from asserting personal  opinions in  an overt 
manner being afraid of disturbing harmony with surrounding people and social relations.44 
According to the 1981, 1990 and 1995-8 waves of the World Values Survey, the average 
propensity to 'discuss politics with friends' is consistently lower in Japan than in the USA, 
Britain and Russia.45 It is their common practice to be much concerned about atmospheric 
or sentimental elements rather than logically clear exchanges in communication.46 Their 
societal norms have been nurtured to that effect, so that their statements and behaviour are 
apt to be affected by situations as subjective constraints.47 Horizontal social ties are likely 
to diminish a clear sense of individuality and liberty at least in the way understood in the 
West.  This  is  especially  the case when they are  part  of  a  wider  social  context.  These 
amount to an extraordinary hindrance on individual attempts at public expression. This 
could  be  associated  with  their  low priority  of  free  speech  even  for  those  who  prefer 
'freedom' to 'order'.
Consequently,  the  Japanese  seem  to  identify  'freedom'  with  a  somewhat  covert 
transmission of their wishes in the vertical direction. This is accompanied by ambivalence 
in regard to their own hierarchical world view, as they dislike authority while being prone 
to it. They do not seem to be inclined towards free speech, which connotes open expression 
in a  horizontal sense. However, after all, the appreciation of freedom per se is basically 
trivial when it faces the primacy of order.
6.3.2.2 Correlation
Table 6.4 presents the correlation coefficients between 'order vs. freedom' and 'order vs. 
44 For instance, Sato argues that Japanese hold a particular orientation to self-restraint in inter-personal 
communication in comparison British and American people. See Sato, Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko [A 
Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan].
45 As for the output of the1999-2002 wave as regards the item of  'discuss politics with friends', the average 
propensity is lower in Japan than in Russia and the USA, whereas British average is lower than Japanese 
one.
46 Sato points out a Japanese inclination to sentimentalism or emotionalism in contrast with a British 
propensity to logicality or reason. She also relates Japanese emotional orientation (shin-jo shugi) to 
collectivism, whereas she associates British logical orientation (ronri-shugi) with individualism. 
According to her, these contrasting traits seem to burgeon as early as the period of infancy. See ibid., pp. 
33-36, 78-80, 93, 113-119.
47 Sato mentions the proneness of Japanese behaviours to situations in comparison with relatively consistent 
personalities of the Western counterparts, which are likely to transcend differing situations. See ibid., pp. 
6-8, 74, 91-93, 110-113. 
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free speech' variables.48 As the results show, the USA has a notable correlation between the 
two variables, which is the strongest among the three societies. Japan is in the second 
place,  whereas  Russia  has  the  weakest  correlation.49 This  suggests  that  American 
respondents  have  a  considerably  stronger  propensity  to  perceive  individual  (general) 
freedom and free speech in similar terms than the other two societies. Table 6.5 presents 
the correlation between the 'order vs. freedom' and 'free speech' four-rating measurement.50 
This indicates the extent to which those opt for freedom (rather than order) have more 
appreciation of free speech. Americans seem to have more propensity in this regard than 
Russians.
6.3.2.3 Summary of the analysis
Consequently, to the people of the USA, freedom of the individual and free speech are 
perceived as having a considerable overlap in their meanings in comparison with those of 
the Russian people. For Russians, freedom of speech occupies only a small place in the 
freedom of the individual. Russian respondents seem to hold somewhat different emphases 
in overall meanings, since the two freedoms show clearly different indications as regards 
their priorities vis-à-vis order. As for Japan, although individual freedom and free speech 
could be slightly more comparable than in the Russian case, it is much less so than in the 
USA. Rather, Japanese freedom is perhaps alien to free speech in the sense of explicit self-
expression. Their freedom may be related to an inward  expectation of being heeded by 
political authority with ambivalent sentiments. Nevertheless, the Japanese appreciation of 
freedom per se virtually becomes trivial when compared with the much greater primacy 
which they attach to order.
48 It should be noted that the variable of 'order vs. free speech' is created by extracting only the data of those 
who choose either free speech or order among the four items of the disaggregated Postmaterialist first 
choice index. Therefore, the data of those who choose either 'more say' or 'prices' is omitted. Thus, the 
variable does not include the whole sample, and therefore is not a perfect measure to evaluate the 
dichotomous priority between order and free speech. Despite this, it indicates, among those who put the 
foremost importance on either free speech or order (of the four items), how the priority of either order or 
(general) individual freedom is acknowledged in each of the societies. Thus, the results of this variable 
are presented to supplement the explanation in terms of (general) freedom and free speech. 
49 The Russian case in the  fourth wave (1999-2002) also shows a similar correlation coefficient (0.120**). 
American, Japanese and British figures are not available. See Appendix 1.
50 Although evaluating these two variables does not directly indicate the conceptual overlap between 
individual freedom and free speech, it would be helpful as a supplementation to the result above. For this, 
the outputs of the 1999-2002 data for Britain, the USA, Russia and Japan are not available.
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6.3.3 Two freedoms and the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension
The  outcomes  of  the  analyses  raise  questions.  Why  is  freedom  of  the  individual 
appreciated at an equivalent level to order while order comes prior to freedom of speech in 
the Russian case? Why are individual freedom and free speech comparable in the USA? 
What is  the actual  difference between the 'two freedoms' in the respective societies in 
relation to the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension? This section considers these points 
with reference to Maslow's values hierarchy.
6.3.3.1 Maslow's hierarchy and meaning of freedoms
In Maslow's values hierarchy in the second chapter (figure 2.1), free speech is located in 
the realm of self-actualisation needs, which involves abstract values such as self-esteem, 
intellectual interests, and aesthetic satisfaction. 
In Russia,  as  shown in a  previous chapter,  the emphasis  on Materialist  values is 
predominant while placing a low priority on Postmaterialist values. This shows a clear 
distinction from the other three societies.  Considering these, together with the identified 
result (freedom of the individual = order > freedom of speech) as above, Russian freedom 
of the individual is possibly less related to 'freedom' in the sense of self-actualisation needs 
(Postmaterialist  values)  than  the  USA.  If  understood  in  this  context,  freedom  of  the 
individual in Russia would be more to do with liberty that holds a pragmatic connotation, 
which is compatible with the Materialist orientation. Another point is that freedom of the 
individual could be perceived as politically passive emancipation from constraints such as 
a central authority, a political power and an ideology. 
Generally, the Materialist view attaches importance to sustenance and safety needs 
including  economic  stability,  social  order  and  security.  Often,  these  goals  are  either 
provided  by  the  state  or  qualitatively  increased  by  personal  efforts  in  such  forms  as 
economic achievements. Politically, the individuals are likely to be passive, since they are 
either the receivers of pragmatic outcomes from the state or those mostly concerned with 
private goals rather than democratic causes. Freedom to this effect  tends to be personal 
rather than public, which emphasises  a release from control or intervention by a central 
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power, holding a centrifugal connotation.51 
On the other hand, the Postmaterialist  view includes intellectual or abstract  goals 
linked with self-expression and participation, which seems to have a great deal of presence 
in the USA and Britain. Their concerns are apt to be associative and at times directed to 
political  affairs  often  with  democratic  implications.52 The  potential  orientation  holds  a 
certain characteristic of spontaneous involvement in various forms of civil society.53 In that 
sense, their freedom tend not to be passive, but to be proactive. It implies a sense of 'rights' 
to participate rather than a simple longing for non-intervention.54 
Thus,  freedom of  speech  in  practice  implies  proactive  participation  in  social  or 
political  debates.55 This  type  of  engagement  occasionally  involves  a  certain  public 
responsibility and elements to cope with criticisms or even reactionary attacks.56 On the 
contrary, if such potential tasks are felt as something to be avoided, and if simply a release 
from social/political constraint is wanted as a matter of liberty, free speech would tend to 
be perceived as redundant.  In that  case,  the subjective meaning of  freedom in general 
would emphatically involve political passivity. In a similar vein, Beetham mentions dual 
51 This could be related to 'privatised' type of individuals in Maruyama's four categories of individuation. 
However, when these Materialist concerns are mixed with the state of insecurity such as the deterioration 
of economy and social order, there would be more likelihood that 'atomised' individuals appear, which 
might have an centripetal orientation. For the categorisation of individual types, see Maruyama, 'Patterns 
of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme'.
52 These qualities may be close to Maruyama's 'individualised' and 'democratised' types of individuals. See 
ibid.
53 There could be a qualitative difference between this sense of civil society prevalent in Western societies 
and one in Russia. For civil society in Russia, see for example, Evans, Alfred B., Jr., 'A Russian Civil 
Society?', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa eds., Developments in Russian Politics 6 
(Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 96-113. On civil society in Central and Eastern 
Europe, see Smolar, Aleksander, 'Civil Society after Communism', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner, Democracy after Communism (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), ch. 4, 
pp. 48-62.
54 Being 'proactive' does not necessarily mean to be 'active' in political participation. The term is employed 
to indicate an opposite quality to 'passivity'. In fact, there is possibility that 'proactive' people withdraw 
participation or simply do not participate. The point is that their behaviour (and non-behaviour) is based 
on relatively autonomous concern and judgement independent of external political influences. They often 
hold associative motivations, which primarily stand on the ground of free will.
55 For instance, in Britain and the USA commonly there are many broadcasting programmes that take the 
forms of citizens' debates. They often consist of open discussions by several dozens of audience in 
studios. In Japan, comparable styles of such programmes are seen less frequently, and the attitudes of 
participants are clearly more passive. It is much less likely that the ordinary people voluntarily raise their 
hands and express their opinions in somewhat assertive manners as often done in the Western 
counterparts. Thus, the emphasis on an open speech and a public discussion seems to be cultural features 
of Western societies.
56 In this sense, freedom of speech is qualitatively connected with political involvement and its rights, which 
is opposite to political passivity in an attitudinal emphasis.
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types of freedoms with reference to Benjamin Constant. He writes, 'Constant contrasted the 
idea of liberty as direct participation in public affairs with notions of liberty that viewed it 
as having mainly to do with the protection of essentially private pursuits and interests'.57 
Consequently,  the  Russian  sense  of  freedom  seems  to  be  compatible  with  the 
Materialist  orientation,  implying  a  certain  political  passivity. According  to  the  World 
Values Survey in 1990, 1995-8 and 1999-2002, the Russian propensity to be 'interested in 
politics' and to regard 'politics as important' was coherently lower than the American (and 
Japanese) ones.58 During the era of the USSR, extraordinarily high rates of voting turnouts 
had the character of mobilisation by political authority.59 The communist regime promoted 
various forms of political  involvement in favour of the ideology, which were in effect 
artificial mobilisations.60 It is possible that such conventions discouraged the spontaneous 
attitudes of popular participation based on free will. This may be indicated by the fact that 
there were continuous falls in electoral turnouts in some Russian elections from the mid-
1990s.61 Similarly, there have been signs of political disengagement in Russia, which is 
particularly  notable  when  compared  with  Western  Europe.62 These  denote  a  general 
political  passivity  among  the  Russian  populace,  which  seems  to  be  reflected  in  their 
perception of freedom.
6.3.3.2 Postmaterialist shift or culture?
The Russian view of freedom thus appears to be associated with the Materialist orientation. 
If,  however,  the hypothesis  of  a  Postmaterialist  shift  is  applicable  to  Russia,  one  may 
conceive of the possibility that Russia would attain a greater appreciation of free speech, 
57 Beetham also quotes 'Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive liberty and the negative principle of 
noninterference'. See Beetham, 'Freedom as the Foundation', p. 33. For the source of the quotation, see 
Constant, Benjamin, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 316-318.
58 However, British averages are lower than Russian ones in the 'politics important' item in 1990 and 1999-
2002 as well as 'interest in politics' in 1999-2002. This may be due to a 'mature' cynicism towards politics 
in British culture.
59 See White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House 
Publishers, 1997), ch. 1, pp. 1-19; White, Stephen, 'Presidential Government', in Russia's New Politics:  
the Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 34.
60 See, for instance, Friedgut, Theodore H., Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979).
61 For the falls in turnout, see Hutcheson, Derek S., 'Protest and Disengagement in the Russian Federal 
Elections of 2003-04', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5: 2 (2004).
62 Hutcheson, Derek S. and Elena A. Korosteleva, 'Patterns of Participation in Post-Soviet Politics', 
Contemporary European Politics, 3: 4 (December 2005).
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provided  that  the  nation  achieves  a  higher  level  of  economic  growth  and  stability. 
Nonetheless, the question remains: is the difference not due to culture? Despite Russian 
liberty's link with the Materialist  values, it  does  not necessarily mean that the Russian 
situation is  more backward than the  USA and thus  could simply be  transformed by a 
Postmaterialist shift. Is there no possibility that  the Russian attitude to freedom derives 
from elements that are very Russian or Postcommunist? This is not to entirely negate the 
possibility  of a  Postmaterialist  effect.  Nonetheless,  if  cultural  durability (related to  the 
Materialist  orientation) strongly exists there,  such a shift  could be hindered or delayed 
even if the above conditions take effect. Indeed, if the case of Japan is taken into account, 
this point is worth considering. As shown, although Japan so far has attained relatively 
long-standing economic affluence and social security comparable to both the USA and 
Britain,  it  shows  a  particular  proclivity.  While  there  seems  to  be  the  emergence  of 
Postmaterialist outlooks, there are tendencies that represent a cultural peculiarity such as 
the primacy of order and the notably low priority that is placed on free speech, which goes 
against a Postmaterialist orientation. This is as if long-standing cultural patterns have been 
hindering  the  Postmaterialist  effect.  In  order  to  explore  this  question  further,  in  the 
following section the regional cultural specificity is further considered. Particular attention 
is paid to the issue of individual freedom and free speech (in relation to order) as examined 
so far. 
6.4 Regional cultural specificity
In the last section, the perception gap in the meaning of freedom in relation to order was 
explored comparing the three societies. Is there, then, any possibility that their differences 
are affected by their cultures in regional contexts? This section examines this point. By 
regions,  we mean Postcommunist,  Western  and East  Asian regions,  to  which the  four 
societies (the USA, Russia, Japan and Britain) belong.
6.4.1 Regional comparisons: order versus freedom
First of all, it is useful to look at the percentages of 'order vs. freedom' in the societies of 
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the three regions (tables 6.1 and 6.6).63 The societies in the West have a largely balanced 
view in relation to the tension between order and freedom.64 Similarly, the majority of 
Postcommunist societies indicate a balance to that effect.65 On the contrary, although only 
the  cases  of  Taiwan  and  Japan  are  available,  both  East  Asian  societies  have  an 
extraordinary skew towards order.66 These tendencies are summarised in table 6.7. Figure 
6.6 indicates an obvious concentration of the Western and Postcommunist cases around the 
point where order and freedom meet with half-and-half percentages, while the East Asian 
cases take points at high levels on the order axis.
These overall characteristics correspond with the comparison of the  three societies 
studied so far as regards 'order vs. freedom'. As we have already seen, the USA and Russia 
show a balance  or  tension,  while  Japan has  a  strong orientation towards  order.  These 
results of the three societies might be, in some respects, possibly representing the three 
regions. In other words, there could be a possibility that each of the three societies has 
something in common with societies in its own region. That is to say, the USA might share 
some  similar  qualities  with  societies  in  the  West,  likewise  Russia  with  other 
Postcommunist societies, and Japan with East Asia.67 Although this might be a somewhat 
audacious presumption, the following analysis suggests plausible evidence that supports 
this view.
6.4.2 Regional comparisons: freedom and free speech
63 These tables show available data from the three regions from the third wave of the World Values Survey 
(1995-8). For the tables of the fourth wave (1999-2002), see Appendix 1.
64 Only Norway is an outlier, being inclined to order.
65 However, Poland and East Germany have a considerable leaning to order. Interestingly, they constitute a 
cohort geographically close to Western Europe among the Postcommunist cases. This connote that their 
attributes may involve influence of Western traits. As mentioned before, a sense of freedom is 
accompanied by a consciousness of order in Western democratic contexts. Presumably, due to the 
unstable conditions of these societies at the time of the survey sampling, they may have been inclined to 
order. This conversely indicates the distinction of the former USSR republics, where priorities of 
individual freedom and order tend to hold even, despite the then instability. Bulgaria seems to be an 
outlier in this context.
66 As for the results of the World Values Survey 1999-2002, with relatively lower support for individual 
freedom, the figures of Postcommunist (and Western) societies are not as clearly balanced as ones in the 
1995-8 survey. Nonetheless, with some exceptions, many of them still hold certain levels of support for 
individual freedom, which would be clear when they are compared with the East Asian pattern
67 Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier note that '[u]sually, researchers conceptualize individualism as the 
opposite of collectivism ...especially when contrasting European American and East Asian cultural 
frames'. See Oyserman, Daphna, Heather McCoon and Markus Kemmelmeier, 'Rethinking Individualism 
and Collectivism', Psychological Bulletin, 128 (2002), pp. 3.
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Table 6.8 presents percentages for the 'order vs. freedom' variable. For comparison, the 
table includes the 'free speech' percentages from the disaggregated Postmaterialist four-
item index (the measures of first and second choices).68 As shown above, on the 'order vs. 
freedom' variable, societies in the West and Postcommunist world seem to largely share a 
similar tendency in the levels of support for 'freedom' vis-à-vis those for 'order' (with some 
outliers). Nevertheless, when it comes to 'free speech', they show clearly different patterns. 
The societies in the Western category in the table show a clearly higher inclination to 'free 
speech'  than  Postcommunist  (and  East  Asian)  societies  on  the  both  first  and  second 
measures.  For  the  first  choice  measure,  'free  speech'  percentages  in  Western  societies 
average around 20 per cent (with 14.4 per cent as the minimum and 30.9 per cent as the 
maximum). In contrast, in the Postcommunist region, all are less than 10 per cent, and the 
majority  are  less  than  5  per  cent.  In  the  second  choice  measure,  the  Western  cohort 
averages around 30 per cent (with 27.4 per cent as the minimum and 39.4 per cent as the 
maximum), whereas Postcommunist societies are mostly around the 10 per cent level (with 
two outliers, East Germany and Georgia).69 In East Asia, the situation is different. Societies 
in this region have very low percentages both for 'freedom' (on 'order vs. freedom') and 
'free speech'. For the 'freedom' percentage, while having clearly lower percentages than the 
West and Postcommunist societies, the East Asian cases do not show the same balance 
between order and freedom. For 'free speech', East Asian societies show percentages as 
low as the Postcommunist cases.
Consequently,  Western  societies  have  an  orientation  to  both  'freedom'  and  'free 
speech'  in  common.  On  the  other  hand,  Postcommunist  societies  share  a  collective 
tendency that can be inclined to 'freedom', but not necessarily to 'free speech'. Meanwhile, 
the East Asian cases seem to have a low leaning to both kinds of freedoms.70 Moreover, as 
suggested before, these regional characteristics correspond with propensities of the three 
societies – the USA, Russia and Japan – respectively. Therefore, the characteristics of the 
three societies seem to represent regional traits (at least as regards the relationship between 
68 For the output of the fourth wave (1999-2002), see Appendix 1.
69 The fact that East Germany is the highest among Postcommunist societies (in both first and second choice 
measures) could also suggest the West's high inclination to 'free speech'. Since the country was unified 
with West Germany in 1990 and the year of East Germany's sampling was 1997, there possibly had been 
mixture of views with, or strong influence from, the view of the West among East Germans.
70 On the whole, the 1999-2002 data seem to have similar results which would agree with these conclusions 
(with some exceptions). See Appendix 1.
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'freedom' and 'free speech'). In other words, they are affected by regional cultural contexts.
6.4.3 Regional comparisons: free speech – a further examination
To examine such issues more closely, this section concentrates on the analysis of 'free 
speech'. Figure 6.7 presents scatterplots of the percentages of 'free speech' and 'order' in the 
disaggregated  Postmaterialist  four-item  index.71 On  the  whole,  there  is  an  obvious 
difference between the Western cohort and the Postcommunist/East Asian cohort. In both 
the first and second choices, the West as a whole has a strong leaning to 'free speech', 
while the other two cohorts have evidently much less leanings towards it. Moreover, each 
of the regions seems to show a  collective tendency in a consistent manner. As for the 
percentages  in  respect  of  'order',  the  Western  group  seems  to  have  a  slightly  less 
orientation than the Postcommunist and East Asian groups, especially as a first choice. As 
such, when a larger number of cases are incorporated in the analysis, it is rather more 
obvious  that  Western societies  have  a  common proclivity  to  put  an  emphasis  on 'free 
speech' whereas Postcommunist and East Asian societies on the whole do not.72
71 This version incorporates many other cases, which were unavailable (and therefore not included) in the 
analysis of the 'order vs. freedom' variable. 
72 The outputs of the 1999-2002 dataset show similar distributional forms to the Figure 6.7, which would 
agree with this conclusion. See Appendix 1. 
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6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined a variety of societies in terms of 'order vs. freedom', and a 
further perception gap between societies on the meaning of (general) individual freedom 
and free speech. The results, on the whole, seem to support the view that there is a social 
variation, to which culture matters.
Order, freedom and free speech
In the initial observation, the Japanese case has an extraordinary skew to order rather than 
freedom, whereas the USA and Russia both show equilibrium between order and freedom. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to free speech, the equilibrium is present only in the USA 
while Russia attaches a much lower priority to free speech (in comparison with order). 
This  indicates  that  American  respondents  possess  a  relatively  comparable  perception 
between a general sense of freedom and free speech. For Russians, on the other hand, 
individual freedom and free speech are not comparable although the latter may represent 
only a small part of the former. Although the Japanese case seems to be inbetween, the 
appreciation of both types of freedom becomes trivial in relation to the primacy which they 
respectively place on order.
Implications for the Postmaterialist-Materialist dimension
The differing degrees and qualities of appreciation of freedom in the three societies appear 
to have relevance to the Postmaterialist-Materialist values dimension. Freedom in the USA 
seems to be compatible with the Postmaterialist orientation, since free speech is one of the 
major  elements  within  the  Postmaterialist  values  category.  Furthermore,  another 
Postmaterialist item – 'more say' in government – also receives a fairly high rating among 
those who choose freedom rather than order in America. American freedom, therefore, 
seems  to  be  largely  understood  in  the  context  of  self-expression,  which  has  a  strong 
relevance for the Postmaterialist emphasis. Moreover, they appear to esteem the power of 
'language' as a crucial element for social and political life. 
In  contrast,  in  Russia,  free  speech  is  far  less  appreciated  –  despite  the  people's 
attachment to a general sense of freedom that even counterbalances order. The Russian 
sense of freedom could be, in its emphasis, qualitatively different from that of the USA. 
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Russian freedom could be more inclined to private concerns, which is rather close to the 
Materialist orientation. Moreover, this kind of freedom connotes political passivity. 
In the case of Japan, basically, both free speech and freedom receive a markedly low 
priority in comparison with order. It is as if there is a general belief that any freedom could 
not  be  superior  to  order.  Interestingly,  the  Japanese  may  appreciate  'more  say 
(participation),' but not quite free speech. Even those who choose freedom over order are 
rather unlikely to opt for free speech, but instead go for 'more say'. A leaning to 'more say' 
to the government  without free public self-expression (free speech) could be a peculiar 
Japanese proclivity. This also connotes their lack of orientation to Postmaterialist values. It 
seems  that  the  Japanese  are  rather  suspended  between  Postmaterialist  and  Materialist 
attitudes. Furthermore, their low priority on freedom per se can culturally run counter to 
the  Postmaterialist  direction,  since  Postmaterialist  values  are  concerned  with  a  strong 
emphasis on self-esteem, self-actualisation and self-expression.
Regional context and culture
The differences across the three societies especially on freedom and free speech have a 
notable relevance to the regional cultural  context. In fact,  the USA's emphasis on both 
freedom and free speech is commonly observable among societies in the Western region. 
Similarly,  a  certain  emphasis  on  freedom,  but  not  on  free  speech,  as  observed  in  the 
Russian  case  seems  to  be  also  present  among  Postcommunist  societies  in  general. 
Likewise, East Asian societies seem to share a low priority on free speech and individual 
freedom  vis-à-vis order. This result indicates the plausibility that differences across the 
three  societies  reflect  regional  peculiarities  or  regional  cultural  contexts.  The outcome 
suggests that the peculiarities of these cultures affect the distribution of Postmaterialist and 
Materialist values.
Political implications: what matters to democracy?
In  addition,  what  are  the political  implications of  this  chapter's  results  especially  with 
respect  to  democracy?  As  mentioned  above,  the  American  sense  of  freedom tends  to 
involve 'free speech'  and 'more  say'  to  a  relatively high degree.  This  kind of  freedom 
implies self-expression and therefore being proactive in social and political terms. It could 
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be compatible with a participatory orientation. Moreover, Americans' commitment to the 
support of freedom seems to be high to the extent that it  counterbalances the sense of 
order.  This  could  be  advantageous  to  a  type  of  democracy  that  puts  an  emphasis  on 
citizens'  participatory  attitudes.  The  results  somewhat  resonate  with  the  outcome  of 
Almond  and  Verba's  classic  work  on  'civic  culture',  to  which  American  people  were 
reported to hold a favourable orientation.73 After all, these qualities would be more likely 
to sustain the responsive function of democracy.
On the other hand, for Russians, although their appreciation of freedom is strong, the 
kind of freedom they value is likely to involve a sense of political passivity rather than 
proactive participation. Thus, in Russia, the popular inclination to participatory democracy 
through open exchanges of free expressions does not seem to be high.74 In this sense, their 
prevalent sense of freedom is possibly unlikely to be a driving force for seeking responsive 
and accountable government.
In  the  case  of  Japan,  its  principal  feature  is  the  strong  presence  of  an  order 
orientation,  which  seems  to  virtually  overwhelm  their  appreciation  of  freedom. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Japanese people have some inclination towards 'more 
say'  although  they  do  not  wish  for  'free  speech'.  More  input  of  their  voices  without 
speaking freely – such a peculiar and seemingly contradictory preference appears to exist 
among them. For democracy, presumably, they have political concerns and interests in 
private, so that there could be a potential motivation for participation. Nonetheless, they 
would not quite go for public expression entailing open explicit debates as free-standing 
individuals. What is inferred from their strong inclination to order is that they may prefer 
being under 'big trees' of larger social contexts while waiting for consequential benefits 
from the 'whole'. In that sense, probably, they tend to be passive in political behaviour due 
to their lack of individual strength in public expression, and this could be an obstructive 
element to the workings of responsive democracy. They may complain mainly behind the 
scenes, but not beyond a line that disturbs the harmony of personal social ties. It seems that 
they hold hesitancy in living as isolated but free, consistent and solid individuals in both 
private  and  public  spheres.  As  Maruyama  has  put  it,  the  history  of  Japanese  politics 
73 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
74 At least, they are not in the same manner as in the USA. 
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comprises 'naki-neiri (crying in bed)' of people who suppress their grievances inside while, 
most of the time, being unable to express their claims in public.75 Although his statement 
was made as early as the middle of the last century, the tendency seems to still remain.
For  the  regional  perspective,  the  results  considered in  this  chapter  would  suggest  that 
societies  in  the  Western  region  are  more  advantageously  placed  for  participatory  and 
responsive  democracy  than  Postcommunist  and  East  Asian  societies.  In  other  words, 
current values patterns on freedom and free speech in the latter non-Western societies have 
a weakness in the support for such democracy in comparison with those in the West. Even 
if Postmaterialist effects are assumed to transform some of their values, the effect could be 
expected (according to the thesis) only if economic affluence is achieved at some time in 
the future. However, it should be recalled that culture or social/regional peculiarities have a 
stubborn influence on values orientations.
75 Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics], p.144.
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Figure 6.2 Postmaterialist (PM) four-item index: first choice and second choice
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Table 6.2 Percentages (A): 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice)
nations goals(2)-1 * govt:soc vs indiv Crosstabulation
% within nat ions goals(2)-1
67 .9% 32.1% 100.0%
37.8% 62.2% 100.0%
56.1% 43.9% 100.0%
31.2% 68.8% 100.0%
87.9% 12.1% 100.0%
71.1% 28.9% 100.0%
77.5% 22.5% 100.0%
68.6% 31.4% 100.0%
49.9% 50.1% 100.0%
30.6% 69.4% 100.0%
44.0% 56.0% 100.0%
6.3% 93.8% 100.0%
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Table 6.3 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'
govt:soc vs indiv * nations goals(2)-1 Crosstabulation
% within  govt :soc vs indiv
45.7% 25.6% 14.9% 13.8% 100.0%
20.4% 39.8% 11.0% 28.8% 100.0%
43.1% 30.8% 21.0% 5.2% 100.0%
22.1% 46.4% 22.7% 8.8% 100.0%
70.5% 10.4% 18.9% .2% 100.0%
58.2% 19.3% 19.7% 2.9% 100.0%
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indiv
order
freedom
govt :soc vs
indiv
Nat ion and wave
USA 95
Japan 95
Russia 95
order more say prices free speech
nat ions goals(2)-1
T otal
Figure 6.4 Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom' 
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Table 6.4 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'order vs. free speech' 
Correlations
.360**
.000
784
.185**
.000
381
.138**
.000
1247
Correlat ion Coefficien t
Sig. (2-t ailed)
N
Correlat ion Coefficien t
Sig. (2-t ailed)
N
Correlat ion Coefficien t
Sig. (2-t ailed)
N
govt :soc vs indiv
(Order vs. Freedom)
govt :soc vs indiv
(Order vs. Freedom)
govt :soc vs indiv
(Order vs. Freedom)
Spearman's rho
Spearman's rho
Spearman's rho
Nat ion  and wave
USA 95
Japan 95
Russia 95
Order vs Speech
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Table 6.5 Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'free speech four-rank measurement'
Correlations
-.201**
.000
1440
-.124**
.000
1835
Correlat ion Coefficient
Sig. (2-t ailed)
N
Correlat ion Coefficient
Sig. (2-t ailed)
N
govt :soc vs indiv
(Order vs. Freedom)
govt :soc vs indiv
(Order vs. Freedom)
Spearman 's rho
Spearman 's rho
Nat ion and wave
USA 95
Russia 95
prot ect  freedom speech
(four-rank measurement )
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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Figure 6.5 Individual (general) freedom and free speech (vis-à-vis order)
    USA                                                                              Japan
    Russia
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Table 6.6 'Order vs. freedom': Postcommunist and East Asian societies
% wit hin NAT W AVE  Nat ion and wave
45.2% 54.8% 100.0%
52.1% 47.9% 100.0%
55.1% 44.9% 100.0%
44.1% 55.9% 100.0%
57.6% 42.4% 100.0%
51.0% 49.0% 100.0%
45.4% 54.6% 100.0%
39.1% 60.9% 100.0%
77.0% 23.0% 100.0%
71.3% 28.7% 100.0%
70.9% 29.1% 100.0%
Russia 95
Ukraine 96
Georgia 96
Belarus 96
T ambov 95
Est onia 96
Lithuania 96
Latvia 96
P oland 96
E Germany 97
Bulgaria 98
order freedom
Order vs. Freedom
T otal
% wit hin NAT W AVE  Nat ion and wave
78.5% 21.5% 100.0%
90.0% 10.0% 100.0%
Japan 95
T aiwan 95
order freedom
Order vs. Freedom
T otal
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Table 6.7 Regional comparison (mean): 'order vs. freedom'
Order vs. Freedom
51.8625 48.1375
8 8
8.4801 8.4801
55.3455 44.6545
11 11
12.6182 12.6182
84.2500 15.7500
2 2
8.1317 8.1317
Mean
N
St d. Deviat ion
Mean
N
St d. Deviat ion
Mean
N
St d. Deviat ion
REGION
W est
P ost comm unist
East  Asia
Order
percentage
Freedom
percen tage
Figure 6.6 Three regions: 'order vs. freedom'
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Table 6.8 Three regions: freedom (in 'order vs. freedom') and free speech (%)
(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index)
54.80 1.60 6.20
47.90 2.40 8.50
44.90 6.20 22.60
55.90 5.30 8.40
42.40 1.20 4.40
49.00 3.40 13.70
54.60 3.40 12.30
60.90 2.60 13.60
23.00 4.10 12.00
28.70 8.30 24.40
29.10 4.90 13.80
49.90 23.50 37.70
54.10 16.90 29.50
51.40 21.50 27.40
47.80 26.10 33.80
27.70 16.10 36.90
53.10 22.10 28.90
50.50 14.40 39.40
50.60 30.90 29.20
21.50 6.00 14.70
10.00 5.80 16.60
Russia 95
Ukrane 96
Georgia 96
Belarus 96
T ambov 95
Est onia 96
Lit huania 96
Lat via 96
P oland 96
E Germany 97
Bulgaria 98
P ostcommunist
W  Germ any 97
Spain 96
USA 95
Aust ralia 95
Norway 96
Sweden 96
Finland 96
Swit zerland 96
W est
Japan 95
T aiwan 95
East  Asia
Order vs.
Freedom:
Freedom %
Free Speech
1st  choice
%
Free Speech
2nd choice
%
178
Figure 6.7 Three regions: free speech and order (%) 
(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index) 
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Note: The data includes three waves (1981, 1990 and 1995-8). For the result of the fourth wave, see Appendix 1.
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Chapter 7: Protest
7.1 Introduction
The expression of inclination to protest  does not merely mean people's willingness for 
protest in the specific sense of unconventional political  behaviour. It also signifies their 
capacity to express their opinions openly towards authorities. The action of protest implies 
stepping further than regular political acquiescence in daily life. It is an action to cross 
borders, beyond which ordinary people would attract unusual attention, criticism and, in 
some cases, reactionary responses from the authorities. The  behaviour requires a certain 
strength (or simply character) to be able to transcend the political limitations granted by 
the authorities. For this reason, the degree of protest inclination would be a useful clue to 
discover the extent of popular resilience for public expression, which could be a source of 
societal force to ensure governmental responsiveness.
Popular  attitudes  to  'moderate'  patterns  of  protest  could  have  considerable 
implications  for  the  workings  of  democracy.  Such  behaviour  implies  two dimensions: 
demands towards authorities in vertical terms and public expression in horizontal terms. As 
far  as  peaceful  forms  of  protest  are  concerned,  these  dimensions  may  share  similar 
cognitive directions with participation and freedom of speech,  which would be crucial 
elements of democracy. Moreover, examining popular resilience in this respect could have 
crucial relevance to the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity. For resilience 
denotes the presence of a stable core attribute that persists over a certain length of time and 
changes in environment. This in turn implies a coherent disposition, which has possibly 
been inherited as the culture of a given society. If, however, there is an indication of a 
consistent change in its degree over time, this may suggest the presence of a values shift. 
In  this  manner,  consideration  is  required  on  the  two  competing  effects.  With  this 
perspective, in this chapter, Britain, the USA, Japan and Russia are compared with respect 
to popular attitudes towards protest. 
7.2 Analytical frameworks
The core theme of the present study is: values shift versus cultural particularity and its 
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implications for democracy. With this, the rationales for examining the protest dimension 
include several points.1 The first key issue is on values shift versus cultural particularity. 
On the one hand, there are discourses suggesting that protest inclination is associated with 
values shift in post-industrial societies.2 In this context, people's protests are often depicted 
as 'elite-challenging' styles of participation, which have been replacing some spheres of 
conventional 'elite-directed'  political  actions.3 On the other hand,  protest  patterns could 
differ depending on cultures. The analytical results so far indicate that Western citizens 
hold considerable orientation to public expression as represented by free speech and other 
self-actualisation  needs.  Since  public  expression  is  related  to  the  quality  of  open 
contestation, it could be assumed that there is a higher degree of protest tendency among 
the Western populace than others. It in turn could be an attribute of Western culture. If this 
is  the case,  this  would raise  one question:  is  a  protest  orientation due to  the Western 
tradition or  the consequence of  a  values  shift?  In relation to these issues,  this  chapter 
primarily focuses the descriptive analyses of protest  orientation by comparing the four 
societies.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  USA  and  Britain  could  be  treated  as  the 
representatives  of  the  West,  and  Russia  and  Japan  as  those  of  non-Western  nations 
(particularly, Postcommunist and East Asian ones).
There is another issue: protest variables have potential implications for democracy.4 
1 For the full account of the rationales, see the 'Protest' section in the first chapter.
2 Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), pp. 314-318; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in  
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges 
Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural  
Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 43-44, 115-134.
3 For 'elite-challenging' (or 'elite-directing') participation, see Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: 
Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), p. 3, 299-300, 314; Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, pp. 5, 
335-370; Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political  
Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press), pp. 43-44, 307-315; 
Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the 
Post-Honeymoon Decline', International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 43 (2002), pp. 300-316; 
Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 94-134. Also, on protest 
activism, see Norris, Pippa, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 10, pp. 188-212.
4 Parry and Moyser acknowledge (relatively moderate) protest as one of several modes of political 
participation, although they seem to regard protest as among minor political actions, which need to be 
treated with caution in terms of relevance to democracy. See Parry, Geraint and George Moyser, 'More 
Participation, More Democracy', in David Beetham ed., Defining Measuring Democracy 
(London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 46-51.
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Citizens' orientation to 'moderate' forms of protest could have an informal linkage with 
governmental responsiveness. For it holds elements relevant to the normative direction of 
polyarchy, which includes public contestation and inclusiveness (participation) along with 
civil  liberties.5 To be fair,  mild protest  per se may not  be directly connected with the 
institutional procedures of democracy due to its unconventional character. Nonetheless, in 
quality, there is willingness to engage in open contestation and the inclusion of opinions in 
policy-making processes. In one way, temperate protest could be a strengthened version of 
public expression, which might be described as 'civic protest'.6 Public inclination to civic 
protest  can  be  a  sign of  popular  resilience  that  gives  substance  to  the  workings  of 
governmental responsiveness. Its variables can, therefore, be viable indicators to estimate 
the  informal  capacity  of  society  to  that  effect.7 For  the  present  chapter,  given  the 
assumption that the USA and Britain (as well as Western democratic nations) have more 
favourable conditions to responsive democracy, if their citizens hold a stronger disposition 
to such a protest, it would provide support for such a hypothesis.
For an empirical examination, there are several points to be considered, which are:
(1) Whether there is a general tendency of protest, and to what extent.
(2) Whether the likely forms of protest are moderate or radical, and to what extent.
(3) Whether there are consistent changes or durability in protest patterns.
The evaluation of the first point will depict primary characters of societies in terms of the 
overall degrees of popular  expressions and contestation towards authorities.  The second 
point is employed due to the fact that the matter of  moderation in protest is particularly 
crucial to a stable state of democracy. In some societies, protest would be likely to hold 
traditional radical characters, which can worsen the order and security of society. Since 
such characters are opposite to democratic operations, caution and differentiation should 
5 For polyarchy, see Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 1-16.
6 For the concept of civic protest, see Furusawa, Katsuto, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union 
and the 'Outsider' States', Contemporary Politics, 12: 2 (June 2006), pp. 207-223.
7 See ibid., pp. 208, 219-220.
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be applied in examining them. The extent of peaceful protest is a key quality to be probed. 
The third point will be a useful framework for considering the matter of values shift versus 
cultural  particularity.  Meanwhile,  the  point  is  relevant  to  differentiating  whether  data 
outcomes represent respondents' basic values or reflect circumstantial conditions such as 
economic difficulties.  To be fair,  protest  actions are normally driven by circumstantial 
motives.  Nonetheless,  if  people  have  a  consistent  preference  for  particular  patterns  of 
protest, it  may well be interpreted as a basic orientation.  The  following  examination is 
divided  into  three  major  parts.  The  first  part  studies  the  general  degrees  of  protest 
inclination.8 The second  part presents  more detailed  investigation  by differentiating the 
five types of protests. The third part pays special attention to missing values.
7.3 A general inclination to protest
As regards a general  inclination to protest,  respondents in the USA have the strongest 
propensity towards a positive stance, and the British come as the second strongest. As for 
Japan and Russia, Russia comes higher than Japan in 1990, which reverses in 1995 due to 
the sharp decrease in the Russian score. The gap remains in 1999-2002.  On the whole, 
except for Russia,  the societies show steady shifts  towards positive stances on protest. 
They also keep certain levels of durability in the shapes of distributions.
According to figure 7.1 and table 7.1, Britain shows a shift towards a more positive 
stance to protest from 1981 to 1999-2002. In the USA, similar shapes are maintained over 
the first three time points. Nonetheless, there is a stronger skew in favour of protest in the 
fourth  wave.  On  the  whole,  the  American  case  shows  a  clear  increase  in  the  protest 
orientation, despite a slight rebound in the middle term (between 1990 and 1995). Japan 
also has durability in the shape of distribution while having a steady increase towards the 
positive  view from 1981 to  1999-2002.  In  contrast,  the  Russian case exhibits  a  sharp 
decline in the scores from 1990 to 1995. This is probably due to the decrease in enthusiasm 
for protest.  Since the year 1990 was a time in which communist rule was collapsing,  the 
spread of their  political concern may have induced the  relatively frequent occurrence of 
protest  activities.  Enthusiasm  nonetheless  seems  to  have  declined  probably  due  to 
8 A measure for this is made from the aggregation of measures on five types of protests drawn from the 
World Values Survey.
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disillusionment as to their efficacy.9 In addition,  despite the changes, there seem to be 
some continuities in the distributional  forms of  protest  scores over the waves in these 
societies.
Figure 7.2 presents a concise picture for an overall comparison. There seems to be a 
consistent tendency in that, among the four societies, the USA has the highest scores, and 
Britain has the second highest. A gap between Western and non-Western cases appears to 
exist as far as these societies are concerned. Moreover, there are coherent levels for each 
society (except for Russia), which suggests  the presence of basic societal stances. It may 
be possible to relate the difference to cultural particularity. The USA and Britain both may 
have the same or similar factors that lead to a higher awareness of protest, which Japan and 
Russia may not share. 
As for basic attitudes, how should the Russian case be interpreted? As mentioned 
above, its sharp decrease may be due to the erosion of an initial enthusiasm. In that sense, 
the  figures  in  1995  could  represent  the  point  where  the  enthusiasm  evaporated.  The 
Russian result in 1995 and 1999-2002 could therefore indicate their original stance. If this 
is  the  case,  the  basic  values  of  Russian  respondents  towards  protest  would  be  more 
negative than Japanese, not to mention British and American counterparts.
Meanwhile, there is an overall tendency that popular preference for protest is steadily 
increasing over the period in the USA, Britain and Japan. Interestingly, in the preceding 
chapters, though not necessarily fully, steady changes in favour of a Postmaterialist shift 
are  detected  among  the  three  societies.  Especially,  among  the  four  items  of  a 
Postmaterialist  measure,  the item of  'giving people more say in  important  government 
decisions' showed noteworthy shifts (although that of 'protecting freedom of speech' tended 
to  be  static).  This  connotes  an  association  between  protest  and  Postmaterialist-related 
values.  Protest  orientation could be,  at  least  partly,  related to values shift  in  relatively 
stable  and  affluent  societies.  The  Russian  case  may  present  some  support  for  this 
assumption from a different direction. The sharp decline in the Russian protest tendency 
coincides with a steep decrease in their Postmaterialist orientation and a drastic rise in their 
9 According to Inglehart and Catterberg's finding in the survey responses, from a phase before/during 
regime transition to a phase after regime change, the decrease of protest behaviour is observed in many of 
Postcommunist societies. This is especially the case with the former USSR republics. See Inglehart and 
Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline'.
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Materialist one. This also implies a connection between the two attitudinal dimensions.
With respect to the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity, protest may be 
seen through both perspectives. Restricting ourselves to only one of the two perspectives 
would result in an unduly rigid interpretation. Adopting both perspectives in an eclectic 
manner does not necessarily contradict each other. It is plausible to assume that there are 
steady changes in favour of a  Postmaterialist  shift  and protest  especially in stable and 
affluent societies, whereas there are basic cultural contexts that affect the posture.
7.4 Measures on five types of protest
This section examines the disaggregated versions of protest measures individually. These 
comprise five individual measures, of which items are: (1) signing a petition, (2) attending 
lawful  demonstrations,  (3)  joining  in  boycotts,  (4)  joining  unofficial  strikes,  and  (5) 
occupying buildings or factories.
7.4.1 Conceptual diagram of protest
Before going into the analysis of the measures, it would be helpful to consider a conceptual 
framework of  protest  types,  through which these  protest  items are  differentiated.  Alan 
Marsh developed a diagram of protest modes through detailed pilot studies of surveys on 
protest as unorthodox political behaviour.10 Figure 7.3 presents a diagram of protest, which 
is extracted (with revisions) from Marsh's scale  of unconventional political behaviour.11 
According to Marsh, his pilot work 'isolated some key examples of protest behavior that 
seemed to traverse the psychological distance between orthodox and unorthodox political 
behavior in progressive stages.'12 And, these examples were incorporated into 'a kind of 
conceptual diagram which relates the examples, and the dimension they form…'13
10 See Marsh, Alan, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977), 
esp. pp. 39-54; Marsh, Alan, 'Explorations in Unorthodox Political Behavior,' European Journal of  
Political Research, 2 (1974), pp. 107-31. Also see Muller, Edward, 'A Test of a Partial Theory of 
Potential for Political Violence', American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), pp. 928-59.
11 The diagram is, with adjustment, based on a Dalton's modified version. See Dalton, Russell J., Citizen 
Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 2nd ed. (Chatham: 
Chatham House Publishers, 1996), p. 72. For the original diagram, see Marsh, Protest and Political  
Consciousness, p. 42.
12 Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness, p. 41.
13 Ibid., p. 41.
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 The main body of the diagram consists of four thresholds on the basis of moderate-
radical  degrees.  Among the five protest  types,  'petition'  and 'lawful  demonstration'  are 
included in the first threshold where orthodox and unorthodox political behaviours overlap, 
while  implying that  'lawful  demonstration'  possesses more connotation of  unorthodoxy 
than 'petition'. Marsh goes on to write, '[the] second threshold is illustrated by "boycott" 
which marks a fairly unequivocal entry into political unorthodoxy and the first steps of 
"direct  action."  "Unofficial  strikes"  and  "rent  strikes"  mark  a  third  threshold  position, 
wherein the question of conscious illegality arises.'14 Though illegal, the third threshold is 
of a non-violent character. The fourth threshold is illustrated by unlawful demonstration, 
occupations and damage to property, which includes violent characters.
 Accordingly,  the  five  protest  items of  the  World  Values  Survey are  able  to  be 
located in the diagram. In the context of the diagram, 'signing petitions' takes a position at 
the left end among the five protest modes whereas 'occupying buildings' is at the right end. 
The former is the mildest among the five kinds of protests while occupying buildings is the 
most extreme. 'Lawful demonstration,' according to the diagram, is the second mildest, and 
'boycott' is the third. The closer to the left end, the milder the behaviour becomes.15 In 
addition, as Dalton writes, in the diagram, 'unconventional political action is cumulative. 
Individuals  active  at  any  one  threshold  also  generally  participate  in  milder  forms  of 
protest.'16 With this diagram as a basic perspective, the examination of the five protest 
items is conducted in the following sections.
7.4.2 Comparison of protest patterns (A): between societies
Figure 7.4 presents comparison between societies within respective years of the surveys as 
regards five  protest  items.  For  the data  of  1995-98,  Britain,  the USA and Japan have 
particularly high scores in the 'petition' item, being the highest among the five types of 
protests. In Russia, on the other hand, the mean score for 'petition' is low, even lower than 
14 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
15 Marsh's diagram takes 'lawful demonstration' as the second most moderate and 'boycott' as the third. This 
order of protest modes was established based on his pilot study. However, the interpretation may need 
caution depending on societies especially concerned with an order between 'lawful demonstration' and 
'boycott'. Nonetheless, this conceptual diagram remains of great use as a standard. It still has validity in 
presenting the tentative degrees of moderateness and radicalness, and of popular acceptability, on the 
protest modes. For Marsh's study on the protest modes, see ibid., p. 29-54; Marsh, 'Explorations in 
Unorthodox Political Behavior'.
16 Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2nd ed., p. 73.
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'lawful demonstration'. For other items, the USA and Japan have 'boycott' as the second 
highest,  and 'lawful demonstration'  as the third while these two protests constitute mid 
points among the five protests.17 Unlike others, Russia takes 'lawful demonstration' as the 
highest, 'petition' as the second, and 'boycott' as the third. For all three societies, 'occupy 
building' is the lowest, being almost zero, whereas 'join strike' is the second lowest. For 
Russia, 'lawful demonstration' and 'petition' hold close positions that are only as high as the 
mid  point  items  of  the  USA  and  Japan.  The  USA  and  Japan  have  relatively  similar 
distributions although the Japanese overall emphasis on protest is somewhat weaker than 
the USA. The Russian figures, nonetheless, exhibit a distinct shape from them. What may 
be noticed is that 'signing petitions' and 'boycott' respectively are clearly lower in Russia 
than in the USA and Japan.
For 1990, the figures show a similar tendency to the 1995-98 data, though there is a 
difference  in  the  Russian  figures.  What  is  evident is,  except  Russia,  the  other  three 
societies have relatively analogous shapes. Among the three, the USA is the highest in an 
overall inclination to protest while Britain is the second, and Japan the third. As for the 
Russian case, the 'shape' of relative priorities between different protest types is almost the 
same in 1990 and 1995-98. Nonetheless, in 1990 'the degree of emphasis on protest as a 
whole' seems to be boosted, so that the Russian case in 1990 attains comparable figures to 
the other three societies. As a result, what is distinctive about the Russian case in 1990 is 
the high degree of 'lawful demonstration',  which is  indeed the highest among the four 
societies. As regards 1981 data (in which the Russian case is not available), the tendency 
of the three societies are more or less equal to ones in 1990 and 1995-98. The overall 
tendency is largely as follows: the USA > Britain > Japan.18 The order is more or less the 
same throughout these waves. The result of the 1999-2002 data, on the whole, seems to 
conform to the tendency in the previous waves. Especially, it shows immediate continuity 
with the shape of the distribution in the 1995-98 data (although there is an overall rise in 
the American inclination to protest). The Russian scores in the fourth wave remain at the 
same level as the ones in the third wave. 
7.4.3 Comparison of protest patterns (B): within societies 
17 British case is not available.
18 'Boycott' item in Britain shows slight weakness in comparison with Japan.
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Figure 7.5 shows comparison over the multiple time-points of the surveys within each 
society. These societies tend to respectively maintain their own orders of priority in types 
of protest. Moreover, the overall patterns are rather stable over time. Although the Russian 
case is  exceptional  due to a  significant decrease in the figures,  still  the same shape is 
maintained. A shift in the relative priority of 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott' in the 
British case might  be also exceptional.  The change,  however,  would be comparatively 
minor in terms of the British pattern as a whole. This would support the assumption that 
there  is  durability  in the  political  cultural  tendency of  respective societies  in  terms of 
protests (although the degree of enthusiasm could be affected by circumstantial conditions 
such  as  regime  transition  and/or  unusual  economic  conditions  as  seen  in  the  case  of 
Russia). In fact, there seems to be considerable durability of peculiarity in each society. 
Whereas  Britain  and  the  USA are  close  to  each  other  in  their  forms,  they  also  have 
respective  patterns.  Japan  then  shows  an  analogous  shape  to  the  two  societies  while 
continuously holding its own form and relative weakness. The Russian pattern is distinct 
among them. Despite an overall shift between the second and third waves, the 'form' is 
preserved as seen in the Figure. Therefore, the Russian shift is a withdrawal from protest in 
general, which is not the change of preference on specific types of protests. In addition, for 
Britain, the USA and Japan, the results largely show overall shifts towards more positive 
stances on protest  over the period in spite  of fluctuations in contrast  with the Russian 
withdrawal.
7.4.4 Protest patterns: a general implication to democracy
What are their implications for democracy? Before discussing the four societies, let  us 
consider a general perspective. The popular inclination to protest in 'peaceful ways' could 
be  associated  with  responsive  and  perhaps  liberal  democracy.  For  it  denotes  citizens' 
capacity for public expression in  relation to  governmental responsiveness.  Empirically, 
according to the World Values Survey, at  the world level,  Western democratic nations 
concentrate in the upper halves of country rankings on the percentages of respondents who 
have engaged in protest. This is especially the case with 'petition', 'lawful demonstration' 
and  'boycott',  which  are  regarded  as  milder  in  Marsh's  protest  diagram.19 As  for  their 
19 The result is according to the fourth wave of the Survey (1999-2002).
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associations  with  democracy,  table  7.2  indicates  that  'signing  petition'  is  evidently 
correlated with both of the Freedom House ratings. 'Joining boycott' also has a significant 
correlation coefficient with 'civil liberties'. Although 'lawful demonstration' is seemingly 
not associated, this would be due to the fact that its nature could vary. Demonstrations 
could  be  either  related  or  unrelated  to  a  democratic  orientation.20 Similarly,  Inglehart 
shows that  the popular  attitude of  'signing petition'  is  clearly  correlated with Freedom 
House indexes.21 There  is  an observation that  West  European societies  tend to  hold  a 
stronger orientation to moderate forms of protest than their Postcommunist counterparts 
do. Also, milder protests are more associated with liberal democratic attitudes in Western 
Europe than in a group of states that consist of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.22 
Thus, it seems that Western democracy and probably liberal democracy are likely to 
be accompanied by the presence of citizens  in  favour of peaceful  protest,  where mass 
resilience  of  public  expression  and a  system of  political  responsiveness  coincide.  The 
people's  attitudinal  commitment  to  open  debates  and  demands  helps  to  ensure  such 
governmental  functions.  It  could  be  moderate  but  continuous  'cognitive  pressure'  that 
encourages the flow of public opinion and behavioural principles that direct political elites. 
In this sense, a crucial point is not necessarily the actual behaviour of the moderate protest 
per se. A societal inclination to temperate protest is a symptom by which we could estimate 
such a popular capacity in democratic function.23
7.4.5 Implications for the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan
In that specific perspective, the USA may have the closest conditions of popular attitudes 
to such a model. Britain seems to be the second to that effect. Furthermore, their conditions 
hold a certain durability, which may be rooted in their political culture. This would be 
supported by the observed fact that their stronger orientation to moderate protests tends to 
20 There could be societies where spontaneous demonstrations are more likely, being associated with 
democratic causes. Other societies, however, may have conditions in which such behaviours are driven by 
economic desperations. For some societies such as ones with Soviet traditions, lawful demonstrations 
might be artificial political mobilisations. See, for instance, Friedgut, Theodore H., Political  
Participation in the USSR (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
21 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Haward J. Wiarda eds., 
New Directions in Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), p. 149; Inglehart, 
Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', PS (January 2003), 
p. 54.
22 Furusawa, 'Participation and Protest in the European Union and the 'Outsider' States'.
23 For a similar argument, see ibid.
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be constant over multiple time points.
As for Japan, the protest tendency appears to be similar to that of the two Western 
nations at first glance. Nonetheless, the Japanese propensity is lower than them. Although 
this gap seems to be subtle in the above results, the weakness is more evident when the 
'action'  of  protest  is  specifically  considered.24 For  the  commitment  to  actual  protest 
behaviour would require a stronger willingness that exceeds psychological barriers towards 
real involvement in comparison with a simple judgement of either a positive or negative 
stance.  In  that  sense,  this  would  more  explicitly  tap  popular  resilience  for  public 
expression. As shown in table 7.3, the Japanese inclination is especially weaker in 'petition' 
and 'boycott' than American and British ones.25 Although Japan may have conditions in 
favour of the democratic dimension discussed so far, their commitment to public demands 
is not as firm as in the Western societies. Moreover, its relative weakness is consistent over 
the series of the surveys, denoting cultural durability. Table 7.4 indicates an analogous 
result, which is extracted from other source.  As for judgements on protestation without 
personal involvement, the levels of supports by Japanese respondents are comparable to 
ones by the two Western counterparts.  Yet,  when it  comes to the matter  of their  own 
protest actions, Japanese scores are notably low. There appears to be an intrinsic lack of 
inclination to open contestation among Japanese populace. To be fair, as observed above, 
there is a steady shift towards a positive attitude towards civic protest.  Nevertheless, a 
particular proclivity clearly persists in the Japanese attitude, which could run counter to the 
quality of public expression at an individual level.
As  regards  Russia,  there  are  several  points  to  be  noted.  First,  it  seems  that  the 
Russian  protest  orientation  per  se is  basically not  substantial.  There  is  an  obvious 
indication that the overall degree of  protest is higher in 1990 than 1995 and 1999-2002. 
Since 1990 was a year immediately before the collapse of the communist rule, there were 
circumstantial conditions that were likely to motivate the frequent occurrence of protests.26 
It  is  inferred  that  in  1990  the  higher  appreciation  of  protest  was  due  to  a  temporal 
24 The results so far are based on averages of protest inclination which considers all the options of answers: 
'have done' = 2; 'might do' = 1; 'would never do' = 0. It is possible that a gap of a subjective attachment to 
protest is wider between those who 'have done' and those who 'might do' than a gap between those who 
'might do' and those who 'would never do'.
25 It should be recalled that these two types are correlated with the Freedom House ratings.
26 Also, see Inglehart and Catterberg, 'Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-
Honeymoon Decline'.
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culmination, whereas in 1995 the popular evaluation on protest shifted back to its original 
level. This is supported by the fact that the same level continued from 1995 to 1999-2002 
as shown in figure 7.5 and table 7.3. Second, there seems to be less stability in the Russian 
state of protest. This could be surmised in view of the fluctuation in the level of protest, 
which  is  not  observed  in  the  other  three  societies.27 Third,  consistently,  the  score  of 
'signing  petitions'  is  much lower  in  Russia  than  in  the  USA and Britain  (and  Japan). 
Fourth,  the Russian score of 'lawful  demonstration'  is  comparatively higher among the 
lower  scores of  the five  protest  items.  What  does  this  signify in  conjunction with the 
relative weakness in relation to 'petition'? Russian perceptions of protest would probably 
differ from the ones generally conceived in the contemporary West. Russian respondents 
appear to place less trust on a simple linguistic expression as a means of contestation. It 
should be recalled that this coincides with a consistent lower priority for 'free speech' in 
Russia, as identified in earlier chapters. Since 'petition'  is a foremost indicator of civic 
protest  among  the  five  items,  democratic  or  civic  connotation  may  be  much  less 
emphasised in the realm of Russian protest. In Russia, protest could be understood mainly 
in traditional and pragmatic terms. The emphasis can be qualitatively different from protest 
prevalent in Western societies, which often involves abstract liberal democratic rationales.
Among  the  five  protest  items,  'lawful  demonstration'  is  located  within  the  first 
threshold in Marsh's diagram, which may be still within the category of moderate means. 
'Lawful  demonstration'  could,  however,  denote  unstable  factors.  Although  it  could  be 
lawful and therefore taken as acceptable by the public, it may affect the stability of society. 
Since  demonstration  implies  direct  action,  it  has  a  certain  unpredictability  in  its 
consequences. This factor may not be favourable to the maintenance of stable democracy, 
unless its activists, society and government have substantial capacity to accommodate such 
effects in a peaceful manner. Given the uncertain conditions of contemporary Russia, it 
would be difficult to judge whether it functions positively or negatively. To be fair, there 
might  be  an  element  in  favour  of  responsive  democracy.  The  occurrence  of  lawful 
demonstrations might push for the enlargement of governmental responsiveness to popular 
voices, as in 1960s/70s (and other times in their history) in the USA, Britain and other 
Western  nations.  Nonetheless,  as  argued  above,  Russian  society  appears  to  lack  a 
27 Nevertheless, it should be recalled that there is durability in the 'form' of protest preference of the five 
protest items in Russian case.
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consistent direction for public expression, being prone to circumstantial motives. This may 
not  substantiate  a  societal  force  for  the  unidirectional  development  of  responsive 
democracy.  Moreover,  the  lack of  consistency  may not  be  advantageous for  nurturing 
durable and moderate attitudes on public demands. For such attitudes would require long-
term learning processes through recurrent events in coherent directions. In the West, the 
unidirectional attainment has been possible due to an inherent cultural orientation to the 
search of freedom residing in the individual. This has been enhanced by the spread of 
material and intellectual resources and values transformation among the people thanks to 
industrial and post-industrial processes. Russia on the other hand seems to hold a different 
cultural  and historical  background,  which may not  work in  an identical  manner  to the 
Western one.
7.5 Missing values 
7.5.1 Protest and missing values
This section examines missing values of protest measures and their implications. Why do 
they need to be  analysed? The figures of missing values have important implications for 
the analysis  of  protest.  Normally,  missing values  are  excluded from the range  of  data 
analysis mainly due to their uncertain natures. Nonetheless, if there is a peculiar social 
difference in the proportions of missing values, it is useful to consider this sphere. In this 
context,  the  protest  measures  in  our  research  have  noticeable  outputs  worth  paying 
attention to. Missing values connote responses that can be regarded as 'don't know' or 'no 
answer'.28 These responses imply respondents' hesitation and/or ambiguity in giving clear 
answers (to questions asked by interviewers/questionnaires). The reasons behind it could 
be  such  as:  (1)  respondents  do  not  have  clear  answers  because  answers  can  change 
depending on situations; (2) respondents are reluctant to give clear answers because there 
are matters in question that cause their hesitation.
28 For the issues of 'don't know', no opinion and other related matters in survey response, see Schuman, 
Howard and Stanley Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question 
Form, Wording, and Context (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 113-178; de Vaus, 
David, Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2002), pp. 72-74. For a study on 'don't know' answers in Russian surveys, see Carnaghan, 
Ellen, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence?: "Don't Knows" and Democracy in Russia', Studies in Public  
Policy, 237 (1994).
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For  protest  measures,  such  responses  could  be  interpreted  to  stem  from  either 
ambiguous or diffident attitudes in expressing clear judgments. Why are they ambiguous or 
diffident? Probably, for the ambiguity, respondents expect various situations and prefer to 
be  adaptable.  Their  sensitivity  to  situations  could  cause  equivocal  judgment  and 
statements. They would be cautious in giving clear (and therefore possibly hasty) answers 
while keeping flexibility in their  following actions.  As for  diffidence,  it  would hold a 
similar rationale whereas the attitude further includes hesitation in asserting one's  own 
views especially on sensitive matters such as protest. This would be likely if given people 
or societies have stronger norms which regard direct contestation as potentially disturbing 
peace and order of society, and more personally, of communal/social ties. Japan seems to 
have inherited the remnants of analogous traditions. It would be possible that the cultural 
heritage  affects  the  way  respondents  answer  in  a  particular  manner.  In  effect,  such  a 
tendency is observable. In following parts, the examination of missing values pays special 
attention to this point.
7.5.2 Observation: indicators of ambiguity
As indicated in figure 7.6, what is significant is the exceptionally high degree of missing 
values  of  Japanese  data  in  all of  the  four  waves  whereas  Britain  and  the  USA keep 
evidently low degrees throughout the waves. Russia takes middle positions between Japan 
and the two Western societies. The Russian case of 1990 is clearly higher than that of 1995 
and 1999-2002. For Britain and the USA, the minimal levels of missing values suggest 
their propensity to clearly express their views on protest rather than having ambiguity in 
their responses. The Japanese case makes an unequivocal contrast with them by exhibiting 
consistently high  levels  of  the  missing  values  although there  are  more  fluctuations.  It 
denotes that in Japan there is an inclination to avoiding a definite statement on protest. The 
Russian case implies that the degree of evasion is lower than Japan, but still higher than 
Britain and the USA. This suggests an intermediate attitude in assertiveness on this issue. 
Meanwhile, circumstantial changes between 1990 and 1995 seem to be also at work in this 
sphere.29 
Each of the societies has relative consistency, that is, durability in each of their own 
29 'Boycott', 'strike' and 'occupying building' show higher fluctuation than two milder protests.
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degrees of missing percentages over multiple surveys (despite fluctuations). This suggests 
that each of the societies has a  persistent tendency in responses on protest. This can be 
translated in the context of cultures. The fact that Japanese values are high at all of the four 
time-points could be due to  a peculiar  Japanese tradition. Likewise, the coherently low 
missing  values  in  Britain  and  the  USA could  be  based  on  their  cultural  particularity. 
Moreover, the constant proximity between Britain and the USA over the waves denotes 
their homogeneity. To a less extent, the Russian tendency to be at mid-points in the figures 
implies the reflection of a trait that is neither identical with Britain/the USA nor Japan. 
Consequently, the result implies that Japanese people are culturally evasive in their attitude 
to  protest.  British  and  American  people  have  an  enduring  propensity  to  express  clear 
stances. The Russian disposition tends to be in the middle although their attitude is prone 
to circumstantial changes.
7.5.4 Further implications: non-Western particularities
Japan
Given the above result, why are Japanese evasive to the question of protest? One reason 
would be that they are hesitant in giving public statements on socially sensitive matters. 
Japanese  citizens  are  normally reluctant  to  protest.  Culturally,  the  motivations of  their 
public behaviours are heavily affected by holistic social norms, systems and atmospheres 
to  which  individuals  belong  rather  than  internally  conceived  personal  principles.30 
Especially  in  public  domains,  individuals  have  a  persistent  concern  for  other  people's 
sentiments and judgements, a normative trend of society, and roles and duties which they 
are supposed to fulfil in societal systems.31 Many of them are bound up in the complexity 
of  intertwined  social  ties.  This  nurtures  weakness  in  individual  autonomy that  should 
underpin self-motivated independent actions. Hence, at a personal level, these amount to 
their reluctance to engage in contestation, which is essentially due to their other-directed 
30 Their intrinsic dependence on external norms and judgement outside themselves might be related to Ruth 
Benedict's claim that Japanese culture is concerned with a sense of 'shame' in contrast with Western 
orientation to that of 'guilt'. See Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of  
Japanese Culture (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947).
31 Lipset mentions Japanese culture emphasise a sense of obligation, which has clear contrast with 
American orientation to that of rights and individual autonomy. See Lipset, S. Martin, American 
Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (London/New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), pp. 
211-263, esp. 217-220.
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rather than inner-directed predisposition.32 
Nonetheless, since their behavioural motives generally rely on constant reference to 
outer  contexts,  there  might  be  a  certain  changeability  in  their  deeds  depending  on 
surrounding atmospheres or main trends of society. In the sixth chapter, it was mentioned 
that the Japanese populace have a tradition of conformism. At a personal level, this could 
result in various behavioural outcomes, which would not necessarily be  coherent.33 Sato 
observed a situation-oriented tendency in the Japanese character as early as the period of 
infancy  in  comparison  with  British  and  American  ones  which  have  more  consistent 
attitudes.34 This suggests that there is already the burgeoning of the cultural difference in 
the early periods of their formative years. Consequently, the same logic can be applied to 
both a Japanese general hesitancy in relation to protest and a certain unpredictability. They 
inherently hold a strong sense of adaptation to surrounding situations, which regulates their 
behaviour. This is also connected with their ambiguity in opinions. It in turn is reflected in 
the high proportions of missing values.
Russia
What implication could be surmised for Russia as regards missing values?  It seems that 
basically Russian people are not eager to engage in open contestation. The rationale is as 
follows.  The  Russian  case  shows  a  higher  protest  inclination  and  larger  missing 
percentages in 1990, whereas they hold a weaker inclination with fewer missing values in 
1995 and 1999-2002. In other words, they are ambiguous in 1990 despite greater interest. 
In contrast, they seem to be clear in their reluctance in 1995 and 1999-2002. The ambiguity 
in  1990  could  stem from their  ambivalence  between temporary  enthusiasm  and basic 
diffidence in relation to protest action. Although Russians would be normally hesitant or 
perhaps sceptical in relation to such behaviour, the situation of 1990 seems to drag them 
32 The Japanese other-directed predisposition would be an indigenous cultural trait rather than the 
consequence of modernisation. For the original concept of the 'other-directed' and 'inner-directed' 
characters, see Riesman, David, et al., The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1950).
33 Maruyama's account on Japanese society in terms of patterns of individuation might be also helpful for 
this explanation. See Maruyama, Masao, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual 
Scheme,' ch. 14, Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization, in Marius B. Jansen ed. (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 493-4.
34 Sato, Yoshiko, Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho to Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku [A Good Child in 
Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo 
Koron Shin-sha, 2001).
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into  the  momentum of  protest.  The  equivocation  in  1990  would  be  because  they  are 
suspended between two conflicting views. Thus, the shift  from 1990 to 1995 could be 
interpreted as their return to a primary unwilling stance. At that point, they are confident in 
their reluctance to protest because they are expressing their original position. Another point 
is the matter of changeability prone to circumstances. This could be present in Russia since 
the evident gap between 1990 and 1995 suggests it.  Russian changeability seems to be 
concerned with material conditions such as the economy or public order.
7.6 Combined measure of 'answered' and missing data
The  degrees  of  missing  percentages  could  be  considered  together  with  the  states  of 
'answered'  data.  The  combined  analysis  enables  further  differentiation  in  data 
interpretation, which could not be extracted otherwise. Figure 7.7 presents the output of 
this  design.  The measure consists  of the combination of the mean scores in  a  general 
measure of protest ('answered') and the mean scores of missing percentages of five protest 
scales. Table 7.5 is the approximate summary of the design.
 The  interpretation  is  as  follows.  As  for  Britain  and  the  USA,  the  societies' 
approximate stances to protest are relatively high with high degree of assertion.35 With 
respect to Japan, despite a slight but steady rise in protest inclination and fluctuations in 
missing percentages, Japan consistently stays in middle positions of the inclination with 
high  degrees  of  ambiguity.  Russia  shows  a  considerable  difference  between  the  1990 
survey  and  later  surveys  (1995  and  1999-2002).  This  would  be  due  to  circumstantial 
changes, as mentioned above. In 1990, Russian protest inclination ('answered') is relatively 
high while having a higher degree of ambiguity (missing percentage). This amounts to a 
still lower inclination to open contestation than Britain and the USA. On the other hand, 
when it  comes to 1995 and 1999-2002, when stimuli  and enthusiasm for protest fades 
away, Russian respondents opt for an unwilling stance with a high degree of assertion.
35 The protest inclination of the American case in 1999-2002 is particularly high.
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7.7 Conclusion
A crucial finding is that the USA and Britain have an orientation to protest especially in 
'moderate'  forms  (so  do  many  Western  democratic  societies).  Although  Japan  has  a 
tendency in a similar  direction,  it  does so less clearly.  Russia shows a deviant protest 
pattern and, on the whole, shows a lower protest inclination than Western counterparts. 
Even during the time of the political change around 1990, the Russian level generally did 
not  quite  go  beyond  those  of  the  USA  and  Britain,  despite  the  relatively  frequent 
opportunities for protest during the period. Only a notable type of protest for Russia was 
'lawful  demonstration',  which  exceeded those  in  the  other  three  societies  in  1990  and 
decreased in 1995. Nonetheless, the level was not comparable to that of 'petition' in the 
British and American cases. Considering the peculiarity of the year 1990, the 1995 and 
1999-2002 data would be closer to the basic attitudes of the Russian public. Therefore, the 
general tendency for protest would  not  be  substantial  in Russia (except for a particular 
orientation to demonstrations).36 Moreover, on average, Russian perceptions of protest may 
differ  from one  generally  understood in  the  contemporary  West  in  the  sense  of  'civic 
protest'.
For the issue of values shift versus cultural particularity, the following is considered. 
On the one hand, among the four societies, long-standing affluent and stable societies have 
a greater inclination to open contestation in more peaceful forms. Also, the signs of their 
steady rises are observed in these societies. This may be concerned with the consequence 
of a values shift. Their social conditions probably have nurtured a stronger sense of self-
esteem and self-expression,  as suggested in the thesis of values changes.  On the other 
hand, there is certain durability in each degree and form of protest and assertiveness in the 
four  societies.  This indicates the presence of  cultural  particularities.  Societies with the 
tradition of the West (or Anglo-Saxon) have a greater propensity for protest. There could 
be a contextual correspondence between the Western heritage of individualism and the 
36 There might be a criticism that the result of the International Social Survey Programme in 1996 is 
contradictory to this claim. To be sure, the percentages of the respondents who have attended 'public 
protest meetings' and 'protest demonstrations' in Russia are higher than the Western counterparts. 
However, it should be recalled that the questions for these items indicate the experience of their 
involvement in 'last five years', which can includes a period closely continuous from 1990. Also, the 
items are approximately comparable to 'lawful demonstrations' in terms of levels depicted in Marsh's 
diagram. In this sense, these items could have overlapping results with the state of 'lawful demonstration' 
in 1990.
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protest inclination.37 According to Lipset, the USA is the foremost in its cultural emphasis 
on free standing individuals and the assertion of rights. Japan is located at the opposite end 
with  a  particular  orientation  to  consensus,  collectivism  and  hierarchical  interpersonal 
relations. West European societies including Britain are inbetween.38 Sato's study on self-
assertion  and  self-regulation  in  relation  to  child  behaviour  in  the  three  societies 
corresponds with this.39 Culture seems to matter to the degree of acceptance of protest.
As  for  the  context  of  responsive  democracy,  the  USA and Britain  appear  to  be 
advantageous  for  the  underpinning  of  the  systems  due  to  their  capacity  for  public 
expression. Japan has a weaker resilience than the two nations.40 Especially, the tradition of 
conformism seems to have been preventing the existence of such a popular capacity. With 
the high degree of ambiguity, Japan has a certain unpredictability in whether it can provide 
a coherent substance to public contestation. With respect to Russia, the extent of civic 
protest seems to be less than in the other three societies. Although there is an orientation to 
'lawful demonstration',  relative inconsistency in overall resilience and direction may be 
disadvantageous for the development of responsive democracy. A moderate protest with 
the power of language as represented by 'signing petitions' is much less emphasised than in 
the other societies. Despite the relative rise of the citizens' protest in 1990, the Russian 
basic  propensity  seems  to  be  oriented  to  political  acquiescence  rather  than  consistent 
claims for their voices to be heard.
In one way, Russian democracy may not be fitted in the exact model of Western 
democracy,  which attaches extraordinary importance to the inclusion and sensitivity of 
popular  voices  in  the  political  decision-making  process.  The  intrinsic  quality  of 
democracies in the West is to assimilate vigorous competition of political demands from 
society.  It  is a  system to channel and coordinate these interests in formalised peaceful 
processes. The predominance of parliament, which has been historically a central feature 
of these societies, would be one of the examples that depict this.41 The strong claims of 
37 Meanwhile, in these societies, the practice of protest 'by peaceful means' is permitted and guaranteed in 
both legal and customary terms. With such wider freedom, the people would have stronger awareness and 
familiarity with civic contestation.
38 Lipset, American Exceptionalism, pp. 211-263, 293-296.
39 Sato, Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan].
40 Despite this, there appears to be a certain effect of public opinion as checks and pressures on political 
authorities in Japan. Nonetheless, its major momentum seems to be led by media, not necessarily based 
on the capacity of public expression at an individual level.
41 Huntington mentions that the presence of representative political body is one of elements in Western 
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plural  interests  chronically  emerge  from not  only  social  groups  but  also  a  number  of 
individuals who hold a persistent penchant for public expression. Western democracy may 
be the most suitable system for societies where such a political culture predominates (and 
therefore may have been developed in the West). In this sense, the current Russian political 
culture  would  be  disadvantageous  and  perhaps  less  suitable  to  the  Western  model  of 
democracy. 
Yet, it does not necessarily mean Russian democracy has a bleak future. As Almond 
and Verba put it, political acquiescence could, in one way, have an advantage for not to 
seriously disturb the stability of a political system while softening political tensions.42 For a 
society  where  material  needs  and  societal  order  are  imperative,  the  principles  of 
participation and free speech may be perceived as luxurious ideals and less practical for 
acquiring  such  a  priority.  For  the  moment  especially,  Russian  citizens  may  long  for 
pragmatic outcomes in their immediate lives rather than abstract political principles. 
Meanwhile, if economic growth is resumed and maintained for a long period in Russia, 
one may expect increases in some aspects of Postmaterialist values, although it may not be 
a fully-fledged shift. If this happens, there may be a point when the society would begin to 
acquire  certain  elements in  favour  of  responsive democracy.  Nonetheless,  it  should be 
recalled  that  values  transformation  would  take  an  extraordinarily  long  time  even  if 
favourable  conditions  were  met.  In  reality,  it  is  difficult  to  expect  the  realisation  of 
economic affluence at the level of the West in the near future, let alone its long-standing 
preservation. Thus, at least for a time being, a values shift would not be an immediate 
remedy for the development of liberal democratic conditions comparable to the West.
civilisation. See Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72.
42 Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitude and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
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Figure 7.1 A general protest inclination
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Table 7.1 A general protest inclination: mean
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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- Protest: mean estimation -
Mean Standard Error
 Britain 1981 3.04 0.06
1990 3.44 0.06
1998 -- --
 1999-2002 3.85 0.07
 USA 1981 3.21 0.05
1990 3.85 0.05
1995 3.64 0.06
1999-02 4.58 0.06
 Japan 1981 2.51 0.07
1990 2.64 0.09
1995 2.96 0.08
 1999-2002 3.16 0.07
 Russia 1981 -- --
1990 2.8 0.06
1995 1.73 0.04
1999-2002 1.74 0.04
Figure 7.2 A general protest inclination: mean comparison of societies
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Figure 7.3 Diagram of protest
Note: With revision/omission, the diagram is extracted from Marsh's scale of unconventional 
political behaviour (on the basis of a Dalton's modified version). The protest items available in the 
World Values Survey are presented in capital letters.
Source: R. J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial  
Democracies, 3rd ed. (Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), pp. 61. For 
the original diagram, see A. Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness (Beverly Hills, Calif.: 
Sage, 1977), p. 42.
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Figure 7.4 Comparison of protest patterns (A): between societies
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Figure 7.5 Comparison of protest patterns (B): within societies 
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Table 7.2 Correlations: Freedom House ratings and protest
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Lawful Occupying 
Petition Demonstration Boycott Strike Buildings
Political Rights 0.54*** 0.10 n.s. 0.27 n.s. -0.07 n.s. -0.03 n.s.
Civil Liberties 0.63*** 0.11 n.s. 0.33* -0.10 n.s. -0.01 n.s.
Note:
(1) N = 45 / Cases with missing values are excluded.
(2) Variables: 
     [A] Protest: 'done' % within nations; [B] Freedom House ratings: year of survey / 6 = highest; 0 = lowest (recoded).
(3) *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001;  n.s.: not significant.
(4) Coefficients are rounded.
Source: World Values Survey 1990-98.
Table 7.3 Percentages of protest actions
Petition
1999-2002 1995-8 1990 1981
USA 81 71 72 64
Britain 79 58 75 63
Japan 63 55 62 48
Russia 12 11 30 --
Lawful 
Demonstration 1999-2002 1995-8 1990 1981
USA 21 16 16 13
Britain 13 -- 14 10
Japan 13 10 13 9
Russia 23 21 33 --
Boycott
1999-2002 1995-8 1990 1981
USA 26 19 18 15
Britain 17 -- 14 7
Japan 8 7 4 3
Russia 3 2 4 --
(Respondents who 'have done': % within nations)                      
Note: Figures are rounded.
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Table 7.4 Views and actions of protest
Views on Protest
                                                                                                 ('Should be definitely allowed' %) 
Public Protest Protest National
  Meetings Demonstrations Strike 
USA 55 49 18
Britain 57 34 14
Japan 40 33 19
Russia 46 41 35
Actions of Protest
            ('Definitely would do' %)
Attend Public Go on Protest
Protest Meetings Demonstrations 
USA 32 22
Britain 24 11
Japan 7 5
Russia 15 13
       (Last 5 years: 'have done' %)
Public Protest Protest
Meetings Demonstrations 
USA 14 9
Britain 12 5
Japan 4 3
Russia 21 11
Note: 
(1) Figures are rounded.
(2) 'Have done': the sum of the percentages of 'once' and  'more than once'.
Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1996 - Role of Government III.
208
Figure 7.6 Protest: the patterns of missing values
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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Figure 7.7 Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity
Note: This measure combines the means of a protest aggregate measure ('answered') and the means of 
missing percentages of five protest measures.
Source: World Values Survey, 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
210
Table 7.5  Protest inclination and the degree of ambiguity
Protest 
Inclination
(Answered)
Missing 
Percentage Tendency
Ambiguity
(Unpredicta
bility)
Protest 
Inclination
(Overall)
Society's 
Approximate 
Stance
Higher Lower
Positive  to  protest, 
and confident in the 
attitude
Higher Higher
Positive  to  protest, 
but  ambiguous  in 
the attitude
Lower Higher
Negative to protest, 
but  ambiguous  in 
the attitude
Lower Lower
Negative to protest, 
and confident in the 
attitude
Low
|
High
|
Low
Higher
Maybe Higher
Maybe Lower
Lower
USA 99-02
USA 
Britain
Japan 95, 99-02
Russia 90
Japan 81, 90
Russia 95, 99-02
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Chapter 8: Values and Political Dimensions – Multivariate Analysis 
8.1 Introduction
The  preceding  chapters  have  probed  the  sphere  of  values  while  considering  issues 
surrounding the thesis of values shift. This chapter pays special attention to the question of 
whether  values  elements  have  influence  on actual  political  attitudes  and behaviour.1 It 
draws together the variables examined so far in conjunction with other pertinent variables. 
One of the major themes of the research is to examine dichotomous perspectives, that 
is,  values  shift  and  cultural  particularity.  Through cross-national  comparison,  we have 
sought to establish whether there are shifts in favour of a Postmaterialist orientation or 
nationally peculiar forms with durabilities.2 As it has emerged, there are both elements that 
have  been  influencing  each  of  the  four  nations.  It  suggests  the  validity  of  the  binary 
perspective.3 In  view  of  this,  can  the  perspective  be  applied  to  other  dimension  of 
Postmaterialist thesis? The thesis assumes that Postmaterialist values are conducive to a 
protest inclination. The first section of this chapter compares the ways of the two elements' 
influence over protest attitudes in Russia, the USA, Britain and Japan.
Another  theme  of  this  research  is  the  implication  of  values  for  the  scope  of 
democracy.  Our  examination  has  discovered  that  there  are  cultural  gaps  in  the 
understanding of freedom as well as the degrees of its emphasis, which could be related to 
1 For the implication of Postmaterialist and related values for political aspects, see for instance, Inglehart, 
Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', PS (January 2003), 
pp. 51-57. For the extended scale of 'self expression values' that incorporates the Postmaterialist variable, 
linkages with (liberal) democracy have been explored by Inglehart as well as Welzel, for instance, see 
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human 
Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Welzel, Christian 
and Ronald Inglehart, 'Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom: The Human 
Development Perspective', International Review of Sociology, 15: 1 (March 2005), pp. 81-108;  Inglehart, 
Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Haward J. Wiarda ed., New 
Directions in Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164; Inglehart, 
Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages', 
Comparative Politics, 36: 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-79.
2 For the issue of Postmaterialist values shift, there were discussions on Japanese case, for instance, see 
Inglehart, Ronald, 'Changing Values in Japan and the West', Comparative Political Studies, 14: 4 
(January 1982), pp. 445-479; Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan', 
American Political Science Review, 67: 4 (December 1973), pp. 1194-1203.
3 There are similar applications of this perspective by Inglehart. See, for instance, Inglehart, Ronald and 
Wayne Baker E., 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', American 
Sociological Review, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in 
Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.
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the issue of democracy. The gaps seem to be the case with the patterns of public expression 
as represented by moderate forms of protest. This raises questions. Do liberal democratic 
attitudes matter on moderate protest behaviour? Do such effects vary depending on distinct 
cultural  contexts?  The  second  section  scrutinises  these  issues.  It  is  envisaged  that,  if 
stronger associations tend to hold between such attitudes and an inclination to moderate 
protest, the kind of protest may have the likely quality of 'civic protest'. With this vision, a 
cross-national comparison is conducted for the four societies. The third section turns its 
attention to views of governance. By utilising two scales, it is intended to examine whether 
liberal democratic attitudes affect people's perceptions in relation to democratic and non-
democratic regimes.
Thus, the chapter comprises three sections. The first part will discuss the impact of 
Postmaterialist values on protest behaviour in the context of values shift versus cultural 
particularity. The second part will evaluate the quality of protest in the four societies in the 
light of the notion of 'civic protest'. The third part will examine views of governance and 
their association with liberal democratic attitudes.  Through this threefold approach, this 
chapter concludes the analytical body of the research in relation to our major theme: values 
and democracy. Do values affect politics and democracy, and in what ways in differing 
societies?
8.2 Postmaterialist values and protest
8.2.1 Hypothesis
This part focuses on the Postmaterialist index and its variants in terms of these values' 
impact on protest  behaviour,  comparing  the USA, Britain, Russia and Japan.4 A major 
issue is the effect of cultural particularity in comparison with that of Postmaterialist values. 
According to the theory of values shift, in post-industrial societies, popular outlooks are 
likely to transform and facilitate 'elite challenging' styles of participation such as (relatively 
moderate)  protest  actions.5 Nonetheless,  there  could  be  cultural  variance,  whereby  a 
4 In relation to this, for example, Inglehart presented a linkage between Postmaterialist values and protest 
potential. See Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ/Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 314-318.
5 Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 115-134; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges 
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consequence may not be unidirectional as expected by the theory. Inglehart notes that the 
actual directions of the values shift are path dependent, thus acknowledging possibility of 
cultural and historical influence.6 This could be the case with not only the process of the 
values shift, but also the political effect of these values, as presented in figure 8.1.
Given the availability of survey data for four time points: 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 
1999-2002, this section examines whether Postmaterialist values consistently affect protest 
orientations across the nations. If there is such a consistency, the political hypothesis in the 
values shift theory would be endorsed. For it will denote the constant effect of values on 
the  enhancement  of  protest  behaviour (if  values  are  transformed  in  favour of  a 
Postmaterialist shift). Nevertheless, if there is a coherent national difference, it will imply 
the influence of cultural particularity. This can indicate that, even if a values shift occurs, 
the political consequence could be diverse. This would provide an alternative conclusion in 
a modified perspective.  The investigation is restricted to the effect of a Postmaterialist 
orientation on protest attitudes (table 8.1). Further attention is extended to the influence of 
the relative commitment to 'more say'  and 'free speech'  as independent variables (table 
8.2).7 
8.2.2 Observation
Table 8.1 shows the association of Postmaterialist values with attitudes to 'petition', 'lawful 
demonstration'  and 'boycott'.  For the USA, Postmaterialist  values seem to be relatively 
evenly associated with protest orientations. For the details, the Postmaterialist variable has 
statistically significant results with all the three protest items in 1990 and 1995, although 
Press, LLC, 2002), ch. 4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural,  
Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: Princeton University Press, 
1997), pp. 307-315.
6 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 1, pp. 15-47 [esp. 18-22].
7 Ordered logit regression is employed for these analyses. This is due to the fact that the dependent 
variables are ordinal. For ordered logit regression, see, for instance, Long, J. Scott, Regression Models for  
Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 1997), pp. 
114-147; Borooah, Vani K., Logit and Probit: Ordered and Multinomial Models (Thousand 
Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2002); Hamilton, Lawrence C., Statistics with Stata: Updated for  
Version 7 (Belmont, CA/London: Wadsworth Group/Thompson Learning, 2003), pp. 228-230; Norušis, 
Marija J., SPSS® 13.0 Advanced Statistical Procedures Companion (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2004), pp. 69-89; Ishimura, Sadao, SPSS ni-yoru Kategorikaru-Deta-Bunseki no Tejun,  
Dai 2 Ban [The Process of Categorical Data Analysis Using SPSS] (Tokyo: Tokyo Tosho Kabushiki-
Gaisha, 2005), pp. 70-93.
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the  effects  somewhat  withdraw from 'petition'  in  1999-2002.8 With  respect  to  Britain, 
tendencies are similar to the American case. The Postmaterialist index exhibits a general 
association with the three protest items with the exception of 'petition' in the first survey. 
For the Japanese case, 'petition' does not have a significant association with Postmaterialist 
effects over all the four time points. Another feature is that, consistently, there seems to be 
a smaller influence on 'boycott' in comparison with the two Western cases. Russia also 
shows peculiar forms. Across the three available surveys, the Postmaterialist attitude has a 
clearly weaker association with 'lawful demonstration' than in the case of the other three 
nations. The fact that 'lawful demonstration' has a distinct tendency corresponds with the 
Russian pattern of protest as identified earlier, whereby respondents are unusually inclined 
to 'lawful demonstration' unlike the other three societies. This could be partly due to the 
Soviet  heritage  in  which  the  people  are  mobilised into  ritualistic  forms  of  public 
demonstration.9 Since the 'Postmaterialist' category is for those who opt for both freedom 
of speech and participation as a priority, such an attachment would not be compatible with 
a forced pattern of protest. 
Table 8.2 presents more details, where the effects of the esteem of 'free speech' and 
'more say' items are differentiated. For the American and British cases, almost full loadings 
of the influence of both 'free speech' and 'more say' are found for 'lawful demonstration' 
and 'boycott' over the period. Although such influence fluctuates in relation to 'petition', 
there appear to be fair indications of association with this item (except for the American 
case in 1999-2002). For the Japanese case, the pattern of the influence is far from even, 
which  is  different  from  the  patterns  of  two  Western  societies.  The  association  is 
statistically  nil  for  'petition'.  Moreover,  for  'lawful  demonstration'  and  'boycott',  there 
seems to be relative weakness in the effect from the 'more say' emphasis across the two 
decades. 'Free speech' has a rather coherent influence. An even more particular form is 
observed in the Russian data. For all the three protest items, the influence mostly comes 
from the esteem of 'more say', whereas 'free speech' seems to be a trivial source for such 
8 The Postmaterialist variable has statistically significant results with all the five protest items in 1990 and 
1995. The overall effects somewhat withdraw in 1999-2002 with only intermediate (semi-radical) protests 
having such an indication. These are 'lawful demonstration', 'boycott' and 'strike'.
9 Friedgut, Theodore H., Political Participation in the USSR (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979).
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motivation.10 
In sum, in the USA and Britain, the protest items and Postmaterialist effect appear to 
be  relatively  evenly  related.  In  particular,  associations  with  'lawful  demonstration'  and 
'boycott' are notable. These are also the case with both 'more say' and 'free speech'. For 
Japanese, the association is far from even, whereas 'free speech' is a likely rationale related 
to the protests. As far as Japanese 'petition' is concerned, nonetheless, there seems to be no 
such influence. The Russian case is the opposite. Largely the protest items are apt to be 
associated with 'more say'. These tendencies have a relative coherence across multiple time 
points. 
We can conclude that there are national particularities in the associations between 
protest and Postmaterialist related variables. Moreover, their relative consistency over time 
denotes certain degrees of their durability, which suggests the presence of long-standing 
peculiarities. These may have roots in cultural or historical contexts. Thus, the form of 
influence  differs  depending  on  nations.  This  provides  a  modified  conclusion  to  the 
hypothesis  that  values  transformation  simply  facilitates  protest  behaviour,  which  is 
expected  by  the  theory  of  values  shift.  As  far  as  the  four  societies  are  concerned, 
Postmaterialist  values  do not  evenly influence  protest  orientation in  Japan and Russia, 
whereas they rather tend to do so in the two Western nations.
What consequences could be expected from such a result? For the American and 
British  cases,  a  Postmaterialist  values  shift  can  evenly  enhance  (moderate)  protest  – 
especially 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott'. For the Japanese case, there is the outcome 
that  'free  speech'  (and  not  quite  'more  say')  is  a  major  stimulus  towards  'lawful 
demonstration' and 'boycott'. On the other hand, the previous result indicates that a values 
shift towards a commitment to the value of 'free speech' is much less likely. As far as the 
Postmaterialist  effect  on protest  is  concerned,  the further  Japanese increase of the two 
types of protest would be weaker than in the two Western nations. Also, there is a potential 
that 'petition' would not be likely to be enhanced by the increase of Postmaterialist values 
in  Japan.11 For  the  Russian  case,  'more  say'  holds  a  consistent  influence,  which  may 
10 The cases in 1990 show slight exceptional fluctuation, where there is neither significant association of 
'lawful demonstration' with 'more say' nor 'free speech'. 'Free speech' shows some influence in that year. 
This particularity would be due to the nature of the year 1990, which is a time of culmination in regime 
transition where there may have been irregular elements in protest motives.
11 It is in fact a puzzling result, given the fact that 'petition' has been gradually increasing.
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seemingly denote the viability of protest increase due to a values shift.  Nonetheless, it 
should be recalled that Russian values are rather oriented to Materialism and even having a 
reverse direction to the values shift. This indicates that the Russian state of protest would 
be less apt to be affected by elements explained by the values shift theory.
8.2.3 Further interpretations
What further interpretations can we draw from the analysis? In the USA and Britain, both 
'more say' and 'free speech' are contributors to protest motives. This is especially the case 
with 'lawful demonstration' and 'boycott', which are neither too moderate nor too radical. 
The  interpretation  is  straightforward.  Culturally,  these  Western  people  emphatically 
acknowledge  the  power  of  public  expression  and  contestation,  which  may  involve 
moderate protest  behaviour as a potential option for participation. Moreover, as observed 
in chapter seven, the actual levels of their emphasis of protest are generally higher than in 
the  other  two  non-Western  societies.12 This  seems  to  be  especially  applicable  to 
intermediate styles of protest. These are relatively overt political actions, which go beyond 
behavioural passivity.  With the higher esteem of self-expression and open debates,  the 
Western publics may have the character of what is termed 'assertive masses'.13
For the Japanese case, the source of the protests is biased to 'free speech'. What does 
this signify? Are they willing to participate through overt contestation? Not quite. For this, 
not only the figures of association, but also the descriptive measures are of use for the 
interpretation.  For  protest  orientation,  the  Japanese  case  is  relatively  weaker  than  the 
Western counterparts especially in the proportions of those who have engaged in protest. 
As shown before, there is constantly a lower commitment to the value of 'free speech' on 
the part of Japanese respondents. Furthermore, the regularity of 'discussing politics with 
friends' is clearly lower despite their relatively substantial interest in politics. Generally, 
they are not  much inclined to public expression and debates at  the level  of individual 
12 This is especially so for the ratios of those who 'have done' as a category rather than mean scores for the 
scales, which consist of 'never', 'might' and 'have done'.
13 Hoffman mentions 'assertive masses' on the basis of a quotation from Putnam's work. See Hoffmann, Erik 
P., 'Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics', in Eckstein, Harry et 
al., Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations 
(Lanham/Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 109. For the original quotation of Putnam's 
work, see Putnam, Robert D., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 104 ff.
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attitudes.  Those  who  go  for  protest  could  be  rather  unusual.  It  would  be  simply  that 
protesters  have  a  stronger  commitment  to  'free  speech',  which  is  not  common for  the 
majority. The relative strength of the association between 'free speech' and protest might be 
due to the gap between those who protest and those who do not, and the latter unwilling 
case is a general pattern. Moreover, 'more say' (the inclination to input their demands into 
policy-making)  is  not  particularly  associated  with  protest,  although  their  emphasis  on 
'more say' is generally greater than of 'free speech'. Thus, for the Japanese, participation is 
not  so  connected  with  the  explicit  contention  of  demands  as  an  individual  mode  of 
behaviour. Consequently, protest seems to be hardly regarded as means of participation. In 
addition, neither 'more say' and 'free speech' has a plausible association with 'petition' at 
all. They probably do not perceive 'petition' as relevant in both participation and freedom 
of speech.
For  Russia,  the  result  suggests  that  protest  is  not  about  'free  speech'  but  about 
demands to be heeded. The fact that 'more say' has predominant weight while 'free speech' 
scarcely does so is entirely opposite to the Japanese case. For the possible explanation, it is 
helpful  to  remember  the  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  freedom and 'free  speech'  in  a 
preceding  chapter.  'Free  speech'  has  an  associative or  politically  proactive  connotation 
rather  than  being  passively  free  from  control. As  seen  in  Inglehart's  diagram  of 
Postmaterialist and Materialist items in accordance with Maslow's values hierarchy, 'free 
speech' is in a way a luxurious concern, which is appreciated by those who are not in 
material need such as the matters of economy and security.14 As we have seen, a small 
portion of the Russian respondents have a commitment to 'free speech'. Protest motives 
driven  by  'more  say'  without  'free  speech'  would  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the 
following rationale. Their sense of protest  is more about immediate demands based on 
pragmatic concerns rather than abstract political ideals. Moreover, although 'more say' is 
formally in the category of Postmaterialist values, the item has conceptual leeway where 
Materialistic  motivations  could  be  involved.15 This  denotes  that  'more  say'  as  a  prime 
contributor for protest could be related to Materialist as well as to Postmaterialist motives. 
14 For the diagram, see Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles  
among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42. Dalton 
provides a concise account of this values allocation. See Dalton, Citizen Politics, pp. 78-82.
15 This is partly supported by the fact that the 'more say' item could be influenced by economic changes both 
in short and long term.
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Furthermore,  as  previously  shown in  a  descriptive  measure,  Russian  responses  on  the 
whole are strongly skewed to the Materialist orientation. Thus, Russian protests would be 
more in traditional terms rather than in the sense of demands for participation and free 
expression. Additionally, it  should be noted that in actual proportion, the inclination to 
protest is rather weak. The Russian populace could be pragmatic and perhaps docile in the 
face of the political authorities.
8.3 Evaluating civic protest
8.3.1 A framework 
The examination so far has revealed that in the USA and Britain protest behaviour is apt to 
be related to the attitudes of participation and free speech.  On the other hand, for the 
Japanese and Russian cases, this orientation tends to lag behind. Does this indicate that, as 
hypothesised in the seventh chapter, the two Western nations more emphatically subscribe 
to elements that could be described as 'civic protest'?  This section further explores the 
sphere of protest with this inquiry. Attention is paid to whether there is a strong statistical 
relationship between liberal democratic attitudes and protest. Also, a consideration is made 
in  terms  of  whether  particular  patterns  of  association  exist  in  respective  countries. 
Furthermore, by employing two time points of the World Values Surveys in 1995 (1998 
for  Britain)  and  1999-2002,  we  shall  investigate  whether  such  patterns  indicate 
consistency, implying nationally particular characters.
8.3.1 Variables
Civic  protest  is  assumed  to  involve  liberal  democratic  implications  in  its  behavioural 
motivation or attitudinal background. Due to this, the following investigation expands the 
scope of the analysis to cover more general liberal democratic attitudes. It is intended to 
examine whether these attitudes affect protest  behaviour. Therefore,  protest indexes are 
placed as dependent variables, and liberal democratic outlooks as independent variables. 
The types of independent variables are extended from ones in the restricted models of the 
preceding section (which included only Postmaterialist related variables). Thus, in addition 
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to  'free  speech'  and  'more  say'  variables,  several  other  components  are  incorporated.16 
These variables are  'freedom vs. order', the propensity to 'discuss politics' with friends, 
'political  consciousness'  and  attitudes  to  authority. The  'order  vs.  freedom'  variable  is 
adopted for the purpose of comparison with the 'free speech'  variable.17 The 'authority' 
measure would stand for the extent  of anti-authoritarian attitudes.  This variable could be 
viable  as  one  of  the  measurements  for  liberal  democratic  contexts,  since  it  includes  a 
sentiment of contestation against interventions/compulsions from those in power as well as 
a  sense  of  equality.  The  'political  consciousness'  scale  is  employed,  since  a  political 
concern tapped by the measure would represent a primary motivation for political action.18 
Similarly, the variable of 'discuss politics' would be related to a political concern. But this 
also  could  be  an  initial  behaviour that  may  be  related  to  further  political  behaviour 
including protest. 
As for dependent variables, a general scale of protest is examined as a first step. The 
scale  is  a  measurement  of  the  overall  inclination  to  protest  behaviour.  Subsequently, 
respective protest items are  analysed. For the latter, the focus is set on 'petition', 'lawful 
demonstration' and 'boycott', which are regarded as comparatively mild forms among the 
five protest types. For the disposition of civic protest is supposed to be associated with a 
stable liberal democracy. 
8.3.3 A general scale of protest
This part presents the results of linear (OLS) regression analyses on a general scale of 
protest.  The results are exhibited in Table 8.3. For the American case, liberal democratic 
attitudes are almost fully conducive to a protest inclination in 1995 except for (general) 
freedom. The R square shows that these variables explain approximately twenty percent of 
the  variance,  which  is  rather  high  for  the  influence  of  attitudes  affecting  political 
behaviour.19 For the 1999-2002 survey, although the R square is reduced by half, still they 
16 The Postmaterialist index itself is not utilised in this analysis, whereas the 'more say' and 'free speech' 
variables (which are variants of the Postmaterialist four-item index) are incorporated. This is due to the 
fact that the focus of attention is on liberal democratic attitudes rather than the issue of Postmaterialism 
per se. This also enables to avoid obscuring the objective of the analysis as well as multicollinearity.
17 For discussions in relation to the two variables of freedom, see the sixth chapter.
18 This scale comprises the sum of scores in two variables: (1) the degree to regard 'politics as important' 
and (2) the extent of 'interests in politics'.
19 Generally, the figures of R-squares or correlation coefficients are not at impressive levels when 
examining attitudes. De Vaus writes, '[r]elationships between social science variables—particularly those 
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have  a  similar  influence  on  protest  orientation.  The  Japanese  data  exhibit  a  weaker 
tendency. The results for the two waves are symmetrical, implying coherence in patterns. 
As for Russia, there is also a consistent pattern across the two time points. Attitudes to 
authority and a relative commitment to free speech are not the elements that affect protest. 
For the British case, although only information on the three variables is available, they 
seem to be all relevant to protest inclination. In all the examined societies on the table, 
political  consciousness  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  'discuss  politics'  and  'more say'  have a 
constant influence.
Is protest related to liberal democracy? In the American case, almost full loadings of 
the liberal democratic variables are observed in association with this scale, and the extent 
is higher than for the two non-Western societies. Meanwhile, as mentioned in a previous 
chapter, among the four societies, the scores are higher in the USA and Britain than in 
Japan and Russia. It seems that being liberal or perhaps Western democracy matters to 
people's quality of protest.20
In  addition,  this  general  indicator  of  protest  includes  both  moderate  and  radical 
behaviour, so that the measured attitude could not be immediately regarded as relevant to 
stable democracy. Nonetheless, since the scale is intended to estimate a comprehensive 
protest orientation, it denotes people's inclination to publicly express their claims toward 
political  authority.  In  one  way,  this  attitudinal  direction  shares  commonality  with 
participation due to its intention for their demands to be heeded. Therefore, the outcome 
may well be regarded as presenting a rough picture of the present theme.
8.3.4 Respective items of protest
Given the above results, what if respective items of protest are closely examined in the 
same  context?  This  section  examines  liberal  democratic  attitudes'  connections  with 
'petition', 'demonstration' and 'boycott'. Table 8.4 shows the outcomes.
For the American case, the influence of liberal  democratic variables is salient on 
'demonstration' and 'boycott' in both surveys. Although 'petition' has less effect, there still 
involving attitudes—are normally weaker than social science and popular stereotypes would have us 
believe.' See de Vaus, D. A., Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed. (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 294.
20 In fact, Inglehart shows that the 'signing petition' variable has a strong correlation with the Freedom 
House ratings. See Inglehart, 'How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy', pp. 54; Inglehart and Welzel, 
'Political Culture and Democracy'.
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are associations especially with attitudes on political concerns.21 For the British case, due 
to limitations in the data, no substantive conclusion is possible.22 There is a sign, however, 
that liberal democratic variables affect 'boycott' and perhaps 'demonstration', which could 
be analogous to the USA. As for the Japanese case, the liberal democratic attitudes seem to 
have limited effects. A case comparable to the American one seems to be restricted to 
'demonstration' in 1999-2002. 'Political consciousness' is the only variable that consistently 
influences  the  three  types  of  protest  across  the  two surveys.  The  attitude  to  authority 
appears  to  be  relevant  in  1995,  but  not  in  1999-2002.23 On  the  whole,  the  Japanese 
associations are clearly less impressive than those in the USA.24 In the Russian case, the 
most  notable  outcome  is  that  'free  speech'  does  not  have  a  statistically  significant 
association with any of the protest  items at all  in both of the surveys.25 The 'order vs. 
freedom'  variable  has  no such association,  except  for  'lawful  demonstration'  in  1995.26 
Consistent influence for the overall protest items comes from 'political consciousness' and 
with variability 'more say'.27 'Discuss politics' tends to be influential.28
This  observation  indicates  the  following conclusion,  which  is  largely  compatible 
with the view developed in the earlier sections. The USA has an orientation to what is 
termed  'civic  protest'  where  liberal  democratic  motives  tend  to  be  involved  affecting 
(moderate) protest. Especially, active but not too radical protest types are associated with 
such values in America, denoting a democratically assertive nature of the populace. There 
is a sign, albeit  not for certain, that this may be potentially the case with Britain. The 
Japanese case shows a less tendency to that effect.  The Russian motivation for protest 
21 For the 1995 survey of the American case, 'order vs. freedom' is not significantly related to any of the 
three protests. Neither do the 'authority' variable for 'petition'. For the 1999-2002 survey, 'petition' does 
not appear to be connected with 'more say' or 'free speech'. The 'authority' variable seems to have 
withdrawn the influence from 1995 to 1999-2002.
22 In Britain, for 'petition' in 1998, 'more say' and 'discuss politics' are conducive, while 'free speech' and 
'authority' are not. For 1999-2002, the attitude to authority and 'political consciousness' has viable 
influence on the three types of protest.
23 Strangely, for Japan, those who regard authority as 'good' are more positive to 'lawful demonstration' than 
those who 'do not mind' authority.
24 For the Japanese case, none of the three protests is connected with 'order vs. freedom' and 'discuss 
politics' in 1995. 'Discuss politics' does so for 'petition' and 'demonstration' in the later survey (where 
'order vs. freedom' is not available).
25 This is the case with all the five types of protest.
26 Attitudes to authority appear to be only relevant with 'boycott' and 'demonstration' in 1995. Nonetheless, 
as opposite to a liberal democratic rationale, those with a pro-authority stance seems to be more positive 
to 'demonstration' (in the 1995 survey), which is similar to Japan.
27 There is, however, no statistically significant influence of 'more say' on 'demonstration' in 1999-2002.
28 This excludes 'boycott' (as well as 'strike' and 'occupying buildings') in 1999-2002.
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stems from interest in politics and demands on government. Nonetheless, the matter of 
proactive freedom does not seem to have relevance to protestation.29 It may be possible 
that their political interests are related to economic and other pragmatic rationales. If this 
assumption is made, it can be inferred that the Russian motives for protest tend to be based 
on direct concern for material needs rather than abstract principles of democratic liberty.
8.4 Views of governance
8.4.1 A framework
In addition to the aspect of protest, this section studies views of governance as another 
political dimension. Attention is directed towards respondents' views to two themes: non-
democratic rule and the efficacy of democracy. An underlying aim is to probe attitudes to 
democracy.30 The scale on the evaluation of non-democratic rule can reflect the extent of 
respondents'  attitudinal  distance  from  (or  closeness  to)  agreement  with  a  democratic 
regime.  The  measure of  the  efficacy  of  democracy,  on  the  other  hand,  involves  more 
qualitative connotations of the system per se. For it extracts the degrees of either positive 
or negative stances towards democracy in the context of performance. With this binary 
approach, views of governance are examined in terms of their associations with liberal 
democratic attitudes. Do values affect regime support?
8.4.2 Scales
Before going into the analysis, let us review the components of the two types of scales. 
The index of non-democratic rule comprises four original variables, which are based on 
questions on several political variables. The items are:
(1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
(2) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country.
29 For the discussion on 'proactive' freedom, see the sixth chapter.
30 For a cross-national research on political support in relation to democracy, see Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 
'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Pippa Norris ed., Critical Citizens:  
Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31-56.
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(3) Having the army rule.
(4) Having a democratic political system.
Respondents are asked to choose either 'very good', 'fairly good', 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. 
The scores of these items are added together in a manner to express the degree of support 
for  non-democratic  regimes.31 In  one  way,  from the  reverse  direction,  it  measures  the 
strength of aversion to such rules. The full version of this scale is named 'non-democratic 
rule (A)'. There is another version that does not incorporate the item of '(4) a democratic 
political system', which is numbered (B). This is in order to include the British case into 
the comparison.32
The measure of the efficacy of democracy is composed of four variables in relation 
to the performance of a democratic system. The questions measure respondents' extents of 
agreement with the following items:
(5) In democracy, the economic system runs badly.
(6) Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling.
(7) Democracies are not good at maintaining order.
(8) Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.
Respondents  are  asked  to  select  either  'strongly  agree',  'agree',  'disagree'  or  'strongly 
disagree'. An index is created with the sum of their scores in a direction to express the level 
of support for the system's performance. This is labelled the 'efficacy of democracy'.
Thus,  these  scales  can  measure  an  overall  evaluation  as  regards  two  aspects  of 
governance. These criteria are more advantageous than examining the detailed individual 
variables per se. General scales can more acutely tap the binary dimensions of governance. 
For the output of the created scale tends to have the cumulation of a common essence 
31 For methods to build a scale based on multiple variables, see de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 4th 
ed., pp. 249-275; Bryman, Alan and Duncan Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for 
Windows: A Guide for Social Scientists (London/New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 50-53; de Vaus, 
David, Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2002), pp. 117-146; de Vaus, David, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 180-199. For transforming data by SPSS, see Norušis, Marija J., SPSS® 10.0 
Guide to Data Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 525-545.
32 The British data in 1998 does not include the item (4).
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shared by the four basic variables.33 This is especially so due to the fact that the scale has a 
wider range of scores than ones in the original four measures (which consist of only four 
ordinal  values).34 Another  advantage  is  that  a  numerically  larger  range  enables  the 
researcher to employ a linear (OLS) regression analysis.35
8.4.3 Analysis
8.4.3.1 Descriptive outputs
Table 8.5 presents the estimation of national average scores (means) of the scales. As for 
the level of support for non-democratic rule, in both (A) and (B) Russia holds the highest 
scores across the two surveys. Moreover, there is a clear gap between Russia and the other 
three societies. A similar division also exists in the evaluation of the efficacy of democracy 
across the two time points. Russia shows notably lower scores than the others. It seems that 
the Russian populace particularly hold a weaker endorsement of democracy.36
Considering the results, a question arises: are such divisions related to gaps in the 
degrees of emphasis on liberal democratic values between these nations? The examination 
has  so  far  revealed  that  Postmaterialist  values  and  the  emphasis  on  free  speech  and 
participation  are  less  held  by  Russian  respondents  than  their  American  and  British 
counterparts (with the Japanese being largely in the middle). This somehow coincides with 
the gap in views of governance. Analogous divisions exist  in other attitudinal spheres. 
Also,  some of  the values items hold certain  associations  with liberal  democracy.37 Do 
liberal  democratic  attitudes  make  a  difference  to  the  support  of  democracy  in  theses 
societies, and in what ways? In this inquiry, the following part presents multiple regression 
analyses. The two scales on governance are located as dependent variables whereas liberal 
33 The summation would create a scale that holds a roughly similar character to one based on a principal 
component analysis of four variables (where common factors of the variables are extracted).
34 The four ordinal values are, for instance, 'very good' (= 3), 'fairly good' (= 2), 'fairly bad' (= 1) and 'very 
bad' (= 0). This could be applied to response items on the degree of agreement or disagreement. It should 
be noted that the values can be different from this order depending on the directions of variables.
35 Although the scores are not precisely continuous variables, it may well be regarded as having an 
analogous property, which would be justified for using the OLS regression as done conventionally in 
social research. For this rationale, see de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed., pp. 313-314, 329.
36 As for the USA, Britain and Japan, there is a fluctuation in their order for the scores of the 'non-
democratic rule' between the two surveys. In the 1995-98 survey, the USA is the least inclined to a non-
democratic support. In the 1999-2002 survey, America is the most oriented to such a support among the 
three societies. At any rate, their levels are not comparable to that of Russia.
37 For instance, it has been observed that there are correlations between the Freedom House ratings and 
variables such as the 'free speech', 'more say', 'petition' and 'boycott'.
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democratic attitudes are arranged as independent variables.
8.4.3.2 Non-democratic rule
Given the patterns of the Russo-Western gap, one might initially hypothesise that Western 
societies would hold stronger associations between the liberal  democratic  attitudes and 
views  of  governance  than  Russia.  The  following  outcome,  however,  presents  a  more 
complex picture, which requires further explanation. For the case of non-democratic rule 
(A), the results are shown in table 8.6. 
Complexity?
There are apparent changes in outputs between the two waves of the World Values Survey. 
In  1995,  whereas  the  Russian  case  indicates  the  relatively  overt  influence  from  the 
emphasis on participation and free speech on the negative view of non-democratic rule, 
unexpectedly for the USA most of their influence has no statistical significance.38 This 
could be contrary to the initial  hypothesis. Nonetheless, this reverses in the 1999-2002 
wave. The American case exhibits the presence of such associations (combined with the 
influence of 'political consciousness' and 'discuss politics'), while in the Russian case the 
statistical relationship is close to nil. This latter survey conforms to the hypothesis.
The USA
The outcome in  the 1995 survey is  in fact  puzzling,  given the fact  that  the American 
respondents largely hold an inclination to liberal democratic values as well as support for a 
democratic regime. Has the emphasis of free speech and participation nothing to do with 
the  regime  evaluation  in  the  USA  at  the  earlier  time  point?  In  fact,  they  do  have 
associations. This is revealed by examining the data more closely. For the USA, when 
'discuss politics' and 'political consciousness' (and others) are removed from the regression 
model, leaving only 'free speech' and 'more say' as independent variables, the coefficients 
of  'free  speech'  and  'more  say'  show  statistically  significant  associations.39 There  are 
38 'More say: first choice' is only item modestly significant for the USA in 1995.
39 This indicates that, in the regression model with the full loadings of the independent variables, the 
variables of free speech and participation are controlled for by the other independent variables including 
'discuss politics' and 'political consciousness'.
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overlaps  in  influence  on  regime  evaluation  between  the  former  ('discuss  politics'  and 
'political  consciousness') and the latter ('free speech'  and 'more say').  'Free speech'  and 
'more say' are deeply connected with political awareness and expression, and they together 
affect  the  evaluation  of  non-democratic  rule.  Meanwhile,  the  clear  influence  of 
participation and free speech items in the 1999-2002 wave would be the result of their 
enhanced  presence.  In  the  latter  survey,  these  four  items  independently affect  regime 
evaluation.40
Given these results, a question arises: why is influence of 'more say' and 'free speech' 
weaker in 1995? One rationale could be that low American support for non-democracy 
(thus,  their  high  support  for  democracy)  in  1995  is  probably  very  general no  matter 
whether one is committed to a sense of participation and free speech. This corresponds to 
the output in table 8.5, which shows that the USA held a minimal endorsement of non-
democratic rule in 1995 survey.  When the aversion to non-democracy became slightly 
weaker in the later survey, the associations with 'free speech' and 'more say' were retrieved. 
Another rationale could be that the American negation of non-democratic rule is mainly a 
practical matter of whether one is politically aware and informed. It should be noted that 
'political consciousness' has a constant influence in the USA across the two time points. On 
the  other  hand,  the  'more  say'  and  'free  speech'  items  are  concerned  with  democratic 
principles. America has a stable established democratic system, so that the judgement of 
non-democratic  rule  in  relation  to  such  principles  would  not  be  domestically  urgent. 
Practically,  those  politically  concerned  are  more  regularly  conscious  of  such  issues  as 
democracy and authoritarianism. This may be why the variables of 'more say' and 'free 
speech'  have  a  relatively  weaker  connection  with  the  scale  on  the  evaluation  of  non-
democratic rule in 1995. Nonetheless, the items of free speech and participation have a 
clear association in 1999-2002. This suggests that, despite fluctuations, American citizens 
hold  a basic potential to relate these liberal democratic principles to regime evaluation, 
whereas their political awareness is a major motive for such a judgement. Meanwhile, the 
40 One might criticise that the influence of the 'free speech' and 'more say' items are spurious in 1995, given 
the fact that they lose significant associations when they are controlled for by the variables of 'discuss 
politics' and 'political consciousness' (and others). But this can not explain why such associations clearly 
emerge in the subsequent survey. Moreover, these two items have a certain compatibility with 'political 
consciousness' and 'discuss politics' in their characters. Since they do not qualitatively exclude with each 
other, it would be reasonable that the effects of the 'free speech' and 'more say are incorporated in that of 
the other two variables in the 1995 survey.
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'discuss politics' has a constant influence on regime judgement.41 The American inclination 
to  public  debates  and  individual  self-expression  could  be  related  to  the  notion  of 
democracy.42 In addition, attitudes to authority do not seem to have much influence on the 
regime evaluation.
Consequently, in the USA, the rejection of non-democratic rule is related to political 
awareness and expression as well as free speech and participatory attitudes. On the whole, 
the initial  hypothesis  on the part  of America is largely confirmed. For Americans,  the 
judgement of non-democracy (vis-à-vis democracy) seems to be concerned with an image 
that informed free individuals get involved in open debates. Democracy in America may 
be one where individuals and the power of language matter.
Russia
For the Russian case, in 1995 there were significant associations between the rejection of 
non-democratic  rule  and  an  emphasis  on  'free  speech'  and  'more  say'  in  government. 
Nonetheless, there is a drastic withdrawal of the liberal democratic rationales from 1995 to 
1999-2002. Why is there such an acute change? One reason could be that even those who 
emphasise  free  speech  and  participation  may  have  become  more  amenable  to  non-
democratic governance in the latter survey.43 Around the time of 1995 survey, for those 
who emphasise free speech and participation, a strong leadership, army rule and expert rule 
may have been perceived as having the potential  to undermine democratic ideals. This 
possibly  was  combined  with  concern  about  the  nation's  political  situation.44 These 
41 It is interesting to notice that for the 1995 survey when 'order vs. freedom' is removed from the first US 
model, it inflates the value of the influence of 'discuss politics' in the second model. This denotes that 
freedom in relation to democracy might be perceived in the context of free debates.
42 But why does the 'free speech' item affect weakly in 1995 whereas 'discuss politics' hold clear influence? 
The 'discuss politics' is more concerned with daily, concrete and personal matter of 'free speech'. In the 
USA the freedom of speech is extensively guaranteed, so that domestically there is much less threat in its 
pursuit. The less sense of urgency for its protection may also contribute to associating democracy with 
immediate sense of free speech as denoted by 'discuss politics' rather than the abstract notion of 'free 
speech' per se. More association with 'free speech' items in the 1999-2002 would be simply the enhanced 
presence of the rationale on free speech, which is extended from a concrete sense of free speech to 
abstract principles.
43 It also should be noted that the figures of R square in the Russian case tend to be smaller than the others.
44 For the related situations in Russia, see for example, White, Stephen, Russia's New Politics: the 
Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 8, pp. 255-
292. For free speech and media, see Oates, Sarah, 'Media and Political Communication', in Stephen 
White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa, eds., Developments in Russian Politics 6,  (Basingstoke/New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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perceptions may have driven them to give negative evaluations of non-democratic rule.45 In 
that sense, the withdrawal of the associations in the latter survey is the most alarming. For 
the  logic  of  'free  speech'  and  'more  say'  may  have  begun  to  lack  a  connection  with 
democratic accountability.46 This could indicate the rise of a potential that could allow the 
rationale  of  'delegative'  or  'managed'  democracy  in  Russia.47 Freedom  of  speech, 
participation and other liberal democratic rationales may have lost their ability to check 
authoritarian rule.
Despite the withdrawal of the liberal democratic rationale in Russia, the appreciation 
of  (general)  freedom  seems  to  have  a  consistent  presence.  Nonetheless,  it  should  be 
recalled that freedom valued there does not  necessarily involve politically proactive or 
associative  connotations  represented  by  free  speech,  which  is  unlike  the  Western 
counterparts. Thus, those who less support non-democratic rule tend to have an orientation 
to freedom from control rather than freedom to be involved. The issue of liberty would be 
consistently relevant to the judgement of non-democracy. This freedom, however, seems to 
be likely to be private, namely, politically passive freedom.48 
Japan
For the Japanese case, the elements that consistently have an impact on the rejection of 
non-democratic  governance  are  political  consciousness  and  anti-authoritarian  sentiment 
over the two waves. The issue of participation does not seem to have relevance to that 
effect.  As  for  liberty,  only  in  1999-2002,  the  appreciation  of  free  speech  exhibited  a 
modest  influence.49 For  the  Japanese,  the  judgement  of  non-democratic  rule  may  not 
45 Nonetheless, it should be recalled that the actual proportions of commitment to participation and free 
speech were rather small. Therefore, the overall orientation was less negative to non-democratic rule and 
has a weaker emphasis on the two items than in the USA, Britain and Japan. Probably, in 1995, there was 
a substantial gap in the view of non-democratic rule between those who were attached to participation and 
free speech and those who were not. This probably has resulted in the higher coefficients of association.
46 The strong leadership, expert rule and army rule (as components of the non-democratic rule scale) have 
qualities that run counter to the logic of democratic accountability.
47 For the notions of 'delegative' and 'managed' democracies, see for instance, O'Donnell, Guillermo, 
'Delegative Democracy' Journal of Democracy, 5:1 (January 1994), pp. 55-69; Sakwa, Richard, 'Politics 
in Russia', in White, Gitelman and Sakwa eds., Developments in Russian Politics 6, ch. 1, pp. 1-17.
48 This is supported by the fact that the impact of 'free speech' fluctuates between the two surveys, while the 
(general) freedom's influence persists being independent of the former. This suggests the regularity of 
influence from the passive part of freedom, when the impact of politically proactive freedom is excluded.
49 Inglehart's democracy/autocracy index, on the other hand, shows the influence of attitude in favour of 
(general) freedom rather than order.
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involve the issue of participation. Concern for liberty may be related to that evaluation. 
However, it should be recalled that, in actual proportions, both (general) freedom and free 
speech tend to receive weaker priority  vis-à-vis securing the public order.50 In practice, 
there could be the potential that a concern for freedom has little strength for opposing non-
democratic  rule.  Anti-authoritarianism seems to  be  a  major  rationale  conducive  to  the 
judgement  of  regimes.  Since this  is  not found in  any of  the other three societies,  this 
tendency would be a particular feature of the Japanese regime evaluation. 
Britain
For comparative reasons to include the British case, let us examine non-democratic rule 
(B), which is shown in table 8.7.51 Generally, the trend of the scale (B) is similar to that of 
(A). For the British case, as far as the available variables are concerned, liberal democratic 
attitudes are generally conducive to the rejection of non-democratic regimes in the earlier 
survey, except for attitudes to authority. This is analogous to the tendency of the USA 
(especially in 1999-2002). The later survey includes a limited set of variables, so that a 
clear evaluation is not possible.52 Meanwhile, in both of the surveys, anti-authoritarianism 
does not seem to have an influence on regime evaluation, which again corresponds to the 
result for the USA.
8.4.3.3 Efficacy of democracy
The  scale  on  the  efficacy  of  democracy  measures  the  respondents'  evaluation  of  the 
performance of democratic regimes.53 On the whole, although the results for the scale have 
50 This could be associated with the tendency argued in 'Asian values' discourses, for instance, see L. Pye 
with M. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA/London: 
Belknap Press, 1985). Maruyama also connotes Japanese individual orientation to sub-merge larger social 
(and political) contexts. See Maruyama, Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou, Zoho-ban, [Thought 
and Behaviour of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); Maruyama, Masao 
(Morris, Ivan ed.), Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London/New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963). Lipset point outs Japanese proneness to collectivity. See Lipset, Seymour 
Martin, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York/London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1996).
51 This excludes a question item on 'democratic system', so that the indicator consists of the summation of 
values of 'strong leader', 'expert' and 'army rule' variables.
52 An only noticeable point is that among the three available variables, 'political consciousness' has an 
association.
53 It should be noted that largely the directions of measurement are opposite between the two scales in terms 
of the pro and con of democracy. Therefore, the directions of coefficients (regarding either positive or 
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a certain similarity to the ones in the examination above, there are different details. The 
outcomes are shown in table 8.8.
For the relative commitment to participation and free speech, the variables do not 
seem to have significant effects on the view of democracy's efficacy in the USA, whereas 
they  do  in  Russia.  This  is  the  case  in  both  the  surveys  of  1995-98  and  1999-2002. 
Although this might be also puzzling in the light  of the generally lower evaluation of 
efficacy and liberal democratic attitudes in Russia than America, the reason for this could 
be understood in a framework similar to some of the above rationales. American support 
for  democratic  efficacy  is  probably  very  common regardless  of  the  emphasis  on 
participation and free speech. Another point is that  political consciousness and 'discuss 
politics' have a consistent association in America, while there is much less indication to 
that effect in Russia (with only a small influence of political consciousness in the latter 
survey). Consequently, for the USA, those who are especially in favour of the efficacy of 
democracy  are  more  politically  aware  and  proactive  in  public  debates.  In  Russia  by 
contrast, for those with liberal democratic attitudes, approval of democracy is a matter of 
principle due to its domestically urgent nature. Yet, despite the relative strength of the 
association in the Russian case, it should be recalled that there is an overall weakness in 
support for both the principle and performance of democratic rule  per se. For those who 
emphasise free speech and participation in Russia, democracy tends to be perceived as 
viable  in  its  performance.  Nonetheless,  they  are  likely  to  be  a  smaller  portion  of 
respondents than in the USA. 
For Japan, 'free speech' and 'more say' have a weak presence in the figures (with only 
'free  speech'  representing  a  modest  source  of  support  for  efficacy).  Attitudes  against 
authority are more likely to contribute to views favourable to democracy's performance as 
shown in both waves of the surveys. This has an identical direction with the output of the 
non-democratic rule scale.
In  fact,  attitudes  to  authority  are  related  to  the  evaluation  of  democracy's 
effectiveness  for  all  three  societies  in  the  1995  survey.  Nonetheless,  whereas  anti-
authoritarian sentiment is conducive to support for democracy's effectiveness in America 
and Japan, the Russian case shows that a pro-authority stance is more contributive to such 
negative) need to be interpreted in this context.
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support.  There might be different rationales behind this matter  in Russia. For the later 
survey, however, the view of authority does not have a statistically significant outcome for 
the American and Russian data. The survey suggests the presence of the impact for the 
British and Japanese  cases.  The  British  case  also  shows that  a  pro-authority  stance  is 
conducive. In addition, the issue of (general) freedom in relation to order seems to have 
relevance in the USA, Russia and Japan, although the data are only available for Russia in 
the 1999-2002 survey.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the three themes through multivariate analyses. The first two 
themes are on the matter of protest. We first of all discussed the impact of Postmaterialist 
values on protest behaviour in the context of values shift versus cultural particularity. The 
second part evaluated the quality of protest in the four societies with reference to 'civic 
protest'. Thereafter, the third theme examined views of governance and their associations 
with liberal democratic attitudes.
8.5.1 Postmaterialist effect, civic protest and democracy
The theory of values shift posits that transformation of values enhances moderate protest 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the result indicates that there is a national difference in the forms 
of influence. This provides a revised alternative to the hypothesis. Postmaterialist values 
do not evenly influence protest orientations in Japan and Russia. Therefore, a fully-fledged 
version of the hypothesis is implausible, being susceptible to each of their own national 
traits.  On the other hand, the Postmaterialist  shift could affect protest  in the USA and 
Britain. For these values tend to be evenly and coherently associated with political actions 
among their citizens, whereby the initial presumption could be endorsed.
It  can be argued that the two Western nations enjoy cultural  advantages in these 
associations.  Especially,  such  statistical  relationships  are  significant  for  'lawful 
demonstration' and 'boycott', which would be active but not so radical political actions. 
Also, their citizens' orientation to such protest is comparatively greater. Their perception of 
protest seems to have a participatory  connotation with the image of self-expression and 
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public  discussion.  Therefore,  they  may well  be  described as  having  the  predisposition 
towards  'assertive  masses'.  They  tend  to  possess  a  critical  tendency  towards  political 
authorities  while  holding  civic  rationales.  Meanwhile,  whereas  Japanese  protest 
orientations  are  partially  affected  by  Postmaterialist  related  variables,  their  actual 
inclination to protest as well as general public expression lag behind those of their Western 
counterparts.  The  result  indicates  that  the  Japanese  populace  hardly  regard  temperate 
protest as a mode of participation. For Russia, protest does not seem to be concerned with 
free speech but with their demand to be heeded. Their perception of protest appears to be 
connected with immediate pragmatic needs rather than liberal political ideals. Given the 
prevalence of Materialist orientations in Russia, their protest behaviour may also be similar 
in its motivation. Additionally, it should be noted that there could be the influence of post-
Soviet  mobilisation for  ritualistic  pro-regime demonstrations.  On the  whole,  given  the 
relative weakness in their level of protest inclination, Russian citizens may be depicted as 
holding rather a pragmatic and perhaps docile character in the face of political authorities.
The  above  outcome as  regards  the  Western  cases  relates  to  the  notion  of  'civic 
protest'.  Further examination revealed that  the USA has an orientation to 'civic protest' 
where liberal  democratic motives tend to evenly affect moderate styles of protest.  The 
Japanese case seems to be less orientated to it. The Russian motivation for protest stems 
from interest in politics and demands on government. But it may be possible that Russian 
motives  for  protest  tend  to  be  based  on  direct  concern  for  material  needs  rather  than 
abstract  principles  of  democratic  liberty.  In  that  sense,  Russian  protest  would  be  less 
related to civic protest than the American one.
What  are  the  implications  of  these  results?  For  American  and  perhaps  British 
societies, their mass orientations to civic protest imply the assertive nature of the people 
towards political authorities. On the other hand, individual citizens in Japan and Russia 
may have comparatively weaker inclinations to such a tendency. These can have different 
consequences in the forms of democracy or governance in terms of inter-relations between 
people  and  government.  Hoffman  notes,  'according  to  congruence  theorists,  the 
combination of authoritarian elites and docile masses is most conducive to hierarchical or 
nondemocratic forms of stability. And the combination of responsive leaders and assertive 
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masses  is  most  conducive  to  horizontal  or  democratic  forms  of  stability.'54 If  this  is 
assumed to be the case, whether the masses are docile or assertive would be a crucial 
element for political structures and stability. The people's state in this respect can greatly 
matter to the likely form of governance. Assertive masses are, according to this scenario, 
suitable to and thus apt to reinforce democratic rule. 
Western  societies  are  well  placed  in  this  respect.  Their  assertiveness  may  even 
enhance the responsiveness of political elites. Civic protest is not only a temporary upsurge 
of people's demands. But also, it could be a sign of a societal capacity to generate regular 
'cognitive pressure' to check government and ensure its accountability to citizens.55 It could 
be the reflection of informal strength in their attitudinal orientation, which is compatible 
with responsive democracy.
The Japanese case seems to be restricted. Despite its increasing similarity to Western 
cases on the surface, there still is the persistence of peculiarities. It shows weakness in 
mass assertiveness at the individual level. This in turn may emerge as a predisposition that 
would not enhance governmental responsiveness. Democracy in their sense may be less 
conceived as a system in which the people 'own' the government. Accordingly, there may 
be less sense that they should be able to demand and participate on the basis of free public 
expression.56
The Russian case could be another which is located in a disadvantageous position. 
The  lower  inclination  to  moderate  protest  connotes  the  rather  docile  character  of  the 
citizens  in  relation  to  the  government.  This  may  allow or  even  induce  a  potential  of 
'hierarchical  or  nondemocratic forms  of  stability'  in  Hoffman's  terms.  The  prevalent 
rationale for protest would not be about participation and free expression, but more about 
the immediate pragmatic needs or the custom of mobilisation due to the Soviet heritage. 
An abstract  concern for political rights may be perceived as still  an indulgence. These 
54 Hoffmann., 'Democratic Theories and Authority Patterns in Contemporary Russian Politics', p. 109.
55 For this account of individual attitudes, 'individualised' and 'democratised' categories might have similar 
traits in Maruyama's differentiation of individual typology in political contexts. See Maruyama, Masao, 
'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in Marius B. Jansen ed., 
Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 
pp. 489-531.
56 This embedded political passivity would be related to Maruyama's consistent concern on the elements of 
Japanese political culture disadvantageous to democratic practices, which are in effect affected by its 
traditional cultural heritages. See Maruyama (Morris, ed.), Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese 
Politics; Maruyama, Gendai Seiji no Shisou to Koudou [Thought and Behaviour of Modern Politics].
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together could have different consequences in the forms and functions of governance as 
compared with ones in the West.
8.5.2 Views of governance
As for the examination of the two scales on views of governance, their descriptive outputs 
indicate that Russian citizens particularly show weaker support for democracy than those 
in the USA, Britain and Japan. Also, it  is recalled that there is a greater inclination to 
attitudes related to liberal democratic outlooks in the two Western nations than in Russia. 
Due to this, the initial hypothesis is that Russia would show fewer associations between 
liberal democratic attitudes and views of governance than the Western counterparts.
In spite of this, the results at face value show puzzling outputs for the USA and Russia. In 
some cases, the variables of  'more say' and 'free speech' showed a significant association 
in  the  Russian  case,  which  is  rather  little  indicated  in  the  American  case.  In  others, 
America is stronger in these associations than Russia. Nonetheless, a careful interpretation 
has revealed that, in essence, the underlying contexts are consistent with the descriptive 
outcomes attained previously: the USA is inclined to democratic governance and liberal 
democratic values, whereas on the whole Russia has considerable hesitancy in support for 
both of them. 
There seems to be a perception gap due to circumstantial differences between the 
two societies, which has resulted in the seemingly  contradictory figures for association. 
For the USA, support for democracy might be too common to have clear associational 
figures with 'free speech' and 'more say' especially for the evaluation of non-democratic 
rule in the 1995-98 survey. In contrast, the overall weakness of Russian appreciation of 
liberal democracy seems to have led to the relative salience of those committed to such 
emphases, which in turn has emerged as a higher figure of associations in some respects.
A gap in the levels of domestic urgency in liberal democratic practices also seems to 
be conducive to asymmetrical results. For the American public, the view of governance is 
more  connected  with  political  awareness  and  practical  public  self-expression  than 
commitments  to  abstract  principles  per  se.  For  Russia,  evaluations  of  regime  and 
democratic performance are related to the extent of emphasis  on the principles of free 
speech and participation probably due to the relative urgency of that matter.  However, 
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overall hesitancy in support for both liberal democratic attitudes and governance in Russia 
should be considered for its translation. 
As a particular case, it is alarming that there is a clear withdrawal in the Russian 
figures of the associations from 1995 to 1999-2002 in relation to the judgment of non-
democracy. For it can run counter to the support of democratic governance. At this point, 
there is an indication that liberal democratic attitudes hardly check authoritarian rule in 
Russia.
For the Japanese case, the major influence on views of governance is the attitude to 
authority, and to some extent political awareness. The strong relevance of the authority 
variable is peculiar among the four societies. Mostly, the matters of participation and free 
speech seem to be of relatively little relevance to regime support. For the British case, the 
conclusion is restricted given the limited data. Within the restricted arrangement, however, 
there is a sign that the liberal democratic attitudes are fairly conducive to the judgement of 
non-democratic regimes in the earlier survey, excluding attitudes to authority. Meanwhile, 
the matter of authority seems to be relevant in the case of the efficacy of democracy.
8.5.3 Civic culture?
After all, for both realms of protest and views of governance, in the USA, there seems to 
be an inclination to participatory democracy and related attitudes, where those who are 
politically aware would get involved while discussing views openly. This has symmetry 
with the account of 'civic culture' by Almond and Verba.57 For American citizens, protest is 
likely to connote a sense of 'civic protest', and their democracy entails a greater notion of 
self-expression  which  corresponds  with  their  assertive  mass  character.  This  may  have 
encouraged governmental responsiveness and public accountability in this Western nation. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  seems  to  be  a  certain  weakness  to  this  effect  in  Japanese 
individual attitudes. The Russian case would be more distinct, holding a weaker sense of 
participatory democracy and perhaps public accountability in comparison to its Western 
counterpart.58 This may have been furthered at the time of the later survey. In Russia, there 
57 See Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba eds., The 
Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
58 Bova explores current Russian political culture using a similar perspective. See Bova, Russell, 
'Democracy and Russian Political Culture', in Russell Bova ed., Russia and Western Civilization:  
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seem  to  be  substantial  elements  of  being  permissive  to  'delegative'  or  'managed' 
democracy. 
Cultural and Historical Encounters (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-276.
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Figure  8.1  The  sequence  of  effects  in  a  values  shift  theory  versus  cultural 
particularity
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Values Shift Political Effect
Postmaterialist 
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(Self-expression 
Values)
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Table 8.1 Protest each item and postmaterialist index 
Ordered logit regression
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USA Postmaterialist 
DV 4-item index (IV) 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002
 Petition Mixed -- .15 .50** -.16
Postmaterialist -- .57** .88*** .02
Lawful Mixed -- .57*** .56*** .19
Demonstration Postmaterialist -- 1.22*** 1.33*** .96***
Boycott Mixed -- .46*** .50** .19
Postmaterialist -- 1.10*** 1.23*** .78***
Britain Postmaterialist 
DV 4-item index (IV) 1981 1990 1998 1999-2002
 Petition Mixed .10 .46** .28 --
Postmaterialist .40 .86*** .45* --
Lawful Mixed .27 .50***. -- --
Demonstration Postmaterialist 1.39*** 1.38*** -- --
Boycott Mixed .36* .28* -- --
Postmaterialist 1.28*** 1.08*** -- --
Japan Postmaterialist 
DV 4-item index (IV) 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002
 Petition Mixed .12 .07 .07 -.01
Postmaterialist -.12 .36 .06 .42
Lawful Mixed .68*** .12 .54** .38*
Demonstration Postmaterialist 1.19*** .88** 1.01*** 1.09***
Boycott Mixed .50** .32 .28 .25
Postmaterialist .61 .76* .73* .77**
Russia Postmaterialist 
DV 4-item index (IV) 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002
 Petition Mixed -- .49*** .45***. .51***
Postmaterialist -- .61** .89* .47
Lawful Mixed -- .14 .37*** .23**
Demonstration Postmaterialist -- .06 .25 .30
Boycott Mixed -- .55*** .46*** .55***
Postmaterialist -- .79*** .90* 1.08**
Notes: 
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) Coefficients without ' * ' are 'not significant'. 
(3) Coefficients are presented in logit.
(4) Coefficients are rounded.
(5) Reference category: 'materialist'.
(6) IV: independent variables; DV: dependent variables.
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Table 8.2 Protest each item and 'free speech'  and 'more say'
Ordered logit regression    
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USA Britain
DV IV Choice 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002 DV IV Choice 1981 1990 1998 1999-2002
More Say -- .29* .52** .13 More Say .02 .39* .09 --
Petition -- .50*** .44** .23 Petition .11 .55*** .35* --
Free Speech -- .14 .38** -.16 Free Speech .18 .35* .13 --
-- .22 .45** .08 .45* .45* .28 --
More Say -- .67*** .41** .39** More Say .44** .52*** -- --
Lawful -- .73*** .70*** .77*** Lawful .68*** .78*** -- --
Demonstration Free Speech -- .39** .70*** .39** Demonstration Free Speech .53*** .59*** -- --
-- .71*** .90*** .71*** 1.00*** .90*** -- --
More Say -- .58*** .57*** .26 More Say .49** .49*** -- --
Boycott -- .74*** .76*** .55*** Boycott .61*** .69*** -- --
Free Speech -- .28* .47*** .31* Free Speech .49** .40** -- --
-- .65*** .76*** .68*** .95*** .62*** -- --
Japan Russia
DV IV Choice 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002 DV IV Choice 1981 1990 1995 1999-2002
More Say .14 .20 .09 .13 More Say -- .43*** .39*** .39***
Petition -.10 .10 .07 -.01 Petition -- .46*** .60*** .65***
Free Speech -.03 -.08 -.03 .32 Free Speech -- .33* .27 .36
.24 .51 .04 .37 -- .11 .60 -.26
More Say .19 .23 .26 .32 More Say -- .18 .25* .20*
Lawful .75*** -.02 .52** .41** Lawful -- .02 .48*** .28**
Demonstration Free Speech .73*** .17 .53** .53** Demonstration Free Speech -- .08 .16 .20
1.13*** 1.30*** .89** 1.16*** -- .08 .42 -.29
More Say .22 .38 .25 .22 More Say -- .38** .36** .42***
Boycott .48* .13 .34 .27 Boycott -- .59*** .72*** .73***
Free Speech .41* .11 .22 .38 Free Speech -- .37* .28 .40
.73* 1.07** .74* .92** -- .48 .01 .50
Notes: 
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) Coefficients without ' * ' are 'not significant'. 
(3) Coefficients are presented in logit.
(4) Coefficients are rounded.
(5) Reference category: 'not chosen'.
(6) IV: independent variables; DV: dependent variables.
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2nd 2nd
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Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Table 8.3 Protest (general scale) and liberal democratic attitudes
Linear regression
1995-1998
Independent Variables USA Britain Japan Russia Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice .160*** -- .157** .116*** MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice .089** -- .075 ns .066*
Free Speech 1st Choice .147*** -- .085* .024 ns FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice .102*** -- .041 ns .036 ns
Order vs. Freedom -.005 ns -- -.010 ns .063*
Discuss Politics: Frequently .200*** -- .019 ns .204*** DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally .191*** -- .100* .173***
Political Consciousness .214*** -- .245*** .133***
Authority: Good -.269*** -- -.046 ns -.007 ns Auth: Bad
Authority: Don't mind -.163** -- -.237*** -.057 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .205 -- .151 .093
1999-2002
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Russia
More Say 1st Choice .157*** -- -- .102* -- .126*** .125*** --
More Say 2nd Choice .080* -- -- .061 ns -- .038 ns .059* --
Free Speech 1st Choice .140*** -- -- .109** -- .009 ns .009 ns --
Free Speech 2nd Choice .052 ns -- -- .040 ns -- .047 ns .042 ns --
Order vs. Freedom -- -- -- -- -- .009 ns -- --
Discuss Politics: Frequently .159*** .167*** .127** .055 ns .079 ns .086* .095** .095**
Discuss Politics: Occasionally .076* .077* .070 ns .179*** .169*** .037 ns .032 ns .036 ns
Political Consciousness .109** .123*** .242*** .240*** .247*** .230*** .232*** .245***
Authority: Good -.175** -.215*** -.195** .003 ns -.020 ns -.062 ns -.068 ns -.083 ns
Authority: Don't mind -.057 ns -.086 ns -.032 ns -.141*** -.157*** -.040 ns -.049 ns -.063 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .088 .070 .123 .147 .142 .091 .095 .083
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Notes:
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) ns =  not significant
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Table 8.4 – (1) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes
Ordered logit regression
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USA 1995 Petition Demonstration Boycott USA 1999-2002 Petition Demonstration Boycott
More Say: Not  Chosen [= 0] -.380* -.556*** -.743*** More Say: Not  Chosen [= 0] -.187 ns -.720*** -.497**
Second Choice [= 1] -.027 ns -.331* -.323* Second Choice [= 1] -.009 ns -.331* -.186 ns
Free Speech: Not  Chosen [= 0] -.342 ns -.686*** -.602*** Free Speech: Not  Chosen [= 0] .033 ns -.692*** -.592***
Second Choice [= 1] .029 ns -.089 ns -.242 ns Second Choice [= 1] -.087 ns -.341* -.321 ns
Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] .045 ns .038 ns .060 ns Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0]
Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -.956*** -1.372*** -1.083*** Discuss Politics: Never [= 0] -.697* -.708** -.966***
Occasionally [= 1] -.468* -.418** -.368* Occasionally [= 1] -.119 ns -.256 ns -.484**
Political Consciousness .316*** .216*** .254*** Polit ical Consciousness .142* .198*** .101*
Authority: Bad [= 0] .638 ns .981*** .929*** Authority: Bad [= 0] -.188 ns .239 ns .359 ns
Don't mind [= 1] -.125 ns .461** .443** Don't  mind [= 1] -.112 ns .309 ns .249 ns
N 1363 1342 1333 N 1163 1153 1151
Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0 Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0
Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .66 1.00 .88 Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .00 .34 .23
Deviance (Sig.) 1.00 .81 .09 Deviance (Sig.) 1.00 .05 .01
Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .10 .18 .16 Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .03 .09 .07
Nagelkerke .13 .20 .19 Nagelkerke .04 .10 .08
McFadden .07 .09 .08 McFadden .03 .05 .04
Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .02 .09 .00 Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .14 .18 .01
Britain 1998 Petition Demonstration Boycott Britain 1999-2002 Petition Demonstration Boycott
More Say: Not  Chosen [= 0] -0.343* Not  available Not available More Say: Not  Chosen [= 0] -- -- --
Second Choice [= 1] -0.176 ns Second Choice [= 1] -- -- --
Free Speech: Not  Chosen [= 0] -0.147 ns Free Speech: Not  Chosen [= 0] -- -- --
Second Choice [= 1] -0.068 ns Second Choice [= 1] -- -- --
Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] -- -- --
Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -0.914*** Discuss Politics: Never [= 0] -.647 ns -.454 ns -.937***
Occasionally [= 1] -0.061 ns Occasionally [= 1] -.620 ns -.156 ns -.519*
Political Consciousness Polit ical Consciousness .320*** .339*** .271***
Authority: Bad [= 0] 0.137 ns Authority: Bad [= 0] .586 ns .811** .676**
Don't mind [= 1] -0.016 ns Don't  mind [= 1] .431* .750*** .563***
N 1021 N 907 891 896
Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0
Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .17 Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .00 .08 .24
Deviance (Sig.) .12 Deviance (Sig.) .60 .01 .04
Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .05 Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .06 .13 .12
Nagelkerke .06 Nagelkerke .08 .15 .14
McFadden .03 McFadden .05 .07 .06
Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .37 Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .63 .17 .12
Notes:
(1) Reference Categories: (2) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01;
More Say: First Choice [= 2]       *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
Free Speech: First Choice [= 2] (3) ns =  'not significant'. 
Order vs. Freedom:: Freedom [= 1] (4) Coefficients are presented in logit.
Discuss Politics: Frequently [= 2]
Authority: Good [= 2]
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Table 8.4 – (2) Protest (respective items) and liberal democratic attitudes
Ordered logit regression
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Japan 1995 Petition Demonstration Boycott Japan 1999-2002 Petition Demonstration Boycott
More Say: Not Chosen [= 0] -.140 ns -.543** -.429* More Say: Not Chosen [= 0] .140 ns -.373* -.291 ns
Second Choice [= 1] -.092 ns -.152 ns -.034 ns Second Choice [= 1] .135 ns -.066 ns -.040 ns
Free Speech: Not Chosen [= 0] .090 ns -.586 ns -.886* Free Speech: Not Chosen [= 0] -.182 ns -1.210*** -.824*
Second Choice [= 1] -.012 ns -.115 ns -.397 ns Second Choice [= 1] -.055 ns -.986** -.632 ns
Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] .363 ns -.131 ns .271 ns Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0]
Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -.109 ns -.321 ns -.205 ns Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -.715* -.838** -.152 ns
Occasionally [= 1] .267 ns .151 ns -.052 ns Occasionally [= 1] -.276 ns -.084 ns .392 ns
Polit ical Consciousness .370*** .315*** .257** Polit ical Consciousness .269*** .296*** .239***
Authority: Bad [= 0] .950** .130 ns 1.380*** Authority: Bad [= 0] .330 ns -.091 ns .224 ns
Don't  mind [= 1] .011 ns -1.357** -.257 ns Don't  mind [= 1] -.183 ns -.834 ns -.364 ns
N 710 627 655 N 974 828 868
Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0 Model Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0
Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .69 .14 .85 Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .01 .96 .02
Deviance (Sig.) .47 .54 .88 Deviance (Sig.) .25 .71 .85
Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .11 .13 .11 Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .07 .14 .07
Nagelkerke .13 .15 .14 Nagelkerke .08 .16 .09
McFadden .06 .07 .07 McFadden .04 .08 .04
Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .04 .15 .34 Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .04 .23 .88
Russia 1995 Petition Demonstration Boycott Russia 1999-2002 Petition Demonstration Boycott
More Say: Not Chosen [= 0] -.528*** -.400** -.659*** More Say: Not Chosen [= 0] -.619*** -.163 ns -.654***
Second Choice [= 1] -.199 ns -.222 ns -.391* Second Choice [= 1] -.337* -.140 ns -.306 ns
Free Speech: Not Chosen [= 0] -.442 ns -.233 ns .204 ns Free Speech: Not Chosen [= 0] .087 ns .187 ns -.528 ns
Second Choice [= 1] -.399 ns -.101 ns .277 ns Second Choice [= 1] .493 ns .383 ns -.153 ns
Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] -.134 ns -.263** -.230 ns Order vs. Freedom: Order [= 0] -.026 ns .107 ns .031 ns
Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -.879*** -.547** -.971*** Discuss Polit ics: Never [= 0] -.747*** -.443** -.286 ns
Occasionally [= 1] .003 ns -.044 ns -.429** Occasionally [= 1] -.402** -.110 ns -.218 ns
Polit ical Consciousness .208*** .176*** .126** Polit ical Consciousness .194*** .230*** .268***
Authority: Bad [= 0] -.257 ns -.298 ns .483* Authority: Bad [= 0] .159 ns .129 ns .339 ns
Don't  mind [= 1] -.200 ns -.408*** .065 ns Don't  mind [= 1] .115 ns .068 ns .107 ns
N 1537 1574 1540 N 1752 1802 1748
Model  Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0 Model Fit -2LL / χ² (Sig.) 0 0 0
Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .17 .21 .00 Goodness-of-Fit Pearson (Sig.) .01 .19 .41
Deviance (Sig.) .05 .00 1.00 Deviance (Sig.) .00 .00 1.00
Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .09 .07 .05 Pseudo R-Square Cox and Snell .07 .06 .06
Nagelkerke .11 .08 .07 Nagelkerke .09 .07 .08
McFadden .05 .03 .04 McFadden .04 .03 .05
Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .02 .04 .62 Test of Parallel Lines -2LL / χ² (Sig.) .14 .01 .11
Notes:
(1) Reference Categories: (2) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01;
More Say: First Choice [= 2]       *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
Free Speech: First Choice [= 2] (3) ns =  'not significant'. 
Order vs. Freedom:: Freedom [= 1] (4) Coefficients are presented in logit.
Discuss Politics: Frequently [= 2]
Authority: Good [= 2]
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Table 8.5 Mean estimation: non-democratic rule and efficacy of democracy
1995-1998 1999-2002
Non-democratic 
rule (A) N = 3345
Non-democratic 
rule (A) N = 4193
Mean
Standard 
Error Mean
Standard 
Error
USA 2.69 .06 USA 3.56 .07
Britain -- -- Britain 3.15 .09
Japan 3.36 .07 Japan 3.29 .06
Russia 5.40 .06 Russia 5.15 .05
Non-democratic 
rule (B) N = 4480
Non-democratic 
rule (B) N = 4490
Mean
Standard 
Error Mean
Standard 
Error
USA 2.16 .05 USA 2.95 .06
Britain 2.55 .06 Britain 2.52 .07
Japan 2.71 .06 Japan 2.59 .05
Russia 3.99 .04 Russia 3.81 .04
Efficacy of 
democracy N = 3316
Efficacy of 
democracy N = 4264
Mean
Standard 
Error Mean
Standard 
Error
USA 7.77 .05 USA 7.68 .06
Britain -- -- Britain 7.62 .07
Japan 7.66 .07 Japan 7.71 .06
Russia 5.07 .07 Russia 5.36 .06
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Note: 
(1) Figures are rounded.
(2) The score ranges of the scales are as follows:
Minimum (negative) Maximum (positive)
Non-democratic rule (A): 0 <= => 12
Non-democratic rule (B): 0 <= =>  9
Efficacy of democracy: 0 <= => 12     
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Table 8.6 A view of non-democratic rule (A) and liberal democratic attitudes
[Linear Regression] 
Dependent Variable: Non-Democratic Rule (A)
WVS 1995-1998
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice -.045 ns -.065* -- .057 ns .061 ns -.052 ns -.075* MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice -.011 ns -.021 ns -- -.018 ns -.006 ns -.120*** -.131***
Free Speech 1st Choice -.042 ns -.058 ns -- -.035 ns -.039 ns -.102** -.116*** FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice -.043 ns -.049 ns -- -.030 ns -.040 ns -.063* -.061*
Order vs. Freedom -.071* -- -- -.059 ns -.123***
Discuss Politics: Frequently -.152*** -.161*** -- -.057 ns -.058 ns .035 ns .052 ns DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally -.067 ns -.075* -- -.030 ns -.038 ns .009 ns .028 ns
Political Consciousness -.139*** -.130*** -- -.149** -.149** -.096** -.086*
Authority: Good .054 ns .066 ns -- .153*** .164*** .011 ns .032 ns Auth: Bad
Authority: Don't mind .083 ns .093 ns -- .124** .140*** -.017 ns -.002 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .065 .060 -- .063 .073 .046 .031
WVS 1999-2002
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Russia
More Say 1st Choice -.117** -- -- .068 ns -- -.001 ns -.010 ns --
More Say 2nd Choice -.086* -- -- .025 ns -- .050 ns .037 ns --
Free Speech 1st Choice -.169*** -- -- -.088* -- -.002 ns -.009 ns --
Free Speech 2nd Choice -.088* -- -- -.083* -- .000 ns .003 ns --
Order vs. Freedom -- -- -- -- -- -.084** -- --
Discuss Politics: Frequently -.132** -.136  **  -.021 ns .039 ns .027 ns -.031 ns -.053 ns -.067 ns
Discuss Politics: Occasionally -.120** -.120  **  -.099  *  -.014 ns -.022 ns -.056 ns -.076 ns -.089*
Political Consciousness -.125*** -.139  ***  -.213  ***  -.152*** -.181*** -.063 ns -.055 ns -.048 ns
Authority: Good .042 ns .088 ns .027 ns .214*** .210*** -.055 ns -.037 ns -.031 ns
Authority: Don't mind .044 ns .080 ns .011 ns .042 ns .067* -.071 ns -.061 ns -.052 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .070 .049 .067 .082 .074 .010 .004 .006
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Notes:
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) ns =  not significant
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Table 8.7 A view of non-democratic rule (B) and liberal democratic attitudes
[Linear Regression]
Dependent Variable: Non-Democratic Rule (B)
WVS 1995-1998
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice -.054 ns -.080  *  .112  **  .033 ns .047 ns -.033 ns -.050 ns MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice -.002 ns -.017 ns .026 ns -.038 ns -.014 ns -.110  ***  -.123  ***  
Free Speech 1st Choice -.033 ns -.060 ns -.076  *  -.044 ns -.062 ns -.064  *  -.073  *  FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice -.029 ns -.038 ns -.097  **  -.047 ns -.049 ns -.055 ns -.059  *  
Order vs. Freedom -.072  *  -- -- -.047 ns -- -.080  **  --
Discuss Politics: Frequently -.174  ***  -.230  ***  -.168  ***  -.061 ns -.092  *  .052 ns .016 ns DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally -.105  **  -.142  ***  -.197  ***  -.025 ns -.059 ns .043 ns .039 ns
Political Consciousness -.095  **  -- -- -.074 ns -- -.093  **  --
Authority: Good .052 ns .059 ns .043 ns .119  **  .145  ***  .088 ns .090 ns Auth: Bad
Authority: Don't mind .082 ns .095 ns .002 ns .077 ns .087  *  .033 ns .037 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .055 .046 .062 .026 .033 .028 .019
WVS 1999-2002
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Russia
More Say 1st Choice -.122** -- -- .078 ns -- .046 ns .037 ns --
More Say 2nd Choice -.098** -- -- .033 ns -- .052 ns .038 ns --
Free Speech 1st Choice -.156*** -- -- -.064 ns -- .016 ns .011 ns --
Free Speech 2nd Choice -.086* -- -- -.056 ns -- .008 ns .004 ns --
Order vs. Freedom -- -- -- -- -- -.055 ns -- --
Discuss Politics: Frequently -.101* -.105** .009 ns .022 ns .022 ns -.014 ns -.036 ns -.051 ns
Discuss Politics: Occasionally -.092* -.093* -.080 ns -.027 ns -.029 ns -.044 ns -.063 ns -.072*
Political Consciousness -.091** -.103** -.199*** -.112** -.135*** -.050 ns -.040 ns -.028 ns
Authority: Good .058 ns .103 ns .023 ns .218*** .215*** .012 ns .027 ns .032 ns
Authority: Don't mind .047 ns .083 ns .025 ns .012 ns .027 ns -.019 ns -.008 ns .000 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .048 .028 .052 .065 .059 .002 .001 .002
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Notes:
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) ns =  not significant
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Table 8.8 A view of the efficacy of democracy and liberal democratic attitudes
[Linear Regression]
Dependent Variable: Efficacy of Democracy
WVS 1995-1998
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Reference Categories
More Say 1st Choice -.050 ns -.046 ns -- -.057 ns -.048 ns .108*** .121*** MS: Not Chosen
More Say 2nd Choice .003 ns .000 ns -- .024 ns .017 ns .089** .098**
Free Speech 1st Choice .042 ns .056 ns -- .076 ns .102* .111*** .123*** FS: Not Chosen
Free Speech 2nd Choice .050 ns .061* -- .068 ns .091* .110*** .104***
Order vs. Freedom .065* -- -- .132** -- .122*** --
Discuss Politics: Frequently .110** .113** -- -.017 ns -.017 ns .000 ns .002 ns DP: Never
Discuss Politics: Occasionally .056 ns .057 ns -- -.014 ns -.007 ns .069 ns .072 ns
Political Consciousness .118*** .110** -- .132** .121* .014 ns .010 ns
Authority: Good -.119* -.120* -- -.259*** -.244*** .142* .129* Auth: Bad
Authority: Don't mind -.063 ns -.065 ns -- .005 ns .002 ns .102 ns .095 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .046 .040 -- .097 .076 .059 .042
WVS 1999-2002
Independent Variables USA USA Britain Japan Japan Russia Russia Russia
More Say 1st Choice .006 ns -- -- -.003 ns -- .080** .108*** --
More Say 2nd Choice .028 ns -- -- .048 ns -- .078** .092** --
Free Speech 1st Choice .016 ns -- -- .094* -- .055* .069* --
Free Speech 2nd Choice .006 ns -- -- .073 ns -- .036 ns .044 ns --
Order vs. Freedom -- -- -- -- -- .163*** -- --
Discuss Politics: Frequently .108** .103** .065 ns .029 ns .056 ns -.025 ns .008 ns .009 ns
Discuss Politics: Occasionally .119** .115** .011 ns .041 ns .048 ns .022 ns .030 ns .040 ns
Political Consciousness .133*** .137*** .007 ns .185*** .196*** .066* .037 ns .049 ns
Authority: Good .056 ns .049 ns .133* -.151*** -.156*** .081 ns .068 ns .063 ns
Authority: Don't mind .027 ns .016 ns .119* -.117** -.123** .043 ns .035 ns .042 ns
(Beta)
Adjusted R Square .037 .040 .004 .087 .084 .045 .019 .002
Source: World Values Survey 1995-98, 1999-2002.
Notes:
(1) * = statistically significant at p < .05; ** = statistically significant at p < .01; *** = statistically significant at p < .001.
(2) ns =  not significant
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
This  chapter  considers  the  findings  of  the  research  and their  implications  for  the  two 
central themes of the thesis: (1) values shift versus cultural particularity and (2) values and 
democracy. The Postmaterialist  thesis and related theories on values shift presented by 
Inglehart and others primarily assume that, as a consequence of industrialisation and post-
industrialisation, people's values transform in manners to increase an awareness and an 
emphasis  on  self-expression,  self-esteem  and  other  qualities.  It  is  implied  that  this 
contributes to (liberal) democratic outcomes.1 In relation to these, the present study raised 
another question, suggesting that cultural particularity should be taken into consideration 
as a factor competing with the effect of values shift  on people's attitudinal conditions. 
Especially, it was assumed that the state of an emphasis on the individual (as a supposed 
quality  of  the  increasing  values  orientation)  could be  affected  by  cultural  difference. 
Individualism and  an emphasis on liberty are often quoted as core elements of Western 
societies, which are not necessarily so in other cultural scenarios. With this inquiry, the 
four-item  Postmaterialist  index  and  related  values  items  were  scrutinised closely  by 
comparing  the  USA,  Britain,  Russia  and  Japan.  At  some points,  the  examination  was 
expanded to broader regions: Western, Postcommunist and East Asian regions. It turned 
out that there was a certain relevance in the account of the cultural effect especially on 
items  concerned  with  freedom.  Attention  was  also  paid  to  political  areas  that are 
theoretically  associated  with  the  values  shift  thesis.  While  incorporating  the  view  of 
cultural  influence,  the  findings  were  considered  in  terms  of  their  implications  for 
democracy. This chapter will attempt to  summarise a series of these investigations and 
further explore core issues underlying the inquiries. The first part will review the main 
results of our research. The second part mentions the originality of our findings. In the 
subsequent  parts,  consideration  will  be  given  to  the  two  main  themes.  Throughout, 
freedom and individuality are the key elements.
1 Inglehart's recent research often associates 'self-expression values' (as a consequence of values shift) with 
democracy (on the basis of measurements utilising the Freedom House scores). See, for example, 
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy', in Haward J. Wiarda ed., New 
Directions in Comparative Politics, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164.
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9.2 Review of findings
9.2.1 Postmaterialist index
The following sections  summarise the findings in previous chapters. The present study 
firstly conducted an examination of the Postmaterialist index. It was discovered that, even 
within these restricted items, there were variations in relation to the competing effects of 
values  shift  and  cultural  durability.  Especially,  the  states  of  two  items  within  the 
Postmaterialist  category  differed.  These  items  were:  (1)  'giving  people  more  say  in 
important government decisions' and (2) 'protecting freedom of speech'.  The 'more say' 
item tended to  be prone to  values  shift  and to  some extent  circumstantial  changes.  In 
contrast, the appreciation of 'free speech' was less subject to such an effect. The USA and 
Britain were likely to have higher emphasis on it at comparable levels to 'more say'. On the 
other hand, the appraisal of 'free speech' was clearly lower in Japan and Russia than in the 
Western counterparts. Moreover, such gaps persisted at multiple time points, implying the 
durability of the particular characters. Cultures or historical experiences seemed to have a 
stronger influence over the conditions of attitudes to 'free speech'.
9.2.2 'More say' and 'free speech'
This finding was further explored for confirmation, and it attained supportive outcomes. 
For the analysis, the variables of relative commitment to 'more say' and 'free speech' were 
employed. 'More say' indicated its proneness to generational values shifts for Britain and 
Japan.  Russian support  for  'more  say'  seemed to  be affected by economic conditions.2 
America seemed to have already achieved a high and stable emphasis on it in view of the 
values shift. Conversely, an emphasis on 'free speech' varied with each of the four societies 
having a particular degree that persisted over time. The two items were further compared 
in terms of the competing effects of economic development and regional identities (that is, 
Western,  Postcommunist  and  East  Asian  societies).  These  effects  were  regarded  as 
representing the dichotomous influences of the Postmaterialist  values shift  and cultural 
2 Russia might have a possible element for a generational change for the 'more say' item, if the change 
takes place. In an age cohort analysis, the support for the 'more say' item tended to be largely higher in 
younger generations than in older ones, which was consistently observed in the available three waves.
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particularity.  The result  was largely consistent  with the earlier  finding:  'more say'  was 
prone to change, and 'free speech' was culturally durable.
9.2.3 Postmaterialist variables and democracy
The implications of above-mentioned results were considered in the context of democracy. 
The relevance of two Postmaterialist items to the model of polyarchy was discussed. The 
previous outcomes suggested that, in Postcommunist and East Asian contexts (including 
Russia and Japan), there would not be full effects of the Postmaterialist shift. Due to this, 
there could be a certain weakness in the effect of the values shift to foster popular attitudes 
conducive to polyarchy. On the other hand, Western societies may have been culturally 
advantageous  to  the  Postmaterialist  effect  as  well  as  popular  attitudes  in  favour of 
polyarchy.
9.2.4 Freedom
The perception of 'freedom' (in relation to 'order') was further examined through a cross-
national comparison. In view of the likely influence of culture on 'free speech', there was a 
question  whether  the  meaning  of  'freedom'  would  differ  depending  on  national 
characteristics.  According to  the results,  for  American respondents,  '(general)  freedom' 
seemed to have more overlap with 'free speech', whereas Russians clearly less associated 
'(general) freedom' with 'free speech'. The Russian public seemed to appreciate 'freedom', 
but not necessarily in the sense of 'freedom of speech'. Although the overlap in Japanese 
perceptions was inbetween the two sides, the priority of 'freedom' was both low vis-à-vis 
'order'. Such distinctions were also discovered to be corresponding to regional differences. 
Postcommunist (especially former USSR) societies shared a similar character with Russia. 
Likewise, the American result exhibited closeness to that of Western societies, and Japan 
to East Asian societies. Cultural traits seemed to matter in the perception of freedom.
9.2.5 Protest
Subsequently,  the  realm  of  protest  was  investigated,  as  having  relevance  to  both 
Postmaterialist  values and responsive democracy.  Since moderate  protest  would denote 
people's  inclination  towards  public  demands  on  political  authority,  this  could  have  a 
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symmetrical direction with the issue of governmental responsiveness. Overall, the USA 
and Britain had more orientation to protest than Japan and Russia. Japanese people tended 
to  be  highly  ambiguous  on  attitudes  to  protest,  thus  implying  weakness  in  public 
expression  and  contestation.  Russian  respondents  did  not  seem  to  have  a  substantial 
orientation to protest among the four societies even during 1990.3 Through the comparison, 
on the one hand, there was a sign of values shift affecting the state of protest, since steady 
increases of temperate protest were observed in the three long-standing affluent societies.4 
On the other  hand,  there  was an indication of  cultural  particularity  at  work.  The four 
societies had respective patterns of popular attitudes to protest with durability. The result 
implied that the Western nations could be advantageous to responsive democracy whereas 
the others would be less likely to be so.
9.2.6 Values and political dimensions
As a final investigation, multivariate analyses were conducted on three issues. The first 
part examined associations between Postmaterialist values and protest.  The values shift 
theory  presumes  that  citizens'  orientation  to  moderate  protest  is  facilitated  by  post-
industrial  values  transformation.  Our  outcome,  however,  discovered  variation  in  the 
patterns of the associations across the four societies. This suggested national difference in 
Postmaterialist effects on the state of protest attitudes. It would be plausible to incorporate 
the perspective of cultural particularity in addition to that of values shift. The second part 
probed the influence of liberal democratic attitudes on protest in view of 'civic protest'. The 
American  case  seemed  to  conform  to  the  model  where  moderate  protest  was  evenly 
affected by liberal democratic motives. Japan appeared to have less orientation to this. For 
the Russian case, there was a possibility that protest would be motivated by pragmatic 
needs  rather  than the  ideal  of  democratic  liberty.  The third  part  investigated views of 
governance and their associations with liberal democratic attitudes. Two indexes showed 
that  the  Russian  case  held  distinctly  low  agreement  with democracy  among  the  four 
societies. Meanwhile, in the USA, regime support was more related to political awareness 
and  self-expression  than  an  emphasis  on  abstract  principles  of  free  speech  and 
participation.  For  Russians,  the  commitment  to  these  principles  seemed  to  be  more 
3 This was when the transition from communist rules saw the culmination of protest action. 
4 They are the USA, Britain and Japan.
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associated.  Nonetheless, careful analyses led to the conclusion that essentially American 
people had more orientation to a democratic regime as well as liberal democratic attitudes, 
whereas Russian citizens held certain reservations about both of them. Moreover, Russian 
attitudes  in  the  latter  survey  (1999-2002)  seemed  to  have  become  more  amenable  to 
authoritarian  forms  of  governance.5 In  the  Japanese  case,  an  attitude  to  authority  was 
notable  in  association with views of  governance,  while  those of  participation and free 
speech  were  rarely  so.  Consequently,  at  least  in  the  realms  of  protest  and  views  of 
governance,  the  American  populace  held  attitudes  compatible  with  participatory 
democracy as well as 'civic culture'.  The citizens may be described as 'assertive masses'. 
Japanese and Russian individuals had a weaker orientation to this effect.
9.3 Originality of findings
With these findings,  what  is  exactly  an original  contribution to political  science? This 
section will outline the ways in which this dissertation makes a unique contribution to this 
academic  field.  First  of  all,  our  findings  provide  a  modification  to  the  scope  of  the 
Postmaterialist thesis (and related values shift theories) expounded by Ronald Inglehart 
and others. It should be noted that the work by Inglehart and related scholars primarily 
emphasises values shift per se, although some of their literature mentions cultural elements 
affecting popular attitudes.6 This study places more explicit stress on the effect of cultural 
particularity, which competes in terms of explanatory power with the concept of values 
shift.  The empirical  outcomes of this work have successfully shown the importance of 
cultural  elements  in  terms  of  understanding  the  variation  of  values  and  value  shift  in 
different country contexts. In addition, this thesis has further refined the measurement of 
Postmaterialism in work by Inglehart. This has been done by a further differentiation of 
Postmaterialist items in its four-item index (namely, 'more say' and 'free speech' items) in 
5 The withdrawal of the associations in Russia from 1995 to 1999-2002 in the judgment of non-democracy 
suggested that liberal democratic values might have become ineffective in checking authoritarian 
governance.
6 For values shift literature that mentions cultural factors, see Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, 
'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', American Sociological  
Review, 65 (February 2000), pp. 19-51; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Culture and Democracy', in Lawrence E. 
Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 80-97.
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relation  to  the  two  competing  effects.  In  the  existing  values  shift  theories,  these 
Postmaterialist items are simply located within one category, and popular orientations to 
these values items are assumed to grow together. However, work for this thesis has found 
that even within the same Postmaterialist group, the effects of values shift (and cultural 
particularity) differ depending on the items. 
This thesis also has found evidence that the Postmaterialist  item  labelled as 'free 
speech' is, to a certain degree, resistant to values shift as it is anchored by cultural factors. 
Moreover, Western societies tend to place a greater emphasis on this item in comparison 
with Postcommunist  and East Asian societies.  The finding parallels  the claim of some 
cultural discourses that Western traditions attach importance to liberty and individualism.7 
In the meantime, this thesis has empirically found that a perception of freedom can vary 
depending on different cultural scenarios. This finding contributes to the extension of the 
scholarly debate relating to the theoretical differentiation in types of freedom.8 Another 
academic contribution would be that, whereas Inglehart discussed the relationship between 
Postmaterialist  values  and  democracy,  this  thesis  developed  further  this  matter 
theoretically by incorporating the notion of polyarchy, which is connected with the above-
mentioned differentiation of Postmaterialist values items.9 
In addition, protest is mentioned in the context of values shift in Inglehart's work. 
However, his exploration of protest does not provide enough depth of investigation into the 
importance of cultural differences in understanding values shift. In this thesis, the study of 
protest is conducted explicitly in relation to values shift versus cultural particularity, which 
includes both the national comparison of protest patterns as well as an examination of the 
relationships  between Postmaterialist  values  and  protest.  This  comparison  revealed  the 
validity of using cultural particularity to examine the role of protest in values shift. The 
research in this study also highlights that there can be difference in quality of protest, 
7 See, for example, Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 69-72; Bell, D. and K. Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal 
Democracy: A Framework' in Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin 
Jones eds., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 
pp. 1-16.
8 See, for instance, Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); 
Constant, Benjamin, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. pp. 316-
318; Beetham, David, 'Freedom as the Foundation', in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., 
Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), esp. p. 33.
9 For Postmaterialist values and democracy, see '1.2.2 Inglehart and democracy' in the first chapter.
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which  may add useful  insight  to  preceding  studies  on  protest  behaviour. Another  key 
contribution is that this thesis explicitly incorporates the concept of 'civic protest' into the 
study of values shift in a comparative perspective. Inglehart mentions the rise of a protest 
orientation as an 'elite-challenging' style of participation, which is combined with values 
transformation  while  being  conducive  to  democracy.10 With  the  awareness  that  this 
phenomenon is typical of post-industrial (especially Western) nations, this research has 
considered  its  connection  with  liberal  democratic  attitudes  through  the  comparison  of 
different cultural settings (in this case Russia and Japan). 
Finally, this research contributes to the debate within the study of political culture 
that is broader than the concept of Postmaterialism. On the whole, the findings in this 
thesis are compatible with the rationale of  Civic Culture by Almond and Verba, in that 
those  in  the  USA  and  Britain  hold  relatively  strong  orientations  to  participatory 
democracy.11 The results that Russia and Japan have weaker support for these concepts 
chime with earlier findings about political culture discourses on these countries.12 
9.4 Values shift versus cultural particularity
9.4.1 A dichotomous perspective and non-Western contexts
One of the major themes of our study is values shift versus cultural particularity in the 
context  of  the  Postmaterialist  thesis.  What  conclusion  could  be  drawn  from  our 
investigation  so  far?  In  principle,  our  findings  positively  endorse  the  validity  of  our 
hypothesis,  which  was  initially  presented  in  the  first  chapter.  We  assumed  that the 
Postmaterialist  shift  and  cultural  particularity  constitute  competing  effects  on  values 
conditions. This parallels some of Inglehart's research, which present the particularities of 
10 For protest as 'elite-challenging' form of participation, see Inglehart, Ronald, Modernization and 
Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ/Chichester: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 307-315; Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg, 'Trends in 
Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline', International Journal of  
Comparative Sociology, 43 (2002), pp. 300-316; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization,  
Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 94-126.
11 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
12 For example, see Maruyama, Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo, Zoho-ban [Thought and Behaviour 
of Modern Politics, An Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964); White, Stephen, Political Culture 
and Soviet Politics (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979).
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cultural  zones  in  addition  to  the  effect  of  economic  modernisation.13 Similarly,  while 
Inglehart and Welzel argue in terms of values shift including Postmaterialist and broader 
contexts, they also seem to notice that the details of actual directions are path-dependent 
for respective societies, being affected by cultural and historical heritages.14 In view of 
their studies, our research has more  emphasised the cultural factors, by examining  how 
they actually affect popular attitudes  vis-à-vis  the effect of values shift. Since the major 
emphasis of the preceding literature on the Postmaterialist thesis has been on Western post-
industrial societies, the examination of non-Western nations would expand the potential to 
detect cultural variations. For this study, Japan and Russia have been employed as non-
Western cases.15 From this point of view, let us consider these societies.
For Japan, there have been the signs of both a values shift and the strong presence of 
traditions.  This  has  been  creating  complexities  in  their  attitudinal  situations.16 A 
Postmaterialist transformation has been observed in certain respects. Nonetheless, it is not 
a fully-fledged version. For instance, the third and fourth chapters discovered that, within 
the  four-item  Postmaterialist  index,  'more  say'  tends  to  be  subject  to  such  a  change, 
whereas 'free speech' rather stays still at a lower level over multiple time points. There 
seem to be cultural norms or tendencies that  de-emphasise a sense of liberty. In fact, as 
presented  in  the  sixth  chapter,  freedom  seems  to  have  much  less  priority  when  it  is 
compared with securing order in society. Conformism is still a general behavioural custom, 
which runs counter to the effect of rising self-expression and individual  esteem as the 
quality of a Postmaterialist shift.17 The individual orientation to public discussion seems to 
13 For instance, see Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional 
Values'; Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy'.
14 Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the Human 
Development Sequence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 1, pp. 15-47, esp. 
18-22.
15 There are studies in similar perspectives, see, for example, Ike, Nobutaka, 'Economic Growth and 
Intergenerational Change in Japan', American Political Science Review, 67: 4 (December 1973), pp. 
1194-1203; Flanagan, Scott, 'Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent 
Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings', Comparative Political Studies, 14: 4 (January 
1982), pp. 403-444; Inglehart, Ronald, 'Changing Values in Japan and the West', Comparative Political  
Studies, 14: 4 (January 1982), pp. 445-479; Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch, 'Postmaterialism 
and the Emerging Soviet Democracy', Political Research Quarterly, 47 (1994), pp. 5-39.
16 Also, Sawa mentions Japanese conditions of Materialism and Postmaterialism in economic terms with 
certain particularity. See Sawa, Takamitsu, Shijo-Shugi no Shuen: Nihon-Keizai wo Dousurunoka [The 
End of Marketism: How Do We Cope with Japanese Economy?] (Tokyo: Iwanami-Shoten, 2000), pp. 80-
96.
17 Vogel mentions Japanese orientation to groups and conformity. See Vogel, Ezra F., Japan as Number 
One (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1979).
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be  lower.  Meanwhile,  what  about  the  sphere  of  protest  as  one  of  political  indicators 
connected  with  Postmaterialist  values  and  public  expression?  In  Japan,  an  overall 
inclination to protest, its pattern and shift show some similarity to ones in the USA and 
Britain. Nonetheless, there are particular properties in the Japanese case. When it comes to 
the matter of protest 'actions', Japanese figures show clearly less inclinations. The extent of 
missing values in response to questions on protest is constantly high, implying their strong 
ambiguity  on  this  issue.  'Civic  protest',  as  a  potential  phenomenon to  values  shift  (in 
Western post-industrial societies), does not seem to be fully applicable. In Japan, there has 
been a values shift, but not to the same extent as in the Western nations especially in terms 
of  its  efficacy.  It  is  possible  that  their  traditional  culture  underlies  these  particular 
conditions.
For Russia, there seems to be strong particularity, which could reflect the influence 
of its own experience. Great proportions of Russian respondents are oriented to Materialist 
values,  which  implies  that  its  attitudinal  patterns  are  virtually  the  opposite  of 
Postmaterialist outlooks.  One might contend that the communist experience, which had 
supposedly achieved  a  certain  economic  development  and  social  welfare,  may  have 
contributed to the emergence of Postmaterialist outlooks. There is a report of the presence 
of such values.18 Nonetheless, as detected in the preceding chapters, on the whole, a strong 
Russian  skew  towards  Materialist  values  is  observed.  A  careful  examination  of  the 
Postmaterialist index and its variants revealed that there are coherent distributions in the 
Russian figures in a manner different from the USA and Britain. There are indications that 
'free speech'  receives a low emphasis with a durable character in contrast  to its higher 
appreciation  by  Western  counterparts.  The  main perception  of  'freedom'  appears  to  be 
qualitatively different from American one. As for the realm of protest in Russia, the degree 
of an inclination, patterns, the way of Postmaterialist influence and the state of associations 
with liberal democratic values hold distinct features from the two Western societies. All of 
these show particularity. These have respective properties that could run counter to the 
elements of transformations presumed by the values shift  theory.  National  particularity 
seems  to  have  considerable  presence  and  influence,  which  might  be  connected  with 
cultural elements.
18 Gibson and Duch, 'Postmaterialism and the Emerging Soviet Democracy'.
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Considering  these,  does  the  Postmaterialist  hypothesis  still  have  validity  for  the 
Russian future? At present, it is difficult to give a clear answer, given the difficult situation 
in the economy and social well-being. One possible judgment would be that there would be 
little possibility to expect the immediate rise of a Postmaterialist orientation, due to the 
current lack of prerequisites. The Postmaterialist theory primarily assumes that there needs 
to be long-standing economic security  as a condition for  values transformation. Even if 
such conditions were met,  it  should be expected that it  would take generations for the 
effect to emerge. Consequently, at least for the moment, Russian attitudinal conditions are 
more likely to be susceptible to what already have existed in the society, which would 
include cultural and historical factors. Also, as empirically detected, these factors could 
represent a considerable hindrance to the emergence of Postmaterialist values, if it were to 
take place. 
In  addition,  our  results  indicate  that  some  of  the  above-mentioned  national 
characteristics have commonalities with broader regions, within which each of the nations 
are located. Japan shares some common elements with East Asian nations, whereas Russia 
does  so  with  Postcommunist  nations  (especially  former  Soviet  republics).  It  is  also 
applicable to the cases of the USA and Britain with Western societies. This also suggests 
the influence of cultures on popular mind-sets. 
9.4.2 Freedom as a core issue
There  has  been  one  primary  issue  that  has  been  consistently  underlying  across  our 
research. This is the matter of 'freedom'. The issue is connected with both values shift and 
cultural particularity. For instance, Inglehart's thesis in essence holds an increasing sense 
of self-esteem and self-expression in post-industrial societies as a central element. This 
would  be  related to  attitudinal  conditions  on freedom. Likewise,  Inglehart  and  Welzel 
argue the rise of an individualistic orientation in a positive tone as a consequence of socio-
economic development (especially in the phase of post-industrialisation) while associating 
this  with  'self-expression  values'.19 On  the  other  hand,  the  discourses  of  cultural 
particularism indicate that individualism or the emphasis on freedom is rooted in Western 
culture.20 
19 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 6, pp. 135-145.
20 For example, see Parekh, Bhikhu, 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy', in David Held ed., 
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In relation to this, what do the findings of the present study suggest? Non-Western 
societies (such as Postcommunist and East Asian societies) are not quite susceptible to the 
full effects of the values transformation in attitudes to freedom. At least, this is the case 
with the outlook on a certain type of freedom as represented by 'free speech'. Although this 
does not negate the theory of the values shift per se, cultural variation appears to have an 
enduring influence on the attitudinal quality of freedom. This implies that non-Western 
factors could function to obstruct, or simply be irrelevant to, the emergence of popular 
support for a specific kind of liberty, which is supposed to be part of an outcome predicted 
by  the  values  shift  theory.  Simply  put,  the  particular  kind  of  freedom overlaps  with 
idiosyncratic elements in Western culture, which may not be simply increased by post-
industrial transformations in a universal manner. An effect of such an increase, when it 
happens, would tend to be confronted with a cultural  hindrance to its enhancement. In 
addition, why is it possible to point to a 'specific' freedom? As one of the rationales, an 
argument in the fifth chapter should be recalled. It was noted that there was a qualitative 
gap  between  'freedom'  emphasised  by  those  in  Russia  and  post-Soviet  societies  and 
'freedom' largely conceived by American and Western publics. This suggests that the types 
or qualities of freedom could be differentiated.21
What is the freedom that could be emphatically Western? To answer this, it would be 
useful to pay attention to one of our findings: Western citizens tend to place a greater 
emphasis on 'free speech' than the others (at least, people in East Asian and Postcommunist 
societies). Although the argument is seemingly simplistic, the result of the data output was 
too unequivocal to be declined,  as presented in the fourth and sixth chapters.  Why do 
Western  publics  possess  such  a  clear  inclination  towards  'freedom  of  speech'?  What 
character of liberty is it that has to involve 'free speech'? Huntington mentions the presence 
of individualism as one of the core components of Western  civilisation.22 According to 
Inglehart's  values  map,  Western  societies  cluster  around  higher  scores  on  the  'self-
expression values' indicator.23 But more precisely, what nature does this freedom possess 
Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), ch. 7, pp. 156-75; 
Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'.
21 For a related topic on the differentiation of freedom, see, for example, Miller, William L. ed., 
Alternatives to Freedom: Arguments and Opinions (London/New York: Longman Group, 1995), pp. 1-4.
22 See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 69-72.
23 For the values map, see Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 92-100; Inglehart and 
Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'; Inglehart and Welzel, 
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as its substance? For this, it would be helpful to recall the argument on the perception gap 
of freedom in the fifth chapter. In Maslow's values hierarchy, Inglehart locates 'free speech' 
in the realm of self-actualisation needs, which includes self-esteem, intellectual interests 
and  aesthetic  fulfilment.24 It  was  discussed  that  freedom  in  this  sense  would  involve 
associative connotations.  This  could have the character  of spontaneous participation in 
society, which implies a politically proactive rather than passive tendency. It is compatible 
with a sense of 'rights'. This could be qualitatively distinct from a kind of freedom that 
primarily emphasises private and pragmatic goals of the individual as well as simple non-
intervention  by  (political)  authorities  in  pursuit  of  them.  After  all,  the  'freedom'  often 
conceived by those in the West would be strongly connected with individuals' intellectual 
or cognitive autonomy as well as spontaneous participation in society.25 
Is such a sense of freedom unachievable to the level of mass values in non-Western 
societies due to its idiosyncratic character? It  might be possible to some extent by the 
effects of post-industrial values transformation (and partly the introduction of the norms 
and ideas from the West). Nonetheless, the presence of cultural differences probably would 
have a strong influence on attitudinal conditions. It can function to obstruct or diverge such 
effects in non-Western scenarios (especially, for East Asian and post-Soviet societies). As 
shown in the fourth chapter, for example, the degree of national emphasis on 'freedom of 
speech' was susceptible to cultural particularity, which could not be simply explained by 
the state of economic development. In a similar vein, according to Inglehart and Baker, the 
state of the 'self-expression values' is substantially affected by the difference of cultural 
heritages in addition to modernisation effects.26
9.5 Values and democracy
9.5.1 Freedom, individuality and democracy
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 48-76, esp. 63.
24 See Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western 
Publics (Princeton, NJ/Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42. Although Inglehart utilised 
the values hierarchy in the context of a post-industrial values shift, the present argument place more 
emphasis on cultural difference, so that the values allocation is viewed from a horizontal perspective 
rather than a vertical/hierarchical one.
25 This interpretation would resonate with ideas such as civil society, public discussions and voluntary 
organisations, which are prevalent notions in the contemporary West.
26 See Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values'.
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This section considers one of our research themes: values and democracy. The preceding 
section  has  suggested  that  one  of  the  crucial  points  on  values  shift  versus  cultural 
particularity resides in the matter of freedom. Freedom is concerned with how one views 
the individual and how its conditions are. It seems that the state of the individual and its 
variation matter to national differences in certain aspects of democracy. The discussion 
will start with this point.
What kind of national variation is there in terms of individuality? Lipset's argument 
would be worth noticing as an initial  step.  He discusses  an American orientation to a 
strong sense of freedom, self-autonomy, and free-standing and rights-asserting individuals. 
By contrast,  the Japanese are prone to a sense of obligation, deference and consensus, 
which connotes collective norms. Britain (and other West European countries) tend to be 
located  between  the  USA  and  Japan  in  the  degree  of  emphasis  on  the  individual.27 
Similarly, according to  Hofstede's individualism index, the USA has the highest figure 
among fifty countries and three regions whereas British ranking is third. Japanese is ranked 
lower than most of Western nations.28 There seem to be clear differences in the general 
perceptions and conditions of the individual. Our findings accord with this point of view. 
As mentioned above, these include the Japanese priority of order in society rather than the 
freedom of  the  individual  as  well  as  their  lower  inclination  to  public  discussions  and 
protest than the USA and Britain. Japanese individuals are not particularly inclined to self-
expression and public demands, which coincide and probably are associated with a weaker 
or  more  ambiguous  sense  of  individuality  than  Western  counterparts.  Weaker  open 
demands  imply  a  lesser  potential  to  call  for  governmental  responsiveness  and 
accountability at the individual level.29
On the other hand, in the USA and Britain, there is a greater presence of 'assertive 
masses'. They hold a certain propensity to express their claims to the government. This can 
be connected with their orientation to self-expression. But it also derives from a substantial 
27 Lipset, Seymour Martin, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York/London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1996), esp. pp. 211-263, 293-296.
28 Western countries that hold lower scores than Japan are only Portugal and Greece. See Hofstede, Geert, 
Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations, 
2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications, 2001), esp. p. 215.
29 On accountability, see Schmitter, Philippe C., 'The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability', in Larry 
Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005). pp. 18-31.
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sense  of  personal  autonomy as  a  crucial  asset  of  individualism.  A sense  of  autonomy 
would compel one to take control of one's life and environment. Political authority can be 
an existence that has considerable influence over these, which therefore can be perceived 
as having the potential to conflict with their autonomy. Likewise, the persistent sense of 
autonomy  is  more  likely  to  go  against  the  rationale  of  paternalism,  which  could  be 
extended to the political realm.30 Subjectively, people with such values are apt to perceive 
authority  as  a  potential  disturbance  or  in  some cases  a  threat,  which  may affect  their 
freedom, well-being and perhaps security. They therefore tend to clearly acknowledge the 
necessity of restricting political authority and making sure that power is duly exercised in a 
regulated manner.31 Moreover,  under  a  democratic  regime,  the  people  are  supposed to 
endow political elites with their power. With this, the stronger attachment to individual 
autonomy  can  enhance  the  people's  motivations  to  check  government  and  ensure  its 
responsibility to provide measures that accord with their wills. The individuals tend to hold 
a stronger awareness and inclination to seek accountable and responsive government. 
If the sense of individual autonomy is weak, such conflicts with authority will be less 
likely to be  recognised.  Paternalism may have more possibility to be accepted, which at 
times could function to endorse the legitimacy of strong political authority. This could be 
more likely in non-Western contexts that have different perceptions of the individual. Pye 
mentions the Asian orientation to paternalistic  authority,  whereas he acknowledges the 
presence  of  individualism  in  the  West  in  contrast  with  Asia.32 As  suggested  earlier, 
freedom in Russian terms may be distinct from one conceived in the West. There could be 
less attachment to the cognitive autonomy of the individual in Russia, which would allow 
more leeway for political paternalism.33 
Meanwhile, the matter of freedom can be associated with the aspect of protest. Our 
findings suggest that there are national gaps in the quality of protest. As suggested in the 
30 A definition of 'paternalism' reads as: '[t]he power and authority one person or institution exercises over 
another to confer benefits or prevent harm for the latter regardless of the latter's informed consent. 
Paternalism is thus a threat to autonomy as well as to liberty and privacy.' See Honderich, Ted, ed., The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 647.
31 In Western democratic societies, 'the rule of law' seems to be understood emphatically in the sense of 
regulating the government in order to prevent the abuse of the power over the individual. This would be 
more likely in societies where the people's emphasis on individual autonomy is prevalent. 
32 See Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions of Authority 
(Cambridge, Mass./London, Belknap Press, 1985). 
33 For a related topic, see for instance, Carnaghan, Ellen, 'Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Tensions 
between Democracy and Order among Russian Citizens', Studies in Public Policy, 352 (2001).
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seventh and eighth chapters, the people in the two Western nations are more orientated to 
'civic protest'.34 American and British respondents also showed the inclination to 'petition', 
which was not the case with Russian respondents.35 These seem to have certain symmetry 
with the national variations in the perception of freedom. It is possible that the particular 
sense of freedom in the West, which was discussed previously, is affecting their higher 
orientation to  civic  protest.  The civic  protest  is  in  turn a  viable  indicator  of  'assertive 
masses',  whose  presence  would  be  conducive  to  the  performance  of  governmental 
responsiveness. 
To conclude,  the  difference  in  cultural  traits  on  individuality  and  the  attitudinal 
quality of freedom seem to make a difference to how the people see and interact with 
government. This in turn could have relevance to some functions of democracy. 
9.5.2 National implications: the individual and democracy
There are national variations in attitudes in relation to freedom and individuality. To some 
extent, the variations seem to have different consequences in a political sphere. With this 
in  mind,  it  would  be  helpful  to  summarise the  picture  of  each  nation  in  view of  our 
findings. 
In the USA, democracy seems to involve the images of spontaneous participation 
and open contestation on the basis of individualism. Since the cognitive autonomy of the 
individual is emphatically valued, 'spontaneity' would be a basic principle for social and 
political behaviour.36 Freedom, especially in the sense of self-expression, constitutes a core 
value of their society, where autonomous free individuals demand, participate and discuss 
of their own accord.37 The active use of language is therefore a crucial asset. Unambiguous 
language enables them to have clearly defined self-images and communicative exchanges 
as separate independent beings. These amount to their attachment to 'freedom of speech' as 
34 It was discovered that liberal democratic values were more associated with (moderate) protest in the USA 
than in Japan and Russia. 
35 Japan is a little weaker than the Western nations on this.
36 In relative terms, the American type of individuality may resonate with the character of an inner-directed 
disposition in comparison with Japanese orientation towards an other-directed one. Although Riesman's 
original rationale on the typology is concerned with the different phases of a society, the categorisation 
seems to be relevant to the description of cultural difference. For the original conceptualisation of the 
notions, see Riesman, David, et al., The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).
37 The strong perception of the individuals as separate independent beings may enhance a view on the 
equality of rights and a sense of fairness in the sense of balance.
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an essential element. This in turn is connected with the emphasis on public discussion and 
contestation, which share an identical direction with civic protest as well as responsive 
democracy. 
For the Japanese case, firstly, it seems that the issue of authority plays a major part.38 
They seem to hold an embedded vertical image in a political dimension. Government, in 
their perception, appears to be located at an upper level of the social hierarchy. Persistent 
anti-authoritarian sentiments at an exceptionally high level in survey responses may be a 
negative reaction to their own social customs where they are somehow prone to authority. 
In horizontal terms, secondly, their weakness in the emphasis on liberty coincides with 
their  lack of orientation to public expression and political  contestation at  an individual 
level.  For  the Japanese,  overt  self-expression and open demands  may be perceived as 
neither a viable way to participate nor a method to be heard. They seem much less to 
associate democracy with participation by autonomous free-standing individuals. Japan is 
formally  a  liberal  democracy,  and  institutionally  citizens'  rights  and  freedom  are 
guaranteed at a historically unprecedented level. Nonetheless, culturally, the individual is 
bound up  with  emotionally  and  structurally  intertwined social  norms  and connections. 
Conformism seems to be still an embedded custom at work, where individuals often seek 
acceptance by socially collective contexts as a means for self-actualisation. In some way, 
however, there is dynamism and ordered security, which the people are enjoying. In such a 
society, constant self-assertion, public claims and fair logical debates by independent and 
autonomous individuals may be seen at odds by many, let alone civic protest.
Britain seems to share similar qualities with America in that there is a respect for 
individual liberty, although they differ in details. The inclination to moderate protest is 
relatively  high.  There  seems to  be  a  common norm that  individuals  should be  treated 
equally, and their rights and autonomy should be respected. If this should be violated, there 
would be often a reaction of protest. On the other hand, comparatively, Britain is different 
in that its values do not necessarily as fully emphasise individualism as in the USA. There 
are more elements of consensus and ambiguity.39 This emerges as less clarity and weaker 
38 See, for instance, discussions on Japanese attitudes on authority in the sixth chapter as well as the results 
of multivariate analysis in eighth chapter.
39 This may be perceived as softening social relationship and communication with a flexibility of situational 
discretion. Sato mentions that British people tend to use more equivocal and indirect expressions in 
communication than American people do. See Sato, Yoshiko, Igirisu no Iiko Nihon no Iiko – Jiko-Shucho 
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persistence  in  explicit  public  debates  on  normal  occasions.  Their  values  are  liberal 
democratic, but also allow communicative ambiguity. In political terms, the people would 
conduct public debates and resort to protest according to necessity. However, on a regular 
basis, they seem to stay discreet and react in accordance with certain principles.40 Their 
society is working with moderate but constant cognitive pressure by the public towards 
government,  which  is  virtually  functioning  as  an  invisible  and  informal  'checks  and 
balances'  system of  democracy.  This  at  times emerges  as  civic  protest,  if  regarded as 
necessary by the citizens. Such may be a quality that Maruyama acknowledges at a certain 
point of British history.41 The quality seems to have become prevalent in modern Britain as 
a whole and perhaps across Western societies.42
Russian perceptions and  behaviour in relation to democracy seem to be different 
especially as compared with their Western counterparts. As argued previously, the Russian 
emphasis on freedom seems to hold a politically passive rather than proactive orientation, 
despite their general appreciation of freedom. This may be much less related to the sense 
of participation and contestation than the way the American (or Western) populace often 
conceive. It suggests a potential lack of strength in the society to constantly check the state 
of governmental responsiveness. As for the Postmaterialist values items, there is a relative 
appreciation  of  'giving  people  more  say  in  important  government  decisions',  which  is 
higher than that of 'protecting freedom of speech'. Nonetheless, this does not sufficiently 
guarantee the stronger awareness of participation. The orientation to 'more say' could be 
subject to not only Postmaterialist shift but also circumstantial changes. Thus, the degree 
of the emphasis on their voices to be heard may vary, depending on the conditions of the 
economy,  social  order  or  other  immediate  environments.  'More  say'  especially  in  the 
to Gaman no Kyoiku-gaku [A Good Child in Britain, A Good Child in Japan – Study of Education on 
Self-Expression and Patience] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shin-sha, 2001).
40 In a similar vein, according to Marsh, whereas British citizens are known for the quality of deference in 
their political culture, they in fact hold protest orientations. See Marsh, Alan, Protest and Political  
Consciousness (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1977), ch. 2, pp. 29-54. Lipset suggests that, 
comparatively, British culture holds more sense of deference with a certain hierarchical connotation than 
American one. See Lipset, Seymour Martin, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 213-224.
41 Maruyama, Masao 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme', in M. Jansen 
ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization (Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1965), pp. 489-531.
42 For instance, anti-war protest movements in 2003 were the most prominently observed across Europe 
among its worldwide examples.
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Russian case has a notional leeway where Materialist considerations could intervene. 
Moreover,  protest  in  the Russian sense may be qualitatively different  from civic 
protest.  In  Russia,  should  there  be  popular  demands on  political  authority,  the  causes 
would tend to be pragmatic necessity rather than abstract liberal democratic rationales.43 
Such needs are often based on circumstantial conditions, which are subject to change. The 
changeability of the motives for the demands would indicate the lack of consistency in 
political behaviour. There might hardly be constant and unidirectional popular cognitive 
pressure in a manner to develop governmental responsiveness and accountability. To be 
fair,  there  could  be  political  activism and protest  for  demanding democratic  practices. 
Nonetheless,  besides  the  direct  motives,  the  causes  could  be  rooted  in  the  relatively 
unstable state of the individual. In quality, the individual may be prone to the impulse of 
the mobilisation to political activism due to a chronic state of material and psychological 
insecurity.  In  Maruyama's  terms,  there  could  be  a  certain  presence  of  'atomised' 
individuals.44 Inglehart  and Klingemann  point  out  the  notably  low degrees  of  Russian 
subjective  well-being.45 As  shown in  the  seventh  chapter,  Russian  respondents  hold  a 
relative  inclination  to  'lawful  demonstration'  whereas  their  emphasis  on  'petition'  is 
comparatively  low  among  the  four  societies.  Also,  there  seems  to  be  comparative 
instability in the state of protest. Thus, the underlying factors of political activism may rest 
on  the  precarious  conditions of  individuality,  transcending respective  issues.  In  fact, 
although there  are  occasional  reports  of  protest  actions  in  Russia,  the  types  of  claims 
considerably  vary  including  economic  demands,  democratic  rallies  and  nationalist 
movements.46 This could be different, in its major tendency, from civic protest in the West 
where popular demands often entail a relatively coherent liberal democratic direction with 
stability and moderation.
Meanwhile,  cultural  and  historical  experience  could  be  affecting  their  particular 
43 See arguments in the seventh and eighth chapters.
44 Maruyama suggests possibility that 'atomised' type of individuals could turn into 'democratic' individuals. 
For the explanation of the types of individuals, see Maruyama, 'Patterns of Individuation and the Case of 
Japan: A Conceptual Scheme'.
45 Inglehart, Ronald and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness', in Ed 
Diener and E. M. Suh eds., Subjective Well-being Across Cultures (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 
pp. 165-183.
46 For reports on protest movements in Russia, for example, see RFE/RL, 13 April 1995; RFE/RL, 16 July 
1997; RFE/RL, 7 March 2006; RFE/RL, 8 April 2006; RFE/RL 3 November 2006; RFE/RL, 4 November 
2006; 18 December 2006; RFE/RL, 7 April 2007; RFE/RL, 21 May 2007.
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features.  There have been arguments  on the possibility  that  the communist  totalitarian 
heritage  has been obstructive  to  the  emergence  of  liberal  values and  civil  society 
comparable to ones in  the  West.47 There are also views that Russia holds a historically 
embedded proneness to an authoritarian legacy, which is often depicted as the dominance 
of a central figure at the top of the state.48 In fact, the recent Russian system constitutes 
firmly centralised power held by a presidency with popular support.49 There seem to be 
deep-rooted patterns in Russian political culture, which have been engraved through a long 
historical process. This might run counter to 'democratisation' in Western terms.50 
9.5.3 Individualism versus trust
As argued so far, there seem to be positive democratic efficacies owing to an emphasis on 
particular freedom in Western societies. Nonetheless, is it fair to state that Western post-
industrial  societies  hold exclusively ideal  values  conditions  for  democracy?  The USA, 
Britain  and  probably  other  Western  societies  seem  to  have  advantageous  traits  for 
underpinning  responsive  democracy.  Their  attitudinal  conditions,  however,  might  have 
counter-productive effects.
47 For instance, see Nodia, Ghia, 'How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?', in L. Diamond and M. 
Plattner eds., Democracy after Communism (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 
pp. 3-17; Smolar, Aleksander, 'Civic Society after Communism', in ibid. For a concise discussion on 
Russian civil society, see Evans, Alfred B., Jr, 'A Russian Civil Society?' in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman 
and Richard Sakwa eds., in Developments in Russian Politics 6 (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), ch. 6, pp. 96-113; Linz and Stepan made several remarks on civil society in 
comparative perspective of democratisation. See Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, Problems of  
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist  
Europe (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
48 See, for example, White, Stephen, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1979). For Russian leadership, see Breslauer, Geroge W., 'Boris Yeltsin as Patriarch', 
Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, Archie Brown ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 70-81; Huskey, Eugene, 'Overcoming the Yeltsin Legacy: Vladimir Putin and Russian Political 
Reform', in ibid, pp. 82-96; Shevtsova, Lilia, 'Power and Leadership in Putin's Russia', in Andrew C. 
Kuchins ed., Russia after the Fall (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2002), pp. 62-78; Shevtsova, Lilia, Putin's Russia, [translated by Antonina W. Bouis] (Washington: D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
49 For Russian presidency, see White, Stephen, 'Presidential Government', in Russia's New Politics: the 
Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3, pp. 70-
106; Willerton, John P., 'Putin and the Hegemonic Presidency', in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and 
Richard Sakwa eds., Developments in Russian Politics 6 (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), ch. 2, pp. 18-39; Waller, Michael, 'The Presidency', in Russian Politics Today: The Return of A 
Tradition (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 23-47. 
50 See White, Russia's New Politics, ch. 8, pp. 255-292.
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Individualism and the West
Numerous scholars have observed a distinctive emphasis on the individual in the West. 
Non-Western theorists often note that the esteem for freedom and individuals is a key 
Western value, which in turn is related to liberal democracy.51 Huntington points out that 
central  attributes  in  Western  civilization  include  the  heritages  of  individualism,  social 
pluralism, representative bodies and so forth.52 Bova refers to Western traits including the 
emphasis on individuals, civil liberty, contestation and participation, for the comparative 
evaluation of Russian political culture.53 Scholars of 'Asian values' such as Pye notice the 
difference in the perceptions of individuality and the degrees of emphasis on the individual 
between  the  West  and  Asia.54 Through  quantitative  comparison  on  cultures,  Hofstede 
shows that Western societies generally have higher scores for his individualism index in 
comparison with others.55 On the other hand, other theorists claim that Postmaterialist and 
self-expression values have been rising as an outcome of a values shift in post-industrial 
societies (which mainly overlap with the West).56 Inglehart and Welzel argue that such a 
transformation is a process of human development with universal connotation.57 They write 
that such a process largely promotes and emancipates individual autonomy and freedom, 
which in effect contributes to the emergence and enhancement of liberal democracy.58 At 
any  rate,  no  matter  whether  it  is  a  consequence  of  a  Western  heritage  or  values 
transformation,  the  emphasis  on  individualism would  be  a  feature  of  current Western 
societies, which may not be shared by societies in other cultural zones.
51 For instance, see Bell and Jayasuriya, 'Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework'; Parekh 'The 
Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy'.
52 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 69-72.
53 Bova, Russell, 'Democracy and Russian Political Culture', in Russell Bova ed., Russia and Western 
Civilization: Cultural and Historical Encounters (Armonk, NY/London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 243-
276.
54 Pye with Pye, Asian Power and Politics.
55 Hofstede, Geert, Culture's Consequences, ch. 5, pp. 209-278, esp. 215.
56 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization; Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and 
Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York: Chatham House Publishers of 
Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 2002), ch.5, pp. 77-96.
57 Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: 
A Cross-Cultural Analysis', European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003), pp. 341-379.
58 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy; Welzel, Christian and Ronald 
Inglehart, 'Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom: The Human Development 
Perspective', International Review of Sociology (January 2005). Also in similar contexts, see Inglehart 
and Welzel, 'Political Culture and Democracy'; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, 'Political Culture 
and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages', Comparative Politics, 36, 1 (October 2003), pp. 61-
79.
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The USA: individualism versus trust
As for political culture of individualism, the USA is often quoted as an exemplar. Lipset 
argues an American 'exceptionalism', which attaches special importance to individuals.59 A 
similar view on America in comparison with Western Europe is found in the discourse of 
Fuchs and  Klingemann.60 Putnam argues a 'bowling alone' where individuals have been 
becoming solitary beings, which has led to increasing social and political disengagement.61 
Inglehart contends on this view that the phenomenon is simply a shift to new patterns of 
participation with more humane, free and self-autonomous outlooks as a part of the human 
development process.62 At any rate, there seems to be an embedded individual orientation, 
which has been and is still being furthered in American society.63 
In a society where individualism predominates, there is a  certain distance between 
people  in  order  to  secure  personal  autonomy.  Individuals  tend  to  hold  separate  self-
contained ideas and systems in each of their own views. The emphasis on the individual, 
however, may have a side effect of reducing the sense of 'trust', which is another crucial 
element for democratic performance. In America, the ideas of freedom and free market are 
prevalent,  which  encourages  competition  as  a  societal  trend.  Where  competitions  are 
norms, a clear perception of individuals as solitary beings can enhance the tendency of 
59 Lipset, American Exceptionalism.
60 Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison 
between East and West', Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, in Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka eds. (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 25-66.
61 Putnam, Robert D, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York/London: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Putnam, Robert D., 'Civic Disengagement in Contemporary 
America', Government and Opposition, 36: 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 135-156.
62 According to Inglehart's theory, the process includes a rising tide of (moderate) protest behaviour as an 
'elite-challenging' form of participation, instead of 'elite-directed' conventional patterns. See, for instance, 
Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 5, pp. 115-134; Dalton, 
Citizen Politics, ch.4, pp. 58-74; Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, pp. 307-315. Also, 
Inglehart presented a linkage between Postmaterialist values and protest potential. See Inglehart, Ronald, 
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 314-
318.
63 In my view, this is a part of on-going individualisation, which has been occurring throughout especially 
since the society began to engage in a modernisation process. The flourishing social associations and 
civic participations in America around the third quarter of the last century might have been a response to 
increasing individualisation, which had become no longer compatible with traditional sense of local 
community ties. Subsequently, the current trend towards social disengagement would be the extension of 
the on-going process. These types of social associations probably have been becoming incompatible with 
more strengthened version of individualism. In this respect, Inglehart would be right, since he grasps the 
trend in the context of value transformation. For the conditions of social associations and civic 
participations in the USA, see especially the time series figures in Putnam, Bowling Alone.
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utilitarian  social  relations.  The  merit  and  utility  of  the  individual  become  of  prior 
importance rather than coordinated reliance and empathetical cooperation. Nonetheless, if 
separate  plural  gains  are  sought  by  clearly  differentiated  actors  emphatically,  people's 
interests might have more potential to face off one another. Lipset point to the litigiousness 
in American culture.64 This may derive from an enhanced view of individuality, which 
draws clear lines between self and others in perception.65 If a given social relationship 
becomes  seriously  intensified,  there  would  be  more  likelihood  of  discord  than  other 
cultural  scenarios where a view of dependency and consensus is prevalent.  These may 
have the possibility to affect the general  state of interpersonal trust.  A strong sense of 
individuality may not be advantageous for conditions of trust. 
The concept of 'social capital'  presented by Putnam may be a response to such a 
situation. In political terms, according to the concept, democracy is not able to function 
fully without an element of trust. The view incorporates facets of human inter-relations. 
Accordingly, there have been discussions that trust or social capital would be a crucial 
factor for the stable and effective performance of democracy.66 Inglehart pointed out that 
despite  the  presence  of  democratic  institutions  in  the  USA  throughout  the  twentieth 
century, interpersonal trust among the populace decreased noticeably.67 
Trust and Asian values
Meanwhile,  according to Inglehart's  data output, West European societies tend to have 
64 Lipset, American Exceptionalism.
65 Additionally, in my view, there would be compatibility or perhaps association between individualism and 
the commitment to the rule of law. Clear perception of the individual allows ones to see themselves as 
comparable beings regardless of social attributes. The law is a source or viable instrument for impartial 
judgment on fair ground. Moreover, this impartiality of the law and a view to see people as equal 
existence share an identical quality in that both use abstracted concept of 'individuals' (which can 
notionally exclude other details of attributes such as characters, genders, social standing and so forth for a 
given specific purpose). This element, the function of abstraction, seems to strongly underlie American 
(and perhaps Western) liberal democracy.
66 For instance, see Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, ch. 6, pp. 160-215; Inglehart, Ronald, 
'Trust, Well-being and Democracy', Democracy and Trust, in Mark Warren ed. (New York/Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-120; Inglehart, Ronald, 'How Solid is Mass Support for 
Democracy - And How Can We Measure it?', PS (January 2003), pp. 51-57; Inglehart and Welzel, 
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, ch. 11, pp. 245-271; Fukuyama, Francis, 'Social 
Capital', in Harrison and Huntington eds., Culture Matters, pp. 99-111; Norris, Pippa, 'Social Capital and 
Civil Society', in Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism, (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 137-167; Putnam, Robert D., Making Democracy Work: Civic  
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
67 Inglehart, 'Trust, Well-being and Democracy', p. 88.
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relatively high levels  of  interpersonal  trust.68 Does this  mean that  their  traditions  hold 
relatively  substantial  elements  of  trust?  This  would  be  partly  the  case,  since  West 
European traits include a communitarian orientation.69 Nonetheless, the higher sense of 
trust could be due to economic well-being, since interpersonal trust and GNP per capita 
visibly show correlation.70 Trust in Western Europe may be dependent on economic level 
at some point. 
In contrast, there is another cultural zone that seems to have a constantly high level 
of trust  regardless of economic levels, which is an area that encompasses East Asia and 
India.71 Does this imply the validity of 'Asian values' in the matter of trust? The argument 
of  'Asian  values'  often  emphasises  the  values  of  interdependence  or  dependency.72 
Culturally, their version of trust could involve personal interrelations often at an emotional 
level. Borders between individuals are likely to be ambiguous with an element of empathy. 
On the other hand, trust in the West tends to be a bridge between autonomous persons, so 
that the solitude of the individual is held as its basis. In the Asian view, there may be an 
inherent  limitation in  Western trust,  since there are certain borders  between individual 
beings, which one could not go across, preventing reliance on each other. From a Western 
perspective,  the  attitude  of  Asian  dependency  may  be  translated  as  having  a  risk  of 
interference in individual autonomy as well as proneness to conformism and collectivism. 
Nonetheless, trust, social capital and social engagement often entail interpersonal elements 
and belonging to some social contexts. Strong persistence in freedom and individualism 
could have characters that run counter to these. To be fair, nonetheless, the points of both 
arguments could be relative. Since a subjective emphasis on one side of the dichotomy 
(viz.,  freedom versus  trust)  may underestimate  the other  side's  efficacy,  there  is  more 
likelihood to perceive risks on the opposite side. At any rate, it would be at least plausible 
that some elements of Asian culture can have positive and independent effects on trust and 
68 Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 36.
69 For instance, see Fuchs and Klingemann, 'Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison between 
East and West'.
70 Inglehart and Baker, 'Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values', p. 36.
71 See Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', p. 89-91. According to Inglehart's figure on trust, for China and 
India, their levels of interpersonal trust are as high as West European counterparts, despite their small 
figures of GNP per capita. Taiwan and South Korea are economically intermediate in the figure, but with 
comparable level of trust. Likewise, Japan is at a similar level.
72 For instance, see Pye with Pye, Asian Power and Politics. Also, for a related issue, see Hofstede, Geert, 
'A European in Asia', Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 10: 1 (2007), pp. 16-21.
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probably social capital that are conducive to democratic performance.73 In the meantime, 
based on the figure, Inglehart notes, '[a] heritage of communist rule also seems to have an 
impact on this variable, with virtually all ex-communist societies ranking relatively low.'74
Thus, whereas American society may have merit in some spheres of democracy such 
as governmental responsiveness, it is not necessarily an all-around ideal to others. Rather, 
their  emphasis  on  individualism  may  hold  a  potential  disadvantage  in  terms  of  trust. 
Culturally embedded particularity in Asia seems to have a possible advantage in the area of 
trust  and social  capital.  The Postcommunist  experience,  however,  does not seem to be 
favourable to either.
9.5.4 Western Europe: the state of achievement values
As discussed so far, in Britain and Western Europe, there seems to be a more moderate 
emphasis on individuals and freedom than in America. There is a relatively substantial 
indication of trust in their societies. The ideas of civil society, the rule of law, respect for 
reason and spontaneous participation appear to be broadly shared in this  region.  Their 
social  democratic  traditions  involve  an  emphasis  on  care  for  popular  welfare  by  the 
government.  Do  West  European  values  have  ideal  conditions?  Despite  these  positive 
components for democracy, there might be attributes that would present a certain weakness 
in economic terms.
If their current values orientation is explained in the context of Inglehart's thesis on 
value shift, economically developed West European societies have entered the phase of 
post-modernisation  where  self-expression  and  Postmaterialist  orientations  increasingly 
predominate. This denotes a transition from the emphasis on achievement values towards 
73 Nonetheless, there have been debates whether the 'Asian values' could be an excuse of authoritarian rule 
or cultural consequence that provides benefits to the populace in unique manners. On Asian values, see, 
for instance, Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya and Jones eds., Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia; 
Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner eds., Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 3-54; Thompson, Mark R., 'Whatever Happened to "Asian Values"?', 
Journal of Democracy, 12: 4 (October 2001), pp. 154-165. For a concise summary of the argument, see 
Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 6th ed. 
(Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 48, 57.
74 Inglehart, 'Culture and Democracy', p. 90. For the state of social capital in Russia, see Rose, Richard, 
'Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-modern, and Anti-modern', Post-Soviet Affairs, 16 (2000), 
pp. 33-57; Twigg, Judyth L., and Kate Schecter, eds., Social Capital and Social Cohesion in Post-Soviet  
Russia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
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the quality of  life.75 On the one hand,  this may contribute to democratic  attitudes and 
outcomes,  as  mentioned  above.  Also,  some  theorists  point  out  that  the  people  are 
increasingly  critical  of  government  and  more  distrustful  of  authority  in  Western  post-
industrial societies.76 This orientation could function as a greater sense of equality and an 
attitudinal checking system on the political authorities. 
On the other hand, from an economic point of view, the European values shift that 
has been occurring over the last several decades may have a drawback. For the values 
transformation virtually indicates the decline of Materialist and achievement values, which 
could have been a source of competitiveness.77 In fact, it has been quite a while since the 
European economy and perhaps  societies  as  a  whole have  somehow lost  their  vigour. 
According to the 1999-2002 World Values Survey, among the 'qualities that children can 
be encouraged to learn at home', the percentage of respondents who chose 'hard work' is 
clearly  polarised between West  European and Postcommunist  societies.  Whereas  West 
European  societies  cluster  together  in  the  lower  half  of  the  world  ranking,  the 
Postcommunist societies concentrate in the upper half. As for the percentage of those who 
reported work as 'very important', on average West European respondents tend to have a 
weaker  emphasis  than those  in  the Postcommunist  societies.  With the  adoption  of  the 
Lisbon Strategy in March 2000, the European Union started promoting various attempts to 
boost the economic capability of Europe, aiming at 'the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world'.78 Nonetheless, it is possible that  the attitudinal 
weakness in achievement motives would not function in  favour of this kind of growth. 
Without  popular  attitudes  to  sustain  momentum,  policy  arrangements  for  economic 
strength  may  lack  some  of  its  substance.  In  the  meantime,  although  Postcommunist 
75 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization.
76 For related discussions, see for instance, Dalton, Citizen Politics, 3rd ed., ch.12, pp. 235-257; Inglehart, 
Ronald, 'Post-materialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority', in Why People Don't Trust  
government, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King (Cambridge, Mass./London: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 217-236; Pippa Norris ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for  
Democratic Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
77 For instance, Granato, Inglehart and Leblang empirically show that achievement motivation is conducive 
to economic growth in addition to the effects of other factors. Granato, Jim, Ronald Inglehart, and David 
Leblang, 'The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some 
Empirical Tests', American Journal of Political Science, 40: 3 (August 1996), pp. 607-631.
78 For the European Union's official summary on the Lisbon Strategy, see 
[http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/lisbon_strategy_en.htm]. For key documents on the Lisbon Strategy, 
see [http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/key/index_en.htm].
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countries  are  still  economically  less  advanced,  the  people  appear  to  have  a  stronger 
orientation towards Materialist  and achievement values. At least  in the sense of public 
attitudes,  they  may  be  advantageous  for  invigorating  economic  and  social  dynamism. 
Thus,  whereas  the  values  conditions  in  Western  Europe  would  be  conducive  to  the 
society's  democratic  practice,  there  may  be  a  potential  lack  of  strength  for  further 
economic growth. 
9.6 Conclusion
This concluding chapter has drawn together the findings and arguments in  the present 
research in a manner to converge on our two major themes: (1) values shift versus cultural 
particularity and (2) values and democracy. Based on the findings, attention is focused on 
the issues of freedom and individuality, which have had substantial importance across this 
study. 
In the context of the first theme, freedom was acknowledged as a crucial element in 
the issue of values shift versus cultural particularism. It was discussed that the attitudinal 
conditions on liberty could be strongly affected by national and regional particularities. 
Especially, an emphasis on a particular kind of freedom is prevalent in Western societies, 
which is not necessarily the case in non-Western contexts such as Postcommunist and East 
Asian societies. This type of freedom involves the ideals of cognitive autonomy of the 
individual and spontaneous participation in society. Popular emphasis on this freedom may 
not automatically be increased by economic development and values shift effect due to the 
hindering effects of cultural particularity in non-Western nations. 
As for the second theme of values and democracy, gaps in the views and conditions 
of individuality seem to considerably affect their national variations in political areas. The 
presence and degrees of individualism is related to people's inclination to public demands. 
The USA is the foremost in this term among the four societies. Britain is the second with 
moderation. Japan is the opposite in that they hold weakness or ambiguity in individuality 
and  open  contestation,  which  are  related  to  their  proneness  to  conformism.  Russian 
freedom  and  individuality  could  be  distinct  with  a  connotation  of  political  passivity. 
Probably  due  to  their  general  orientation  towards  Materialist  attitudes,  their  public 
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demands  would  be  primarily  concerned  with  pragmatic  motives  rather  than  (liberal) 
democratic ones. Together with other factors, the state of Russian popular attitudes may 
not effectively function for the unidirectional development of responsive democracy with 
public accountability. Hence, the conditions of freedom and responsive democracy would 
be  susceptible  to  cultural  factors.  As  another  issue,  it  was  discussed  that  the  cultural 
scenario of individualism could be disadvantageous to the conditions of trust in society. 
This could be especially the case with the USA where individualism is salient. Culturally, 
Asian societies may be well-placed for the embedded presence and functioning of trust. 
The Postcommunist experience seems to be unfavourable in this respect. West European 
nations hold a positive state of values in both freedom and trust. Their attitudinal stances, 
however, may have a weakness in achievement values and thus economic dynamism. 
Albeit  invisible,  the people's  outlooks can make a  difference to  the function and 
quality  of  democracy.  Especially,  as  we  have  shown,  the  issues  of  freedom  and 
individuality hold important implications for them. Whereas the tangible indications of 
attitudinal and behavioural characters would be observed in nationally collective terms, 
these  at  any  rate  derive  from the  individual,  which  is  the  basic  unit  of  society.  The 
perception and state of the individual therefore can be crucial for political outcomes and 
customs on democracy, if certain characteristics of individuality are shared to some extent 
in a society. Not least, these would constitute what we call the political culture of a nation. 
They might be affected by the effect of the values shift. Nonetheless, their states are often 
rooted  in  embedded  cultural  and  historical  experiences,  which  can  hold  an  enduring 
strength of continuity. At least, their presence can have considerable influence on the path 
of values transformation. 
Culture matters to values and democracy. It exercises a substantial influence over 
people's attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. Culture competes with and, in some areas, 
surpasses the effect of economic development and values shift. Our study has paid special 
attention to the dichotomous factors in the context of the Postmaterialist thesis. Despite 
some limitations in the paradigm, the two factors would constitute crucial contexts across 
nations.  With  their  dynamism,  societies  could  develop  various  consequences  and 
characters. Nonetheless, people may not necessarily be passively prone to these effects. 
There could still be a chance that they could intentionally influence the direction of their 
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outlooks and societies. For the human being has a subjective existence with the capacity of 
leading life. We should always keep this in mind and be open to such possibility.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: 
The results of World Values Survey 1999-2002 for 'Chapter 6: Freedom'
Order vs. freedom (%)
Maintain order Respect freedom
Russia 52.1% 47.9%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
Note:  In the World Values Survey 1999-2002,  Russian data is available for 'order vs.  freedom' whereas 
British, American and Japanese data for it are not available. 
Postmaterialist four-item index: first choice and second choice
Russia Order More Say Prices Free Speech Total
PM First Choice 56.4% 18.7% 23.6% 1.3% 100.0%
PM Second Choice 27.6% 24.0% 43.1% 5.3% 100.0%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
Correlation: 'order vs. freedom' with 'free speech'
Russia  Order vs. Free Speech
Order vs. Freedom
Correlation Coefficient 
(Spearman's rho) .120**
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000
 N 1283
**: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Note: 
(1) Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the above is: 0.132** (N = 1259).
(2) British, American, Russian and Japanese data for (Postmaterialist) 'free speech' four-rank measurement 
are not available.
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
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Order vs. freedom (%): three regions
 Order vs. Freedom Total
Maintain 
Order
Respect
Freedom
Postcommunist Russia (1999-2000) 52.1% 47.9% 100.0%
Belarus (1999-2000) 66.5% 33.5% 100.0%
Ukraine (1999-2000) 49.6% 50.4% 100.0%
Lithuania (1999-2000) 65.5% 34.5% 100.0%
Czech Republic (1999-2000) 82.1% 17.9% 100.0%
Slovenia (1999-2000) 62.8% 37.2% 100.0%
Georgia (1995-7) 51.4% 48.6% 100.0%
Azerbaijan (1995-7) 89.5% 10.5% 100.0%
Armenia  (1995-7) 47.8% 52.2% 100.0%
West Iceland (1999-2000) 57.9% 42.1% 100.0%
Spain (1999-2000) 46.6% 53.4% 100.0%
Australia (1995-7) 51.3% 48.7% 100.0%
 New Zealand (1995-7) 61.6% 38.4% 100.0%
 Norway (1995-7) 72.3% 27.7% 100.0%
Switzerland (1995-7) 53.0% 47.0% 100.0%
 
East Asia Taiwan (1995-7) 90.0% 10.0% 100.0%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002. 
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Percentages (A) 'order vs. freedom' by PM four-item index (first choice)
Russia 
1999-2002 Order vs. Freedom
 Order Freedom Total
First Choice Order 58.7% 41.3% 100.0%
 More say 35.2% 64.8% 100.0%
 Prices 53.0% 47.0% 100.0%
 Free speech 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
Percentages (B): PM four-item index (first choice) by 'order vs. freedom'
Russia  1999-2002 PM First Choice
Order More say Prices Free speech Total
Order vs. Freedom Order 63.1% 12.8% 23.8% .3% 100.0%
Freedom 48.8% 25.8% 23.2% 2.2% 100.0%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
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Three regions: freedom (in 'order vs. freedom') and free speech (%) 
(in disaggregate measure of four-item Postmaterialist index)
Country/Region
Order vs. 
Freedom: 
Freedom %
Free Speech: 
1st Choice %
Free Speech: 
2nd Choice %
Postcommunist Russia (1999-2000) 47.9% 1.3% 5.3%
Belarus (1999-2000) 33.5% 5.3% 11.7%
Ukraine (1999-2000) 50.4% 1.9% 9.6%
Lithuania (1999-2000) 34.5% 3.9% 12.5%
Czech Republic (1999-2000) 17.9% 7.9% 19.8%
Slovenia (1999-2000) 37.2% 9.7% 25.8%
Georgia (1995-7) 48.6% 5.6% 21.8%
Azerbaijan (1995-7) 10.5% 2.2% 13.2%
Armenia  (1995-7) 52.2% 8.4% 18.3%
West Iceland (1999-2000) 42.1% 9.4% 25.9%
Spain (1999-2000) 53.4% 17.7% 27.3%
Australia (1995-7) 48.7% 26.1% 34.1%
 New Zealand (1995-7) 38.4% 14.1% 29.4%
 Norway (1995-7) 27.7% 16.1% 36.9%
Switzerland (1995-7) 47.0% 33.8% 30.8%
 
East Asia Taiwan (1995-7) 10.0% 6.4% 15.5%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
Note: It should be noted that, for some countries that were not surveyed in the fourth wave, the data of the 
third wave are included in the World Values Survey 1999-2002 dataset. See European Values Study Group 
and World Values Survey Association, 'User Guide and Codebook', European and World Values Surveys 
Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I (Second ICPSR Version), August 2004.
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Three regions: order and free speech (%) 
in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index - (I)
 
Order:
First choice
Free speech:
First choice
Order:
Second choice
Free speech:
Second choice
Postcommunist
Albania 70.1% 6.6% 17.6% 23.0%
Azerbaijan 74.2% 2.2% 13.5% 13.2%
Armenia 61.2% 8.4% 22.1% 18.3%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 71.0% 3.9% 14.0% 21.9%
Bulgaria 75.9% 5.9% 15.4% 21.7%
Belarus 56.1% 5.3% 24.8% 11.7%
Croatia 27.8% 9.1% 21.4% 24.0%
Czech Republic 55.7% 7.9% 23.0% 19.8%
Estonia 57.2% 1.8% 24.3% 11.1%
Georgia 65.3% 5.6% 18.6% 21.8%
Hungary 52.5% 1.9% 26.3% 8.3%
Latvia 53.7% 4.4% 26.0% 13.9%
Lithuania 24.1% 3.9% 26.8% 12.5%
Republic of Moldova 62.7% 2.9% 20.3% 21.1%
Poland 40.4% 4.4% 28.8% 13.5%
Romania 49.2% 8.1% 25.8% 16.8%
Russian Federation 56.4% 1.3% 27.6% 5.3%
Slovakia 48.1% 3.7% 32.7% 12.3%
Slovenia 41.8% 9.7% 25.7% 25.8%
Ukraine 54.6% 1.9% 26.5% 9.6%
Republic of Macedonia 76.6% 4.3% 12.3% 22.3%
Serbia 49.3% 6.5% 26.5% 17.4%
Montenegro 53.9% 5.8% 17.4% 19.8%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
280
Three regions: order and free speech (%) 
in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index - (II)
Order:
First choice
Free speech:
First choice
Order:
Second choice
Free speech:
Second choice
West
Australia 22.9% 26.1% 21.8% 34.1%
Austria 36.0% 24.3% 22.9% 40.1%
Belgium 38.3% 20.0% 24.5% 32.5%
Canada 22.2% 22.1% 17.3% 30.4%
Denmark 58.5% 22.1% 23.2% 41.1%
Finland 52.2% 10.8% 24.9% 27.7%
France 43.1% 14.4% 18.8% 31.4%
Germany 42.2% 9.5% 23.2% 24.1%
Greece 39.6% 9.2% 20.6% 22.8%
Iceland 56.6% 9.4% 24.7% 25.9%
Ireland 37.2% 8.4% 20.7% 25.9%
Italy 32.1% 16.9% 19.9% 32.3%
Luxembourg 45.2% 13.8% 20.9% 28.3%
Malta 32.7% 8.5% 31.4% 19.9%
Netherlands 40.5% 36.7% 29.8% 34.3%
New Zealand 33.2% 14.1% 20.2% 29.4%
Norway 66.3% 16.1% 18.7% 36.9%
Spain 36.2% 17.7% 21.7% 27.3%
Sweden 44.8% 20.1% 27.0% 31.1%
Switzerland 31.9% 33.8% 23.8% 30.8%
United States of 
America 32.6% 25.4% 23.9% 29.1%
Northern Ireland 40.5% 10.6% 21.2% 27.8%
Portugal 33.0% 9.2% 27.7% 16.9%
East Asia
China 56.9% 5.0% 24.6% 12.8%
Japan 33.5% 4.8% 27.5% 14.6%
Republic of Korea 42.5% 4.3% 33.4% 10.8%
Taiwan 68.7% 6.4% 18.3% 15.5%
(Singapore) 68.1% 4.6% 17.9% 13.5%
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
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Three regions: free speech and order (%)  
(in disaggregate measures of four-item Postmaterialist index) 
P = Postcommunist societies; W = Western societies; E = East Asian societies
Source: World Values Survey 1999-2002.
Note: For the convenience of comparison, it should be noted the presented visual range of 'order 2nd choice' 
axis in an output presented in Chapter 6 is from 0 to 80, whereas that of the above graph is from 10 to 35. 
With this, it is observed that these outputs share similarity in the distribution of three regions. 
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Appendix 2: 
Further defence of a quantitative approach 
(A supplementary argument to Chapter 2)
As for the validity of quantitative methods, one may criticise the simplicity and rigidity of 
quantitative  variables  as  incapable  of  measuring  concepts  correctly.  Moreover,  the 
divergence of societies, cultures and individuals would not allow such measurement to be 
pertinent, being unable to 'travel' across the difference. This is not necessarily the case. 
First of all, there are a number of carefully developed methods for reducing such 
problems while creating potent variables on the basis of survey data.1 For instance, there 
are notions of reliability and validity, which are related to how adequately a given variable 
taps what is to be measured.2 Various methods are available to explore these qualities.3 
Factor analysis enables a researcher to check to what extent a given set of variables share a 
homogeneous  conceptual  direction  in  respective  societies.4 It  allows  to  see  if  these 
variables have similar connotations across different societies. A Likert scale is a method 
that constructs an effective measurement that covers multiple facets of a single concept by 
aggregating plural question items.5 This can increase the generality of the concept, which 
1 For the construction of variables, see de Vaus, D. A., Surveys in Social Research, 4th ed. (London: UCL 
Press, 1996), pp. 233-275; de Vaus, David, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 147-199; de Vaus, David, Analyzing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis 
(London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 1-146.
2 For the reliability and validity, see Moore, David S., Statistics: Concepts and Controversies, 5th ed. (New 
York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 2001), pp. 130-140; de Vaus, Analyzing Social Science Data, pp. 
25-27.
3 For example, see de Vaus, Analyzing Social Science Data, pp. 17-32. However, de Vaus suggests that 
there is no absolute solution to establish unequivocal evidence of validity especially in the realm of social 
sciences, partly due to the abstract nature of concepts used. He writes, '[v]alidity has to be argued for: it is 
not proven'. See ibid., p. 27.
4 The method can also examine conceptual locations of respective variables while being capable of 
generating a factor scale. For factor analysis (and principal component analysis), see Bryman, Alan and 
Duncan Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for Windows: A Guide for Social  
Scientists (London/NY: Routledge, 1999), pp. 271-285; Tabachnick, Barbara G., and Linda S. Fidell, 
Using Multivariate Statistics, 4th ed. (Boston/London: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), pp. 582-652; de Vaus, 
Analyzing Social Science Data, pp. 134-146, 384-385; Field, Andy, Discovering Statistics Using SPSS, 
2nd ed. (London/Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 619-680; Norušis, Marija J., SPSS® 13.0 
Statistical Procedures Companion (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), pp. 393-430.
5 This makes possible to create a comprehensive variable for one concept while retaining the functionality 
of simple question items for data collections. For Likert scales, see de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 
4th ed., pp. 88, 252-257; Bryman and Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS Release 8 for  
Windows, pp. 56-57; de Vaus, Surveys in Social Research, 5th ed., pp. 102, 181-186; de Vaus, Analyzing 
Social Science Data, pp. 122-133.
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enhances  its relevance to divergent societies.  Moreover, these methods are conducted by 
using data of research object. The applicability of variables is secured at any rate, since the 
aim of the above methods per se is to screen out and construct applicable variables to the 
data and therefore to societies to be examined.
Secondly, it is implausible that well-coordinated survey data is incapable of tapping 
popular  attitudes  simply because of  cultural  and social  differences.  The World Values 
Survey has  been conducted on the  basis  of  pilot  studies  and worldwide  academic co-
operation over around two decades. Moreover, the survey's standard questionnaire includes 
items that amount to more than two hundred variables.6 The items cover a wide range of 
attitudes.  Of course,  there  may be cultural  conceptual  gaps for  some items in  varying 
degrees. However, it would not be plausible that the cultural gaps are so great that the 
entire variables are unable to measure attitudes across borders. It would be unlikely that 
fundamental human concepts irrationally diverge between cultures. In the World Values 
Survey, many of the items are reasonably common questions that ordinary people normally 
understand. To be sure, there is cultural variety, and one of the research aims is to explore 
this  point.  Nonetheless,  an  excessive  emphasis  on  difference  would  be  unreasonable. 
Across societies, human beings share much of commonalities rather than heterogeneities. 
The validity of the World Values Survey questions could not be rejected simply because of 
cultural gaps. Rather, their value is clearly much greater than their supposed disadvantages.
Finally,  the  fact  that  statistical  indications  are  observed  per  se demonstrates  the 
relevance of the quantitative data. There would be of course variations in concepts across 
nations and even individuals. Such variation is in fact part of the 'variance' that statistical 
analysis  can consider.  Given such a  variation,  it  is  likely that  the aggregate  results  of 
national data will show relative densities in central patterns such as mean scores with small 
standard deviations, certain level of correlation coefficients, regression coefficients with 
tangible  R  squared  scores  and  so  forth.  With  this,  how  can  one  claim  that  there  is 
conceptual  irrelevance?  Because  there  is  the  relevance  in  these  variables,  there  are 
indications of central tendencies and associations. If there is conceptual irrelevance, why 
6 See Inglehart, Ronald, et al., 'Codebook, Combined Three Waves 1981-1990-1995 World Values Survey', 
in World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997 (2000); 
European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 'User Guide and Codebook', in 
European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999-2002, Release I (2004).
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do such indications emerge? To be fair, there could be conceptual gaps between nations or 
cultures that could be indicated in the statistical indicators. This difference is, however, the 
very  point  which  the  present  study  attempts to  explore.  Consequently,  quantitative 
variables are not something to be rejected because of cultural differences. They are rather 
viable tools to examine it.
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Appendix 3: 
Protest variables: missing values percentages
Britain 1981 1990 1995-8 1999-2002
Petition 1.14 1.15 2.2 2
Lawful Demonstration 2.44 2.83 4
Boycott 4.55 4.11 4
Strike 3.33 3.17 5.8
Occupying Buildings 2.36 2.49 4.8
Average 2.76 2.75 2.2 4.12
USA 1981 1990 1995-8 1999-2002
Petition 4.34 2.77 2.08 0.5
Lawful Demonstration 6.15 4.73 3.7 1.58
Boycott 6.19 4.95 4.41 1.83
Strike 6.32 5.27 4.54 2.92
Occupying Buildings 6.24 5.06 5.71 5.25
Average 5.85 4.56 4.09 2.42
Japan 1981 1990 1995-8 1999-2002
Petition 15.86 15.43 11.48 10.21
Lawful Demonstration 24.5 28.78 22.3 25.4
Boycott 25.58 29.57 19.92 21.44
Strike 23.09 28.88 23.24 25.77
Occupying Buildings 21.26 24.33 20.87 19.97
Average 22.06 25.4 19.56 20.56
Russia 1981 1990 1995-8 1999-2002
Petition 10.45 6.57 6.6
Lawful Demonstration 7.5 4.75 3.8
Boycott 14.89 6.47 7
Strike 14.99 7.45 6.88
Occupying Buildings 16.32 6.86 7.76
Average 12.83 6.42 6.41
(%)
Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1990, 1995-98 and 1999-2002.
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